Using Cultural Heritage as a Tool in Post-war Recovery:

Assessing the Impact of Heritage on Recovery in Post-war Dubrovnik, Croatia by Bishop, Katherine
 Using Cultural Heritage as a Tool in Post-war Recovery: 
Assessing the Impact of Heritage on Recovery in Post-war 
Dubrovnik, Croatia 
 
 
Katherine Louise Bishop 
 
PhD 
 
 
University of York 
 
Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit 
 
 
December 2014 
 
  
2 
Abstract 
 
Cultural heritage is a significant aspect of both conflict and the recovery from conflict, but its role in 
shaping and influencing the post-conflict landscape has not been fully explored conceptually, nor has 
its role been fully implemented into recovery processes by practitioners. This thesis explores the 
disjuncture that exists between heritage theorists’ conceptualisation of cultural heritage as a cultural 
process, and practitioners’ tendency to privilege material reconstruction. By bridging cultural 
heritage and post-conflict literatures, the thesis presents the foundations for a holistic approach to 
cultural heritage in post-conflict settings. An Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework (IHAF) is 
developed to operationalise this holistic conceptualisation.  
This thesis makes three key contributions to the fields of cultural heritage studies and conflict studies. 
The first is a substantial contribution to the literature by reconceptualising the use of heritage in post-
conflict recovery to argue for a shift away from reductive uses of heritage as cultural property towards 
more expansive notions of heritage as a process that can actively influence the course of recovery. 
Secondly, and building upon this conceptual foundation, the thesis has created and tested a 
methodological framework, the IHAF, capable of balancing recovery practitioners’ and policy-
makers’ priorities with a nuanced conceptualisation of heritage. The purpose of this framework is to 
identify what impact heritage has on recovery, in order to reposition heritage as an active component 
of recovery processes, and remove it from being perceived as passive recipient of damage and 
restoration. The third aspect of the thesis applies the IHAF to the case study of Dubrovnik, Croatia, 
demonstrating the impact of heritage in three key areas of the city’s recovery. This assessment of 
Dubrovnik’s physical, economic and socio-political recovery viewed through the active lens of 
heritage adds an important new perspective on the Old Town’s long term narrative of recovery and 
reconciliation.  
The thesis demonstrates the importance of the Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework and its 
potential broader application to different conflicts, and in doing so, puts heritage firmly at the heart 
of post-conflict recovery.   
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Chapter One: Introduction 
During war, cultural heritage becomes a target for aggression, resulting in the widespread damage of 
cultural property and irreversibly changing the intangible connections to its people and place 
(Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 95; Meskell, 2005, p. 124; O'Keefe, 2006, p. 25, Silberman, 
2015, Smith 2006; 83).  In the aftermath of conflict, cultural heritage becomes a focal point for 
reconstruction efforts, which tend to prioritise material reconstruction of damaged built cultural 
property (Ascherson, 2007, p. 17; Barakat, 2007, p. 36; Wijesuriya, 2005, p. 33). These 
reconstruction efforts can often result in a restored façade of cultural property, but lingering damage 
remains to the invisible, non-material, aspects of heritage.  
The issue that has been identified and explored in this thesis is the disjuncture between how heritage 
is perceived by heritage theorists as a cultural process (Ashworth et al., 2007, p. 68; Meskell, 2010, 
p. 199; Smith, 2006, p. 83), and the way it is materially perceived and restored by those responsible 
for its post-conflict recovery (Merryman, 1986, p. 831; Musitelli, 2005, p. 324; UNESCO, 1954). 
The nuances of the varied and flexible definitions of heritage that have evolved in academic thought 
which prioritise the links to people, their past, and the trauma of conflict are sometimes lost in the 
physical reconstruction of heritage, becoming retrospective interrogations of the recovery process 
rather than their guiding principle (Jokilehto, 2002, P. 2; Smith, 2006, pp. 93-94). Cultural heritage 
is defined in this thesis as a process of meaningfully connecting people to place and the past, which 
is symbolised by tangible objects and intangible narratives. Cultural heritage’s role in post-conflict 
recovery is interrogated by this research as the negotiator between the past events of conflict and the 
new reality after conflict. Dubrovnik, in Croatia, is one such example of reconstruction after conflict 
which focused primarily on the material reconstruction of cultural heritage. These efforts sought to 
repair the town’s built cultural property but did not fully explore the effect the damage on the town 
had on its residents, their connection to Dubrovnik, or the lasting effect it had on neighbourly 
reconciliation.  
This thesis proposes that a response to this problem is to put cultural heritage at the heart of recovery, 
to enable a more sustainable route to peace and reconciliation which acknowledges phenomenal 
influences of culture over conflict-affected societies (Kaldor, 2006, p. 18; Kaplan 2001, p. 22; 
Richards, 1996, p. xii; Sen, 2006, p. 85). In order to achieve this solution, the way cultural heritage 
is already used in conflict and recovery must be better understood, and a new framework of heritage 
analysis must be created to do so. Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to create a research 
framework which is capable of investigating heritage in a post-conflict setting based on the 
integration between the demands of recovery and the needs of cultural heritage. This mixed-method 
based framework has been tested in the field in Dubrovnik to gain empirical evidence into why 
cultural heritage matters to post-conflict recovery, and why definitions of heritage-as-material 
property are incapable of adequately reflecting the needs of a post-conflict society.  
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1.1 Context 
This thesis seeks to interrogate the impact that heritage has on the processes of recovery faced by 
places and people affected by conflict. The focus of this research is primarily on the post-conflict 
period, but also seeks to understand how heritage affects, and is affected by, conflict. The conceptual 
foundation for this research is heritage studies, particularly the perspective that argues that heritage 
is a process of creating and ascribing meaning to sites, places, and people (also known as meaning 
making), which is profoundly affected by its contemporary circumstances (Ascherson, 2007, pp. 17-
20; Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996; Hewison, 1987, p. 9; O'Keefe, 2006, p. 25; Smith, 2006, p. 66). 
The culmination of the argument made by this thesis is that if heritage is considered to have an 
important influence over all aspects of society, then it must be better represented in post-conflict 
studies and real-world interventions.  
The internationally accepted meaning of heritage has altered numerous times, and it can be argued 
that despite its widespread appreciation and acceptance as a significant aspect of society, a singular 
agreed upon definition remains elusive. Despite its ability to change and evolve, the concept of 
heritage has been codified in many different international agreements, laws, and conventions 
(Kastenberg 1977, p. 277; Merryman, 2005, p. 12; Starzmann, 2008, p. 368). It is this formalisation 
process that has shaped both the definition of heritage and the way it is used in international efforts 
to assist in the recovery from conflict. In order to create a better way to measure its impact on post-
conflict recovery it is imperative to interrogate how the concept of heritage has developed within 
these formal structures. Arguably, the most influential formal conventions over heritage in a conflict 
setting are the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 
(hereafter Hague Convention) and 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural 
and Natural Heritage (hereafter the World Heritage Convention). The Hague Convention determines 
what counts as acceptable military use of heritage, and the protection it should receive in conflict 
(UNESCO, 1954), whilst the World Heritage Convention defines certain heritage sites as universally 
significant (UNESCO 1972). The aim of these two conventions was to produce a list of heritage of 
agreed international, cross-cultural importance; heritage that is universally accepted as important and 
which is well protected should conflict occur. In practice this has not happened; the lists have been 
produced, but the safety of the sites is by no means assured and the reasons for this are further 
explored in this thesis. Indeed, the fact that world heritage sites are targeted precisely because of their 
massive impact on a global opinion undermines the efficacy of these formal conventions (Francioni, 
2011, p. 10; Meskell, 2002, pp. 568-569; Sen, 2006, p. 88; Stone, 2013, p. 166). The Standing 
Buddhas in the Bamiyan valley in Afghanistan were one such famous example of a universally 
significant heritage site being destroyed in 2001 in an effort to undermine international cooperation. 
If the formal process of heritage definition has proven to be fallible then the question is raised as to 
why they fail. This thesis argues that the formal codification of heritage remains problematic because 
it relies on absolute definitions of heritage and cannot evolve at the same pace as fluctuations within 
that definition. In order to reflect the needs of heritage in an analysis of how it impacts on the recovery 
processes, the contemporary use and definitions of heritage theory are paramount. The discourse and 
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interpretation of heritage have a profound effect on the identities of a society (Foucault, 1989 [2002]; 
Hall, 1999; Smith, 2006), and this narrative functions as the negotiator between a pre-conflict past 
to a post-conflict reality (Fisher, Ury and Brett, 2004, pp. 6-9). This thesis argues that heritage is a 
driving force which shapes the way conflict is interpreted and internalised, and can govern whether 
conflicts can be reconciled or rekindled.  
Heritage is viewed in post-conflict studies as an area of interest but not one which has the potential 
power to govern the outcome of recovery. The lack of appreciation of the complexities of heritage 
may have contributed to the prioritisation of built cultural heritage over a more holistic approach in 
previous post-conflict interventions. Heritage as a signifier of cultural identity can be an attributing 
factor in the causes of conflict (Ascherson, 2007, pp.18-19; Barakat, 2007, p. 16; Judt, 1992, p. 83); 
it is not a bystander or victim of violence but a rallying point for both unity and division. The violence 
associated with heritage goes some way to explain why heritage is often a casualty of war, but it also 
helps interrogate how conflict becomes heritage and also severely alters pre-conflict heritage 
perceptions (Meskell, 2005, p. 139; Sen, 2006, p. 22, p.103). The attack on Palmyra in Syria in 2015 
illustrates the overt connection between heritage and violence, and also further evidences why the 
reconstruction of these violently impacted cultural sites is not possible without acknowledging that 
the material properties of heritage were not the only aspect of heritage destroyed by this act of war.  
The violent associations between war and heritage do not disappear in the post-conflict arena. The 
tensions between people and place are mirrored in their intangible connections to culture and heritage 
(Hall, 1999, p. 14; Kaldor, 2006, pp. 1-5; Coward, 2012, p. 469). Narratives of dissonance and the 
creation of new negative heritage sites create tension in a post-conflict setting, particularly one under 
pressure to recover physically and financially as well as emotionally (Macdonald, 2009, pp. 2-3). 
The recent past is reshaped, distanced and mythologised through heritage in order to recover from 
conflict, but this should not be mistaken for acceptance, reconciliation, or forgiveness (Ashworth, 
Graham and Tunbridge, 2007, p. 65; Connerton, 2008, p.59). The socio-political recovery of a post-
conflict area may benefit from the physical reconstruction of heritage, and its role in re-stabilising 
the economy, but a superficial concord based on economic interests may mask a yet-to-be reconciled 
past in which lingering societal tensions remain. These uses of heritage (physical reconstruction, 
economic reliance, and socio-political acceptance) are the guiding principles of the methodological 
framework suggested by this research, and form the basis for its first trial in Dubrovnik, upon which 
the its viability is assessed.  
1.2 Research Questions 
Overall, this research project has sought to bridge between cultural heritage studies and post-war 
recovery studies in order to create a framework for conceptualising the relationship between heritage 
and post-conflict recovery. This framework has then been applied to the case study of Dubrovnik, to 
critically explore its applicability and value. Below, the three research questions that have guided the 
study are introduced. In order for clarity to be maintained, each research question is accompanied by 
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reflection on the objectives that have guided the research, and have informed responses to each 
research question.  
1. How can the impact of heritage on post-war recovery be conceptualised? 
The aim of this question is to interrogate the concept of heritage both in heritage literature, formal 
charters and conventions, and in post-conflict studies. This exploration of heritage is carried out in 
order to understand it as a holistic concept and to identify and explain the gap between the ways in 
which heritage is defined and interpreted in different schools of thought. This interdisciplinary 
literature review is structured around the use of heritage in different temporal environments, namely 
times without conflict, during conflict, and post-conflict, in order to investigate not only how heritage 
is perceived but also how that definition changes in response to different pressures. The objectives 
that guide this research question: 
• What are the definitions of cultural heritage? 
• What protects heritage from war? 
• Is heritage presented as passive recipient or active participant in the causation and 
continuation of conflict? 
• How does heritage alter post-conflict society? 
2. How can the impact of heritage on post-conflict recovery be assessed? 
The question aims to build on the perspective gained from the literature review and suggest a way 
that the impact of heritage could be assessed that respects both the needs and demands of heritage 
and those of post-war recovery. The research objectives that guide this question are: 
• How can the demands of post-conflict recovery be reconciled with the needs of heritage 
protection and reconstruction? 
• What existing assessment frameworks exist and are they suitable for assessing the impact 
of heritage on recovery processes?  
• What methodological tools are capable of assessing these needs? 
• Is this a rigorous methodological framework? 
3. What effect does heritage have on the recovery from conflict in the case study of Dubrovnik? 
This research question moves beyond the conceptualisations of heritage assessment in post-conflict 
recovery that can be gathered from existing literatures, and turns attention towards fieldwork as a 
means of gaining empirical data and evidence to further explore the effects of heritage on the post-
conflict case study (Dubrovnik, Croatia). This question also aims to examine whether the framework 
has been successful in its attempt to create a robust, reliable, and repeatable methodology based on 
this assessment. 
• Why was Dubrovnik chosen as the case study? 
• What is the context for this case study, and can it be assessed by the methodology? 
• What is the impact of heritage (as built heritage) on physical recovery? 
• What is the impact of heritage (as cultural assets) on economic recovery? 
• What is the impact of heritage (as a process) on the socio-political recovery? 
• How do these results combine to assess the holistic recovery of the case study? 
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Detailed responses to the above research questions are provided throughout the main body of the 
thesis, and a returned to through the analysis and conclusion chapters. At a foundational level, the 
responses to these questions have led towards the creation and critical application of an Integrated 
Heritage Assessment Framework (hereafter referred to as the IHAF). The IHAF is the product of a 
bridging between the cultural heritage studies literature and post-conflict studies literature, and 
provides an analytic tool for gaining traction over the relationship between cultural heritage and post-
conflict transitions’ 
Measuring the impact of heritage on the recovery from conflict cannot be reduced to assessing the 
damage done to cultural property and its physical restorations needs. To do so would imply that the 
profound effects of violent conflict on a society’s identities can be masked and hidden, as with 
shrapnel marks on stone facades. The relationship between people, place, and their heritage is far too 
important to not be included in an assessment of a post-war recovery. But, this argument raises a 
problem; how can a fluid definition be assessed and its impact quantified without losing the 
complexities introduced in this chapter.   
The response to the problem identified in this thesis has been to create an Integrated Heritage 
Assessment Framework which is capable of exploring the impact of both tangible and intangible 
heritage through a quantitative and qualitative mixed methodology. Damage to tangible and 
intangible heritage has profound and long lasting influences over the processes of recovery, and the 
process of rehabilitation of both contributes to how an area is perceived to be recovered by 
international neighbours and its own population. This perception of recovery has immediate 
influence over the economy of an area, particularly one that is known for its cultural heritage. 
Therefore, it is not enough to look at a split between physical damage to cultural property, and the 
socio-political recovery of intangible heritage associations; the effect of these recovery areas on the 
economy also needs to be investigated. In doing so, the integrated heritage assessment can gain an 
insight into three interdependent and valuable areas of physical, economic and socio-political 
recovery. 
Creating the IHAF relied upon taking existing conflict assessment tools, researching them, and 
tailoring them to meet the specific needs of heritage. As such, the response to this problem was 
addressed not only through the wide ranging literature review but also by close attention to the 
Department for International Development (hereafter DFID) Strategic Conflict Assessments 
(hereafter SCA) (Goodhand, Vaux and Walker, 2002) and the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment 
(hereafter the PCIA), which created the kernel that this methodology has developed from. The IHAF 
could have been created using the theoretical literature and the research on these frameworks alone, 
but this would have impaired its reliability and rendered it as untested. This research instead took 
this framework to Dubrovnik to test it in the field. The result of this was the generation of a case 
study which looked at the heritage recovery process with intense scrutiny to produce a first trial of 
this methodology. The results show that the IHAF was a success as the results gained from this case 
study has provided fresh insights to dissect how the recovery process and heritage intertwine. The 
Dubrovnik fieldwork has the ability to stand alone as a case study that interrogates the use of heritage 
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in recovery, but functions in this thesis as the culmination of the IHAF and the literature review upon 
which it is based.   
Dubrovnik has been chosen as a viable case study and testing ground for this framework for several 
reasons. First, the attack on the city in 1991 and 1992 was an explicit attack on a town famed for its 
cultural heritage (ICTY, 31.01.2003). As a UNESCO world heritage centre it had been a 
demilitarized zone since 1979, and the prosecutions following the attack refer explicitly to cultural 
factors being a major facet in the choice to attack the city (ICTY, 31.01.2003; UNESCO 2012). 
Secondly, the town has been recovering for twenty years and as such has built up a great wealth of 
records to analyse. The abundance of records and information allows the first trial of this 
methodology to run in a best-case scenario, which will enable the researcher to see the benefits and 
flaws of this framework. Thirdly, the conflicts in the Balkans are notorious for their use of culture 
and cultural division during war (Silber and Little, 1996), and it is thought that the assessment of 
heritage in Dubrovnik will provide a good indication as to whether culture and heritage have helped 
the reconciliation and recovery of the area. The use of culture and heritage in conflict within the 
Balkans (particularly Croatia) forms the context for this case study. The trial run of the IHAF 
presented by this research resulted in an in-depth look at the recovery of Dubrovnik, and yielded 
results that looked into the physical recovery of the built heritage, the influence of cultural assets 
over the recovery of the economy, and the way heritage-recovery is perceived by its people in the 
social and political status of heritage in the town. The culmination of this is a holistic view of 
Dubrovnik’s recovery processes, one which challenges the perception that the town and its heritage 
have been completely restored to its pre-war state by identifying cracks, controversies, and 
contradictions in this narrative. The discussions around Dubrovnik illustrate the integral role heritage 
plays in recovery from conflict, particularly around the conception of identities, sense of place and 
ownership of the past, and the negotiation of reconciliation; furthermore, the investigation into the 
recovery of Dubrovnik have added substantially to debate surrounding memory and identities formed 
by violence by examining the juxtaposition of public and private conceptions of recovery by those 
communities who have experienced war.  
1.3 Thesis Outline 
The thesis is structured around the three research questions. The first part (Chapters Two to Four) 
focuses on the conceptualisation and protection of heritage in and after conflict offered in legislation 
and existing literatures, as is highlighted by the first research question. In order to answer the second 
research question, the central element (Chapter Five) focuses on turning perspectives of the 
conceptual chapters into a mixed methods research framework, based on the integration of 
knowledge gained in these first chapters. This section not only presents the IHAF in detail, but also 
serves as the bridge between the conceptualisation of heritage and the empirical fieldwork that 
assesses its impact. The latter part (Chapters Six to Nine) focuses on interrogating the results from 
this empirical case study, and using these to determine the extent that heritage can be considered to 
have impacted on the post-conflict recovery of Dubrovnik, answering the third research question. 
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The concluding chapter (Chapter Ten) brings together the results of the case study to analyse the 
impact heritage has had on the town, what this reveals about the conceptual connection between 
heritage and post-war recovery, and extrapolates these findings to assess the effectiveness of the 
IHAF, and its potential application to future cases.  
 
Figure 1.1 Thesis structure flow chart 
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Chapter Two: The Evolution Legislation to Protect Heritage in Conflict  
Cultural heritage has been affected by conflict throughout history: built heritage suffers damage and 
destruction, cultural property is stolen, and cultures erased from history through the decimation of 
heritage, but heritage is not considered an intrinsic aspect of warfare that can alter the course of 
violence and conflict, and neither is this impact recognised in legislation designed to protect heritage. 
It has been argued that since the time of ancient Greece cultural heritage has been seen to be 
something that is too precious to be damaged in times of war by an attacking force (Magraw, 2001, 
p. 1; Kastenberg, 1997, pp. 277–278); nevertheless, it is clear that cultural heritage has faced damage 
and destruction during war time and time again. Through this chapter, the evolution and 
shortcomings of cultural heritage protection are identified in existing legislation. By reviewing the 
evolution of the legislation that has led to the enduring 1954 Hague Convention the 
interdependencies of cultural heritage classification and its protection are explored. From this 
comprehensive analysis of these legislative attempts a foundation for an integrated approach to 
heritage assessment is presented which encompasses both built heritage sites and the cultural context 
they inhabit in order to fully interrogate the impact of heritage in and after conflict.  
The discussions in this chapter focuses on the evolution of the legal protection of heritage, moving 
from the Lieber Code in 1863 as the first recognisable attempt to codify how heritage should be 
regarded in conflict, to the present state of protection governed by the 1954 Hague Convention, its 
1999 second protocol, and its relationship to the 1972 World Heritage Convention.   
There is a historic contradiction in the way heritage is viewed in conflict; cultural heritage is and has 
been regarded as morally untouchable in war, but it has been purposefully targeted and destroyed 
since antiquity (Kastenberg, 1997, pp. 281–282). Heritage is simultaneously a structure of society 
that should never be attacked, and an entity that is always attacked in conflict. This contradiction is 
at the core of the discussion in this chapter, and is used as a foundation for exploring how heritage 
protection has evolved and why legislation that cannot recognise the political uses of heritage in 
conflict remains ill-equipped to deal with modern warfare. Patty Gerstenblith expands on the history 
of cultural heritage protection in conflict by exploring how cultural heritage has been defined in 
military terms, and its reliance on cultural property as the definitive feature of heritage (Gerstenblith. 
2012, pp. 5–6).   This is used in this chapter as an entry point to discuss Western bias in heritage 
protection and definitions, and the ramifications this simplification of has on the effectiveness of 
heritage protection in conflict (Merryman, 2006, p. 20).  
Different formulations of the significance and political construction of cultural heritage are thrown 
into sharp relief in war. This chapter examines two ways of understanding how heritage functions in 
war, and how each is framed or excluded from legislative attempts to protect heritage.  A universalist 
approach to valuing heritage asserts that heritage historically bound feature of a culture that exists as 
a fixed symbol of society and civilisation; this conception of cultural heritage makes it a universal 
feature of all cultures and assumes that it will be respected and protected by all but the most deviant 
of spoilers. This definition features heavily in the legislative attempts to connect built heritage to an 
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internationally owned concept of heritage that transcends space and time. This essentialist view of 
heritage is problematised by the power structures that first codified heritage in these terms, and by 
the behaviour of combatants in conflict which seek to attack heritage to undermine this definition. 
The second approach seeks to establish heritage in legislation as a socially constructed aspect of a 
contemporary culture, that will change in response to its environment; in this interpretation heritage 
is intrinsically bound to its context and the process of creating heritage around sites becomes a highly 
politicised act with the potential to create and continue violence and conflict. This approach 
acknowledges two key factors that define heritage; the power structures that authorise heritage 
narratives (Said, 1994, pp. 335–336), and groupism which determines whether these sites are 
legitimate, authentic, and acceptable (Moses, 2010, pp.22-23; Sen, 2006, p. 80-82). The clash 
between essentialist definitions of heritage codified in heritage protection legislation and the social 
construction of heritage in conflict and its use to undermine heritage protection are discussed in a 
case study in this chapter relating to the protracted negotiations and eventual destruction of the 
standing Buddhas in the Bamiyan Valley in Afghanistan by the Taliban in 1999  
The chapter ends by discussing how heritage protection legislation is framed in modern contexts and 
argues that the 1954 Hague Convention acts not as a deterrent but as a legal framework to prosecute 
the deliberate damage done to cultural heritage, and to guide emotional international responses to 
damage and destruction. Musitelli (2005) and Meskell (2010) argue that the destruction of cultural 
heritage in war is framed internationally as a unique and unexpected act and the perpetrators as 
deviants, despite the evolution of the protection of heritage illustrating that attempts of cultural 
destruction are a normalised feature of warfare. 
The 1954 Hague Convention (and its 1999 protocol) stands as the leading document to deter 
deliberate damage to cultural heritage as well as providing a clear set of principles to assist in the 
prosecution of those who do so, but its approach is based on the universal acceptance of a system 
that values heritage for its tangibility through the incorporation of Eurocentric prioritisation of 
culture. In doing so and as an unintentional by-product, the Hague Convention and its relationship to 
the WHC has created a way for spoilers to identify and classify internationally heritage sites which 
can attacked and destroyed with maximum impact on an international and local level. The result of 
this is that cultural heritage is not only targeted as a means to destroy and humiliate different cultures 
during conflict, it is also used as a means to openly rebel against the international community and 
reject its laws, agreements, and definitions of heritage. 
2.1 The Lieber Code: Protecting the culture of civilians from military vandalism  
The first attempt to codify legal and illegal acts of conflict was made in 1863 by Dr Francis Lieber 
in his publication of the Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, 
General Order № 100 (hereafter the Lieber Code), this legislation sought to provide an ethical code 
of conduct and laws for combatants to follow in the Civil War in the USA. The high death toll and 
the number of new non-military recruits into both sides of the civil war resulted in a high number of 
untrained soldiers entering into combat situations with little or no appreciation for the so-far 
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unwritten rules of combat. The Lieber code grew out of this necessity to codify acceptable military 
behaviour in war both to prevent widespread criminality and to ensure that militaries after the conflict 
could be re-professionalised based on philosophies of acceptable codes of conduct rather than to 
continue the practices exhibited by untrained commanders and soldiers (Gardner, 1965, p.4). The 
aim of the Lieber code was to protect humanity (both combatants and civilians) from conflict, 
although this did not preclude the use of extreme force and violence against civilian populations to 
ensure conflicts ended swiftly (Meron, 1998, p. 272). This theoretical foundation presents a departure 
from previous conflict legislation which sought to protect a state’s interests in and after conflict. As 
such, the Lieber code stands not only as the first attempt to legalise and criminalise behaviours in 
conflict, but also the first attempt to acknowledge and guard against the negative impact conflict has 
on ethics and humanity’s ability to function, of which culture is an intrinsic part (Meron, 2000, p. 
245).  
The Lieber Code focused explicitly on the ethical and humane treatment of civilians, prisoners, and 
property in conflict (Lieber and Hartigan, 2011, pp. 3–5). In articles 34–37 the Lieber Code specifies 
that damage to “classical works of art” should be avoided in conflict even if the site is of military 
importance. The Lieber Code sought to end purposeful and recriminatory violence being levied at 
civilians on opposing sides of the civil war from returning and transient military groups. The general 
orders sets heritage alongside intellectual tools and hospitals; both these entities reveal a 
preoccupation with culture and acceptable use in war that later is echoed in Lemkin’s Genocide 
definitions which sought to protect the cultural groups and their heritage as imperative for humanity 
to survive.  In the Lieber Code the order to preserve scientific collections and instruments represents 
the preservation of knowledge, whilst the protection of hospitals represents the protection of 
vulnerable humans, the preservation of classical works of art represents the preservation of culture; 
all of these aspects of society are fundamental to the survival and recovery of a conflict affected 
society: 
Classical works of art, libraries, scientific collections, or precious instruments, such as 
astronomical telescopes, as well as hospitals, must be secured against all avoidable injury, 
even when they are contained in fortified places whilst besieged or bombarded. 
General Orders No. 100: The Lieber Code, 1863, Article 35 
The Lieber Code classified all such places as private property, defining their ownership as separate 
from the state and protecting them from destruction and theft by soldiers as spoils of war (Hartigan, 
1983, p. 51). Consequently, it is argued here that the Lieber Code was the first effort to codify cultural 
heritage protection in a legal framework, and although it was not internationally adopted, its 
principles went on to inform the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions with respect to the laws and 
customs of war on land (Magraw, 2001, p. 2). 
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2.2 The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions with respect to the laws and customs of 
war on land 
The 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions (Laws and Customs of war on land) continued to evolve the 
humane ethos of the Liber code by seeking to reduce the caveats allowing violence to be used against 
ex-combatants, prisoners, and civilians if there was no other recourse for military advantage. The 
1907 Hague Convention ensured humane treatment of prisoners and civilians by removing caveats 
which included using starvation of occupied towns as a technique for military advancement, 
criminalising orders which instructed militaries to give no quarter or take no prisoners, both 
techniques were defended in the Lieber code through the justification that reducing the length of 
conflicts would reduce its impact on humanity (Meron, 1998, p. 273). The Lieber Code also allowed 
some caveats for the use and removal of Cultural property in conflict, allowing it to be removed if 
there was no risk of damage and claimed on behalf of the state and not the individual, this loophole 
was closed by article 56 of the 1907 Hague Convention which establishes cultural property as private 
property, and therefore affords it protection under articles 46 and 50 (Meron, 1998, p. 272-273).  
 These conventions were the first significant internationally recognised treaties that explicitly 
protected cultural property from removal and damage during conflict (Techera, 2007b, p. 24). They 
achieved this by prohibiting the seizure of property by invading forces (articles 23, 28, and 47 of the 
1899 Convention) and encouraging action to avoid the seizure, destruction, and wilful damage of 
“religious, charitable, and educational institutions, and those of arts and science” and “[h]istorical 
monuments, works of art and science” in article 56 (Gerstenblith. 2012, pp. 5–6). The 1907 
Convention expanded and further prohibited the removal of property using stronger terminology, as 
well as shielding cultural property from deliberate damage in warfare (Gerstenblith. 2012, p. 6). Patty 
Gerstenblith suggests that careful caveats were put in place in the 1907 Convention that sought to 
simultaneously increase the efficacy of protection and make space for the military use of cultural 
property if all other avenues had been explored (Gerstenblith. 2012, p. 7). Both the terminology and 
these two caveats are echoed in the 1954 Hague Convention (Kastenberg, 1997, p. 281).   
Without the inclusion of article 56 into the 1907 Hague Convention, which determines cultural 
property as private property, occupying militaries could legally seize cultural property in conflict and 
retain in in the aftermath of conflict regardless of the conflict outcome- reparation agreements 
notwithstanding (Meron, 1998, p. 272). As such, the 1907 Hague Convention was employed as a key 
piece of legislation that protected heritage through World War One and Two which witnessed 
widespread destruction and theft of cultural property. Meron argues that without this definition 
enshrined in article 56 of the Convention, Nazi Germany would have a legal recourse to remove and 
retain all moveable property taken during the Second World War from occupied nation states (Meron, 
1998, p. 272), furthermore, there would be no legal precedent upon which to base the 1954 Hague 
Convention.  
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2.3 The treaty of Versailles: Cultural property as evidence for reparations  
Kastenberg notes that the 1907 Convention and its approach to cultural protection was put to the test 
in the First World War, but ultimately failed to prevent the razing of cultural sites by both sides 
during both world wars, and it did not halt widespread looting by occupying forces (Kastenberg, 
1997, p. 289). In the aftermath of the World War One (and with popular approval) the articles 245–
247 in the Treaty of Versailles demanded that German forces return property with cultural 
significance that had been stolen (Goldrich, 1999, p. 129) based in part on the protection given to 
cultural property under article 56 of the 1907 Hague Convention (Meron, 1998, 274). 
The use of heritage as reparations for conflict set a precedent of culture becoming an economic asset 
in post-war agreements, which disconnects the cultural value of heritage to a group and instead links 
its value to its material and economic value. The use of cultural property as economic assets has been 
seen frequently in conflict wherein heritage has been used as a spoil of war to promote loyalty and 
increase morale, and in line with the Lieber code allowed cultural property to be considered as 
national assets after the conflict by allowing sized heritage to legally remain the property of the 
victorious nation. However, the treaty of Versailles set a precedent of presenting seized cultural 
property as evidence of transgressions of international codes of combat, and setting monetary 
recriminations against these acts. Whereas previous discussions on post-war moveable heritage 
rested on the rights of ownership, the use of cultural heritage in reparations sought to associate 
material heritage to an economic value. The use of heritage as evidence of barbarism, vandalism, and 
war-crimes would become a common feature of the use of heritage in future conflicts and reflected 
in the conventions and prosecutions following these conflicts.  
Within six months after the coming into force of the present Treaty the German Government 
must restore to the French Government the trophies, archives, historical souvenirs or works 
of art carried away from France by the German authorities in the course of the war of 1870–
1871 and during this last war, in accordance with a list which will be communicated to it by 
the French Government; particularly the French flags taken in the course of the war of 1870–
1871 and all the political papers taken by the German authorities on October 10, 1870, at the 
chateau of Cercay, near Brunoy (Seine-et-Oise) belonging at the time to Mr. Rouher, 
formerly Minister of State. 
Treaty of peace between the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan 
and Poland. Signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919, Article 246 
 
The Treaty of Versailles is an important moment in the history of heritage protection in war as it 
constituted a move away from legislative protection during conflict, and instead (successfully) sought 
reparations against Germany, who had failed to adhere to the (as yet uncodified) convention of war 
(Cunning, 2003, p. 216; Kastenberg, 1997, p. 280). The Treaty of Versailles thus represents a move 
from preventative damage control to reactive and enforceable prosecution. 
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The First World War was also the first theatre of war to experience the widespread bombing of 
population centres from the air, and from this time the possibility of deliberate or accidental 
destruction of cultural property from a distance became a significant threat (Kastenberg, 1997, p. 
288; Magraw, 2001, p. 2). 
2.4 Roerich Pact and universalism in heritage protection 
The Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historic Monuments (Roerich 
Pact) of 1935 sought push the protection of cultural heritage on from the 1907 Hague Convention to 
protect against its use for military purposes in conflict and to create an institution capable of enforcing 
the protection of monuments. The Roerich Pact sought to connect the loss of cultural monuments to 
the loss of knowledge into past cultures, connecting the value of monumental heritage to its aesthetic 
and historical importance; this definition values material culture as evidence of historical significance 
and connects its protection to the preservation of authorised historical discourse. The approach taken 
to cultural monuments in the Roerich Pact connected their value to their historical significance, and 
their protection as a duty to preserve them for future generations which is echoed in the conception 
of the 1954 Hague Convention and the 1972 World Heritage Convention (Schipper and Frank, 2013, 
p. 14); this constructs heritage as a tangible marker of universal value rather than perceiving heritage 
as a culturally constructed manifestation of contemporary value (Musitelli, 2005, p. 330).  
By perceiving material culture as a static marker of historic value, the Roerich Pact was able to create 
an institution that could solidify what sites should be protected in conflict, and determine who was 
responsible for protecting them (Schipper and Frank, 2013, p. 16). The Pact also sought to define 
sites of significance as neutral zones and therefore exempt from any and all use in conflict.  This 
three tiered approach was the early pre-curser that was directly adopted by the 1954 Hague 
Convention, and further supported by the creation of the international committee of the blue shield 
in 1954 (Schipper and Frank, 2013, p.15), and cemented by the World Heritage Convention in 1972. 
Furthermore, the definition of heritage sites as neutral zone has been codified in the 1954 Hague 
Convention and 1972 WHC which determine World Heritage Sites as demilitarized zones (Schipper 
and Frank, 2013, p.16). In defining heritage sites as neutral zones the Roerich Pact achieves two 
aims; first, it sought to make the use of heritage in conflict more difficult by divorcing the site from 
involvement in conflict by placing it outside of the theatre of conflict, and secondly it removed 
heritage ownership from its community and placed it under international protection. In theory, these 
aspects distance heritage from conflict, but is limited in its ability to do so as it cannot alter the 
physical location of a pre-defined heritage site and thus it is unlikely to avoid damage and destruction, 
and more importantly, it is incapable of removing the cultural context of heritage from its 
contemporary surrounding and the influence it has over conflict.  
Despite the difficulties faced by a universal approach to material heritage protection, the Roerich 
Pact formed a basis for future heritage protection- both in and out of conflict- and influenced both 
the wording and approach of the Hague Convention and the institutions which would be created to 
enforce it.   The perceptions of conflict were drastically altered during and after the second world 
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war by the technological advancements of the military and their use on a grand scale against civilian 
populations. The airborne bombing campaigns against urban centres across Europe resulted in an 
unprecedented level of damage and destruction, of which heritage was both an intended and 
unintended target. In the aftermath of this conflict, protection for heritage during war moved beyond 
local occupation and removal of cultural property towards defending it from the perceived threat of 
mass destruction.  
2.5  Influential Military technological advancements 
The increased technological abilities of the 1930s enabled military expansion to occur more quickly 
and on a wider-scale, which resulted in more widespread damage to civilian locations and with it 
cultural heritage sites (Kastenberg, 1997, pp. 289–290). The 1907 Hague Convention protected 
heritage as private property, but this did not safeguard it from bombing raids which would attack 
private property as targets or as collateral damage in the course of military advancement which 
became apparent in the shelling raids of the First World War. Whereas previous legislative attempts 
had fought to safeguard against the illegal removal of cultural property and the use of heritage sites 
as bases for military occupation, they were not able to safeguard against ongoing technological 
advancement which could destroy and damage urban settlements from a distance without removing 
or occupying heritage sites. The increasing destructiveness of war and its impact on urban settlements 
made it necessary to update the legal safeguards in response to the changing dynamics of warfare.  
Kramer argues that the changing dynamics of war experienced in the First World War subtly changed 
the extent to what was considered acceptable and unacceptable destruction in conflict. This is not a 
departure from the ethos or laws that characterise the Lieber Code and the 1907 Hague Convention, 
rather, it is a reworking of the basic tenants of the acceptable codes of conduct in conflict that 
underpins both documents (Kramer, 2007, p. 334). Furthermore, Kramer argues that when the 
technology did exist, the mental preparedness and experience of using this destructive force had not 
yet been required, and it was during the course of the First World War that the impetus and 
willingness to use bombing raids on civilian settlements was tested (Kramer, 2007, p. 334).  The First 
World War presents a change in the cultural acceptance of destruction where the dynamics are shifted 
away from traditional codes of combat, facilitated in part by technological changes in military 
capacities, towards more widespread civilian and combatant psychological acceptance of destruction, 
and a willingness to accept the consequences of widespread destruction. For Kramer, the acceptance 
of destruction carried out in the First World War assisted in changing the public perception on what 
was possible and acceptable to destroy in conflict, and enabled the psychological scales of acceptable 
destruction (both heritage and human terms) to be increased again during the Second World War 
(Kramer, 2007, p. 334-336).  
In response to this changing perception of the destructiveness of war, the safeguards used to protect 
heritage also had to evolve in response; this dynamism is reflected in the 1954 Hague Convention 
and its focus on protecting material heritage sites from damage and destruction. The movement 
towards universalism in heritage protection can be interpreted as a reaction to the changing dynamics 
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of conflict elicited during and after the second world war which saw violence and destruction visited 
on civilian populations on an unprecedented scale and in doing so redefined the perception of war 
and how it could be guarded against in the future.  
2.6 The Genocide Convention  
Underpinning the definition of heritage in all its legislative uses is an idea of groupism and its 
expression through culture. This idea is centred on the understanding that all individuals will belong 
to part of at least one cultural group which will define their patterns of behaviour and traditions 
(Moses, 2010, p.22). Within these groups, individuals take on the ownership of a shared culture and 
seek to adhere to these conventions in order to maintain their sense of belonging and identity, which 
is a fundamental aspect of the processes of creating and maintaining heritage. Lemkin argues that 
there are four types of basic groups that are able to create culture; national, racial, religious, and 
ethnic. Lemkin argues that these four groups create intrinsic identities which in turn creates and 
reinforces culture. In this approach, group identity informs and is informed by the production of 
heritage, which can be used to determine the place of said group within a national or international 
society.  
Fundamental to groupism and its use in defining heritage is the value placed on culture as the 
foundation of humanity. The oft quoted coining of the term of genocide highlights the dual aspects 
that Lemkin considered to be imperative to their term; gene from the Greek meaning race, nation or 
tribe, and the Latin cide meaning killing (Lemkin, 1947, p. 48). The choice to use of gene rather than 
homo (meaning human or man) suggests that Lemkin’s description of genocide went beyond murder 
or mass murder to include the extermination of groups defined by their culture (Moses, 2010, p. 33). 
The new crimes coined by Lemkin in association with genocide- barbarism and vandalism- 
correspond to the dual preoccupations of genocide; vandalism to destroy and erase a culture and its 
heritage (gene), and barbarism to humiliate, ruin, and exterminate humans (cide) (Lemkin, 1947, 
P.48-56). For Lemkin, universal acknowledgement of culture as a defining aspect of humanity was 
fundamental to the idea that an attack against culture and expressions of culture in conflict or peace 
times are acts of violence against humanity (Moses, 2010, p. 31).  This philosophical approach 
underpins the Genocide Convention of 1948, the Geneva Convention of 1949, and the Hague 
Convention of 1954. However, the tenants of this approach can be traced back further than its 
formulisation within the Genocide convention to the Lieber Code of 1863 where Cultural property 
and heritage was explicitly tied to the notion of ethical treatment of civilians during military conflict. 
Barbarity and vandalism were proposed by Lemkin as crimes which are utilised in order to commit 
genocide. Barbarity aimed towards making the victims of genocide less human through degradation, 
economic poverty, and acts of extreme aggression and violence (Docker 2004, P.4). The result of 
this was the dehumanisation of victims and their extermination. Barbarity encouraged oppressors to 
become immune to the plight of the oppressed by enabling oppressors to see them as other or separate 
(Moses, 2010, pp. 30-31). Though Lemkin explored barbarism in response to the Nazi holocaust, this 
‘othering’ is echoed through colonialism and the treatment of indigenous group under imperialism 
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(Said, 1994, p. 12), and reflects the social construction and manipulation of their cultural groups to 
appear as inferior, as seen through the balkanisation of Slavic cultures during the 1990’s to explain 
and distance violence from European cultures (Todorova, 1997, pp. 33–35).  In this interpretation, 
barbarity acts as a facilitator for extreme violence without prejudice based on reconfiguring opposing 
groups as less than human. If barbarity is the means to denigrate and destroy the person, Vandalism 
is the method employed to destroy and undermine their culture, the memory of their cultural heritage, 
and their connection between people, place, and the past (Docker, 2004, p. 4).  As Lemkin defined 
culture as a universal aspect of humanity, vandalism was not just an attack on the heritage of a 
cultural group, but an attack on the culture of the world (Docker, 2004, p. 4). Consequently, 
barbarism and vandalism were crimes against humanity which made local attacks on heritage in 
conflict prosecutable under international law by the International Criminal Court (ICC Rome Statute) 
and reflected (though culture was not explicitly included) in the Genocide convention and 
subsequently the 1954 Hague Convention and the 1949 Geneva Convention and its 1977 protocols.  
Despite the theories of groupism that have influenced international legislation on the treatment of 
heritage in conflict, this research argues that the 1954 Hague Convention crystallises a discourse on 
heritage which prioritises and protects cultural property over cultural heritage in conflict, and in 
doing so fails to focus on how culturally motivated attacks on heritage create a pervasive atmosphere 
that allows for escalating violence towards groups and minorities.  As discussed previously in this 
chapter, definitions of heritage have historically been linked to contemporary power structures and 
perceptions of cultural ownership at material heritage sites rather than contextually bound 
connections between people, place, and the past. This research argues that despite an evolution in the 
definition of heritage to become more inclusive toward non-material aspects of cultural heritage 
intrinsically bound to the formation of group identity and belonging, the key pieces of legislation 
which protect heritage in conflict remain reliant on definitions of heritage as material property at risk 
from military damage.  
The preoccupation with physical heritage sites put at risk by war is a reflection of a western 
imbalance in both the power to define heritage internationally using definitions of material value 
gained from the approach codified in the 1964 Venice Charter, and to protect heritage from known 
threats in conflict with are predominantly linked to European experiences of conquest and occupation 
from interstate conflicts rather than the risk posed to heritage from diverse cultural groups who are 
heavily invested in the meanings associated to the site (Meskell, 2010, p. 191). 
At the heart of the Genocide Convention is Raphael Lemkin’s philosophy that individuals are 
innately part of groups who think and act collectively following cultural patterns (Moses, 2010, 22-
23). The cultural patterns performed by groups and expressed in cultural sites are therefore not just 
reflections of cultural identity, they are cultural identity (Moses, 2010, p. 25). Consequently, an 
attack resulting in the destruction and suppression of cultural heritage sites in conflict is a targeted 
act of genocide against a cultural group and their collective identity. This philosophy underpins the 
formation of the Genocide Conventions which seeks to codify the definition of genocide, and to 
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specify protection and punishment measures needed for signatories to protect individuals within their 
nation state in times of conflict and peace (Short, 2010, p. 837).  
Lemkin argued that in order for genocide to occur the complete destruction of people was not 
necessary, rather, it relies on the destruction of the cultural patterns of oppressed group and the forced 
imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor (Moses, 2010, p. 21). Consequently, genocide can 
be considered not as the complete contemporary annihilation of a group of people, but the destruction 
of their culture both through mass murder and erasing the heritage of survivors (Butcher, 2013, 
p.257); in doing so, the link between survivors and their past is destroyed, which disrupts their ability 
to own and legitimise a cultural legacy on which to build cultural identities in the present and future 
(Bevan, 2016, p. 7). A link can subsequently be made between the purposeful destruction of physical 
cultural heritage site during conflict with an attempt to destroy the identity and culture of the groups 
who subscribe to the meaning of heritage, and by extension an attempt to destroy of the group itself 
(Moses, 2010, p. 25). As argued by this thesis, heritage should be considered as a highly political 
process of connecting people to place and the past (Smith, 2006, p.58) achieved by determining and 
controlling legitimate narratives of the past expressed though physical heritage sites (Kaplan 2001, 
p. 7). In conflict, these links between people and place are violently attacked, and the meaning of 
sites are eradicated or defaced through the destruction of the site and its associated people (Meskell, 
2010, p. 193), and the enforcement of new discourses made by oppressors in support of the violence 
enacted in conflict or justification for the erasure of other cultures (Sen, 2006, p. 82).  
Lemkin expanded the idea of group cultures to a transnational level where all heritage belongs to the 
whole of humanity shared as a collective culture (Lemkin, 2008, p. 91). In this definition it was not 
the components of heritage that bore universal value, rather, the concept that cultures had distinct 
heritage was in itself a universal collective culture. Consequently, and attack against any culture is 
an attack against all culture (Moses, 2010, p.22-23). This concept is reflected in the universalist 
approach taken by the World Heritage Convention which seeks to define a universal appreciation to 
culture, and support the Hague Convention’s codification of protecting internationally pre-
determined heritage sites in conflict. In both cases, the primacy of universal ownership of culture 
allows heritage sites to be defined to transcend its national context and contemporary subjectivities 
(Francioni, 2011, p. 1). In doing so heritage sites become prioritised according to dominant global 
powers and their interpretation of value, rather than to accept all heritage as of equal value according 
to its local contemporary definition (Merryman, 2006, p. 20). Lemkin also argued that disparate 
cultures should not be prioritised over each other, and ardently argued against the colonial 
suppression of minority cultures. However, the arguments made earlier in this thesis suggest that the 
World Heritage Convention’s preoccupation with ascribing outstanding value to built heritage sites 
creates an intrinsic division between valuable and not-valuable culture, allowing comparison and 
power imbalances to determine the worth and prioritisation of shared universal cultures (Labadi, 
2013, p. 68); this results in the definition of culture used in the WHC becoming the antithesis of the 
approach Lemkin took towards culture when forming the Genocide Convention.  
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There is a disjuncture here between the Lemkin’s philosophy of universal culture which underpins 
the Genocide Convention based on an acceptance of cultural diversity, and the codification of cultural 
heritage protection in WHC, Hague Convention, and the Geneva Convention which use universal 
heritage to order the value of cultural groups through the prioritisation of specific heritages. The 
impact of this disjuncture is that the Hague Convention continues to prioritise the protection of 
material heritage from purposeful or collateral damage from military occupation as a signifier of 
cultural value, but is ill-equipped deter acts of aggression which actively seek to destroy cultures 
through the destruction of cultural property (Labadi, 2013, p. 68; Schipper and Frank, 2013, p. 220. 
In protecting cultural property from war the Hague Convention does not focus on the impact that the 
destruction of heritage has on the safety and security of the culture who created the site, instead, it 
focuses on the destruction of monumental heritage as a marker of historical and aesthetic significance 
determined and supported by a universal value system. In the first approach, the loss of heritage is 
irreplaceable and its meaning forever changed by an attack; in the latter approach the loss of a 
heritage site can be rebuilt and revalued.  
Moses argues that Lemkin’s approach on the cultural foundations of genocide reached a barrier that 
prevented the philosophy of cultural groups becoming codified in the Genocide Convention (2010, 
p.37). The inclusion of culture as a fundamental aspect of the definition of genocide was resisted by 
the international signatories at the Nuremberg trials between 1945 and 1946, which sought to 
determine and follow a narrower definition of genocide that focussed on the mass murder of Jews, 
Gypsies, and Polish nationals based on ideological and religious persecution in order to expedite 
Nazi prosecutions and avoided precedence for prosecutions against the historic assimilation of 
indigenous cultural groups, rather than to include a broader range of cultural annihilation spanning 
distinct cultural groups (Moses, 2010, p. 37). This resulted in the prosecution of genocide based 
primarily on acts of mass murder, rather than on the techniques applied to facilitate the annihilation 
and suppression of cultures as precursors to mass murder (Moses, 2010, p. 33-34; Docker, 2008, p. 
14).  The initial reluctance to include culture as a fundamental aspect of genocide allowed the 
definition to be broken into different areas of Genocide; cultural genocide became a separate and 
niche aspect of Genocide, and perceived as a consequence of genocide instead of a key factor in the 
perpetration of genocide (Butcher, 2013, P.253-254).   The reluctance to formalise the inclusion of 
cultural groups in the definitions of genocide impacted on the interpretation of cultural property 
within the Hague Convention, wherein without a codified precedence of cultural erasure as genocide, 
the destruction of cultural property is seen as an attack on expressions of culture rather than as an 
attack on culture itself.  
It is possible to argue that based on the spirit of the Genocide Convention that all acts made in conflict 
to target and destroy heritage could feasibly be determined as acts of genocide. However, as genocide 
is defined within the Convention as physical acts of murder of national, ethnical, racial or religious 
groups, attacks on culture and heritage cannot (or are not routinely) invoked as evidence of genocide. 
Although heritage destruction is used as evidence in International Criminal Court proceedings, it is 
considered evidence of genocide or of war crimes, not as an act of genocide in itself unless directly 
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connected to mass murder. This echoes how heritage is regarded in the Hague Convention, as an 
attack on the physical manifestation of culture, not as an attack on culture itself. In both conventions, 
heritage becomes a niche category used in support of more serious war crimes rather than as a key 
factor used in the facilitation of violence. 
We see this prioritisation in practice being when heritage is utilised by the ICTY as evidence to 
prosecute Milošević for culturally motivated attack on Dubrovnik as part of a wider prosecution for 
genocide. In this instance the attack on culture is seen as a war crime but not necessarily regarded as 
the enabler needed for genocide to occur; this echoes the move away from Lemkin’s definition of 
cultural erasure as a pre-requisite for genocide to the condensed definition in the Genocide 
Convention which focuses primarily on mass murder (O’Lear and Egbert, 2009, p. 2-3). The focus 
of the convention on the outcome of genocide (mass murder, sterilisation, and brutality), rather than 
on the ways in which genocide is facilitated (through cultural annihilation, assimilation, and 
vandalism), divorces the impact of genocide from the processes which enable it to thrive- including 
the process of creating, distorting, and destroying cultural heritage (Fournet, 2016, p.44).  
2.7 The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict 
Joshua Kastenberg notes that 1954 The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Conflict (Hereafter referred to as the Hague Convention) was the result of both 
a historical trend and philosophy to protect heritage in war, and the failure of this philosophy to 
prevent the widespread damage, destruction and looting of artefacts in the Second World War 
(Kastenberg, 1997, p. 281). Whilst it is true that the Hague Convention was the latest convention to 
tackle the issue of cultural heritage in conflict and that the Second World War drastically changed 
the dynamics of war by demonstrating what was technological possible in contemporary warfare, the 
Hague Convention was also created in reaction to a preoccupation with protecting Western 
definitions of built heritage as markers of ownership, legacy and control. The loss throughout the 
second world war of cultural heritage sites though purposeful and accidental destruction revealed the 
precarious state of heritage in conflict, but the post-war period also led to a rise in a preoccupation 
with preserving heritage from decay and misuse. In the post-war period both the Venice Charter 
(1964) and the World Heritage Convention (1972) rose to prominence, and whilst neither directly 
protected heritage against conflict they did lay out prescriptive guidance on how to protect and restore 
heritage from time and misuse, which cemented the position of built heritage as the primary definition 
of heritage into future protective legislation.  
In this argument, the Hague Convention became an avenue to codify the treatment of built heritage 
in conflict, and by focusing on built heritage, made it possible for heritage sites to be restored after 
conflict. Had Lemkin’s cultural genocide approach been adopted by the Geneva or Hague convention 
the restoration of cultures as a physical activity alone would not be possible as his definition would 
have meant that an attack on heritage was the destruction of a culture rather than a heritage site alone. 
Using a more inclusive and holistic definition of heritage which includes an intangible connection 
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between people and place and a definition of heritage destruction that goes beyond tangible structures 
requires the recovery of cultural heritage after war to have a more integrated approach beyond 
restoration and repair; this approach is the foundation to the Integrated Assessment Framework 
introduced in this research.  
In the chronology of heritage protection, the 1954 Hague Convention drew together the tenants of 
the preceding legislative attempts to control the use of heritage in conflict; from the Lieber code it 
took forward the idea that certain historical artefacts should be protected due to their significance to 
past, future, and contemporary society (Lieber, 1863, articles 34- 36). The tenants of ownership 
around cultural property removed during war was taken from the 1907 Hague Convention, and used 
to assist in criminalising theft and illegal removal of cultural property within the 1954 Hague 
Convention (International Committee of the Red Cross, 1907, articles 27, 56). Whilst the Roerich 
Pact was moved almost wholesale into the 1954 Hague Convention to ensure that heritage sites were 
physically labelled with the Blue Shield insignia to mark them as demilitarized zones of universal 
significance to be protected during conflict (Roerich, 1935, Preamble; Schipper and Eichberger, 2010 
p.170). This approach signified not only that heritage should be protected, but also signalled that the 
national signatories of the 1954 Hague Convention regarded heritage as outside of the theatre of war. 
This perspective also reflects an approach to protecting heritage that relies on physical material of 
heritage sites as the limits that define heritage, as reflected in the chronology of heritage protection 
and the WHC.  
The 1954 Hague Convention made and cemented a link between monuments, property and the built 
manifestations of culture with the term heritage (Merryman, 2006, p. 20); conflating material culture 
with cultural heritage. This thesis suggests that the conflation between the material expression of 
culture and cultural heritage could only have been achieved due to the primacy given to material 
heritage when defining culture using a Eurocentric perspective (Fairchild Ruggles and Silverman, 
2009b, pp. 4–5; Said, 1994, p. 12). In turn, the longevity and international acceptance of the 1954 
Hague Convention is intrinsically supported and linked to the prioritisation and significance afforded 
to material heritage which endures through the World Heritage Convention of 1972.  
However, a material centric approach to heritage is at odds with a perspective that puts culture and 
heritage at the heart of conflict and sees it as a pivotal instrument in the construction of cultural 
identities, violence, and the context for war and Genocide, as supported by Lemkin’s underpinning 
of the Genocide Convention and the inclusion of the 1954 Hague Convention in the Geneva 
Convention (Frank and Schipper, 2013, p. 20), and the theoretical approaches to cultural and heritage 
taken Sen, Merryman, Said, and Smith outlined in Chapter Three of this thesis.  This dichotomy 
between fixed material heritage and contextually bound definitions reflects two approaches to the 
definition of heritage taken in the legislative attempts to protect it; the essentialism of heritage as a 
historical marker of past value which contemporary generations are responsible to protect, and the 
social-construction of heritage value in the present to signify and justify the existence of 
contemporary identities.   
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The essentialist perspective on heritage provides an opportunity to define and protect heritage with 
minimal interpretation into why heritage sites need to be protected (Högberg, 2016, p. 42); heritage 
sites need to be protected in conflict to ensure that the historic values they espouse are passed on to 
future generations and the responsibility to protected heritage is also discharged to this future 
generation. The meaning of these heritage sites are fixed, and tied to a historical past and can be 
protected and restored based on their physical existence. This is the definition of heritage that is 
protected in the WHC and Hague Convention. This type of heritage is determined by its material and 
limited to a site, it is capable of being damaged and restored, and is attacked as it represents a fixed 
notion of cultural significance determined by an interpretation of history that transcends 
contemporary ideology and geo-political boundaries. The codified protection of heritage that 
culminates in the 1954 Hague Convention reflects this approach, and also reflects the Eurocentric 
paternalism and ownership of an authorised historical discourse that controls what values are 
considered significant enough to be defined as universal (world) heritage. The movement of 
contemporary theories towards the construction of heritage as a process that connects people to 
places and the past through contextually bound identities, and the lack of movement away from 
essentialist definitions of heritage in legislation has created a widening gulf between what heritage 
is understood to represent to a diverse range of individuals and the formal ways it is protected in 
conflict (Högberg, 2016, p. 41),  which has contributed to the continued use of heritage in conflict 
causation and continuation.  
In a social constructivist argument, the meaning of heritage changes in response to its contemporary 
circumstances and the cultures who have ownership and control over its use. This definition of 
heritage uses and interprets an imagined past to justify a contemporary cultural ideology, heritage 
here acts as a contemporary cultural signifier of value that exists only in relation to its present reality 
and context. This approach extends the value of heritage beyond its material borders to include its 
context, and the ways it is being interpreted (Smith, 2006, p.58). The use of heritage in this 
construction is highly politicised, and enables heritage to be used to create inclusion or exclusion, 
and to promote similarity or cultural division. This definition of heritage is the underlying vandalism 
factor that creates a pervasive atmosphere for Genocide according to Lemkin, and the currency to 
ignite and maintain violence in conflict according to Sen. This construction of cultural identities and 
its link to heritage is harder to protect through legislation as the meaning of heritage will be constantly 
changing in relation to its contemporary circumstance, furthermore, attempts to solidify the meaning 
of heritage in order to protect it will present an opportunity for disenfranchised groups to attack 
heritage sites as places of constructed universal significance in order to signal their difference and 
rejection of the international community and its value system.   
2.8 Standardising Value: The Convention concerning the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage  
The Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (referred to 
as the World Heritage Convention or WHC) of 1972 is the most significant convention governing 
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the treatment of heritage internationally and, in conjunction with the 1954 Hague Convention, it is 
of particular importance to the assessment of heritage in war. 
The WHC offers both criteria for assessing outstanding universal significance in heritage sites, and 
the authority to judge and designate world heritage internationally in countries that are signatories 
(Askew, 2010, p. 19). This convention works on the principle that significant sites can be assessed 
and protected, and in doing so become the property (in spirit, if not in law) of the international 
community (Askew, 2010, p. 20). The WHC came into being in relation to the development of 
heritage sites around the world, most notably the Aswan High Dam development in Egypt 
(Donnachie, 2010, p. 118). The international heritage community was able to remove an ancient site 
from danger by carefully moving it to higher ground to avoid flooding, and in doing so successfully 
intervened in saving heritage despite national borders (Donnachie, 2010, p. 118). The WHC places 
the impetus to act to save or protect heritage on the national government that owns the site, but has 
frequently intervened when the national government has failed to do so (Askew, 2010, p. 20; Labadi, 
2013, p. 29). 
 The mainstay of the Convention is to designate sites as universally significant and then encourage 
and support their protection through conservation programmes and economic support for their 
upkeep. It discourages inappropriate development and destruction by placing the site on a Heritage 
in Danger list (if the heritage is threatened) or by using the ultimate sanction of the removal of world 
heritage designation if the site is altered too much (Askew, 2010, p. 18). The deterrent of losing 
world heritage status is bound with the perception of heritage as safe places for tourists and the 
economic benefits they bring (Askew, 2010, pp. 20–21); the loss of world heritage status would show 
a lack of confidence in the heritage site and its management, and an implication that the site is less 
valuable than before (Labadi, 2013, p. 69). The use of this status to inspire visitors’ confidence is of 
particular relevance to heritage in post-conflict zones. Cultural heritage theorist Sophia Labadi argues 
that world heritage status is not only a marker of national security but also of national stability; that 
preserving world heritage sites (WHS) is a politically targeted act of ensuring a singular narrative of 
stability supported by an authentic representation of a unified and fixed past (Labadi, 2010, p. 70).  
The tenets of universalism (in regards to culture) and international heritage commonality are clearly 
at work in the designation of world heritage. The WHC is an effort to protect heritage for the good 
of all mankind and in doing so creates a standard currency for heritage sites. To be considered 
universally significant a site must fulfil all the criteria listed in the convention (Labadi, 2013, p. 29). 
These criteria focus on ancient or existing built heritage sites (Fielden and Jokiletho, 1993, p. 69). 
The approach to this method of conservation is fixed (adhering to the principles of the Venice 
Charter) (Jokilehto, 1998b, p. 230); the sites must be kept as they were at the time of their initial 
inclusion on the list, using minimal intervention strategies and preserving whatever historic fabric is 
considered authentic and significant. The WHC is limited by its conflation of material culture as 
cultural heritage; by excluding heritage which is less tangible, and it risks alienating cultures that 
consider heritage to involve less tangible markers (Labadi, 2013, p. 68). It is argued by the author of 
this research that in a hypothetical nation with a single uncontested authorised culture this would be 
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an immensely difficult but achievable goal, in a real-world multicultural global setting it is 
impossible to condense all definitions of heritage into one set of fixed criteria, and in a conflict 
situation has the potential to become a dangerous cause of contention and violence. 
Maria Starzmann argues that the assumption that an invading force has an almost paternal 
responsibility for the protection of heritage made early heritage protection problematic in a post-
colonial contemporary political landscape (Starzmann, 2008, p. 371). The devastating effects of 
imperialist invasion and the appropriation and removal of cultural property are often dismissed as 
‘spoils of war”, and its arguments for the removal of heritage for its own protection – though accepted 
and enshrined in early legislative attempts to protect heritage – are highly contentious and 
problematic contemporary issues (Starzmann, 2008, p. 373). 
Maria Starzmann notes that this universal definition favours the promotion of Western history, 
enabling the perception of non-Western history as “other” (Starzmann, 2008, pp. 369, 371; Said, 
1974). The colonisation of non-European countries brought Europe into contact with different 
cultures with the ensuing commercialisation and paternalist management of their heritage by the 
colonisers (Starzmann, 2008, p. 372). This allowed the colonisers to create a distinction between a 
perception of value rather than diversity (Meskell, 2005, p. 139), for example. The lasting legacy of 
this cultural imperialism was the judgement that European heritage was intrinsically more valuable 
than non- European heritage, and therefore agents of European culture had the right and 
responsibility to control other cultures by managing and presentation their heritage using a 
Eurocentric definition of its (Parry, 1997, p. 227). Benita Parry argues that the very discourses that 
created the “othering” of cultures are now responsible for denying cultures the space to dispute them 
by removing such discourses from contemporary historical narratives (Parry, 1997, p. 231). In this 
view, the notion of heritage (particularly world heritage) is a legacy of cultural imperialism, which 
is simultaneously attempting to retain Western approaches to heritage and encouraging alternate 
perspectives to gain a place within this perspective. In doing so the Western-orientated approach 
becomes a performance of postcolonial heritage inclusion, but is reliant on its imperialist framework. 
2.9 Influences of essentialism on codifying universal heritage in the Hague 
Convention  
Universalism prescribes value based on the assumption that all definitions of value can be 
understood, applied and accepted globally, which links universal definitions of heritage to an 
essentialism where heritage has an innate value and status which is universally understood if not 
readily accepted.  Value is ascribed to heritage (particularly world heritage) in a check list of 
authorised UNESCO criteria and processed by a congress of global representatives. These criteria 
are systems of universalist and essentialist classifications that ignore geo-political context. The aim 
is to produce a global standard and currency that determines and defines what heritage is and means 
on a global scale. Universalist categorisations of value seek to transcend temporal realities and to 
define what humankind finds valuable and ultimately protect it.  
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However, World heritage designation risks enhancing cultural differences by providing a clear 
distinction between what may be considered culturally valuable and what may not, and by ignoring 
its geo-political context and it provides a target for those who oppose this distinction. World heritage 
site designations in Palestine and Israel have helped to solidify the difference between the two, 
supporting increasing nationalism and making heritage a central part of the political turmoil in the 
region (De Cesari, 2010, pp. 302–303). De Cesari argues that this negative effect has come about 
because the ascription of universal value not only builds on national ideas of heritage, but 
“reproduces, amplifies, and expands” both the ideas and the political power institutions that support 
them (De Cesari, 2010, p. 302). In conflict, universal classifications of heritage can become signifiers 
of Western intervention, and their cultural value is second to symbols of intervention; in this view, a 
cultural site ceases to be valued as cultural and is instead seen as similar to that of an army base, a 
school, or a hospital; as a functional part of a conflict landscape. In times of conflict these sites can 
become significant as markers of international intervention. 
John Henry Merryman suggests that despite its global positioning, The Hague Convention has a 
specifically Western agenda. States may define their own individual approach to cultural property 
and decide on their actions towards its theft and repatriation but the narrow definitions of acceptable 
value and culture make it difficult for them to do so (Merryman, 2006, pp. 22–23). By recognising 
the existence of intangible heritage in non-Western nations a distinction is drawn between highly 
valuable Western built culture and the less valuable intangible culture (Sullivan, 2003, p. 49). The 
term “cultural property” in The Hague Convention is therefore political in character, and it prioritises 
built heritage over intangible heritage so that in times of conflict using heritage to further military 
aims is rendered a crime, and cultural property may not be removed from the theatres of war or 
vanquished enemies (UNESCO, 1954).  
Merryman argues that universalism in The Hague Convention limits its effectiveness, Merryman 
suggests that since there is no such thing as a universal value system as different cultures and nations 
have different ways of ascribing value to their societies and heritage (Merryman, 2005, p. 15). 
However, Francioni argues that the strength of The Hague Convention is precisely in its universal 
applicability (Francioni, 2011, p. 1), where the notion of universal ownership of heritage limits the 
power of nations or states to define heritage, and instead allows cultural value to be decided by 
(ideally) a politically neutral cross-border panel of decision makers, which, he argues, protects people 
from the current political leanings of their governments (Francioni, 2004, pp. 1211–1212). In turn, 
this suggests that the legislation that defines universal value as a concept defends heritage from the 
political context that it inhabits rather than being defined by it (Francioni, 2004, p. 1214). In this 
view The Hague Convention protects the cultural heritage of minority or deviant groups from 
majority groups in power that could threaten it (Guibernau, 2004, p. 1257). In this interpretation, 
essentialism in The Hague Convention protects culture by preventing its meaning being re-
constructed on an international stage. 
In this interpretation The Hague Convention becomes an insurance policy discouraging violence 
against heritage because it is protected by the international community. As the destruction of heritage 
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in war continues, however, the weakness of Francioni’s argument becomes clear. If the main goal in 
The Hague Convention was to create a standard of heritage to enable protection though 
condemnation, it has failed to do so. Rather than create a universal standard and protecting the 
heritage so identified, the WHC and The Hague Convention have instead created a way to identify 
and then damage heritage which is universally valued but not contextually or culturally relevant or 
acceptable.  
2.10 Universal classification and the Social Construction of value in the 1954 Hague 
Convention 
Tomlinson argues that the definition of culture is less important than “how people use the term” 
(Tomlinson, 2002, p. 5). This thesis argues that universal classifications of the significant of heritage 
create can be considered to be an attempt to formalise what heritage is on a global scale. This 
universal classification of heritage relies on prioritising its international significance over its local 
significance, and in doing so making it the shared heritage of an imagined global community. To 
achieve this, the parameters of universal significance must be set, and a heritage site must be 
interpreted to sit within these parameters. Both the World Heritage Convention and The Hague 
Convention use this universalist stance to interpret and protect international heritage sites. 
Conversely, meaning attached to heritage do not always confine themselves to universally attributed 
classifications of significance. Instead, meaning is socially-constructed around a heritage site (and 
narrative) in response to local pressures and tensions. When the socially constructed meanings of 
heritage collide with the universal classifications of heritage tensions arise. In peaceful context, this 
can result in disputes and compromise; in a context of conflict this can result in violence. When this 
collision occurs in conflict the result is often unfavourable to the heritage site in question, as the 
internationally acclaimed site can be constructed as a place of negative international intervention, 
and attacked in order to protect a culture from said cultural intervention. This argument is framed in 
this thesis as a clash between universalism in international classifications of culture, and the social-
construction of heritage narratives.  
Said (1979, 1994) argues that Western culture is constructed as the universal norm, and non-Western 
cultures are considered “other” to that universal norm (Said, 1994, p. 12). The consequence is that 
the notion of the universal becomes synonymous with Western Eurocentric priorities (Said, 1994, p. 
268). The idea of universalism is revealed to be a highly exclusive system of categorisation and 
management that is opposed to an inclusive worldwide system that can legitimise (and delegitimise) 
claims to a place in the past (Said, 1994, pp. 335–336). For this universal claim to appear legitimate, 
a constant comparison between Western and non-Western culture is required, with in which Western 
culture must always be perceived as being culturally superior and timeless, whereas non-Western 
culture must always be perceived as being inferior and in need of Western protection (Said, 1979, p. 
49). Thus, not only are non-Western cultures “othered” by the dominance of the West, that they are 
also constructed as unable to function or survive without Western intervention. 
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In a social constructivist approach to attacks on heritage, heritage is constructed as a culturally 
specific symbol that is identified as something either to be idealised or to be destroyed, depending 
on the ideology of those involved in conflict (Francioni, 2013). The debate is based on whether 
heritage is seen as the property of the state or as the property of humankind (Francioni, 2013, p. 3). 
For Francioni this debate is used to explore the legality of retaining or exporting cultural property 
(Francioni, 2013, p. 3), but this view can also help us frame the way value is disputed at heritage 
sites. Universal classifications of value support the view that heritage is the property of all 
humankind, but for those who are vehemently opposed to international intervention this act can be 
constructed as an affront on their cultural identity and attacked- either physically through targeting 
heritage sites, or ideologically by rejecting the value of the site in favour of socially constructed 
meanings, or both, as in the case of the Bamiyan Buddhas. In accordance with Tomlinson’s earlier 
argument, the meaning of heritage is less important than the way it is used when constructing or 
destroying a world heritage site 
Universalist approaches to heritage argue that the unequal relationships between international states 
(both contemporarily and historically) have both defined heritage and brought them into inevitable 
conflict. The dominant international value system of heritage is a colonial construct and therefore 
becomes a target in a post-colonial global society (Meskell, 2002, p. 557; Musitelli, 2005, pp. 325–
326). Social constructivist approaches to heritage in war suggest that damage to heritage is not 
inevitable, but that the construction of heritage in war can become a focal point for reinforcing or 
rejecting identities (Katzenstein, 1996, pp. 26–27). Ruggie (1998) suggests that international politics 
influence the construction of identities and force those identities to legitimise themselves through 
culture (Ruggie, 1998, pp. 864–865). This thesis argues that the political causes of conflict filter 
down and influence the construction of cultural identities which in turn dictates how cultural heritage 
(as symbols of identity) is treated in war. The use of religious and cultural symbols in Bosnia as sites 
of atrocity or targets is an example of the restructuring of cultural spaces into theatres of war in an 
effort to damage and delegitimise the link between people and place. The use of heritage and culture 
as tools of war are apparent in examples from the conflicts in Bosnia, including the ethnically 
motivated massacre of Bosnians in the UN safe space of Srebrenica (Perkins, 2004), and the 
widespread systematic torture and rape of both Christians and Muslims in places of worship in the 
Balkan wars between 1990 and 1995 to target religious and cultural identities (Kennedy‐Pipe and 
Stanley, 2007, pp. 73–74). These examples are brutal reminders that heritage in conflict is a tool of 
war that goes beyond attacks on material cultures, and targets the intangible meaning of such places 
and the individuals that identify with them. 
Heritage can be constructed to justify and perform ideological connections to a place and a preferred 
interpretation either locally or internationally (Burr, 1995, p. 4). The act of attacking a World 
Heritage Site is a way to reject acceptance of universal value systems with maximum exposure as 
the international community will pay attention to such an act. The heritage site is constructed by 
these attackers not as a place of heritage or historical importance, but as the physical symbol of 
universalism and a reflection of political unrest. Furthermore, targeting heritage sites with 
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significance to specific cultures is an act of ethnic cleansing wherein an attacker seeks to erase the 
culture of another from the physical and emotional landscape of the past, present, and future.   
In this reading a universalist approach to attacks on cultural heritage explain why there is such a 
pronounced performance to record destruction and also helps to explain why attacks on UNESCO-
inscribed world heritage sites are frequently targeted during warfare. The construction of value at 
heritage sites changes in response to conflict, and the process of ascribing international significance 
can have profound consequences for its survival. When heritage is constructed as an ideological 
symbol- either by its international acclaim or by its local ownership- it becomes something valuable; 
in conflict, it becomes something to be defended or attacked. 
2.11 The 1999 Second Protocol of the Hague Convention 
 The 1999 Second Protocol of the Hague Convention was formed mainly in reaction to the use and 
destruction of cultural property in the Balkans in the 1990s (Toman, 2009, p. 96). The protocol’s aim 
was to increase the protection for cultural property by making it harder to use heritage for military 
advantage (Henckaerts, 1999, p. 21). After the prolonged attack on Vukovar during the break-up of 
Yugoslavia it became apparent that not only had cultural property been used for military 
advancement through its use as a military base (which transgressed the 1954 convention), the town 
had also been purposefully targeted as a place of cultural significance (Toman, 2009, p. 96-97) (as 
had many other sites such as the bridge in Mostar and the Old Town in Dubrovnik).  
The 1999 second protocol was added in reaction to further weapons development, specifically the 
development of weapons of mass destruction and remote attacks and an obligation for states party to 
work with archaeologists in peacetime to identify sites of cultural value (Toman, 2009, pp. 21–23). 
The conception of heritage used in The Hague Convention remains focused on physical cultural 
property, the protection of which is linked to material restoration and recovery as supported by the 
WHC and the Venice Charter; this remains the case with the contemporary iteration of the Hague 
Convention which does not fully reflect the changing definitions of heritage from a theoretical 
perspective or the legislative attempts to diversify the definition of peace-time heritage though the 
Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (2003), the Burra Charter (1979) 
or the Nara Document on Authenticity (1994). 
The second protocol focused on article four of the 1954 Hague Convention, and sought to add a 
waiver that if the attack would damage or was already damaging cultural property than the military 
action should be suspended (O’Keefe, 2010). This waiver was presented to reduce the ambiguity in 
the 1954 Hague Convention which allowed cultural property to be used for military advancement if 
here was no other recourse; the 1999 protocol urged for fighting to cease if no recourse was available 
(O’Keefe, 2010, p. 370). This tried to balance the needs of military advancement with the needs of 
heritage protection to avoid places of cultural significance from being destroyed by future conflicts 
(Forrest, 2010, p. 116) whilst also offering a more powerful threat of penal sanctions if the 1954 
Hague Convention and its 1999 protocols were not adhered to (O’Keefe, 2010, p. 373). 
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The second protocol of 1999 occurred after the events of the Siege of Dubrovnik 1995, but it remains 
a useful indication of the tremendous influence that the use of heritage in the Yugoslavian conflicts 
(particularly the examples mentioned above) had on changing the political and legal scape of heritage 
protection in the years following these conflicts.  
The Hague Convention and its protocols are currently the most significant and direct piece of 
legislation on the worldwide protection of cultural property during conflict (Lehman, 1997, p. 532). 
It not only protects but criminalises the removal from countries of cultural property, which had 
previously been considered the spoils of war (Lehman, 1997, pp. 531–532). Jennifer Lehman notes 
that the overall goal of The Hague Convention is to protect cultural property during war as damage 
to heritage represents damage to all mankind; and this is the defining sentiment of The Hague 
Convention – that the protection of cultural property should be primarily perceived as an ethical and 
moral requirement of war (Francioni, 2011, p. 1; Merryman, 1989, pp. 346–347). This is enshrined 
in the Supra notes that preface the preamble of The Hague Convention, which outlines the 
responsibility that all nations carry towards cultural heritage: 
Being convinced that damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means 
damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to 
the culture of the world … 
(Supra note 4, UNESCO, 1954, p. 8) 
This note shows that The Hague Convention connects cultural property to cultural heritage, thus 
establishing a link between heritage significance and material definitions of culture. Secondly, it 
shows its underlying assumption of universalism, that cultural heritage is a universal asset which is 
the property of “all mankind”. 
2.12 Summary: Protecting heritage from Conflict  
Although material heritage sites remain the definitive feature of heritage protection in conflict, 
conceptualisations of world heritage have changed since the first construction of both the 1954 Hague 
Convention and the 1972 World Heritage Convention (Musitelli, 2005, p. 333). Specifically, 
UNESCO’s focus has changed from a purely material heritage focus to include the need to identify 
and designate the outstanding universal value (OUV) of many different types of culture (Musitelli, 
2005, p. 324). Musitelli argues that the result is that a diverse range of heritages now face being 
standardised into the UNESCO method, and world heritage will remain as the “producer of norms 
and orchestrator of international cooperation” (Musitelli, 2005, p. 325). Jukka Jokilehto notes that 
the operational guideline definitions of WH have evolved beyond their initial conception and are 
becoming more accepted as an interpretation of OUV (Jokilehto, 1998a, pp. 17–18, 2006, p. 12). He 
argues that the result of this is the inclusion of diverse attitudes in the designation of sites but not in 
changes to The Hague Convention (Jokilehto, 1998a, p. 19).  
For Jokilehto it is obvious that what counts as an OUV is a matter of interpretation, which as this 
chapter has discussed, is difficult for protection legislation to guard against. He argues that the WHC 
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was meant to be read as a guidance document towards the interpretation of heritage as a diverse range 
of creative processes (Jokilehto, 2006, p. 2). In this interpretation the management of world heritage 
falls into the domain of national cultural preferences and reduces the impact of a universal definition 
of value. This has particular applications for understanding authenticity at heritage sites, how the 
term is interpreted nationally and globally and the effect it has on the construction of history 
(Jokilehto, 2006, p. 2). Although this perspective reflects a trend towards inclusivity in heritage 
legislation, the need to focus on material culture in protection legislation in order to collect evidence 
of illegal activity in conflict continues to drive definitions and heritage use within conflict and post-
conflict protection measures. This focus is furthered by the continued fixation of destroyed heritage 
sites in international media which reflect an enduring idea of world heritage principally as material 
heritage, and as such material heritage remains a target in conflict not only because it is an attack on 
a cultural identity or ideology but also an attack on Western assumptions of universal value. 
Simply put, instead of reflecting the social construction of heritage sites as a contextually bound 
process, The Hague Convention and WHC have created Western-defined heritage sites which are 
manifested through material heritage. These places can be purposefully interpreted as a process of 
Western-biased intervention in national and local politics and in doing so world heritage designation 
becomes a way to identify devastating political and psychological targets with maximum 
international impact. This construction of heritage also reduces the awareness and acceptance of the 
extreme damage that cultural vandalism and genocide has on cultures, it also undermines attempts to 
prosecute the use of heritage destruction as a weapon of war employed to eradicate cultures. 
Putting together Meskell’s and Musitelli’s arguments, this thesis suggests that the social construction 
of sites of heritage provides the foundations from which heritage destroyers can be categorised as 
cultural deviants. UNESCO provides a framework not only to define what heritage is, but also 
provides guidance on how to perceive those who transgress or disagree with the definition (Meskell, 
2002, p. 567; Musitelli, 2005, p. 330). To some extent this can also be seen in the inclusion of the 
Nazi death camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau onto the list of world heritage (Meskell, 2002, p. 571); it 
functions to signal universal condemnation (Meskell, 2002, pp. 570–571). Following Meskell, we 
might argue that genocide is an abnormal event in history which requires memorialisation, similar to 
in the way historic architecture is resigned to the past; as something unique that cannot be repeated. 
However, as Lemkin and Sen argue, the construction and deconstruction of a cultural other is 
facilitated by heritage interpretation and this is connected to delegitimising their right to exist in a 
certain place and time, and effectively used in conflict as a means to eradicate a culture as a precursor 
to mass murder. The WHC and The Hague Convention have become political instruments that govern 
the way we perceive conflict and its impact on heritage, but it does so by connecting heritage sites to 
an essentialist conception of fixed historical narratives expressed by material heritage sites that are 
universally protected and supported, which in turn affords them legislative protection against being 
forgotten or erasure. The Hague Convention also limits the ability of context to determine why 
heritage is being attacked as it assumes it is an attack on universal values intrinsically connected to 
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heritage sites, and cannot protect against the cultural and contextual impacts of heritage destruction, 
it can only provide a record of attacks on cultural property.  
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Chapter Three: Conceptual definitions of Cultural Heritage 
Defining what is meant by cultural heritage is fraught with difficulties; the fluidity and flexibility of 
heritage definitions means that it is difficult to generate a working definition of heritage that can be 
used to frame future arguments involved in the relationship between conflict and heritage (Harrison, 
2010, p. 16). Heritage interacts with many spheres of critical thought from politics, sociology, 
psychology, discourse analysis to memory studies, it is conceptualised as tangible structures, 
intangible traditions, and its very existence is under discussion (Smith, 2006, p. 11).  
Each interrogation and criticism of heritage allows a new angle to shed light on the use and usefulness 
of heritage in different contexts. This conceptual review will explore the definitions and terminology 
of heritage based on its conceptualisation, use and its relationship to discourses of conflict; it will 
address the relationship between heritage and identity (Harvey, 2001; Sen, 2006); heritage and 
interpretation (Graham and Howard, 2008a; Howard, 2003; Hewison, 1987); heritage as a discourse 
(Smith, 2006; Hall, 1999); heritage and power (Cheong and Miller, 2000; Clegg, 1993); heritage as 
cultural significance (Saussure, 2011 [1916]; McManamon, 2000); and heritage as memory 
(Connerton, 1989; Connerton, 2008; Spillman, 1997). The investigation of heritage here will 
encompass both theoretical and policy definitions of heritage and show how, for the purposes of this 
research, heritage is defined as a process that negotiates the connections between people, places and 
their pasts (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, pp. 1–2; Connerton, 2008, pp. 59–60; Macdonald, 2009, 
p. 2; Smith, 2006, p. 11). 
This exploration into the conceptualisation of heritage forms the theoretical foundation to the IHAF 
which relies on a holistic definition of heritage as a process that connects people to place and to the 
past. This view takes into account the importance of cultural property in creating and protecting 
heritage, but goes beyond the material limitations of heritage to argue that heritage is formed by the 
contemporary cultural narratives and power struggles that surround a cultural site. 
3.1 Interpreting the Past 
Moving beyond the predominant definitions offered within the practitioner-focused work on cultural 
heritage, the section below explores the ideas and conceptions from within a broader range of cultural 
studies. Here, attention is placed on the diverse ways in which history constantly are interpreted and 
reinterpreted, and explores what effect this has on establishing and legitimising (or destabilising and 
delegitimising) the past through heritage.  The interpretation of the past frames the way that heritage 
sites are presented and understood in the present (Lowenthal, 1985, p. 264). Society often regards 
history as set fixed points, or as factual occurrences that do not need to be interrogated (for example 
timelines in school classrooms, well-known oft repeated events, and notorious historical figures) 
(Harrison, 2010, p. 9); this thesis (as well as the majority of theorists referenced in this reseach) argue 
that history is not fixed or factual but is a subjective interpretation of the past which has been turned 
into a powerful and practiced grand narrative. This narrative creates an illusion that history is a 
objective reflection of actual events. Whereas the grand narrative of history can give the illusion of 
being fixed and objective, the value and meaning of heritage overtly changes over time from 
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contemporary pressures, and does so at a greater pace than the diversification of the grand narrative 
of history. In doing so, heritage becomes an avenue to diversify and interpret the grand narrative of 
history and undermine its claim of objectivity.  
For Smith, the way heritage is interpreted relies not only on how an event is interpreted but on who 
is interpreting. In this sense, the way history is interpreted as heritage relies on the subjective bias 
and objectives of the interpreter (Smith, 2006, p.58) In a post-conflict setting, wherein the events of 
the conflict are being reflected upon and turned into a narrative discourse, the interpretation of those 
events has a direct correlation to how those events are remembered and signified in heritage. This 
could render the conflict events as a triumphant narrative, supported by memorial and celebratory 
heritage sites, or it could interpret the events as dissonant narratives supported by heritage sites 
emphasising atrocity and the barbarity of opponents. Of course, all interpretation rests heavily not 
only on the events of conflict themselves but also on how the interpreter experiences conflict; for 
example, the interpretation of a conflict event would be drastically different depending on whether 
the interpreter was a victim or perpetrator of violence. This construction of conflict narratives is 
returned to later in this chapter, and is a core argument of this thesis.  
The ways in which heritage is interpreted can be used as a means to understand, appreciate and 
protect heritage by using it to educate and connect ourselves to the past as Tilden has argued (Tilden, 
2008 [1957], p. 233); but in doing so, the previously agreed upon narrative of history changes as the 
present seeks to impose itself on the past (Uzzell, 1989, p. 74; Hewison, 1987, p. 12). For Hewison, 
the interpretation of the past rests in the imposition of contemporary needs onto the past resulting in 
the re-imagining of a nostalgic past that can be inauthentic (Hewison, 1987, p. 45). Hewison uses 
themed ‘living heritage’ museums as a case studies to argue that by turning sites into contemporary 
heritage places to visit we trivialise the past and traduce its authenticity (Hewison 1987, p. 15). By 
contrast, for Tilden, heritage offers an unproblematic opportunity to learn from the past where 
heritage interpretation acts as a way to connect the present to the past and instil them with the need 
to protect heritage to pass on to future generations (Tilden, 2008 [1957], p. 20). Perhaps a good 
example of these arguments is in the debates that surround the ongoing legacy of the Nazi 
concentration camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau (UNESCO, 1979). The camp is a site of mass atrocity, 
where over a million civilians were brutally murdered and tortured during the Second World War. It 
is also a contemporary site of large scale tourism, with increasingly high visitor numbers (Dalziel, 
2016, p. 186). The camp and museum in no way trivialise the events that occurred there, and it serves 
as a stark record of the brutality of the Holocaust. However, the site is not robust enough to deal with 
the foot fall it receives each year and so parts of the camp (including the notorious extermination 
chambers and showers) have been rebuilt and relocated to make them more accessible for visitors 
(Donadio, 2015; Williamson and Davis, 2002).  
In this (brief) example we can see both Tilden and Hewison’s arguments at work; the heritage site 
functions as a place of education that needs to be remembered and passed on to future generations 
(in accordance with Tilden’s arguments on the education merits of heritage), but it is also being re-
imagined to suit the needs of the contemporary audience which in turn is altering the site (in 
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accordance with Hewison’s criticism of changing the past to fit the needs from the present). The 
altering of the material of the site does not change its interpretation as a place of dissonant heritage, 
but what has occurred is that the intangible meaning of the site as a whole has been given a higher 
priority than the material authenticity of the individual buildings. 
We can see this use and interpretation of heritage sites in places affected by conflict. The use of 
Auschwitz-Birkenau as a heritage site is slightly removed from Hewsion’s critique of re-creating 
heritage sites as the camp is most certainly not a nostalgic re-imagining of the atrocities that took 
place there, it is however a site that functions to provoke emotional responses in order to educate and 
connect people to a difficult past. Indeed, in many ways the camp is the antithesis of nostalgia; instead 
of re-creating a past that is familiar and comfortable, the re-creation and continued preservation of 
Auschwitz-Birkenau is designed to be an emotionally uncomfortable place to visit and far removed 
from the aims of themed heritage sites. The interpretation and presentation of Auschwitz-Birkenau 
serves as way to remember the atrocities of the Holocaust through a physical site which seeks to 
cement these events into the narrative of the Second World War to ensure the events are remembered 
and cemented. Although this site has become part of that historical narrative, it has also gone through 
a process of rejection from contemporary ownership. The Polish government petitioned UNESCO to 
change the name of the world heritage site to make it clear it was a German, not Polish, site 
(UNESCO, 2006). This was done in an effort to prevent the site from ever being misattributed as a 
place of Polish blame, and to clearly attribute the responsibility for historic atrocities to the Nazi 
regime of 1940s Germany.  
Ashworth and Tunbridge suggest that the process of interpreting dissonant heritage sites differs from 
that of beneficial heritage sites; whereas dissonant sites can be distanced or rejected, beneficial 
heritage is claimed and celebrated (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 94-95). Ashworth and 
Tunbridge build on this idea by showing how dissonant pasts can be denied or erased or changed 
into acceptable versions of atrocious events in an effort to distance oneself from the event (Ashworth 
and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 95; Howard, 2003, pp. 31- 32). In conflict, this can be seen through the 
repackaging of war narratives into myths which remove both blame and responsibility from the 
present. Such interpretations celebrate, commemorate or demonise the event by portraying the agents 
in the narrative as victors and victims, or evil and good, in a context that no longer exists (Benton, 
2010a, pp. 126–128). The point of interpretation here is either to construct conflict in terms of 
opposing sides and elevate and demonise them through commemoration, or (in the case of mass 
atrocity) distance the event by making it context specific, unrepeatable, and a facet of objective 
education rather than subjective blame (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, pp. 91–95). There are of 
course exceptions to this approach, particularly in interpretations offering with ways of forgetting, 
forgiveness, attributing and accepting blame and reconciliation that will be explored throughout 
Chapter Four. 
Howard extends this line of thinking and argues that the entrenched discrimination between 
beneficial and dissonant heritage is based on a society’s tendency to remember sanitised versions of 
the past (Howard, 2003, pp. 205–207). Although societies cannot completely erase dissonance from 
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their past, they are capable of disavowing responsibility for it (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 
105). Thus events in the past that shine a positive light on the group are incorporated into their social 
identity and events that reflect badly on them are seen as remote from the groups’ identity and are 
forgotten, distorted or disowned (Benton, 2010a, pp. 129–130; Howard, 2003, p. 99; Uzzell, 1989, 
p. 77). 
Ralph Samuel’s argued that the interpretation of a past event is as important as the event itself 
because the way an event is remembered will take precedence over the objective facts of its 
occurrence (Samuel, 2012, p. 246). However, unlike Ashworth, Tunbridge and Howard, Samuel 
suggests that rewriting history is not an attempt to omit uncomfortable details, but instead is a way 
or incorporating a greater variety of interpretations and perspectives that otherwise would have been 
excluded (Samuel, 2012, p. 18). For Samuel, heritage becomes an active tool for democracy, 
allowing people from all social backgrounds to record and express their interpretation of history 
(Samuel, 2012, p. 261). Samuel suggests that the official record of the past is flawed because its 
foundations rest in elite intellectual interpretations of history and do not take into account many other 
dissenting interpretations that are thus removed from the dominant discourse (Samuel, 2012, p. 17). 
This intersects with the arguments that connect heritage to a legacy of cultural imperialism (Said, 
1994, p. 44), warping the way heritage is viewed and protected in times of conflict. Samuel constructs 
heritage as a political force capable of including and excluding narratives of history based on its own 
preferences and motivations against a background of Western-dominated global history and heritage 
(Samuel, 2012, p. 17). In this view, heritage narratives become a cacophony of interpretations, which 
struggle against each other for dominance. This idea of narratives asserting themselves then fading 
from dominant discourse has a direct bearing on the tensions that arise after conflict when post-
conflict narratives of events and experiences surface. 
The political implications of using heritage sites to reinterpret and rewrite the past suggest that 
heritage has the potential to control, own and change the way the past is viewed in contemporary 
society if it is accepted uncritically (Hall, 2005, p. 5). As the interpretation of the past is likely to be 
based on the grand narrative of history, the heritage sites chosen to represent history are unlikely to 
reflect the experiences of minorities whose viewpoints are excluded from official histories (Hall, 
2005, p. 9). Thus the histories of minorities will fade from public consciousness unless they are given 
(or they take) room to exist within historical discourse (Hall, 2005, p. 12). In order to include minority 
heritage in public perceptions of history, Hall argues that one must interrogate heritage sites not just 
as history, but assess whose history is being presented and why (Hall, 2005, pp. 32–34). 
Often heritage is interpreted to show the ideal and beneficial aspects of a society, taken from a past 
re-imagined nostalgically (Hewison, 1987, p. 12). A good example of this is the multi-vocal 
narratives of conflict in Dubrovnik, wherein the conflict was experienced in a myriad of different 
ways by individual citizens but then communally cemented into an authorised discourse in an attempt 
to first apportion blame for destruction of their town, and then to create a narrative of recovery to 
benefit the town. These positive interpretations of heritage serve to distance cultures from the more 
unsavoury aspects of their past, allowing those in the present to function without having to take 
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responsibility for past deeds (Benton, 2010a, p. 127). When it is cannot be interpreted positively, it 
must interpret dissonance in another way; it is displayed as distanced from a present society, blame 
is either accepted or rejected, and the participants in a dissonant events shown as victims of atrocity 
or of circumstance. This lifecycle of dissonance in heritage sits can be demonstrated in an anecdote 
from the old town in Dubrovnik. Croatia was complicit in terrible war crimes during the Second 
World War (Denitch, 1994, p. 41), and in the communist era in Yugoslavia following the war a 
memorial plaque was erected at the main Gate in Dubrovnik Old Town which overtly took 
responsibility for their part in the war. However, during the conflicts in the 1990s the plaque was 
removed and not replaced. This is not to suggest that Croatia no longer accepts responsibility for its 
part in the Second World War, rather, it demonstrates that this interpretation has been distanced and 
removed from is contemporary narrative. The power of heritage to influence political discourse is 
displayed in this example; the narrative of history may not be truthful or objective, but the ways in 
which heritage is interpreted certainly help to create the illusion that there is an authorised narrative 
of the past (Smith 2006, p. 29).   
3.2 Heritage Discourse and the Narration of Conflict 
The two sections above have reviewed practitioner-focused work on cultural heritage, and 
mainstream literature within cultural heritage studies and post-war recovery studies that present 
‘cultural heritage’ as a relatively accessible and observable social factor. Through the paragraphs 
below, more critical literatures are engaged with. By problematizing and more explicitly politicising 
the concept of cultural heritage, these works demonstrate a need for reflexivity and a more inclusive 
conception of heritage to be used within the IHAF, in order to achieve its goal of holistically bridging 
between an eclectic range of literatures. 
Authorised heritage discourse (AHD) presents a single narrative of history that is based on events 
occurring in the past. This history is viewed as an objective and truthful account of events, Laurajane 
Smith argues that this “legitimate” version of history is achieved via the negotiation of the past 
through heritage (Smith, 2006, p. 29). Although the events themselves may have occurred, they were 
not objectively recorded as several choices were made during and since the event in question which 
undermine the notion that such history is an objective account (Foucault, 2002 [1989], p. 62). Michel 
Foucault argues that discourse is used to give meaning to and to represent a time in history using 
recognisable and replicable terms, and in doing so it shapes how society perceives history and the 
present (Foucault, 1991, pp. 63–65). Laurajane Smith uses Foucault’s concept of power discourse to 
suggest that heritage is a way to support and also to subvert history through an AHD, offering a way 
to include or exclude minority narratives from a metanarrative of history (Smith, 2006, pp. 29–30). 
Graham Fairclough argues that narratives are created for and by society to support their own ideals 
and values, thus heritage a highly politicised and active agent in creating and shaping power in 
societies, as expressed in the (socio-political) cultural landscape (Fairclough, 1999a, pp. 27–29). 
Smith, Fairclough and others suggest that understanding heritage as a discourse uncovers the power 
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structures than underlie heritage, particularly in terms of ownership and narrative control 
(Fairclough, 1999b, p. 28; Lemke, 2002, p. 50; Smith, 2006, p. 30). 
Discourse is the process of producing and displaying knowledge to be disseminated and replicated 
by society, who will use and replicate the same language and tone when they are speaking about the 
same subject (Foucault, 1991). If we apply this to the discourse of heritage, it can be argued that 
heritage creates and replicates a record of the past which dictates the way history should be valued 
(Smith, 2006, p. 34). In this discourse heritage is both supported by and supports the historical 
narrative that it embodies and both transmits and receives meaning, value and cultural significance 
from and to society (McManamon, 2000). In a context of conflict this can be seen in the creation of 
war narratives, constructed from the interpretation of dissonant events (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 
1996, p. 96; Benton, 2010a, p. 128) that are internalised in society through the AHD (Smith, 2006, 
p. 26) and transmitted to a wider international society, to be perceived as historical fact rather than 
the negotiated process of heritage (Barthes, 2000, p. 117; Saussure, 2011 [1916], p. 135; 
McManamon, 2000, pp. 6–7) 
Heritage discourse acts as a means to transmit meaning and value from an imagined past to 
contemporary society, and in doing so authorises particular perspectives of the past, legitimising 
them and turning them into historic facts or truth to be repeated by future generations (Kessous and 
Roux, 2008, p. 192; Saussure, 2011 [1916], p. 42). Patrick Wright suggests that heritage 
reinvestigates the past, and re-writes the narrative of history to include different narratives and 
perspectives which undermine the authority of historical records (Wright, 1985, p. 58). Wright goes 
on to note that the inclusion of diverse interpretations of the past into a singular heritage discourse is 
partly responsible for society’s obsession with heritage and the expansion of the so-called heritage 
industry (Wright, 1985, p. 61). Wright argues that the obsession with interpreting past events to 
include individual narratives does not allow a culture to stagnate by trapping it in the past, but instead 
makes a society more self-reflective and knowledgeable about the contemporary situation (Wright, 
1985, p. 65). He goes further to suggest that in order for it to survive heritage must always be seen 
to be under threat and in need of protection, whether physical or psychological; the notion of heritage 
decay (and in conflict, damage in warfare) is countered by an impetus to rescue and protect (Wright, 
1985, p. 69). By framing heritage in the discourse of danger, loss, and constant threat the need for 
intervention, management, and its subsequent ability to control and change the past is justified and 
approved without interrogating why it should be protected. 
The source of heritage messages, values and interpretation is usually elites, intellectuals and those in 
power (McManamon, 2000, p. 6). The past is not objective, truthful nor legitimate, rather it is the 
collective agreement that the heritage presented is believed to have occurred (Howard, 2003, p. 205). 
The previous two sections have shown that the past is interpreted from a multitude of perspectives 
based on the reactions of many individuals to a singular event or stimulus; and the incorporation of 
these perspectives into the AHD fragment and disrupt the purported singularity of history, and create 
alternate histories and interpretations which change the value and meaning of heritage. The 
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conception of the past as neither truthful nor objective was reiterated during the research in 
Dubrovnik. 
David Lowenthal suggests that the increasing global attention to heritage has created a “crusade like 
obsession with tradition and cultural rights” (Lowenthal, 1998, p. 5), and created a new and complex 
process of negotiating history that is open to influence and manipulation both for “good and evil” 
(Lowenthal, 1998, p. 6). Heritage as a source for “good” allows communities to reconnect to the past 
in the face of present turmoil, offering them an avenue to locate themselves in the narrative of history 
and legitimise their identities (both in conflict and peacetime), but heritage can also act as a source 
of “evil” when the narrative that is presented is not seen as inclusive or reflective of those who claim 
ownership (Lowenthal, 1998, p. 10). In peaceful contexts when the contested heritage it is not always 
accepted, the outcome is seldom violent. However, in a fragile post-conflict context the contest over 
heritage narrative, and the perception that it is not reflective of those involved can spill into violence 
and heritage rejection (Benton, 2010a, p. 129; Clegg, 1993, p. 22). Social pressures and conventions 
allow individuals, groups, communities and governments to create narratives which are based on 
events but reworked into acceptable, holistic narratives. 
3.3 Heritage, recovery from conflict, and identity 
Identities are both shaped by and shape heritage. Heritage is the embodiment or the expression of a 
communal or individual identity that has been constructed based on an interpretation of their historic 
identities in the present (Graham and Howard, 2008a, pp. 2–3; Harvey, 2001, p. 319; Uzzell, 1989, 
p. 32). If this idea is applied to a post-conflict setting then two linked events can be seen to occur; 
firstly, in the midst of social upheaval, the legitimacy of pre-war identities is challenged (Graham 
and Howard, 2008a, p. 15); and secondly, the interpretation of history upon which heritage identities 
are based begins to be problematized as new events occurring during the conflict are incorporated 
into it (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 90; Sen, 2006, pp. 84–85). Identities undergo crisis in 
response to social upheaval in the aftermath of war, where the perceived legitimacy of pre-war 
identities is threatened by a number of factors (changing history, involvement in conflict, changing 
social power dynamics, loss of the familiar past and ontological security) (Grenville, 2007, p. 449). 
As the relationship between heritage and identities is interdependent, when identities are in a state of 
flux, so too is their existing definition of heritage. 
Social identities that are connected to a particular heritage site may be may be numerous, diverse and 
conflicting (Jones, 2005, p. 110). The upheavals resulting from conflict can fracture communities, 
altering their shared identities. However, if heritage can not only support but actually create identities 
(Harvey, 2001, pp. 320–321) heritage is an invaluable resource in a post-conflict situation to 
reconstitute fractured and fragmented identities (Harvey, 2001, pp. 320–321), or it can be used as a 
vehicle for hardened divisions, violence and hatred (Sen, 2006, p. 82). To use heritage as a tool for 
reconciliation we need to be aware of the theoretical relationships between heritage and identity and 
also recognise that heritage can reinforce identity in both positive and negative ways (Sen, 2006, p. 
83). 
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Using heritage to promote social cohesion and community identity is a highly politicised process. 
Sen states that “the connection between cultural bigotry and political tyranny can be very close” 
(Sen, 2006, p. 105). He points out the asymmetric relationship between rulers and the ruled, which 
heightens a sense of contrast between different identities (Sen, 2006, p. 105). The gap between 
cultural understanding and political decision making must be bridged with great sensitivity for the 
successful use of heritage in post-conflict recovery. Any perceived misunderstanding and 
manipulation of heritage by socio-political intervention will affect the ways in which discourses of 
heritage are received. 
3.4 Processes of Remembering and Forgetting Conflict 
The argument has been made by many that cultural heritage is a social process rather than a cultural 
product. As with memories, facets of social history are chosen to memorialise in heritage sites 
(Smith, 2006, p. 57). The collective memory attempts to establish an acceptable version of an event 
that simplifies history into an inclusive metanarrative (Misztal, 2003, p. 2). This process works on 
the assumption that events are remembered in similar ways by many different individuals, but this is 
rarely the case and so there must be other pressures influencing the creation of collective memory 
and historical discourse (Benton and Cecil, 2010). This section examines how processes of social 
remembering influence the creation of heritage, particularly through the use of collective memory, 
the practices of commemoration and the ways in which forgetting occurs within society. 
One strand of heritage studies prioritises the link between remembering and commemorating the 
past. Heritage acts as an anchor to which memories can be attached, giving both collective and 
individual memories legitimacy and a sense of place both geographically and historically through 
imagined traditions of remembrance (Misztal, 2003, p. 60). The collective commemoration that often 
occurs after times of unrest or great change (particularly conflicts) can be viewed as a way to 
incorporate social events into a public consciousness or into a collective memory (Misztal, 2003, p. 
61). Under a collective memory, individuals who experience a singular event differently will 
collectively remember it in the same general way, thus creating a definitive history and remembrance 
of an event (Connerton, 1989, pp. 18–19; Misztal, 2003, pp. 62–64). Collective memory therefore 
functions to manifest a shared past that relies on reinforcement through festivals, ceremonies and 
commemoration ceremonies to survive in a present that is constantly rewriting the past (Schudson, 
1995, p. 348; Misztal, 2003, p. 17). Schudson argues that claiming that collective memory can distort 
personal memories implies that there is a correct and incorrect way of remembering an event, and a 
fixed narrative that can be twisted to fit in the collective memory of a society (Schudson, 1995, p. 
346). Since there is no definitive metanarrative of history there can be no true memories, and 
particularly not a true collective memory (Schudson, 1995, p. 356). Thus, memory should be viewed 
as fluid interpretational remembrances of a past event that are liable to change through personal as 
well as collective recall (Schudson, 1995, pp. 355–356) 
Paul Connerton (1989, p. 72) agrees with this position to argue that the stimulus that causes memory 
making is not the only factor that causes memories. The individual’s reaction to the stimulus is as 
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much part of the memory making process as the event itself (Connerton, 1989, p. 73). Emotional and 
psychological responses to an event can alter the way an individual remembers it, and in doing so 
they diversify and influence the collective memory of the event in question significantly altering the 
way an event is portrayed in history (Connerton, 1989, p. 15). Collective memory can be used as a 
political tool to prioritise certain narratives that support a particular agenda (Misztal, 2003, p. 11). 
Although, as Schudson suggests, memories can neither be correct or incorrect (1995, p. 354), the 
prioritisation and legitimisation of certain memories over others can control belief that memories can 
be true or false (Clegg, 1993, pp. 20–21). However, some memories are perceived to be more 
acceptable than others (Warnock, 1989, pp. 70–73) and from this it can be argued that collective 
memories are based on interpretation and subjective reactions to the event and the legitimisation of 
these events through authorised discourse and their attractiveness to the power structures in place at 
the time. 
It can be argued that the most important (or at least the most visual) function of cultural heritage in 
the aftermath of conflict is its role in memory, particularly in commemoration (Ashplant, 2000, p. 
363). Paul Connerton’s exploration of collective memory and commemoration suggest that memories 
are created not only by the event that gives rise to them, but also by the ways in which a society 
remembers or commemorates an event (Connerton, 1989, p. 26). When societies remember ancient 
or long-past events, all that is being remembered is the communal re-imagining of the events. In the 
case of more recent events, individual memories are turned into communal memories in order to 
create a context of the past event, and to situate oneself in the tapestry of history (Ashworth and 
Tunbridge, 1996, pp. 5–6). The past may be an infinite resource; memories however, are likely to 
fade and be forgotten. The concept of generational memory is pertinent to the use of memory in 
conflict (Connerton, 2008, pp. 59–60). Schuman and Scott argue that individual memories of an 
event have a shelf life of three generations; that is the individual, the generation below (children) and 
the generation below that (grandchildren) (Schuman and Scott, 1989, p. 364). Schuman and Scott 
say that not only is the life of a memory generational but it has close ties to family history, and when 
family and generational ties are broken (by displacement, death or rifts) there is little likelihood of a 
particular memory being brought to the collective remembrance of an event (Schuman and Scott, 
1989, p. 359). This is extremely poignant after the atrocities of war and the effect war has on family 
and generational ties. 
Remembering conflict has two functions; first, to commemorate the conflict itself (Ashplant, 2000, 
p. 363) and secondly to confront a difficult past (Baddeley, 1989, p. 42). The Truth and 
Reconciliation commissions in ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda are advocates of this second use of 
memory and they have attempted to use memories of past atrocities to confront and come to terms 
with war crimes enacted at different levels of society (from prosecuting those responsible for 
organising and orchestrating atrocities, to confronting individuals who were party to war crimes). 
Analysing the success of the Truth and Reconciliation commission is not within the scope of this 
research, but the investigation of atrocities by using memories has parallels with the aims of this 
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project, as both seek to emphasise the importance of using the interpretation of past events as a crucial 
aspect of recovery from conflict (Bloomfield, Barnes and Huyse, 2003b).  
A significant aspect that affects how heritage is formed after conflict is the way it was used in 
conflict. Connerton argues that there are various ways a dissonant event is forcibly forgotten to ensure 
that a culture can come to terms and survive an attack on their identities (Connerton, 2008, p. 60-61), 
and in doing so attempts to distance a present incarnation of culture from a difficult past as victim or 
victimizer (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 95).  Lemkin’s theories on genocide argue that the 
attack on heritage is an attack on culture itself, and an attempt to erase said culture from existence 
both by destroying culture and people, an also ensuring that survivors cannot reconnect to a destroyed 
cultural past (Lemkin, 1947, p.48-56). The destruction of heritage here serves to disconnect people 
from place in order obliterate their connection to a shared identity and replace it with another, and in 
doing so erase the cultural group from collective memory so that it is not possible for the past to be 
reclaimed (Fournet, 2016, p.44). It has been argued in this chapter that heritage can survive physical 
destruction as heritage is capable of living within the memory of its people and physical heritage can 
be reinstated and restored (albeit in altered form) after their destruction if memories survive 
(Macdonald, 2009, p. 2); however, where all evidence of heritage is erased by the destruction of 
those connected to it, the memory of heritage is also destroyed. Bevan argues that the targeted use of 
heritage in conflict is an active way not only to destroy heritage for future generations, but also to 
erase past heritage to deny it ever had legitimacy or a right to exist (Bevan, 2016, p. 7). 
Andras Riedlmayer accelerated the debate into whether attacks to cultural heritage should be 
considered as acts of genocide a step further by correlating cultural violence with ethnic cleansing 
by conducting research into the systematic destruction of Mosques in Bosnia in the 1990s, and 
presenting this at the ICTY proceedings (Riedlmayer, 2007). Riedlmayer testified before the ICTY 
that when the destroyed Mosques were plotted on a map, they matched Serb controlled areas which 
had also been recorded as host to ethnic cleansing (Bevan, 2016, p.45); this gave a tangible and 
evidentiary correlation between acts of cultural destruction and acts of genocide. Riedlmayer notes 
that the conflicts in the Balkans were not only characterised by ethnic cleansing and horrific loss of 
life, but also by a systematic attack on the cultural heritage of all involved (Riedlmayer, 1995, p. 8). 
The destruction of libraries, museums, and religious sites acted not only to destroy the cultural 
property, but also the cultural memories they stored. The destruction of written records of culture 
alongside the erasure of collective memory through the massacre of civilians served to erase these 
cultures from memory, and reduce what remains to physical structures whose meaning becomes 
synonymous with destruction of culture rather than remembering what made this cultural heritage 
significant. Riedlmayer argued that despite the lack of cultural genocide appearing as an aspect of 
international law, there is growing acceptance that there is a clear link between the destruction 
cultural heritage sites, the resulting erasure of knowledge and memory, and its impact on facilitating 
genocide (Riedlmayer, 2007, p. 128).  
Material heritage in this approach plays a dual purpose in the creation of cultural memories; it at once 
seems fixed and permanent but is capable of having its meaning evolved and changed in order to suit 
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the needs of its contemporary ownership. In doing so, heritage is expressed through architecture both 
to create contemporary cultural distinctness form others but to do so based on a legitimate legacy 
from the past. The result is that heritage and architecture can deepen insular cultural bonds within a 
group, and ostracise itself of other from inclusion into said culture. By creating difference and 
distinctiveness, a culture can give rise to an imagined supremacy which provokes a reaction from 
those who reject or clash with this constructed past and can result in the destruction of the material 
site which expresses it (Riedlmayer, 2007).  
Material heritage or architecture relies on its apparent permanence to connect people to a legitimate 
past to justify future actions; in appearing to be a fixed entity that controlled history, built heritage is 
capable of producing cultural norms and traditions that are defended as if they have always existed 
(Bevan, 2016, p. 12). This masks the impermanence of heritage and the ever changing narratives and 
memories that shape it; the meaning of a site will evolve and change in response to its contemporary 
use, but appearing to be a fixed entity allows it to be seen as somehow above and beyond 
contemporary politics and protected as such in conflict legislation (Bevan, 2016, p.23). Bevan argues 
that the apparent permanence of architecture is what renders it so malleable to interpretation after 
conflict, and why damage to architecture is such a manipulative tool in conflict as it can recreate not 
only the significance of the site but also increase the significance of the attack (Bevan, 2016, p 35).  
In effect, the attempted destruction of heritage serves to increase its significance in the perceptions 
of its owners and increase their historic connection to the site by prompting a culture to examine their 
connection to the site through their collective memory; where a culture is reminded of the value of 
its heritage through attacks to the physical manifestations of culture, the outrage and reaction to the 
attack increases proportionally (Bevan, 2016, p. 16). The Buddhas of Bamiyan are an example of 
this effect, where the outrage generated by the destruction of the Buddhas resulted in their designation 
as a world heritage sites, whereas their less-well publicised existence prior to destruction did not.   
Herscher and Riedlmayer note that the conflicts in the 1990s were a turning point in the use of cultural 
heritage in conflict and in the political retributions and criminal proceedings following conflict. The 
use of evidence relating to the illegal treatment of cultural property in the Balkans conflict became a 
feature of the ICTY trials, and set a precedence for their use in further proceeding (Herscher and 
Riedlmayer, 2000, p. 108). Herscher and Riedlmayer noted that it was an expected result that with 
the rise in using of cultural property as evidence for war crimes there was also a rise in its recruitment 
to support political ambitions following conflict (Herscher and Riedlmayer, 2000, p. 108). Using 
Kosovo as a case study, Herscher and Riedlmayer investigated how heritage was used to political 
advantage after the violence has ceased in 1999. To give the discussion into political use of heritage 
in Kosovo context, this case study is outlined briefly below.  
During the conflict in Kosovo in 1998-1999, Mosques were purposefully targeted by Serb forces and 
resulted in a huge number of these buildings being damaged or destroyed. After the conflict, the 
majority of Serbian cultural sites within Kosovo were left abandoned, and became targets of 
retribution after the conflict by returning Albanians. On the basis of these attacks, the Serbian 
government tried (unsuccessfully) to petition the UN into allowing Serbian troops and police forces 
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to re-enter Kosovo in an attempt to protect their cultural heritage. Although the petition was denied, 
the Serbian government continued to press the UN on destruction to Serbian heritage in Kosovo, 
with no reference to the sustained attack on Kosovan heritage that preceded the retaliation. Herscher 
and Riedlmayer note that the conclusion of this argument over which party is the victim and 
victimizer of heritage vandalism has resulted in the events being removed from public discourse, as 
each party tried to distance themselves from accusations or were unable to produce reliable evidence. 
In turn, this has resulted in cultural heritage becoming a lesser known aspect of the Kosovo conflict 
and allowed humanitarian intervention to focus on basic needs rather than incorporating cultural 
needs into their approaches. This was not reflective of similar interventions made in Bosnia, Serbia, 
or Croatia where cultural diversity and division were considered as fundamental aspects of the 
recovery process and discussed at length when determining the causes of the conflict (Herscher and 
Riedlmayer 2000., p. 110-114).   
Herscher and Riedlmayer argue that the lack of reference to culture and heritage in international 
interventions render the Kosvans as victims, and blocks of any avenue to escape this new cultural 
categorisation (Herscher and Riedlmayer, 2000, p. 113). From this it is possible to argue that the 
destruction of Kosovan heritage resulted not only in the loss of the tangible heritage sites, but also 
the cultural ties to their past and memories, and in doing so facilitated the enforcement of a new 
culture on the Kosovans which denied them access to their pasts. This concept of enforcing a new 
culture onto a group has links to the erasure of identities as an aspect needed to facilitate genocide.  
The escalating tensions around built heritage, both in constructing and destroying cultural meaning 
and sites, is particularly relevant to the Balkan conflicts in the 1990s, and the widespread purposeful 
attacks on cultural heritage that framed the conflict. For Bevan, the use of heritage as a tool in conflict 
cannot be separated from other genocidal acts made in these conflicts wherein the ethnic violence 
and retribution between Croat and Serbian hostilities in the 1990s resulted in thousands of deaths, 
motivated and supported by constructed cultural difference (Bevan, 2016, p. 35). The distinction 
made between violence and cultural violence in legislation is particularly blurred and absent when 
considering sites such as Mostar, Vukovar and Dubrovnik. These sites were host to purposeful 
attacks against culturally significant sites which were made before and alongside mass murder and 
atrocity in order to dehumanize the cultural groups ascribing to the sites, and to provoke violence in 
response as justification for continued barbarity (Bevan, 2016, p. 6). The reconstruction of these sites 
after the wars reflect the new history of violence associated with them. 
Similarly to Lemkin (1947, p.48-56), Bevan argues that the attacks on places of cultural significance 
through the vandalism of the physical sites and the erasure of their cultural meaning through the 
brutalisation of cultures at these sites renders these attacks as a singular attack on culture, and 
suggests that diving cultural heritage from the definition of genocide disregards the impact cultural 
destruction has on laying the foundation for violence and mass murder (Bevan, 2016, p. 8).   
 For Bevan, a physical cultural site is not only a marker of significance but places where cultural 
difference can be targeted most effectively and destroyed, in this argument the belligerent must first 
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create or accept the meaning and significance of heritage before purposefully destroying it (Bevan, 
2016, p. 10). This argument is similar to the arguments made by Amayta Sen who suggests that in 
order to justify and continue violence in conflict, the cultures in contest must be constructed to be 
incompatible, and can only continue to do so by reinforcing difference through the rejection and 
othering of opposing cultures, and cementing this imagined incompatibility through violence (Sen, 
2006, p. 82)  This construction of cultural difference is created both through the acceptance 
(demonstrated by rejection) of traditional cultural signs and symbols such as historically important 
monuments and religious iconography, but also can occur through the acceptance and retaliation of 
designation of significance through legislative attempts to protect it such as the 1954 Hague 
Convention or the 1972 World Heritage Convention. As this research has argued, Bevan suggests 
that the protection of heritage in conflict is limited in its ability as it does not fully connect attacks 
on cultural property to attacks on culture itself (Bevan, 2016 p. 202). Overall, this thesis and the 
IHAF approach build out from Bevan’s position regarding the inextricable links between cultural 
property and culture, and seek to develop a means of holistically exploring the links between cultural 
heritage and post-conflict recovery.  
3.5 Summary: Towards a holistic conceptualisation of cultural heritage 
The objective of this chapter was to explore definitions of cultural heritage across existing literature, 
and to introduce the understanding that will inform the IHAF. Drawing on insights from across this 
literature, it is suggested that a holistic conceptualisation must be adopted to allow for the focuses 
and concerns introduced through existing literature to be bridged between. Specifically, it is 
suggested that heritage must be considered to be a varied and complex social process, rather than a 
fixed definition culminating in a physical site. This argument has been carried out by assessing the 
various ways in which heritage has been regulated in formal conventions and charters, and by 
investigating some of the key conceptual attributes that define heritage (namely interpretation, 
discourses of power, identity politics, and processes of remembering and forgetting).  
Heritage is a complex process of interpreting history, and using that interpretation to create a 
powerful narrative of what has occurred and how it should be perceived by its audience. Smith (2006) 
has argued that heritage is a process, and this chapter has built on this to suggest that the interpretative 
narrative of heritage influences the cultural identity of an area by encouraging a society to adhere 
and accept the narrative expressed in physical cultural heritage sites as well as the intangible 
narratives and traditions around them.  
Heritage influences the way the past is perceived in the present, but it also helps to orchestrate what 
is remembered and how it is remembered for future generations. The applications for this argument 
in theatres of conflict and in the post-conflict recovery are profound; subsequent chapters will argue 
that the way conflicts are interpreted, manipulated, and represented by heritage alter not only how 
the events of a conflict are remembered, but how contemporary society use them to justify their own 
cultural bias and perceptions.  
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The formal conventions, agreements, and charters which govern the conservation of heritage show 
how the definition of heritage has evolved over time shifting from a focus on the material fabric of 
sites in the Venice charter to the appreciation of intangible practice expressed through physical 
structures in the Nara Charter. This shift in focus reveals that although the physical heritage site can 
be considered as a constituent part of heritage, but it cannot be considered to be the definitive aspect 
of heritage. Instead, heritage is a process of interpretation and narrative creation wherein a site or 
event is interpreted and turned into a narrative discourse which is dependent on the whims and 
pressures of the contemporary geo-political climate. The definition of heritage as a process of 
creating and supporting contemporary cultures is at the core of this thesis, and the arguments of 
subsequent chapters use this as a foundation for the investigation into the role of heritage in post-
conflict recovery. The narratives behind heritage decide what is valuable, who is valuable, what is 
memorable, how it should be remembered, what should be excluded, and how identities connect to 
it. This defines heritage as an active process which connects people to places and the past through 
the interpretation and creation of heritage discourses, which are symbolised and strengthened by 
physical heritage sites. 
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Chapter Four: The role of heritage in Conflict 
Previous chapters have highlighted importance of interrogating meaning of cultural heritage and 
practices of cultural heritage protection. Here, attention turns to understanding of the nature and 
drivers of ‘conflict’, and how heritage influences and interacts with conflict. The previous chapters 
have argued that the conceptualisation of heritage is not a fixed entity, but a fluid flexible process of 
creating and supporting identity. Despite the influence heritage has over the cultural identities, 
heritage in conflict is often regarded as a victim of conflict, and its meaning limited to its material 
fabric and the damage done to it. This chapter argues that heritage has a huge influence on the causes 
and consequences of war, and its careful manipulation has the power and the means to alter the course 
of a conflict to ignite violence or to bolster peace and stability. The use of heritage in any community 
alters it; the history and identity represented by heritage are changed in response to the needs and 
wants of its contemporary owner. In conflict, these needs and wants are highly pressured, and the 
process of creating meaning and narrative are exacerbated, changing the meaning of heritage to 
support of vilify actions in a conflict. This chapter argues that not only does heritage have the power 
to alter a conflict, it has the power to create a legacy narrative of conflict which can be used to justify 
simmering tensions and recriminations after the war. Regarding heritage as the sum of its physical 
parts in conflict risks lessening the impacts the less tangible aspects of heritage have on the post-
conflict landscape. Using the holistic definition of heritage offered by the previous chapters as a 
foundation, it is argued that that the creation of an authorised historical narrative of conflict has the 
power to legitimise (and delegitimise) the experiences of all those involved in the conflict, and use 
these experiences and identities to create a divisive history of cultural difference between combative 
foes in order to justify past, present, and future violence. 
Built heritage and intangible heritage are profoundly affected by conflict; built heritage sustains 
visible damage that requires attention and conservation for the structure to survive, and the intangible 
associations between people and places are irrevocably changed to incorporate (or reject) war 
narratives into the ongoing lifecycle of a heritage site (Ashplant, Dawson and Roper, 2000, p. 4). 
Although the site often survives the conflict, its meaning and protection in a post-conflict 
environment remains under threat by a new and altered reality (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 
95). Intangible heritage without an anchor in the form of a built heritage site can itself decay through 
processes of forgetting and cultural alienation (Connerton, 2008, pp. 59–60). 
Conceptualising heritage as a process of dynamic meaning-making allows it to be perceived as a 
potential cause of conflict and a tool in recovery programmes (Silverman and Fairchild Ruggles, 
2007, p. 3). Re-imagining heritage as a process, rather than as an object, is at the heart of this research. 
Heritage serves not only as a record of cultural significance over time and space, but as a record of 
conflict, imperialism, colonisation and occupation (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 96). Until the 
rise of postmodern thought, that accepted plural interpretations of history, historical narratives 
focused on singular and significant upheavals rather than multitudinous small-scale changes 
(Ashworth, Graham, and Tunbridge, 2007, p. 99). They consisted of accounts of regime change, 
battles won and lost, artefacts taken as the spoils of war and the colonisation of weaker groups by 
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stronger nations (Sen, 2006, p. 88). Recently, narratives of war have taken up plural and multi-vocal 
accounts, undermining the authority of historical meta-narratives (Smith, 2006, pp. 41–42). 
Triumphalist narratives of war have become undermined by contrary accounts depicting horrific 
memories and acts (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 35). Simultaneously, narratives of survival 
and hope in the face of conflict have emerged; diversifying experiences and memories of war 
(Connerton, 1989, p. 113). In this context, built heritage in the aftermath of a conflict has become 
imbued with a multitude of meanings and interpretations that may modify or even undermine from 
the original concept of the site as heritage. 
4.1 Understanding Conflict 
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program defines armed conflict as a “contested incompatibility which 
concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at 
least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (Uppsala Conflict 
Development Program, 2012). The Uppsala definition does not help with our understanding of how 
and why conflicts occur. To improve our grasp of this topic, this section looks at the different 
conceptualisations of conflict from a cultural perspective. 
4.1.1 Cultural Heritage and Violence 
Heritage is as an important issue in conflict, but understanding its function remains a subject of much 
debate. Amartya Sen encapsulates this argument by noting that “the world has come to the conclusion 
– more defiantly than should have been needed – that culture matters. The world is obviously right- 
culture does matter, however, the real question is: How does culture matter?” (Sen, 2006, p. 103). 
Sen goes on to argue that a reductionist view that seeks to understand culture in simplified and 
polarised terms limits our ability to respond to culture (Sen, 2006, p. 103). Sen argues that by 
constructing these polarisations we are merely reinforcing structures of opposition and encouraging 
the polarisation to harden and divide society. Sen sees the hardening division between Western and 
non-Western cultural attributes as metaphor for the evolution of the hardening of cultural identities 
leading to violence (Sen, 2006, p. 50). The cultural identities of the West and their impact on non-
Western cultures has been explored in Chapter Three, but its acquired its fully negative character 
when these constructed difference between cultures becomes a defining feature of both (Sen, 2006, 
pp. 51–52). This definition-by-difference is a fundamental cause of tension and friction; when parties 
become so reliant on fabricated differences of identity that now define them that they cannot avoid 
the violence that follows (Said, 1979, p. 12; Sen, 2006, p. 86). The authorised political discourse that 
enshrines cultural difference encourages the violent protection of culture from outside threats. 
Sen cautions that partitioning cultures through the definition-by-difference of cultural identities is 
destined to fail as it cannot explain or understand either heterogeneity within a culture or similarities 
between cultures (Sen, 2006, p. 58). The reliance on imagined difference is destabilised by the real 
similarities – such as similar perceptions and use of science, trade, commerce, and technology (Sen, 
2006, pp. 58–59). Thus, cultures that have come to be defined by their difference are constantly under 
pressure to assert that very difference in order to survive in the face of naturally evolving cultural 
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similarities. Philip Hammack argues that bolstering and reinforcing cultural identities in tumultuous 
contexts is a reaction against threats to an individual culture through increased reliance on familiar 
traditions and the ontological security they provide (Hammack, 2008, p. 225). For Hammock, 
cultural identities and the way they are perceived and managed in contexts of conflict have a direct 
influence on local security and local tensions; as the world becomes ever more connected more 
cultures interact with each other and the ways in which the past is interpreted changes the meaning 
and connections between people and place (Hammack, 2008, p. 226). The result of this can either be 
multiculturalism and cultural diversity or cultural division, increased nationalism, culturally defined 
‘others’, and the resurfacing of armed conflict (Agnew and Muscarà, 2012, pp. 178–179; Hammack, 
2008, p. 226; Said, 1994, p. 12; Sen, 2006, p. 58). 
4.1.2 Causes of Conflict: Cultural Identity and Resources 
Mary Kaldor’s theory on “new” wars argue that there are distinct changes between how and why 
wars were fought in the nineteenth and twentieth century, and the new wars of the late-twentieth and 
twenty-first century (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2). She notes that the logic behind the new wars is distinct 
from old wars in its goals, actors, methods and finance. Old wars were characterised by regimented 
army units aiming to gain geo-political or ideological advantage, whereas new wars are fought by a 
combination of both state and non-state combatants and aim to further control or the rights of a 
particular cultural group in a state (Kaldor, 2013, pp. 1–2). In the face of increased globalisation 
since the Second World War and the end of the Cold War, wars are now fought with the aim of 
creating, protecting, and mobilising cultural identities rather than to further a geo-political agenda 
(Kaldor, 2013, p. 2). The wars in the Balkans can be considered to be new war in that many different 
cultural identities clashed in both state and non-state authorised violence in order to promote their 
own culture and identity as the sole owner of Slav culture. 
In this reading, the Yugoslav conflict focused on creating and maintaining individual national 
identities by the violent suppression of others (Kaldor, 2006, p. 35). In doing so, Balkan countries 
created a cultural hatred between themselves based on the imagined animosity in the past. These new 
wars are thus fought by emerging nationalist identities that are constructed by violent conflicts and 
in turn perpetuate them (Kaldor, 2004, p. 167). This constructed identity is based on a preconceived 
idea of the past that is used and manipulated to suit needs and ideologies in the present (Anderson, 
2006, p. 16). Thus, violent conflict and the cultural identity that emerges from it is created both by 
state controlled geo-political aspirations, and the ideologies of disillusioned and disenfranchised 
communities (Kaldor, 2004, p. 168). 
The new war thesis has been criticised. It is argued that as the characteristics of the new wars are 
also present in the old wars they cannot be new (Berdal, 2003, p. 477) and there is no way to measure 
the difference and distinction between these two types (Henderson and Singer, 2002, p. 167). Kaldor 
counters this challenge by suggesting that although some characteristics of violence and culture were 
present in old wars, they were not used in the same way or to the same degree (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2); 
that the use of the word new does not create an exclusive division between old and new, but 
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differentiates between the two (Kaldor, 2013, p. 1). Whereas the success of old wars is measured in 
geo-political gains, new wars are measured by the damage caused by and to cultural groups, the 
economic and political benefits of war, and the cementing of cultural identities (Kaldor, 2013, p. 3). 
New war theory goes against a grand historical narrative of cultural violence in the Balkans presented 
by Misha Glenny and others, which suggest that animosity between cultural groups has been slowly 
constructed over centuries of warfare governed by European powers (Glenny, 2000, p. 27). The use 
of culture and identity in the creation and continuation of violence is shown here to be an important 
aspect of conflict as well as a key motivator in the control and subjugation of an area. Kaldor and 
Sen argue that culture is a driving force of violent conflict through its connection to ideology and 
identity, and the power these attributes have (Kaldor, 2013, p. 2; Sen, 2006, p. 86).  
Economic motivations are a leading cause of conflict. With the rise of neo-liberalism and the power 
of the free market, economic control was perceived to lie less with political or governmental forces, 
and more in the hands of the commerce (Collier, 2000, p. 92). In a so-called developing state, 
different groups compete for access to finance as development is not a unilaterally equal process 
(Collier, 2000, pp. 98–99). Some parts of society are able to develop more quickly than others; and 
in this context of economic inequality the developing state is unable to redress the imbalance (Collier, 
2000, p. 92). Jacoby notes that when some social groups believe they are worse off than the rest of 
their society, smouldering social and religious tensions can boil over into conflict (Jacoby, 2008, pp. 
78–79). If heritage is conceptualised as an economic resource than it functions as a symbol of cultural 
disparity wherein ownership of this prized resource denotes the owner’s economic and cultural 
superiority. It also gives their rivals an incentive to take it away or destroy it so as to negatively affect 
their financial and cultural stability. In the case of built heritage, this can occur through looting and 
iconoclasm (Jacoby, 2008, p. 34 as well as by the repression of cultural links to heritage (such as the 
subjugation of minority religions and making traditional practices illegal) (Silverman and Fairchild 
Ruggles, 2007, p. 3). 
4.2 Conflict and Cultural Heritage 
As a symbol of national or regional difference heritage can act simultaneously to celebrate society 
or as to inflame aggression (Jacoby, 2008, p. 79). The primary way that heritage causes conflict is 
by the close links between heritage and identity (Harvey, 2001, p. 319). If heritage is perceived to be 
an expression or embodiment of the identity of a community or society, then an attack on their 
heritage is an attack on their identity (Sen, 2006, p. 86). In times of conflict, where tensions are 
already heightened, heritage can thus become both a target and rallying point for conflict (Panjabi 
and Winter, 2009, p. 20), as well as a way to distort and manipulate the past to justify actions in the 
present (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 95), and a means to control the remembrance of the 
conflict in the future (Connerton, 2008, p. 59). 
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4.2.1 Contested Narratives and Control 
Heritage is often considered as a positive aspect of society: as a common good that benefits all levels 
of society. However, as heritage can both bind and divide groups (Silverman and Fairchild Ruggles, 
2007, p. 7). The clash over interpretations, cultural identities and ownership claims can inspire 
competition and conflict. When there is contestation over heritage, there are also tensions and the 
potential for violent conflict (Silverman and Fairchild Ruggles, 2007, p. 21). Silverman and Ruggles 
note that heritage is neither neutral nor inherently positive. Instead it “can promote self-knowledge, 
facilitate communication and learning, and guide the stewardship of the present culture and its 
historic past” (Silverman and Fairchild Ruggles, 2007, p. 3). It can also be a tool for oppression and 
it has a difficult and negative relationship with the promotion of universal human rights (Silverman 
and Fairchild Ruggles, 2007, p. 3). However, if one considers heritage to be a process (rather than a 
concept, as Silverman and Ruggles suggest) then the manipulation, use and management of heritage 
becomes the cause of contention and conflict. Conflict is therefore a contest over the interpretation 
of heritage rather than over the heritage itself. 
Through contestation a single heritage site in times of peace may display multiple histories and 
identities (Hall, 1999, p. 4). In times of conflict, this multiple significance reveals the fractures in 
society and such heritage can become a place of contention where several different ideologies clash 
over its meaning, ownership and history (Smith, 2006, pp. 47–48). Opposing forces may try to gain 
control of heritage and by doing so gain control over the narrative of history. This could help explain 
why WHSs are often targeted in war. They mark and reinforce identity as symbols of Western 
dominance over international heritage (Said, 1994, p. 32; Smith, 2006, p. 26), as symbols of tension 
between cultures (Sen, 2006, p. 103), as war trophies (Lowenthal, 1998, p. xiv; Rothfield, 2009), as 
political statements (ICTY, 2003), and as jealously coveted economic markers of superiority (Collier, 
2000, p. 25). While the relationship between culture and cultural heritage to the dynamic of conflicts 
has not yet been fully researched, the literature does assume that culture matters, but does not show 
why or how (Sen, 2006, p. 103). This question is, however, raised in this literature review which 
argues that heritage, as a marker of cultural identity, can become imbued with significant but 
contested meanings (cultural or economic) which are both created by conflict and also create conflict. 
The next section explores how heritage is conceptualised in the post-conflict arena, and examines 
the influence of the tensions described here on the creation and negotiation of heritage after conflict. 
4.3 Manipulating Culture: The Destruction of Palmyra, Syria 
In 2014 heritage took centre stage when it became the target of violence in Daesh’s (ISIL, IS or ISIS) 
ongoing terror campaign across Syria and Iraq (BBC, 2015). Daesh’s modus operandi originates 
from their cultural claims as an ultra-conservative Sunni Muslim faction waging war against the West 
and on Western values and religion (Chulov, 2015). Their interpretation of Islam has allowed them 
to perpetrate acts of extreme and grotesque violence. Culture and cultural manipulation is a core 
principle that has allowed Daesh to progress to its contemporary position of power, and to continue 
to gain dominance in Syria and Iraq (Chulov, 2015). At the core of Daesh’s manipulations is their 
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creation of culture by division (which has been discussed in this chapter with reference to Sen [2006] 
and Said [1979]). Daesh is able to function so long as it can create an ‘other’, a lesser entity to push 
against. For Daesh, this entity is anyone and anything that is not itself; the uncategorised ‘West’ is 
the primary target, but so is any religion, Muslim, and the Yazidi population, who have been 
particularly brutalised by Daesh (BBC, 2015). Daesh’s use of culture as a weapon is not uncommon; 
but what sets Daesh apart is its public celebration of the horrific consequences of their acts (Shaheen, 
Swann and Levett, 2015). Daesh does not so much claim its terrorist acts, as has been the case for 
the latter half of the twentieth century, as much as it actively celebrates them (Harrison-Graham, 
2015). Cultural heritage (or rather, built heritage) took centre stage in Daesh’s cultural conquest when 
it began to target and destroy cultural sites whilst carefully filming and broadcasting the destruction 
in the media (Harrison-Graham, 2015). As Chapter One introduced, heritage sites in conflict areas 
take on an extra layer of meaning, becoming not just markers of cultural significance but also markers 
of internationalism and Western intervention (Tomlinson, 2002; Francioni, 2013), such as in the case 
of the Buddhas in the Bamiyan Valley. Daesh’s widespread destruction of cultural sites since 2013 
is both an explicit attack on international cultures and an attempt to use culture to reinforce the ultra-
violent identity they have created. 
In September 2015 Daesh attached explosives to the ancient columns of the Roman town of Palmyra 
and destroyed it (Harrison-Graham, 2015). The event was filmed by the perpetrators and widely 
broadcast on both traditional and new media (Shaheen, Swann, Levett, 2015). The WHS had been 
under Daesh’s control since May, and there is anecdotal evidence that it may have been destroyed 
only after it had been thoroughly looted of any moveable property (Shaheen and Black, 2015). The 
Keeper of Antiquities Khaled al-Asaad was brutally murdered and his body displayed in the town 
before it was destroyed, and it is believed he was interrogated for months on the location of valuable 
artefacts (Shaheen, Swann, and Levett, 2015). In destroying Palmyra Daesh have shown the 
significance of heritage use in conflict. Firstly, it shows that cultural heritage can become a target in 
conflict. The city had survived for over two thousand years despite its location in an area embroiled 
in contemporary and historical conflict, but it was destroyed by a (relatively) new terrorist group. 
Secondly, it has shown that rhetoric of cultural division and difference can be used to justify the 
destruction of cultural property. In contrast to Dubrovnik, Bamiyan, Mostar, and countless other 
destroyed heritage sites, the destruction of Palmyra was not justified by arguments about cultural 
difference or religious icons; no such argument was required. Thirdly, it shows the lack of will of the 
international community to take action in such cases. Although the attack contravened international 
law and was anticipated for months no intervention strategy was put in place. And lastly, it shows 
that heritage is not only the stage for acts of violence, it is also their cause and target.  
4.4  Heritage in conflict and post-conflict recovery 
It is argued in this chapter that heritage is not a passive bystander in conflict, but is a process that 
actively contributes to the causes of conflict. Kaldor (2013, pp.1-2) argues that culture and identity 
can be considered to be the reason what conflicts erupt. She suggests that in ‘new’ wars (post-1990) 
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the aim of conflict is to dominate the culture of another by prioritising your own identity and 
forcefully eradicating the other. This chapter investigated how heritage interacted with Kaldor’s new 
war theory to suggest that heritage is fundamental in creating and transmitting cultural superiority 
which are symbolised at physical heritage sites (Silverman and Fairchild Ruggles, 2007, p. 3). In this 
way heritage either becomes a rallying point or a target depending on which side of a conflict an 
actor is on. This chapter takes this argument a step further and suggests that heritage is also a way to 
justify violence, and in doing so escalate and continue conflict. Sen suggests that during war culture 
and identities violently attack one another; in doing so they alter themselves to become more violent 
to justify acts they have perpetrated, and to reciprocate similarly violent attacks made towards them 
(Sen, 2006, p. 103). Sen argues that this creates a spiral violence, wherein cultural identities become 
increasingly violent based on an imagined past of culture of inherent violence (Sen, 2006, pp. 58–
59). This chapter argues that heritage is linked to this construction of violence as it becomes a way 
to demonstrate cultural superiority (or destruction), which in turn lends legitimacy to the brutal 
treatment of different cultures and ideology deemed inferior (Meskell, 2010, p. 193). In this way 
heritage acts as a narrative of cultural dominance that subjugates cultures based on the contemporary 
needs of a society at war.  
Heritage cannot be considered as only a recipient of damage during conflict, instead it must be seen 
as an active process which shapes the cultural discourse of conflict. Furthermore, it is argued by this 
thesis that heritage is not a passive place where cultural and ethnic divisions can be seen through 
different inherited cultural symbols (Kaplan 2001, p. 7); heritage creates cultural difference through 
the narratives of division it is capable of creating. By the time cultural property is purposefully 
attacked or destroyed, it can be argued that the violent narratives of cultural dominance and 
ideological superiority have already become entrenched in the discourses of heritage. From the 
literature explored in this chapter it is argued that heritage has the potential to change the course of 
conflict, and is capable of inciting devastating violence and cultural division. It has become clear in 
this chapter that the influence of heritage on the causes and continuation of violent conflict cannot 
(or should not) be ignored; from this stance it is argued that understanding the impact of heritage in 
the post-conflict period is imperative to better understanding how societies recover from conflict. 
The inclusion of heritage into our understanding of post-conflict recovery is fundamental to 
understanding how cultural identities have been affected by conflict, whether they will survive the 
recovery period and continue to have a legacy to build a future from, and how heritage can influence 
post-war recovery processes and socio-political relationships with other cultures. Whether heritage 
is embodied in new heritage sites and commemoration practices, or a pre-war identity and ways of 
life remerge, focus on cultural heritage will emerge in war-affected communities and understanding 
how heritage is and can be used by them is paramount in creating a way to better include and use 
heritage in post-conflict environments. 
The remainder of this chapter explores how heritage is framed in conflict and post-conflict studies 
literatures. This specifically explores conceptualisations of the relationship between heritage and 
recovery, and how this relationship is altered by conflict and the impact this has for peace and 
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reconciliatory processes. The following argument describes the three roles heritage has in post-
conflict recovery; restoring established heritage after conflict, in particular the disconnect between 
old and new ways of conceptualising heritage (Benton and Cecil, 2010, p. 8) in relation to old and 
new wars (Kaldor, 2006, p. 12); the creation of new heritage after war as a reaction to war 
(Macdonald, 2008, p. 49). This includes exploring how commemoration functions and its impact 
(Ashplant, Dawson and Roper, 2000, pp. 4–5), the inclusion or rejection of dissonance from AHD 
(Smith, 2006, p. 29) and the effect war has on the reinterpretation of the past (Howard, 2003, p. 17; 
Meskell, 2010, p. 193); and the impact of heritage on several areas of recovery, specifically, tourism 
as a signifier of economic recovery and stability (Cavlek, 2002, p. 478), processes of reconciliation 
(Bloomfield, 2003, p. 12), the relationship between conflict, heritage and post-conflict nationalism, 
(Allen, 2010, p. 198; Kaldor, 2004, p. 162). 
4.4.1 Restoring cultural heritage after conflict 
Conflict and heritage have a historical link; the commemoration of history into authorised narratives 
present conflict as a normalised part of culture, as a defining experience for all types of cultural 
groups. In historical discourse conflict is not an anomaly, it is an aspect of cultural normalcy. 
Monumental events are used in authorised discourse to bind cultures together, and to create collective 
memories of shared experiences and in doing so create an inclusive cultural group defined both 
through share memories and through the differentiation and exclusion of other groups who have not 
experienced these events. Conflicts act as a means to provide fixed points in discourse, and to create 
the illusion through heritage and commemoration that these are unalterable realities based in the past 
which shape and legitimise present and future cultural identities. 
Legislative attempts to preserve heritage in times of war take a different approach to the normalcy of 
conflict and heritage. Attempts to protect heritage in conflict rely on constructing heritage as 
something that has an intrinsic universal value which transcends contemporary political difference, 
and subsequently will not be targeted during conflict (Kaldor, 2004, p. 68; Kastenberg, 1997, p. 281). 
This construction enables heritage to be seen as a resource of value during conflict which can be 
stolen and owned by opposing factions, but does not anticipate the destruction of heritage unless it 
is to openly destroy a specific culture and attack the universal value and understanding of culture 
(Musitelli, 2005, p. 324; Sen, 2006, pp. 14–15, Merryman, 2006, p. 20). In this understanding, 
heritage functions as a constant connection to the past and historical valuation of culture, which is 
supported by the active use of heritage sites in commemoration practices (Schudson, 1995, p. 348). 
This understanding also allows for destroyed heritage to be reconstructed in the image of its previous 
incarnation because the heritage site exists both as a physical entity and a conceptual construct 
created through memory, commemoration, and necessity.  Mostar bridge in Bosnia serves as a 
poignant example of reconstructed heritage where the need to recreate a symbol of reconciled 
difference and multicultural tolerance required the heritage site to exist and offered an opportunity 
to incorporate destruction into the life cycle of the destroyed bridge. The construction of meaning at 
heritage sites can therefore be conceived not as a linear process of cultures beginning and ending 
with the creation and destruction of the site, but of a cyclical process of reuse wherein heritage can 
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be changed, destroyed, and rebuilt to create an illusion of seamless permanence of history, and in 
doing so give legitimacy to the cultures who accept the meaning of heritage sites both on a local and 
international scale (Meskell, 2010, p. 199). The process of heritage renewal and continuation is 
supported through tradition and commemoration which requires a culture to actively embody its 
heritage by performing rituals and reaffirming their connection to the authorised historical narratives 
of history by commemorating conflicts (Bevan, 2016, p. 12).  
4.4.2 Strengthening post-conflict heritage thorough commemoration 
Commemoration is an intrinsic aspect of conflict and post-conflict recovery, in which perceptions of 
a shared experience of war are woven into a collective memory and commemorated as defining 
events (Spillman, 1997, p. 24). Processes of commemoration are tightly related to the creation of a 
highly political collective memory and idea of nationhood, or what it is to be part of a community 
that has a shared the experience of war (Spillman, 1997, p. 132). Conflict (and post-conflict) are not 
discordant events that can be separated from an uninterrupted history of peace, they (and their 
commemoration) are history, or at least a defining feature of history. Nations are defined not only 
by their language or ethnicity but by their shared memories of a “political destiny”, of which war, 
violence and recovery is an essential part (Weber, 1978, pp. 922–3). As Anthony King points out, 
the experience of war becomes a unifying force around which communal identities and experiences 
crystallise which are continually supported by commemoration practices (King, 2010, p. 3). 
Commemoration is now a recognisable aspect of modern warfare, and our recognition of 
commemoration stems from the First World War, where there was a shift from remembering named 
fallen commanders to commemorating the mass of the soldiers who died (King, 2010, p. 5). The act 
of commemorating thousands of fallen soldiers helped to focus the experience of war, creating a 
singular shared experience that could be reified and remembered as history by the whole nation 
(Ashplant, 2000, pp. 17–18). Commemoration therefore plays a number of different roles; firstly, to 
remember a conflict or rather, people in conflict (Spillman, 1997, p. 30); secondly, to produce a 
shared experience and collective memory (Misztal, 2003), and thirdly, to accept, expect, and to 
become familiar with the brutal acts of war which will be present in all subsequent wars (Stanley, 
2000, p. 240). In all three interpretations of commemoration, the process is highly political and open 
to manipulation depending on what is being remembered, forgotten or commemorated (Ashplant, 
Dawson and Roper, 2000, p. 32). 
4.4.2 Creating New Heritage after Conflict 
In relation to conflict, heritage falls into two categories: pre-war heritage and post-war heritage 
(Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 112). Heritage created by conflict reflects the way that societies 
are forever changed by war. It is possible for the communities affected by conflict to use post-war 
heritage to become reconciled to the effects of the conflict; alternatively, such communities may 
instead delete, deny, or forget the war, or indeed may maintain points of conflict within post-war 
heritage (Connerton, 2008, pp. 65–70). The creation of heritage after conflict can be investigated by 
looking at how dissonant experiences are turned into heritage and also how conflicts are transmuted 
66 
into a shared understanding of the past through commemoration processes (Ashplant, 2000, p. 270; 
Winter, 2008, p. 73). The next section investigates these effects by examining the processes of 
commemoration and the inclusion of dissonant and difficult experiences into AHD. 
Dissonant Heritage and the of conflict is the reflection of the ways in which a society has been forever 
changed by warfare, as demonstrated in the popular familiarity with sites of atrocity (Macdonald, 
2009, pp. 1–3). 
Dissonant, or difficult heritage, is heritage that has been created by conflict or is existing heritage 
that has been severely altered by dissonant events and the values and meanings of heritage have 
changed (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, pp. 94–95). Dissonant heritage is also apparent in 
commemoration ceremonies that remember lives lost and the collective experience of war. The type 
of dissonant heritage that is created by conflict depends on the site and context that frames the 
dissonant event; either a site become dissonant or experiences become dissonant (Ashworth and 
Tunbridge, 1996, pp. 99–100). For example, places where genocide or massacres occurred become 
dissonant sites, and tangible signifiers of atrocity that can be visited and commemorated (Macdonald, 
2009, p. 2), whilst dissonant war experiences are carried by individuals and groups and can be turned 
into commemoration ceremonies to be remembered at sites that can be far from where they occurred, 
such as war memorials (Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz, 1991, p. 376). A third type of dissonance can 
emerge through the forgotten or hidden narratives of minority groups as humiliated silence 
(Connerton, 2008, pp. 69–70), who are able to express their dissonant experiences many years after 
the conflict has ceased, or example narratives from women civilians under the control of Soviet-
occupied East Berlin in 1945 (Anonymous, 2005). 
Sharon Macdonald explores the notion of a dissonant heritage by looking at how difficult yet 
meaningful pasts are negotiated to be interpreted, reconciled, and accepted in the present 
(Macdonald, 2009, pp. 51–53). She notes that the messages we take from conflict are normally the 
narratives of the victors, such as triumph, success over a foe, and spoils of war (Macdonald, 2009). 
But what was once perceived as triumph can soon become a source of shame and regret; colonial 
pasts, empires, and war victories have become difficult memories for societies who once celebrated 
them. The Allied bombing of Dresden in Germany in the Second World War, for example, which 
was once seen as a triumph, is now increasingly controversial (Macdonald, 2009, p. 2). 
Sites where atrocities have been performed in a conflict eventually turn into dissonant heritage sites, 
however, their survival as heritage sites suggests that interested parties want to visit them. This 
demand is known as dark tourism (Stone and Sharpley, 2008, p. 575). Stone says that people wish to 
visit such places to not only view the information on display but to look for hidden narratives or seek 
to understand and prove that obliterated narratives exist (Stone, 2009, p. 58). Biran, Poria, and Oren 
note that people chose to visit dark tourism places so as to accept responsibility for a shared 
international past, and to see the evidence to experience the existence of such places for themselves 
(Biran, Poria and Oren, 2011, p. 825). Dissonant heritage is thus only not rejected; it is actually 
sought after by various groups in society. Dissonant or dark heritage sites are simultaneously places 
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with a difficult heritage that are hard to accept into the narrative of history (Stone, 2009, pp. 71–72). 
It is more than a macabre interest that drives people to visit such sites; they wish to understand events 
that seem distant from their own moral beliefs and values (Stone, 2009, p. 72). By visiting a dissonant 
heritage site and acknowledging its difficult past one is able to distance oneself from the dissonant 
event by creating a barrier between the values of the past and your own values (Ashworth and 
Tunbridge, 1996, p. 96). This distancing can occur when individuals or groups believe they are 
completely different from those who perpetrated acts of atrocity, and that they are therefore incapable 
of recreating or understanding the motivations of the aggressors (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 
96, Long and Reeves, 2009, p. 69). 
4.4.3 The Impact of Heritage on Post-Conflict Recovery 
The construction and deconstruction of heritage discourses in and after war has a direct and lasting 
impact on the ways societies continue function in the post-war landscape. The certainties and 
securities that heritage embodied prior to conflict are dismantled by conflict, and replaced with 
uncertainty and identity crises in the post war period. Heritage is capable of changing the 
development of societies after conflict by influencing how the conflict is perceived (Tunbridge, 1996, 
p. 35; Macdonald 2009, p.5), how wounded and aggrieved a party can consider themselves (Sen, 
2006, p. 17), and what can be gained from controlling the narratives of history and heritage (Smith, 
2006, p.27; Meskell, 2005, p.139) . This process of connecting a pre and post war cultural identity 
through heritage can move an area closer to reconciliation and the re-establishment of infrastructure 
or towards he exacerbation of tension and the solidification of oppositional ideologies. The IHAF 
approach and the frameworks that have shaped its creation posit there are three main factors which 
can help to assess conflict recovery; the physical recovery of an area, its economic recovery and the 
socio-political recovery of culture. Within these spheres of recovery, heritage influences and is 
influenced by these three major aspects of a post-war society. The economic reliance on heritage and 
how the use of heritage-as-a-resource influences the primacy placed on remembering or punishing 
the conflict. Whilst the use of heritage a tool in reconciliation is dependent on what conflict 
experiences and narratives are being prioritised through heritage. The role of heritage in creating 
tension dependent on creating cultural difference through nationalism before and during conflict 
helps to justify and continue a political stance and action, but the translation and de-escalation of 
nationalism in the post-war setting is problematised not only by the use of heritage-nationalism in 
conflict, but also by the reliance on heritage-nationalism to mend or recreate the connections between 
people and place. Nationalism provides an avenue to promote cultural difference during war to create 
violence, and is used in post-conflict to reassert national identities; which creates a barrier to long 
term recovery, stabilisation, security, and reconciliation.  
The following sections look in detail at the influence heritage has over these three aspects of recovery 
to identify what opportunities and threats are presented by using heritage as a tool for recovery in 
war affected areas.  
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4.4.4 Economics of heritage and tourism in Post-Conflict recovery 
For many communities across the world tourism is an economic cornerstone as well as a leading 
indicator of stability, security, and development (Cavlek, 2002, p. 478). Tourism is drastically 
affected and usually brought to an end by conflict, and it takes decades for visitors to recover 
confidence to return to war-affected regions (Sonmez and Graefe, 1998, p. 118). Of course, it is in 
the aftermath of war when economies suffer and resources become scarce that communities need 
tourist income the most (Corak, Mikacic and Ateljevic, 2013, p. 161; Keen, 2000, p. 20). Tourism is 
a key resource for all cultural heritage sites, and it is an indicator of the safety of cultural heritage 
(Cavlek, 2002, p. 478).  
Beyond these utilitarian economic realities, tourism at heritage sites also acts to cement war 
narratives and post-conflict stories and experiences, and to give these discourses legitimacy though 
their consumption by tourists (Meskell, 2005, p. 124). The focus of this research is on what messages 
and discourses are being presented by heritage sites, what their political motivations are, and what is 
being left out or obliterated (Cheong and Miller, 2000, p. 371). This concept takes note of Schudson’s 
analysis of Erving Goffman’s notion of embarrassment, explaining how difficult memories are 
shaped and manipulated to mitigate embarrassment and shame (Schudson, 1984, p. 634) and Robin 
Wagner-Pacifici and Barry Schwartz examination of the way societies deal with a “less than 
glorious” past (1991, p. 376). Whether the dissonance of war is recorded in a site or removed is a 
choice dictated either by the need to manipulate memories and to create a seamlessly positive 
narration (to present to tourists), or to present a past that includes conflict, and therefore has to 
attribute blame and responsibility (Goulding and Domic, 2009, p. 85; McDowell, 2008, p. 407). The 
situation is further complicated when we consider the source of historical and heritage narratives: 
victors of conflict will be more lenient about their own history than with that of those who were 
defeated or who no longer have control over the discourses of warfare (Ashworth, Graham and 
Tunbridge, 2000, p. 77). 
Heritage sites can reduce and present actors as “good” and “bad” in a post-conflict period, and it is 
these evaluations which can endure indefinitely among the local, national and international 
populations (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 95). Encouraging tourism in post-conflict areas has 
many politically charged ramifications; for example, merely by visiting heritage attractions the 
tourist can be aligned to supporting the site economically and accepting the narrative therein (Stone, 
2009, pp. 56–58; Smith, 2006, p. 154). They are legitimising the heritage regardless of their own 
ethical and moral reaction to it; their mere presence (particularly in international tourists) bolsters 
the image created by post-conflict powers at post-conflict heritage sites and lends support to its 
definition as heritage (Sonmez and Graefe, 1998, pp. 118–120). 
Dealing with crises such as conflict is an integral part of business activity, but no industry is so 
negatively affected by conflict as tourism (Leaf, 1995; Cavlek, 2002, p. 450). Peace, safety and 
security must be met for tourism to continue (Cavlek, 2002, p. 478). Barriers to tourism created by 
war are more severe than those of natural crises as there is a psychological barrier to be surmounted 
that discourages potential tourists from visiting war-affected regions (Cavlek, 2002, p. 479). A cycle 
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of need (or catch-22) is created whereby tourists will not return until an area is perceived to be safe, 
but the area will not be perceived to be safe until tourists return. 
Heritage creates a sense of uninterrupted flowing history, and although the sense of history promoted 
may not be true or accurate, it engenders a degree of psychological security that tourists and tourism 
promoters are able to capitalise on (Sonmez and Graefe, 1998, pp. 112–113). The use of pre-war 
heritage in post-war tourism is focussed on returning the site back to its imagined ‘authentic’ pre-
war state (Wang, 1999, p. 365); this is not the case for heritage created by war. War atrocity or 
destroyed heritage sites create a difficult relationship with the local owners of heritage and tourists 
from outside on account of the ethical implications of maintaining such sites for tourists (Goulding 
and Domic, 2009, pp. 85–90; Moscardo, 1996, pp. 376–80) 
4.4.5 Reconciliation and heritage connections 
Reconciliation is an over-arching process which includes the search for truth, justice, forgiveness, 
healing and so on. At its simplest, it means finding a way to live alongside former enemies – not 
necessarily to love them, or forgive them, or forget the past in any way, but to coexist with them, to 
develop the degree of cooperation necessary to share our society with them, so that we all have better 
lives together than we have had separately. Politics is a process to deal with the issues that have 
divided us in the past. Reconciliation is a parallel process that redesigns the relationship between us 
(Bloomfield, 2003: 12). 
A post-conflict situation is one where violent conflict has ceased and a new organisational structure 
is trying to construct a “new society out of the ashes of the old” (Bloomfield, 2003, p. 12). Part of 
the success of the newly constructed society will rest on how relationships with previously 
antagonistic parties are managed and how difference and the past can be reconciled with the present 
(Batten, 2009, p. 85). Negotiating how the past interacts with the present to form a safe, peaceful and 
stable society constitutes the intersection between heritage and reconciliation, where heritage and 
history are used to reconcile a society to its recent war past, to its re-formed populace, their new 
realities and identities and to post-conflict relationships between the perpetrators and victims of a 
conflict (McDowell, 2009, p. 218). The negotiation of heritage also seeks to reconcile recent events 
with an AHD in which conflict is seen as a small part of a national history (Meskell, 2002, pp. 559–
561). The process of reconciling people to a traumatic or difficult past mirrors the process where 
heritage is used to shape national narratives and identities; so it is unsurprising that the factors 
influencing the shape of heritage also have a bearing on the shape and acceptance of reconciliation 
(Long and Reeves, 2009, pp. 80–81; Assmann, 1995, pp. 130–132). Bloomfield argues that 
reconciliation is often both a goal and a process to deliver that goal, and that this dual purpose of 
reconciliation has led to the term becoming confused and difficult to interpret (Bloomfield, 2003, p. 
11). Bloomfield recommends that reconciliation is considered a process; the aspiration to reconcile 
is something to aim for in the future, while reconciliation is firmly grounded in the present and is an 
active process rooted in the reality of a post-war environment (Bloomfield, 2003, p. 12). 
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It could be argued that reconciliation is the goal of a heritage process in a post-conflict context, but 
meaning and memory-making at heritage sites problematize this straightforward view (McDowell, 
2009, pp. 215–216). Heritage is tightly bound to the commemoration of events both in monuments 
and at intangible and individual levels (Ashplant, 2000, p. 263). The commemoration of events in 
war, particularly in a recent war, is not wholly conducive to reconciling opposing parties in the often 
fragile ensuing peace. The questions that have to be asked are why is this event commemorated 
through cultural heritage, what effect does it have on local relationships and whether heritage is an 
aid or a barrier to reconciliation (Long and Reeves, 2009, pp. 79–80). Bloomfield notes, “Politics is 
a process to deal with the issues that have divided us in the past. Reconciliation is a parallel process 
that redesigns the relationship between us” (2003:12). This study holds that heritage is the process 
that negotiates and expresses the relationship between places, past and people in recovery. 
4.4.6 (De)Constructing Nationalism through heritage  
Mary Kaldor suggests that nationalism in and after a war can be a performance, and a justification 
of violence based on ideology (Kaldor, 2004, p. 170). The idea of nationalism is created in order to 
legitimise the actions of war based on the interpretation of a national identity derived from the past. 
This process of creating identities relies not only on the careful manipulation of the past into a desired 
form, but also on the assessment and adoption of national stereotypes that are beneficial to a cause 
(Sen, 2006, p. 59). In Kaldor’s view (and her new war perspective), nationalism is not a feature of 
nation-states; it is a feature of the ideology of specific groups and what they take to be their national 
identity. This can manifest as ethnic groups, religions, political beliefs or geographical borders 
(Kaldor, 2004, pp. 174–175). Coward notes that heritage allows not only the construction of 
nationalist ideology to flourish, but that the destruction of heritage further intensifies and accentuates 
an idea of ethnic separateness (Coward, 2008, p. 26) or (as referred to in this thesis) cultural 
difference.  
Amartya Sen uses religious fundamentalism to explain the adoption of ideological nationalism by 
groups. He argues that fundamentalist Islam has adopted an oppositional identity to that of Western 
Christianity, and in doing so has abandoned the strict tenets of Islam to pursue an identity based on 
an interpretation of religion that prioritises the violent protection of Islam above Islam itself (Sen, 
2006, pp. 14–15). For Sen, national religious identities attempt to bond with other similar 
fundamentalist identities and form an imagined cross-border nation (Sen, 2006, p. 17; Anderson, 
2006, p. 141; Shils, 1981, p. 49). These imagined nationalities can be seen in the formation of terrorist 
and fundamentalist groups and their identification with and collaboration with each other. A 
contemporary example of this is the Islamic State (ISIS) that claims ownership of geographical areas 
based on a shared Islamic heritage and nationality that crosses the country borders of Iraq and Syria, 
or groups such as Al-Qaeda or the Taliban (Kaldor, 2004, p. 171). Constructed nationalism allows 
groups to pick and choose desirable national pasts to celebrate and justify their identities based on 
historical narratives and evidenced by heritage. As explored in this and previous chapters the 
packaging of memories and pasts into an AHD allows a cultural identity to be simultaneously created 
and legitimated (Ashworth, Graham, and Tunbridge, 2007, p. 14). 
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Nationalism can be constructed and used to subjugate others, based on claims of cultural superiority. 
The process makes use of constructed stereotypes to create traditions and in the case of conflict these 
become traditions of violence (Kaldor, 2013, p. 4; Sen, 2006, p. 84). The commemoration process 
has many functions, one of which is to familiarise a population with the brutality of war and teach 
them to expect deaths and violence in war. Constructed nationalism works on similar principles. For 
example, Kaplan refers to the “ancient hatred” between Balkan nations (Kaplan 2001, p. 7), which 
was a widely accepted argument when it was first posited despite being strongly refuted and rejected 
in contemporary literature (and by this thesis) (Tuastad, 2010, p. 597) ; however, Kaplan’s argument 
built on cultural assumptions and pejorative sterotypes went on to reintroduce and reinforce these 
arguments in popular discourse in the 1990s and assisted in the ‘Balkanisation’ of the conflicts in the 
1990s. Maria Todorova argues that the pejorative creation of Balkan stereotypes of savagery is used 
to simplify and explain the violence of the Balkan wars, and to familiarise a local and global 
population with the violence in Yugoslavia (Todorova, 1997, pp. 33–35). Moreover, these 
stereotypes have also been used by Balkan nations to justify their own violence against others, based 
on the construction of a tradition of ancient hatred and violence. Thus, nationalism constructed from 
imagined pasts and evidenced by heritage becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy in which the created 
identities and their imagined foundations become more real with each attempt to legitimise them. 
Simply put, the imagined national identity becomes a nationalist reality, is violently supported in 
conflict, and remains embedded in communities after conflict. 
The impact of heritage on recovery processes is explored in the remainder of this thesis through the 
establishment of the Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework, and its application to the main case 
study of Dubrovnik.  
4.5 Summary: The impact of heritage on conflict and post conflict recovery 
Roland Barthes notes that there is a further process involved in the semiotic interpretation of signs, 
by which recognisable cultural signs became myths (Barthes, 2000, pp. 109–110). He argues that 
Saussure’s theory of signs can be pushed a step further to the study of meaning in discourse (Barthes, 
2000, p. 111). Myths are the “collective representation” of meaning-making, and can be used not 
only to examine the ways in which individual narratives become local myths, and then in turn become 
globalised (Barthes, 2000, p. 9). According to Barthes, myth-making uses cultural meanings and 
signs that are already understood to be markers of cultural value (Barthes, 2000, p. 110) which are 
continually reworked into connective process of immediate recognition and subsequent repetition 
(Barthes, 2000, p. 120). Following this argument, one can see the mythologizing of conflict narratives 
occurring when local experiences of conflict are turned into discourse in their retelling, and signified 
as important through heritage sites, which then transmit the mythologies to a wider public. As well 
as approaching mythologies through Barthes’s theories, the use of myth in culture relies on a 
vernacular understanding of the term as “a set of ideas that may or may not be true … but which 
fulfil some need or function that blinds the believers to alternative understandings” (Cowlishaw, 
2010, p. 210). For both Barthes and Cowlishaw, myths are both the process that creates a dialogue 
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as well as the product that is transmitted and supported by those who enter the dialogue (Barthes, 
2000, p. 12; Cowlishaw, 2010, pp. 210–211). In the case of post-conflict heritage this involves the 
creators (signifying value through narratives), the curators (refining narrative value into tangible and 
intangible heritage sites) and the visitors. 
Barthes argues that mythologies in societies are created by connecting commodities to nations (and 
nationalism), and marketing them as such. Nationalism creates a mythical perception of national 
identity by the repeated narration of national characteristics and stereotypes (Barthes, 2000, p. 62). 
Applying this to heritage in post-conflict contexts, national cultures are mythologised and celebrated 
through post-conflict heritage, and this create the illusion of their cultural superiority through 
imagined comparisons and competitions. Conflict narratives are instantly recognisable to a populace 
because they have been formalised into a familiar discourse of expected violence and peaceful 
outcome. This has occurred in part due to the rhetoric of violence in popular culture (the media, film, 
etc.) and also by cultural traditions of violence that have become mythologised as heritage (blood 
sports, for example) (Das, 1987). From this stance it is possible to see that by mythologizing national 
identities in a world well versed in the rhetoric of violence, conflicts have become part of the expected 
narrative of local, national, and international culture. This is perhaps why heritage assets hold a 
prominent position as markers and commemorators of violence and also why they are targeted. 
Heritage is not only attacked and restored as a marker of value and significance, but because myths 
of war and violence have taught a contemporary globalised culture that such attacks are expected and 
required. 
This view is supported in part by Kaldor’s argument about the performance of nationalism, which 
requires the acting out of practiced roles in the commemoration and celebration of national myths of 
war experience (Kaldor, 2004, p. 68), and in part by the long legacy of violence against cultural 
heritage in most wars throughout the ages (Kastenberg, 1997, p. 281), the deliberate destruction of 
the Old Bridge in Mostar, or the shelling of Dubrovnik Old Town is an example. This position is in 
direct contrast with the surprise and outrage shown by the media in the wake of attacks to cultural 
heritage in conflict. As Emberling and Hanson note in their analysis of the looting of the Baghdad 
National Museum in the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the attacks could have been 
(and were) anticipated and should have been prepared for to avoid the loss and destruction of Iraqi 
heritage (Emberling and Hanson, 2008, pp. 13–14). Heritage protection usually fails in conflict 
because if there is a mythology of violence and iconoclasm in war then it is likely that heritage will 
be targeted, and if heritage legislation works on the assumption that heritage will not be targeted, 
then damage and recovery approach the issue from two very different perspectives. 
The use of cultural imperialism and Eurocentrism in the inscription of WHS might thus be understood 
as myths posing under the guise of their universal acceptance (Starzmann, 2008, p. 369). In a post-
conflict environment mythologies of atrocity are created by connecting narratives of genocide to 
heritage sites such that the name of the site itself invokes a recognition of mass murder. Auschwitz-
Birkenau and Srebrenica, for example, are synonymous with Holocaust and genocide, but the 
invocation of the names does not necessarily lead to a recall of exact details or events. This semiotic 
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discourse has created an instantly recognisable connection between sites of atrocity and ideological 
perceptions of ‘good’; and ‘evil’. In doing so, the acts of violence have become mythologised and 
commodified to a specific geographical and temporal context (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 
98). The result of this context-specific connection is that the violence itself is relegated to the past 
and distanced from the present (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, pp. 95–96). From this, we see that 
the mythologizing of violence in sites of atrocity (and in other post-conflict contexts) does not 
diminish the trauma, devastation, and importance of the events but it does limit and constrain them 
to particular sites and history. This is perhaps one reason why mass violence and genocide always 
seems so shocking in conflict, despite its frequent appearance in conflicts over several thousand 
years. However familiar, conflict and atrocity are mythologised as part of a barbaric past that is 
distant from a civilised present. 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to interrogate the gap between theories of conflict and theories 
of heritage and to find commonalities and links between the two fields in order to close this gap. The 
result is the creation on an integrated perspective on heritage and conflict that has identified key 
shared issues and areas to investigate. This chapter is the culmination of a wide-ranging literature 
review carried out in the previous chapters to form the conceptual basis which upon which the 
remainder of this research is set. The following chapters move on from a purely conceptual 
exploration of these issues and offer a methodological framework that is able to explore, measure 
and assess the impact of conflict and heritage on the post-conflict geo-political landscape of 
Dubrovnik in Croatia. 
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Chapter Five: Methodology 
The methodology used in this study has been framed around the research questions to ensure that the 
research followed a systematic route, starting with the objectives and finishing with a set of rational 
and well-supported conclusions (Naoum, 1998). The research strategy evolved in response to the 
legislative evolution towards the protection and conception of heritage (Chapter Two), the 
fluctuations and nuanced definitions of heritage (Chapter Three), and the subsequent culmination of 
an integrated perspective on heritage, conflict, and recovery (Chapter Four). In order to create a 
methodology capable of studying the facets of heritage explored in the previous chapters, an 
appreciation of existing post-conflict research methods is needed. While the Integrated Heritage 
Assessment Framework methodology outlined through this chapter takes as its starting point an 
internationally-recognised strategic conflict assessment tool developed by DFID (Goodhand, Vaux, 
and Walker, 2002b), to organise the research, the specific needs of heritage (both tangible and 
intangible) require a nuanced methodological approach. As such this research methodology is 
populated by a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods in order to address both tangible and 
intangible conceptions of heritage. The Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework (Table 5.1) 
allows for each of the project’s guiding research question to be systematically addressed. This chapter 
firstly examines general considerations surrounding mixed-methods research, and then secondly 
explores the specifics of top down and bottom up approaches to conflict assessments. Finally, and 
reflecting considerations introduced in the first and second sections, the chapter closes with an outline 
of the rationale for and the design of the IHAF. 
At the beginning of this research it was decided to identify a specific case study to assess the impact 
of heritage on recovery. The criterion used was that the case had to have significant cultural heritage 
capital that had suffered in a recent conflict. As a WHS, Dubrovnik in Croatia fulfilled this criterion 
and so was chosen. The SCA approach requires an understanding of the background and context of 
conflict; this is described in Chapter Six, with a specific focus on the role of heritage and culture in 
Croatia’s conflict profile. 
The research questions this thesis sought to answer were:  
1. How can the impact of heritage on post-war recovery be conceptualised?  
2. How can the impact of heritage on post-conflict recovery be assessed? 
3. What effect does heritage have on the recovery from conflict in the case study of Dubrovnik? 
These questions are divided into the categories of impact and assessment; the first sought make a 
contribution to knowledge by linking the concepts of heritage and conflict theory. The second 
question used these linked concepts in an applied, field-based case study. The first three chapters in 
this thesis have partially answered the first question by exploring in great detail the theoretical and 
philosophical links between heritage and war. This chapter addresses the assessment of the impact 
of heritage in a post-conflict setting. It suggests the use of a methodology that measures that impact, 
based on the notion that heritage is not an object, but it is a process that affects different disciplines, 
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and requires a mixed method approach in order to assess it accurately. The methodology proposed 
here is used to answer the second research question. 
Table 5.1: Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework 
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5.1 Research Approaches: Literature Review 
In order to reconcile the demands of post-conflict recovery with the needs of heritage, a mixed 
methodology must be adopted to enable a researcher to study the impact of heritage on societies 
recovering from conflict. The following methodological literature review has been carried out to 
interrogate this position, and is structured in response to the first objective of the second research 
question.  
Table 5.2 Comparisons of Quantitative and Qualitative Research 
 
This thesis can be characterised as an exercise in applied research (Creswell, [2003]2015, pp. 10–
15); as an empirical investigation into the impact of heritage on post-conflict recovery in Dubrovnik. 
It uses a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods within a bespoke framework. Benz and 
Newman, (1998, p. 2) argue that the separation between qualitative and quantitative research is 
invalid in practice. Whereas quantitative methods rely on a realist philosophy, wherein the world can 
be objectively measured using hard evidence, qualitative methodologists consider the world to be a 
social construct, which leads Benz and Newman to the conclusion that it can be subjectively assessed 
but not objectively measured (Benz and Newman, 1998, p. 3). The pivotal variable in this discussion 
is the assumptions made by the researcher; they position their research as either a qualitative study 
of socially constructed reality, or an exercise in the objective collection of facts (Benz and Newman, 
1998, pp. 3–4). These authors say that the choice of method is made according to the conceptual 
preferences of the researcher and their overall research aims (Benz and Newman, 1998, p. 4). While 
this division between quantitative and qualitative methods may be invalid, it is one that is well 
established. Nevertheless, it does not lend itself well to a study such as this one, which aims to study 
the holistic effects of heritage and conflict. This study has accordingly adopted a mixed methods 
Researcher Constraints Quantitative Qualitative 
Role Fact-finding based on 
evidence or records 
Attitude measurements based 
on opinions, views, and 
perceptions 
Relationship between 
researcher and subject 
Distant Close 
Scope of findings Nomothetic Idiographic 
Relationship between 
theory, concepts, and 
research 
Testing/Confirmation Emergent/Development 
Nature of research Hard and Reliable Rich and Deep 
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approach that utilises both approaches to create a more inclusive methodological framework. Bryman 
and Becker (2012, p. 120) categorise the differences between the two approaches in terms of 
researcher role, relationship to subject, scope of finding, approach to theory, and the nature of the 
research (Bryman, 1998), as expressed in Table 5.2. 
5.2 Mixed Methods 
The nature of cultural heritage and its existence in both tangible and intangible forms lend themselves 
to a dual quantitative and qualitative research strategy, which come together in a powerful research 
tool of the mixed methods approach. Mixed methods are used in a pragmatic combination to 
investigate and explain specific phenomena (Flick, 2009, pp. 32–33). 
A mixed methods approach uses and combines different methods either from within a single 
quantitative or qualitative approach (Brannen, 2004, p. 4), or from both (Brannen, 2008, pp. 53–54). 
The use of different research strategies creates a complex research design, which in turn may result 
in a wealth of data that can be difficult to interpret (Bryman, 2012, p. 383). However, Tashakkor and 
Teddlie argue that the benefits of a mixed method are numerous. For example, the use of several 
different methodologies increases the scope of the project, whilst also increasing the accuracy and 
holistic results of the research (Tashakkor and Teddlie 2010, p. 18). The breadth of data resulting 
acquired in this study was difficult to manage on account of the quantity of information. It took time 
to analyse this wealth of information but ultimately it resulted in seven key findings which required 
a variety of methods.  
The mixed method approach used in this research was considered to be the most suitable method (i) 
as a result of the literature review, which conceptualised heritage as both intangible and tangible in 
character, (ii) as versatile and flexible research strategy, as discussed by Bryman and expressed in 
Table 5.2 and (iii) in its ability to answer a complex research question from multiple perspectives, 
thus enhancing the reliability of the findings and ultimately allowing the research to show the 
complex relationship between cultural heritage and a post-conflict environment. It has been argued 
that anthropological research cannot be either solely qualitative or quantitative, but that in order offer 
a valuable contribution to knowledge it must be both (Bernard, 2011, pp. 1–2). By employing a mixed 
methods perspective, it is possible not only to make these assessments, but also to assess the 
crossover between them. Mixed methods provides an innovative, flexible, and varied tool for 
interrogating the holistic impacts of heritage rather than its individual components. This is how this 
research will link theory, practice, and policy uses of heritage in the post-conflict recovery 
environment. 
5.3 Conflict Assessment and the development of the Integrated Heritage 
Assessment Framework 
The Strategic Conflict Assessments (SCA) developed by DFID informed the construction of the 
IHAF through their focus and prioritisation of the dynamics and context of a conflict which are 
particularly pertinent to both longitudinal studies and to the interrogation of culture and heritage. The 
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assessments uncover the likely tensions and stressors associated with armed conflict and once 
identified, these issues can begin to be managed. The purpose of the SCA is to analyse conflict, 
measure the risks of intervention and develop conflict-sensitive policies and programmes 
(Goodhand, Vaux and Walker, 2002a, p. 5): 
The Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) methodology is intended as a flexible framework 
that can be adapted as needed, rather than a standardised approach. The conceptual basis for 
the SCA is the combined use of the following analytical “lenses” … 
(Goodhand, Vaux and Walker, 2002b, p. 1) 
This was the starting point for the design of this research, and answers the second objective of this 
research question: What existing assessment frameworks exist and are they suitable for assessing the 
impact of heritage. The following section will draw heavily on Goodhand, Vaux, and Walker (2002a, 
2002b) to dissect the SCA methodology and to suggest ways to adapt it from the analysis of tensions 
in a conflict environment to the analysis of heritage in post-conflict environments, to produce the 
IHAF. The SCA methodology falls into broadly three stages: the analysis of the conflict and of the 
international response, and development strategies and options (Goodhand, Vaux, and Walker, 
2002a, p. 6). Although all three are useful analytical tools, this research focuses primarily on adapting 
the first stage of the framework to analyse heritage in post-conflict recovery, and incorporates some 
analysis of international responses. The third stage is outside the scope of the present research, but 
suggestions are made at the end of the thesis on areas of further investigation into the applications of 
its findings. 
Table 5.3: Three stages of DFID Strategic Conflict Assessment 
Stage A 
Conflict Analysis 
Stage B 
Analysis of Responses 
Stage C 
Strategies/Options 
Structures 
Mapping external responses Influencing other 
responses to conflict 
Actors 
Mapping development policies and 
programs 
Developing/refining 
DFID policy and 
program approaches 
Dynamics Assessing impacts on conflict and peace  
 
Of the three stages shown in table 5.3, most pertinent to the study of heritage after conflict is stage 
one (table 5.4). Stage one of the SCA includes an analysis of structures which are the long-term 
underlying factors of conflict in order to contextualise understanding of the conflict. This requires a 
study of the history of the conflict, historical and contemporary tensions, and the relationship 
between the two (Goodhand, Vaux and Walker, 2002a, p. 11). In this thesis, this stage is reconceived 
as an analysis of the cultural context of conflict through a historical analysis of the cultural causes of 
conflict. With the analysis of tension completed, the SCA then categorises the risks into themes. The 
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thematic tensions are security, political, economic, and social in character (Goodhand, Vaux and 
Walker, 2002a, pp.9- 12), as expressed in table 5.4. 
Table 5.4: DFID Conflict Analysis  
Structures Actors Dynamics 
Analysis of long term factors 
underlying conflict 
Analysis of conflict 
actors 
Analysis of change 
Security Interests Long term trends of conflict  
Political Relations Triggers for increased violence 
Economic Capacities Capacities for managing 
conflict 
Social Peace agendas Likely future conflict scenarios 
 
Incentives 
 
 
The aim of the first step of the SCA is to identify tensions leading to conflict; the aim of the IHAF is 
to identify the impact of heritage in post-conflict. With this in mind the themes have been adapted as 
follows: 
The political and social themes of the SCA are conflated into a single theme. The social element of 
the SCA investigates societal issues that lead to tension such as exclusion, ethnic divides and 
competition, whilst the political element assesses the political manipulation and institutional 
responses to conflict (Goodhand, Vaux and Walker, 2002a, p. 11). This is reconfigured here as a 
range of socio-political uses of heritage which may impact positively or negatively on a population, 
including the assessment of political manipulation of heritage, the social perception of heritage, and 
the effect and tensions of heritage felt in the local community (such as social exclusion, ethnic 
divisions and the ways in which the conflict is remembered). 
The economic impact of heritage is assessed to ascertain the reliance on the local area on heritage 
commerce, including livelihoods, employments, and the value of the area (and heritage) to GDP. 
This part of the analysis closely mirrors that of the SCA (Goodhand, Vaux and Walker, 2002a, p. 
11). 
An additional category of physical impact (not present in the SCA) reflects the preoccupation with 
BCH shown in The Hague Convention (1954) and other international agreements and legislation, 
and incorporates it into an integrated approach to heritage. The physical impact is measured in terms 
of the damage and reconstruction of the heritage. 
The SCA stage one also explores the impact of actors, identifying the interested parties, their 
influence and possible spoilers (actors trying to disable the process of recovery) (Haider, 2009, p. 
12). This element is explored in this thesis in terms of the influence of UNESCO, local heritage 
organisations and international funding bodies. This section also includes the local population as 
interested parties. In both the SCA and this research, actors are considered to have highly political 
motivations and therefore they are of paramount importance as they hold the ability to either assist 
the processes of recovery or to block them (or even to purposefully disrupt them) (Haider, 2009, p. 
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14). In this research, actors are identified in each of the themes outlined above; for the physical 
impact the influence of UNESCO and funding bodies will be explored; the economic impact will 
include the analysis of who contributes to and benefits from the finances of heritage; the socio-
political impact will be identified through the perceptions of both the local population and the global 
community of heritage in and after conflict. 
Much of the research done in post-war environments is shaped by the need to produce policy 
applications, thus, most conflict methodology is shaped by a pragmatic and evidence-focused system 
of research (Goodhand, Vaux and Walker, 2002a, pp. 1–5). The dynamics of a conflict are established 
in the SCA to analyse the trends and to identify the triggers. This approach is mirrored in this 
research, which looks at the three forms of impact over a long period of post-war recovery, assessing 
how they change over time. The forms of impact are long-term economic data, the damage and 
recovery of physical heritage fabric and the changing associations between people and place based 
the analysis of local (interviews) and international (media) perceptions. 
Although the SCA has been used as a guide, it is not without its critics. The SCA is geared towards 
development actors rather than end user needs, which means that the success of SCA applications 
and proposals can adversely affect the conflict environment (Barakat and Waldman, 2013, p. 260). 
A joint approach is needed to integrate the needs of actors from all levels to mitigate hostilities and 
tensions, and increase the chance of a successful, sustainable peace (Barakat and Waldman, 2013, p. 
280). Moreover, the top-down system of assessment is actually a barrier to the inclusion of non-
development actors in the decision-making process (Baumann and Stengel, 2014, p. 519). Although 
the focus of these critiques is on tension and conflict, their concerns are pertinent to this research and 
mirror the issue of the diverse needs of heritage as outlined in earlier chapters. Just as conflict analysis 
needs an integrated perspective on the actors concerned, so too does the analysis of heritage post-
conflict. The result of the methodology used here is to produce three data streams in an integrated 
perspective on the different impacts of heritage as a physical feature, as an economic resource and 
as an intangible societal connection to place. This reflects the three arguments on heritage outlined 
in earlier chapters; as a built environment (UNESCO WHC, 1972b; UNESCO, 1954; Stovel, 1998), 
heritage as a commodified asset (Hewison, 1987; Ashworth and Goodall, 1990; Cohen, 1988; 
MacCannell, 1989; Urry, 1990), and heritage as a process of identity and connection (Smith, 2006; 
Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996; Waterton, 2009; Sen, 2006). These areas are rarely considered 
together. 
The aim of the SCA is a contextualised evaluation of the conflict, the identification of its main actors 
and tensions, and the policy implications of the assessment. The aims of IHAF developed in this 
research are: a similar evaluation of the cultural context of the conflict, the impact heritage has had 
on recovery, the extent to which the post-conflict environment’s heritage can be considered 
recovered, and the possible implications of the use of heritage in recovery in future projects.  
The IHAF has been designed not only to be adapted to the needs of a specific conflict at a specific 
time, but also to standardise the way information on conflict and heritage is captured to enhance the 
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knowledge around this relationship through longitudinal studies and conflict comparisons. It is 
anticipated that these assessments will be utilised by strategy and policy to inform the knowledge 
base on heritage and conflict to help inform interventions in a more effective way, and in doing so 
assist with long term peacebuilding. Although this long-term goal may be beyond the limits of this 
research project, the IHAF has been designed as a framework capable of being utilised in this way. 
With this high-level aim in mind, the early conceptualisation stage of IHAF needs to develop a 
strategic approach to conflict assessments as a starting point before moving on to an implementation 
phase for a tactical or operational purpose.  This approach is replicated in the structure of this thesis 
that has first identified an appropriate methodology and created a high level framework, before 
operationalising this framework in Dubrovnik.  
The aim set out above lends itself to creating a framework based on current best practice in conflict 
assessment methodologies, particularly those with a strategic oversight on various conflict, as such, 
the widely used and critiqued DfID Strategic Conflict Assessment has been used as a foundation to 
model the IHAF upon. This grants the IHAF two advantages; first, the SCA is an established strategic 
tool which has been used and adapted numerous times for field based conflict assessment following 
a recognisable methodology which are used to inform global policy decisions.  Secondly, this 
approach positions the findings of the IHAF assessment alongside SCA country wide assessments, 
which will enable the IHAF findings to be augmented to fit within a wider non-heritage based 
assessments to gain a more holistic view of a conflict. This future collation between the IHAF and 
SCA justifies why the SCA has been used as a model for this initial research in this thesis, and also 
give a perspective on why the SCA would suit the long terms goals of the IHAF beyond this research 
and thesis. 
5.4 Comparative Assessment Tools: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment  
It is widely acknowledged that it is important to balance between ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ 
approaches when evaluating post-conflict environments (MacGinty, 2010, p. 392). The IHAF 
presents an attempt to accomplish this balancing act. By incorporating elements of the Strategic 
Conflict Analysis approach, which is widely regarded as a ‘top down’ set of frameworks, and the 
Post-Conflict Impact Assessment approach which is seen as a more ‘bottom up’ approach, IHAF 
aims to provide a widely-applicable analytic tool that also supplies flexibility to acknowledge and 
adapt to context-specific factors. The section above has offered an evaluation of SCA and an 
overview of the manner in which SCA has been incorporated into IHAF. The section below offers 
an evaluation of PCIA, and an overview of the manner in which both the SCA and PCIA has been 
incorporated into IHAF. 
5.4.1 Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Evaluation 
The PCIA is a guidance framework that utilises a context-bound tactical approach to impact 
assessment, rooted in the Do No Harm principle (Anderson, 1999; Bush, 1998). The PCIA 
approaches conflict assessment from a ground-up perspective, looking at context and culturally 
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specific issues that affect the sustainability peace in relation to a specific event or intervention (Bush, 
1998). The guidance relies on assessing the success or failure of an initiative based on its contribution 
towards sustainable peace, rather than following indicators of success of the intervention itself (Bush, 
1998, p.22). This enables the PCIA to remain focused on a local context, but generalise the results to 
assess the its impact on broader issues of peace or a return hostilities (Hoffman, 2003, p. 2). 
The PICA follows three broad thematic steps: context mapping, a risk and opportunity mapping 
exercise, and a peace and conflict assessment (Bush, 2007, pp7-10). The first phase aims to define 
and understand the context of conflict and peace, and outline the dynamics and stakeholder interests. 
This is similar to the first step in the SCA framework, and is also integral to the first stages of the 
proposed IHAF structure.  The second phase of the PCIA seeks to assess how an initiative or 
intervention could negatively or positively affect the outcome of peace of conflict (Bush, 2007, pp. 
7-10). This is achieved through structured scenario mapping with key stakeholders and practioners. 
Risk assessment lies beyond the focus of this thesis, and as such this second stage is not directly 
relevant to the formation of the IHAF methodology. The third PCIA phase is a conflict assessment 
which further explores the positive and negative impacts of the initiative, and seeks to connect the 
impact through all phases of the intervention (from before the intervention through to feedback and 
review) as a way to correlate the impact to the intervention (Hoffman, 2003, p.177) This step is 
explored in detail below in relation to the strengths and weaknesses of using scenario mapping and 
risk assessment to correlate interventions to sustainable peace or return to hostilities.   
The key strengths of the PCIA rely on its contextually driven approach and ability to bridge the gap 
between academically focused research approaches and their application to intervention strategies 
(Bush and Duggan, 2014, p.304). Whilst the SCA relies on creating a high-level strategic framework 
that can be adapted to different contexts, the PCIA takes a contextually driven approach with the 
understanding that this may be only utilised in a specific instance or iteration for use in the field 
(Bush, 2003, p.37). The PCIA appreciation for conflict sensitivities reduces the likelihood of 
following themes and concepts with may not be relevant to a specific conflict, and as such ensures 
that work carried out is relevant to the focus of the intervention, with an awareness for the possibility 
that said initiatives have the potential to negatively affect the post-conflict context (Haider, 2017, 
p.339-340). A culturally-bound focus aims to reduce the chance that an intervention would cause a 
negative or harmful reaction by following the ‘Do No Harm’ (DNH) principle. The PCIA seeks to 
ensure that inventions are culturally sensitive by ensuing that the context is considered first, and that 
intervention is shape around the context (rather than rolling out intervention strategies that worked 
elsewhere in different conflicts and contexts) (Bush and Duggan, 2013, pp. 16-17).  
Although the DNH Principe and cultural awareness of the PCIA is relevant to the formation of the 
IHAF, the PCIA is capable only of identifying heritage as an expression of culture and recipient of 
interventions rather than a controlling process that shapes culture in line with power structures which 
determine where interventions should be made. In this argument, were the PCIA be applied to 
heritage interventions, the perception of success would rely on consensus, acceptance and 
normalisation of heritage narratives rather than an interrogation of what heritage and history was 
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being promoted and which localised power structures were directing these decisions. To avoid a 
wholesale reliance on localised perceptions of culture and heritage in the immediate aftermath of 
conflict and the inherent power struggles to promote the ‘correct’ version of events, a balance needs 
to be struck between bottom-up approaches and top-down initiatives to ensure the plurality, diversity, 
and contradictory interpretations of heritage are understood and their impact assessed.  
The major weakness the PCIA has regarding its application to heritage-centred recovery is that the 
model produced would not be transferable to other heritage contexts without changing the core 
elements of the framework to incorporate the holistic definition of heritage and see it reflected in 
society. The IHAF is designed to be flexible and transferable, but provide enough structure for 
heritage assessments to be built across time and space in order to provide a comparable result. The 
IHAF is flexible and can be adapted to each context, but as it is so heavily focused on heritage there 
are specific areas that need to be address regardless of how they appear in the context. If a PCIA 
model is followed, then elements which were not applicable at the time or context may not be 
included, and will create an incomplete record. The focus of heritage is changeable both through 
different contexts and time periods and practioners (as explored in chapters two and three), in order 
to safeguard against prioritisation of current heritage trends it in imperative that both tangible and 
intangible elements are prioritised and included. Although the PCIA is capable of capturing this 
information, it is not reinforced by the framework structure, therefore the context driven approach 
may give rise to practioners bias, interpretation and prioritisation and could potentially negatively 
impact on the assessment being made. To ensure the IHAF is capable of capturing the most accurate 
and valid information on heritage, it needs to reflect the most up to date heritage theory and practice 
and this can only be achieved by making this specialism available through a structured strategic 
approach.  
A final drawback which prevents the PICA being fully utilised in a heritage assessment framework 
is the reliance of the PCIA on intervention risk assessment and prediction without a clear way to 
measure their impact where the outcome is not a tangible factor (Achitei, 2014, pp 55-56).  A risk 
assessment predication on the success or failure of interventions relies both on the intervention 
providing a clear and measureable connection to sustainable peace, and on the assumption impact 
and risk assessment are capable of predicating outcomes and mitigating uncertainty (Renn, 2017, p. 
43). Such a trajectory is unlikely to remain clear in a post-conflict environment, particularly when 
combined with the expectation and motivations of donors (Hoffman, 2003), which problematises 
predictive impact assessments. Crucially, the aim of this research and the IHAF is not to make an 
assessment on the impact of heritage–led interventions, but rather of the impact of heritage itself on 
post-conflict recovery. As heritage is changed in response to conflict, and conflict reinterpreted by 
heritage over time there is no way to risk assess or predict how heritage will be altered without 
understanding how it has been used. Furthermore, the reliance of the PCIA on impact and risk 
predictive assessments combined with the lack of bespoke heritage progress indicators renders the 
impact assessment of heritage problematic, as it can only predict a degree of correlation and will be 
unable to assess whether or not an intervention held transferable value. This is particularly pertinent 
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to the study and use of heritage conceptualised away from built material as there may be a tendency 
to prioritise reconstructed built heritage as a marker of success of an intervention and recovery. This 
would ultimately be at odds with the goal of an IHAF intervention which prioritises intangible 
connections between people, place, and the past as a marker for heritage recovery.  
5.4.2 Benefits of the IHAF: Balancing a top-down strategic conflict assessment against a 
bottom-up operational use of conflict impact assessment.  
The IHAF measures the disruption to heritage caused by conflict, and how its subsequent recovery 
from disruption affects post-war cultures. This is not a measurement of heritage-led interventions, 
rather, this is an investigation into the impact of heritage on post war societies recovering from 
conflict.  
In order to achieve this the IHAF utilises a strategic and analytical approach which seeks to 
understand the impact of conflict on heritage, and how heritage affects the post conflict landscape in 
a specific context. This a holistic assessment of how heritage is capable of shaping a post-war 
environment. The IHAF has been designed to gain a critical perspective on how influential heritage 
can be to guide its use and as such, the IHAF is an assessment tool that is transferable and assumed 
no pre-existing knowledge of heritage assessment. It also rejects a one size fits all approach by 
balancing the need to be strategically transferable with the need to be operationally versatile, 
represented by finding the balance between the SCA and PCIA approaches.  
The IHAF becomes strategically transferable by standardising the assessment steps using a rigorous 
methodology which utilises an SCA approach, this creates the opportunity to transfer the assessment 
approach to other sites and contexts. The framework is operationally versatile as it requires the 
assessor to approach each case study with no assumption of prior existing knowledge, and assess 
each new context from the ground up, which is a similar approach to the PCIA. However, the IHAF 
deviates away from both approaches as it seeks to be bound to a single theme of heritage, and 
designed to respond to the nuances involved in defining heritage and its impact over recovery. 
Neither the SCA nor PCIA is capable of assessing the impact of heritage as they do not have the 
capacity to define heritage as a process without disrupting the structure of their frameworks. The 
SCA relies on established areas of conflict recovery as defined by policy, practice and known 
conventions. It is used heavily in policy and strategic mapping, and requires fixed definitions of 
recovery areas in order to determine the effectiveness of interventions and the prioritisation of 
funding (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013, p. 764). The PCIA is best suited to the measurement of the 
impact of interventions on post-conflict contexts, and the subsequent success of these measures 
(Bush 1998, P.7). For the PCIA impact measuring is symbiotic with risk forecasting and mitigation. 
Although this presents an opportunity to base the assessments on a close and detailed understanding 
of the context, it is ill-equipped to measure the impact of an aspect of a post-conflict society over 
recovery that is not necessarily linked to interventions.   
The benefit of using the IHAF over both the SCA and PCIA is that it takes a context specific bottom-
up approach to each case it is applied to, but utilises a standardised approach to the assessments, 
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making the methodology scalable to varying contexts and giving a strategic and comparative 
overview of how heritage affects conflicts and vice versa. This reflects the nexus between State and 
policy level decisions and the localised consensus, narratives and interventions in regards to heritage 
within a post-conflict context, and as such reflects the hybridity of both a top-down and bottom up 
conflict assessment approach capable of moving with the changeability of a post-conflict society. 
(Mac Ginty, 2010, p. 397).  The concept of hybrid peace suggests that the post conflict landscape 
can be mediated towards peace (or conflict) by balancing local and international needs and wants to 
ensure the restitution of law, cultural identity and the establishment of a new post-war normality 
(Mac Ginty, 2010, p.392;  Richmond, 2015, p. 51) as with the restoration or recovery of heritage in 
post conflict, the result of this process is tied to power hierarchies and the perceived legitimacy of 
decision makers (Richmond, 2015, pp. 62-63). Such hybridity is integral when considering the role 
of heritage and its ability to shape and alter conceptions of conflict both in the immediate aftermath 
of conflict and over a longer period of time, and the impact heritage can have on the formation of 
cultural identities, cessation or escalation of violence, and acceptance or rejection of peace. The 
formation of the IHAF has been designed to capture the balance between top-down and bottom-up 
initiatives by putting the influential role that heritage has on this negotiation at the forefront of the 
assessment.  
 The formation of the IHAF gives valuable policy insight for the future use of heritage and heritage-
led interventions as it will provide more in-depth information on the value and dangers associated 
with heritage and peacebuilding, and further illuminate the influential role heritage has over recovery 
to decision and policy makers both locally, nationally and internationally. This approach is designed 
to equip such practioners a greater understanding of what heritage is, how it relates to the physical, 
economic, and socio-political spheres of recovery, and how it can be used to further the effectiveness 
of recovery and peace-building initiatives.  
5.5 Data Analysis Tools Applied to the IHAF 
Mixed methods research results in numerous datasets that need to be integrated and interrogated, and 
as such, a system of data analysis is needed. Creswell notes that either a comparative or a 
complementary system of interpretation will be needed depending on what the research hopes to 
achieve (Creswell 2014, 227), and that the theories or approaches used in the research will dictate 
which for of analysis is used (Creswell, 2015, P.204). In this applied research case study, the results 
make a significant contribution to collective knowledge and wisdom. This is achieved in this study 
through the discussion of different interpreted datasets gained from different samples (carried out in 
Chapters Seven, Eight, and Nine) and integrated through the research findings (presented in Chapter 
Ten). The underpinning data analysis strategy for this study is one that utilises the Data Information 
Knowledge Wisdom (DIKW) model (Figure 5.1 shows an example of the model, taken from 
Esterbrook 2012). First presented by Russell Ackoff in 1989, the DIKW model uses a logical chain 
of system management to organise the way in which data is turned into knowledge (Ackoff, 1989, 
pp. 3–9); data are gained from a primary source, then interpreted and turned into meaningful 
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information, then refined into knowledge and given a context, and finally a conclusion where the 
data and analysis can be applied to a real world problem (Rowley, 2007, pp. 164–165). 
Figure 5.1: Model of DIKW hierarchy   
 
The data for this study has been collected using the IHAF outlined in Table 5.1, which has resulted 
in the generation of three datasets with the raw results of the physical, economic, and social impact 
of heritage in Dubrovnik. This raw data consisted of photographic surveys of buildings, a large 
statistical database on Dubrovnik tourism and transcribed interview data. The raw data was then 
evaluated to turn it into meaningful information. This process involved analysing the building 
surveys, which were compared with archival photographs to assess the level of damage and recovery 
of BCH and were mapped on street and building plans to demonstrate the speed and priority of 
recovery. The economic datasets were explored using Excel, using a set of variables to discover the 
extent and importance of tourism in Dubrovnik 1992 and showing how the war affected the economic 
profile of the city through probability modelling. Raw interview transcripts were coded and mapped 
using NVivo software (which enables the analysis of large, text-based qualitative datasets) to identify 
themes, trends and patterns, and generate data trees. This analysis resulted in the raw data becoming 
useable information to be interpreted and discussed in Chapters Nine to Eleven, which in turn has 
resulted in the generation of knowledge in the form of evidence-based findings that answer the 
research questions of this study, and have far-reaching applications for the use of cultural heritage in 
the recovery from conflict.  
The final step of the DIKW process is the transformation of knowledge into wisdom. In the case of 
this research, this stage is found in the final application and generalisation of the outcomes to inform 
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further research, which is discussed in Chapter Eleven. The knowledge gained from this study of 
Dubrovnik does not only increase collective understanding of the impact of heritage on this one case 
study, but also contributes to a shared wisdom of what impact heritage has more generally (both in 
theory and practice) and how the IHAF can be used in other conflicts. 
5.6 Organisation of the Research: Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework 
To recap briefly, in this empirical research a mixed methods approach has been employed to generate 
several datasets on the subject of cultural heritage in conflict environments, in the context of 
Dubrovnik. The literature reviews in Chapters Two to Four have facilitated a critical understanding 
of both aspects individually and in collaboration, and they have drawn attention to the vital research 
objectives of this research, namely; 
• What is the definition of heritage? 
• What protects heritage from war? 
• Is heritage passive recipient or active participant in the causation and continuation of 
conflict? 
• How does heritage alter post-conflict society? 
These four areas of literature reviewed have helped refine how this study approaches the question of 
‘How can the impact of heritage on post-conflict recovery be assessed?’ (Research Question II), and 
has resulted in the generation of three research areas (physical, economic, and socio-political) and 
their different data collection methods. These research areas form the basis of the IHAF, and are 
interrogated here in response to the third objective (‘What methodological tools are capable of 
assessing the impact of heritage recovery?’) under Research Question II. 
First and foremost, the nature of this research (combined with the lack of data on the issue of heritage 
in conflict) required empirical data to be collected in field research. The qualitative element of this 
project required interviews to be carried out, whilst its quantitative aspects required that buildings be 
measured and mapped using photographic techniques and damage and repair to damage assessed. 
Fieldwork requires an in-depth and extended involvement of the researcher with the subjects of the 
study in order to understand and interrogate their social surroundings and the phenomena the 
researcher wishes to study. 
The physical impact of heritage on recovery was chosen as a key theme as it involves both conflict 
and heritage theory and practice in terms of it being tangible. This focus is reflected in heritage 
legislation used both in peace time and conflict situations (including the Venice Charter, The Hague 
Convention, and the WHC) and is concerned primarily with defining, listing, and assessing damage 
to material sites of culture. The analysis also involves the focus put on heritage destruction in material 
terms expressed by conflict theory and media reports of conflict. Furthermore, the physical properties 
of heritage are discussed in detail by heritage theorists, and despite growing concern with the 
intangible aspects of heritage over the last few decades, tangible culture and its conservation remains 
the primary focus of all heritage studies. As such, it is impossible to frame this study into the impact 
of heritage on conflict without assessing the physical heritage of the case study. 
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The economic impact of heritage on recovery was chosen because it can be addressed using 
quantifiable data to argue that heritage has a specific and measurable value in post-conflict recovery. 
To date, the quantitative value of cultural heritage to a post-conflict community has not been assessed 
(the focus has previously been on quantifying the cost of the damage, rather than its impact on 
economic recovery), and as such the way heritage is considered in development circles depends on 
the subjective interest of those involved. Therefore, the role of heritage can be underestimated or 
overestimated in recovery.  
The socio-political impact of heritage was chosen because it directly addresses the intangible impact 
of heritage on a community. Despite the focus on the material properties of culture, it is often 
intangible values that determine what heritage is, and how it should be protected and understood in 
relation to its contemporary culture. This perspective is gained from the literature review carried out 
in Chapter Two, and its application to the post-conflict setting which is explored in Chapter Four. To 
examine the intangible value of heritage a qualitative approach was employed. 
An immersive ethnographic approach to fieldwork through participant observation is one avenue to 
qualitative data collection (Delmont, 2012, p. 342). One criticism of this approach is that the by 
participating in the community the researcher alters the community they wish to study, damaging the 
objectivity and reliability of their results (Bennett, 1995, p. 257; Flick, 2009, p. 391). Another 
approach to fieldwork is as an assessor or interviewer. In this approach the researcher is set apart 
from the culture or society they wish to study, and instead uses a formal system of interviews to gain 
information from subjects, and so maintain objectivity. In formal interviews the transparency of the 
research is maintained (since the participants understand what the researcher is there for), although 
this may skew the reliability of the data (as participants tailor their responses to questions 
accordingly). A grounded theory approach is better suited to immersive ethnography (albeit ethically 
problematic) (Benz and Newman, 1998, pp. 78–79), but applied approach (such as this one) is better 
suited to semi-structured interviews conducted by a non-participant researcher (Braun and Clarke, 
2006, p. 100). To combat the influence of participant bias this research carried out as many interviews 
as possible, but the author emphasises that the interviews constitute only one (small but extensive) 
dataset in conjunction with two larger quantitative datasets. 
5.6.1 Qualitative Analysis and Data Collection: Socio-political Impact 
It was argued above that both heritage and conflict legislation have primarily focused on the tangible 
aspect of heritage. The reliance on built heritage as the definitive marker of cultural value has 
prioritised it in studies and policies, and its intangible cultural connections have played a less 
prominent, less well-researched role. In reflection of the division between tangible and intangible 
heritage, this research has divided the research methods between the two definitions. Quantitative 
measurements have been used to assess the tangible facets of BCH, and qualitative methods have 
been employed to study the intangible connections between people, place and context. This has been 
achieved by using semi-structured interviews, and through the analysis and interpretation of that data. 
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In-depth interviews offer a way for a researcher to gain valuable, detailed, and contextually bound 
information. Semi-structured interviews were employed as the main qualitative technique in this 
research. The value of these interviews lies not in their number, but in the detailed nature of the 
testimony of the participants. The interviews allowed the participants to talk freely, under the 
assurance of complete anonymity, on the effect of cultural heritage in and after the war on their own 
community. This perspective was used as the unofficial narration of the conflict through heritage; 
from cultural destruction to cultural economy in Dubrovnik. The semi-structured interviews offered 
a way to enable the participants to talk freely, but also to follow a standardised line of questioning, 
which in turn became the basis for person-to-person comparisons and thematic assessment. Both 
questionnaire and focus groups were considered, but rejected due to the sensitivity of the research 
topic. Questionnaire and surveys were deemed too impersonal; this was supported by the preliminary 
research trip upon which the researcher was repeatedly informed by participants that Dubrovnik is a 
place that functions primarily as an oral culture and that surveys would not be successful. This proved 
to be the case, but the researcher discovered those who were unwilling to participate in surveys would 
agree to be interviewed. Focus groups were also rejected as it would be unethical and irresponsible 
to conduct focus groups asking people to discuss their experiences and trauma of war within their 
own community without a guarantee that their testimonies would not be shared by other participants. 
This was proved to be the right course of action in interviews, as several participants asked to speak 
off the record, or needed to repeatedly be assured of their anonymity and the safety of their 
testimonies. 
The format of the interviews was divided into five sections, with up to five questions per section (see 
Table 5.5). The average interview took at least 90 minutes, and the researcher officially interviewed 
ten participants. The questions were open ended to allow the participants to speak freely, and 
recorded and transcribed by the researcher. Important themes that arose from this data were the 
narrative trend of exaggerating damage done during the 1991 bombing, the reliance on culture and 
tourists in post-conflict Dubrovnik. 
Table 5.5 Socio-political Impact: Interview Questions 
Conflict background 
How do you think the [town] was affected by the conflict? 
Do you think the effects are still apparent today? 
Post-conflict recovery 
Was heritage a feature of the recovery process after the war? 
How important was heritage considered to be? 
Were there any specific times when heritage was a main feature in the recovery of the [town]? 
Future of the town 
What do you think will happen to the [town] over the next 5 to 10 years? 
What is your opinion of the remaining war damage on the cultural property? 
Finance and Economics 
How important are the cultural assets of the [town] to the economy of the [town]? 
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Have the cultural assets played a role in the recovery of the [town]? 
How do the assets affect tourism and media relations in the [town]? 
To what degree do the cultural assets play a financial role in the [town] today? 
Physical Repairs 
What planning approach did the authorities take to the restoration of the [town] 
What planning tools were used? 
Who was in charge of the restoration projects? 
What were the difficulties? 
What provisions are there to safeguard heritage today? 
 
5.6.2 Physical impact: building surveys and mapping physical damage 
To expand the data, two datasets were created to assess tangible heritage. The qualitative methods 
used to assess the impact of heritage on Dubrovnik society have been outlined above and the 
remaining two data quantitative datasets are discussed here. 
The first dataset focused on the physical destruction and reconstruction of the city by mapping its 
recovery in photographic comparisons, producing a timeline of recovery, analysing the funding for 
recovery and examining the way in which these were linked. It included archival research of photos 
taken in the Old Town in the immediate aftermath of the war and the identification of the buildings 
of interest within these collections. The methods employed included comparing archival pictures of 
damage taken from official records and UNESCO-sanctioned recovery literature with a 
comprehensive photographic survey carried out by the researcher. Archival building recovery reports 
were used to map damage and recovery on (both the original and existing) street plans of Dubrovnik. 
The written record of damage done to the buildings was also evaluated and compared with a 
contemporary account to ascertain whether the damage had been repaired, and whether it was still 
visible or whether repairs were visible. The data was combined to explore the extent of the damage 
through comparisons of archival and contemporary material, priorities in rebuilding, transparency in 
the recovery process, and the extent to which Dubrovnik’s BCH can be considered recovered. 
In order to map the damage and recovery of Dubrovnik, the buildings were plotted on a street plan 
of the Old Town. Using architectural survey maps from the Dubrovnik Conservation Institute a new 
blank street map was created, using Corel-Draw software. The blank street map was then used as a 
base map to plot damage done to buildings, and the phases to complete recovery of the Old Town. 
The maps show the extent and pace of recovery, and reveal which buildings received the most 
attention from 1990 to 2011 and the order in which their repair was prioritised. 
Data has been collected from as many sources as possible to ascertain what the order in which the 
Old Town was repaired. There is a great deal of myth-making and storytelling over the first item to 
be recovered in the Old Town, and each claim is linked to a claim of cultural significance and 
cementing a cultural identity of the Dubrovnik residences. Discovering the first item to be restored 
seems to indicate its importance and cultural significance – to the residents, UNESCO and interested 
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parties (donors). The order of recovery shows which buildings are deemed most important, and which 
received the most money and attention to be repaired quickly. 
This method revealed some interesting discrepancies between the various narratives of recovery that 
are extant in the literature and in the collective memory, which are examined in Chapter Nine. 
5.6.3 Economic impact: statistical analysis 
The economic impact of heritage has been assessed in a statistical analysis of Dubrovnik’s tourist 
industry, using tourism as a proxy for the economic value of cultural heritage (discussed in Chapter 
Eight). The economic impact is measured using a set of indicators that show the intensity and 
changing flows of tourism in Dubrovnik and the effect this has had on Croatian GDP, together with 
the economic reliance on placed on it. The indicators have been formed using data taken from the 
Croatian Bureau of Statistics (CBS) as the main source. The existence of institutions similar to the 
CBS around the world makes replicating this data stream accessible to further case studies. The data 
were explored in Microsoft Excel and used to calculate averages to establish an approximate value 
for tourism. The data is discussed extensively in Chapter Eight, using the indicators (presented here) 
to frame the structure of the chapter. 
Statistical analysis produces a reliable account of how important tourism (and heritage) are to the 
economic survival of the city. The conceptual link between tourism and heritage is explored in detail 
in both Chapter Two and Eight, but is introduced here to argue the simple point that tourism in a 
WHS is an economic powerhouse capable of generating income, and in the case of Dubrovnik the 
hinge on which recovery and disaster hung in the balance. A cursory glance at the wealth of hotels 
and tourists in the city should confirm this assertion, but it is statistical analysis of tourism data from 
1991 to 2013 that can demonstrate this more rigorously.  
Table 5.6: Economic Impact: Tourism Indicators 
 Indicator Objective 
1 Tourist arrivals To show how many domestic and international tourists arrived in 
Dubrovnik per year and trends and changes to tourist arrivals via 
variations in the number of visitors between 1990 and 2012, using 
data on tourist arrivals from the Croatian Bureau of Statistics from 
1990 to 2011. The data covers both the whole of Croatia from 1990 
to 2011, and specifically Dubrovnik from 2000 to 2011.  
2 Nights spent To monitor changes or trends in the number of nights spent in 
Dubrovnik by national and international tourists from 1990 to 2012. 
Overnight tourist stays are defined by the nights spent in 
accommodation facilities. 
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3 Duration of stay To gain an insight into how tourists behave whilst in Dubrovnik, and 
to estimate how much tourists spend on each trip. The average 
duration of stay is calculated by dividing the overnights stay by the 
number of tourist arrivals. Changes in stay duration were monitored 
by looking at tourism statistics from 1990 to 2012. 
4 Accommodation by 
type 
To discover how many different types of accommodation are on offer 
and how popular they were with tourists. The statistics are divided 
into collective (subdivided into hotels, campsites and others) and 
private accommodation (room and apartment renting). The data has 
been assessed from 1990 to 2012 to look at changing trends in 
preferred accommodation types (the number of tourists staying in 
different types of accommodation), and also to investigate the 
changing number of facilities on offer.  
5 Available beds 
(capacity use) 
To assess the capacity of the tourism sector in Dubrovnik by looking 
at how many available beds there were in tourist accommodation. Data 
is taken from the Croatian Bureau of Statistics from 1990 to 2012 to 
uncover trends and changes in the capacity of the accommodation on 
offer and to calculate the frequency of use of available beds in Croatia 
by dividing bed places by the number of overnights in a particular year.  
6 Direct contribution 
of tourism to GDP 
To assess the contribution of Dubrovnik tourism to the GDP of Croatia, 
compared with other regions of Croatia, together with changes in the 
value of tourism from 1990 to 2012. This indictor dealt with direct 
tourism services such as accommodation, culture, recreation and 
services directly linked to tourism; it excludes employment and 
government contributions.  
7 Direct employment 
in tourism services 
To assess how many people are employed directly by tourism in 
Dubrovnik, and to examine changes between 1990 and 2012 
 
5.7 Analysing the Research Data 
The qualitative data on the social impact of heritage was analysed using a thematic analysis of the 
transcripts taken from the interviews. A thematic analysis identifies patterns and themes found in the 
raw data, and uses these to assess commonalities or differences between research participants (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006, pp. 78–79). Emerging themes were coded across all participants, and the themes 
and patterns grouped (using data trees). The datasets were used to establish hypotheses that answered 
the research questions, and in doing so provided new insights into the impacts on heritage. 
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Commonalities and themes were also explored in the findings of the quantitative datasets; issues of 
tourism and destruction were flagged as common themes in the previous dataset and so were expected 
to play a role in the thematic concerns of the interviews. As all data were collected before any analysis 
could begin, and the qualitative interviews were not impaired by the expectation that certain themes 
would arise. 
The transcriptions were produced by the researcher after the interviews, and explored using NVivo 
software to code and generate themes and patterns. The investigation was carried out after the 
quantitative assessment of the economic and physical impact of heritage. This is a departure from 
Tashakkor and Teddlie’s mixed method design, which suggests that qualitative datasets should be 
assessed first. The reversal of order was carried out for two reasons; first, the abundance of physical 
data on the reconstruction of the town allowed the priorities of heritage and conflict management to 
be clearly assessed and investigated, establishing how important heritage has been to the city. In 
doing so, it was possible to ascertain the impact heritage would have on local people and the 
likelihood that people would remember and share heritage and war narratives. Secondly, the 
economic impact revealed the reliance of Dubrovnik on tourism, and so indicated that many people 
would be influenced by their position and employment in the tourist industry. This allowed the 
researcher to understand the participants’ narratives on tourism in context and acknowledge bias, and 
to ensure that the testimonies were not taken at face value. As a further note on the order of research, 
the physical assessment of the BCH took over two years to complete, and accessing and using 
restricted economic archival data also took a great deal of time. However, despite the small number 
of interview participants, gaining access to them and winning their trust was the most time-
consuming endeavour, and analysing this also had to take place at the end of the study, as it was the 
final dataset to be completed.  
5.8 Methodological Considerations 
There are several methodological considerations and limitations to this study, and these are important 
to address in order to ensure the IHAF is rigorous methodological framework (in accordance with 
objective four of the second research question). These considerations are discussed below, as well as 
an outline of factors considered by the researcher in accordance with the Researching Under fire 
fieldwork methodological checklist. 
Language Barriers 
Most of this fieldwork was carried out in Dubrovnik, and the researcher does not possess an advanced 
level of Croatian language skills, and therefore interviews either had to be conducted in English or 
with a Croatian interpreter. The preliminary fieldwork showed that it was possible to have in-depth 
and advanced conversations with the residents of Dubrovnik in English. Both the use of English in 
the educational system in Dubrovnik and its locus as an international tourist market meant that the 
researcher encountered no problems being understood by or understanding local residents and 
interview participants. On only one occasion did an interview participant indicate they would not be 
comfortable conducting an interview in English. The researcher was prepared to employ a local 
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interpreter to help conduct the interview, however, this particular participant withdrew from the 
process for personal reasons. At the start of each interview an interpreter was offered, but declined 
by all participants. Although this was not anticipated the researcher was repeatedly informed that 
traditionally Dubrovnik functions primarily as oral culture and they would prefer to speak directly to 
the researcher. 
Ethics 
To ensure that the risks to interviewees and interviewer were minimalised, the interview questions 
went through a rigorous ethical evaluation (both by the researcher and through an official panel of 
academic researchers at the University of York). The interview questions were submitted to this 
panel and approved by the departmental Ethics Committee. Furthermore, the interviewees were 
encouraged not to answer questions they did not wish to and informed of their right to withdraw 
consent and their participation from interviews at any time. The researcher did encounter some issues 
with participants reliving traumatic memories. However, the participants confirmed that they told 
their stories to clarify and justify their own perspectives and assured the researcher that they were 
comfortable doing so. 
Assuring Anonymity 
Another ethical issue that was anticipated was the need for anonymity. Each and every participant 
was assured of anonymity. All participants asked to remain anonymous, and accordingly, the 
participants’ names were removed and each transcript labelled as CH (cultural heritage) and an 
individual number. To further assure the anonymity of the research participants the transcripts will 
not be made available in their entirety in this study as per agreement with both the ethical committee 
and the interview participants. 
Institutional Participation 
An unanticipated issue arose due to the reluctance of a key cultural heritage institution to participate 
in the interviews. Despite friendly email exchanges and their willingness to share information and 
unpublished information relating to BCH recovery, they were unwilling to participate in interviews. 
Despite repeated offers of interpreters and rearranging interview dates the institution continued to 
decline an invitation to interview. Although it would have been advantageous to have interviewed 
someone from this institution, the effect was mitigated by interviewing ex-employees who had been 
involved in the organisation at the time of the conflict and immediate aftermath. 
Number of Interview Participants 
Two unforeseen issues were encountered during this study relating to the number of participants: 
developing trust and reluctance to go on the record. Although there was a great deal of interest in the 
study, it took a long time to build up trust between the community and the researcher. Speculative 
(and anecdotal) reasons for this reluctance include a lack of free time in the high tourist season and 
exhaustion with the city during the low season; not wanting to discuss personal issues with a stranger 
and not wishing to share war narratives as the city tries to change its reputation (away from war and 
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towards heritage). The researcher countered this issue by returning to the city for several months 
each year, building up relationships over time. It was not feasible to stay for longer than two months 
at a time (due to economic constraints) and repeated visits proved useful as the researcher was 
recommended to participants by previous participants. The second issue was the reluctance of 
potential participants to go on the record and join the interview process. These people would initially 
agree to talk about heritage and the conflict, but would not agree to interviews. This resulted in 
receiving a great deal of anecdotal data that could not be used in the study. This could be countered 
to some degree as the anecdotal data helped the researcher to identify important areas of tension in 
the city (such as tourism), as well as receiving help in identify other more willing participants. The 
relatively small number of participants was successfully dealt with as (i) the interviews that were 
carried out were exhaustive and in depth, resulting in a rich variety of information; (ii) commonalities 
and themes in the interviews suggest that data saturation had occurred to some degree as the trends 
were found in all interviews, and (iii) due to the mixed methods design of the study the 
interview/qualitative data were further supported and complemented by a further two datasets. 
Testing the feasibility of the IHAF methodology 
Sultan Barakat and Sue Ellis suggest a framework for field-based research (1996, p. 149): the 
methodology for this research has been assessed using Research Under Fire as a checklist for its 
strengths, weaknesses and feasibility. 
In order for fieldwork to be successfully undertaken (that is to yield results and to maintain its flexible 
and innovative approach) several issues need to be taken into account (Ellis, 1996, p. 149). Robert 
Chambers notes that there are several biases that can affect the collection (and subsequent analysis) 
of data in post-war environments (Chambers, 2005, p. 79) in an effort to identify and mitigate the 
impact of these issues, this research has outlined several of them below in relation to the fieldwork 
in Dubrovnik. The following issues have been taken from Barakat and Ellis’ paper (based on 
Chambers’ 1989 paper), and their analysis of bias is used as a framework here 
Pre-field preparation 
Before undertaking any research, it is paramount that the researcher knows as much about the context 
of the research as possible (Barakat and Ellis, 1996, p. 151). This also forms part of the DFID SCA 
which encourages the context analysis of the conflict as a foundation requirement for any assessment 
(Austin, 2003). This has been achieved in this research by the historical (leading to contemporary) 
analysis of Dubrovnik, which allowed the researcher to gain an insight into existing cultural tensions 
(both historic and contemporary), and added support for the need for an exploratory field trip as part 
of pre-fieldwork preparation. 
Project bias 
Project bias occurs when “the researcher is drawn towards sites where contacts and information are 
readily available – inevitably a site that has been investigated before by many other researchers” 
(Barakat and Ellis, 1996, p. 150). Although Dubrovnik and its heritage have been investigated before, 
the methods used to do so (proposed in the IHAF) have not. Neither has the conceptual approach of 
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the impact of heritage on recovery (as opposed to the impact of recovery on heritage) been applied 
to this case study. As both the approach and methodology have not been used it is unlikely that the 
results gained and discussed in this research have been gained anywhere else at any other time. The 
fieldwork trips were performed over a number of years, and the data gained from them is both 
detailed and substantive, again supporting the uniqueness of this study. 
Person 
Person bias is defined as “articulate key informants are not always representative of the typical 
opinions of a community and yet, because of their position and ability to communicate, they are often 
the only ones spoken with by the researcher” (Barakat and Ellis, 1996, p. 150). This impact was 
mitigated by the researcher talking to a range of participants- some were approached via pre-arranged 
appointments with members of government and heritage professionals, whilst other participants were 
identified and approached in the Old Town and asked to participate, these included shop owners, 
retirees, students, and restaurateurs. 
Season 
“Researchers have a marked tendency to conduct research in foreign countries only during periods 
of pleasant weather; thus, many of the most severe problems faced by a community go unobserved” 
(Barakat and Ellis, 1996, p. 151). This is a very pertinent bias to the research undertaken in 
Dubrovnik as there is a difference in tourism numbers between the summer season (May to 
September) and the winter season (October to April). The research was carried out in the early 
summer season in order to assess the impact of tourism as well as talking to local residents. The 
reasons behind the summer visits were related in part to the ease of access as there were more 
participants willing to talk in the summer than winter (many closed businesses during the winter and 
the population moved to winter dwellings outside of the Old Town). This bias is also mitigated by 
the additional data streams which do not rely on interviews but on alternate fieldwork (photo-
surveys) and desk based analysis of economics. The numerous inter-disciplinary data collection 
avenues minimise bias associated with single data stream collection in one area at a particular time. 
Diplomatic and professional bias 
It is noted that “diplomatic expediency can lead to selectivity over which projects are shown to the 
researcher” (Barakat and Ellis, 1996, p. 151). Although this could have been an influencing factor, 
the lack of co-operation from some institutions meant that the researcher received no information not 
in the public domain regarding the cost of recovery of BCH, and other confidential data was received 
regarding recovery processes from a variety of sources on the same issue (cost of recovery and 
tourism figures) which diversified the information and would have highlighted selectivity. 
Professional bias (by which the researcher refers to “Professional specialisation generates a focus 
that can lead to researchers missing links between processes”) (Barakat and Ellis, 1996, p. 151) has 
been mitigated in this research by an awareness that this research is looking at only one aspect of 
recovery, and acknowledging that the focus on heritage is only a constituent part of a larger process. 
Gaining access and identifying gatekeepers (including freedom of movement for fieldwork) 
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Access to Dubrovnik was not an issue for this researcher; both diplomatic and transport links were 
stable and allowed freedom of movement between the UK directly to the Dubrovnik region. 
Language restrictions were an initial threat to the success of the project but were mitigated by the 
ease with which the local population spoke English (as a direct result of tourism). Gatekeepers were 
identified prior to the research in order to speak with those directly involved with heritage 
management in Dubrovnik, but gatekeepers were also identified through personal recommendations 
based familiarity and trust gained from participants’ knowledge of the researcher and their work over 
several years. “Even with inside assistance, the researcher’s passage will not always be as easy as 
might be envisaged prior to entering the field” (Barakat and Ellis, 1996, p. 152), and this proved to 
be the case in Dubrovnik in terms of gaining and declining interviews. Unfortunately, the number of 
participants in the research stayed at a low number (ten) as many local residents were willing to talk 
about the conflict (off the record), but not willing to be interviewed (on the record). On occasion, the 
integrity of the researcher had to be preserved (over familiarity from participants and 
recommendations based on promoting family business connections) and invitations to (two) 
interviews declined. On both of these issues the potential impact of additional data is mitigated by 
the extensive in-depth research in other data streams (economic and physical in lieu of additional 
socio-political information). 
Time limits 
The unpredictable nature of research in post-conflict communities means it is difficult (if not 
impossible) to predict how long research may take (Barakat and Ellis, 1996, p. 152). The research 
trips were either completely or partially self-funded expeditions and so could not encompass 
travelling more than once a year for more than six weeks at a time. To mitigate this and to collect as 
much data as possible the researcher organised annual field trips and used these field trips to create 
cumulative datasets instead of a singular snapshot of a single year in Dubrovnik. In this way, a time 
limit based on limited resources became an asset to the research as the results were gained over a 
long period of time, with time for analysis, reflection, and identification of gaps in the data between 
each trip. 
Limited information 
Information on post-war recovery is limited and there may be a lack of document sources (Barakat 
and Ellis, 1996, p. 153). Although this is certainly the case in many contexts, Dubrovnik had a wealth 
of information available due to its status as a WHS (and documentation being kept in UNESCO 
archives) and as a tourist centre (tourism statistics kept nationally, not locally). Data that was missing 
(such as tourism statistics for only Dubrovnik from 1990 to 2000, and recovery cost reports) has been 
explained in the economic discussions in Chapter Seven. The potential for limited information has 
been mitigated by the formation of not only a detailed analysis of the context of the conflict (Chapter 
Six), but also based on a reliance on three modes of investigation opposed to a single line of inquiry. 
This approach is supported by Hall and Hall who suggest that due to the unpredictable nature of 
fieldwork it is integral to maintain flexibility and diversity in the methodological approach to the 
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study (Hall and Hall, 1990, p. 43). Barakat and Ellis argue “A good knowledge of the situation that 
existed pre-war can address some of these issues, as can the creation of one’s own maps and records 
of information while in the field using basic survey methods, sketching and photographs” (Barakat 
and Ellis, 1996, p. 153); whilst this approach has proved invaluable to the formation of the contextual 
knowledge of the conflict, the basic methods proved insufficient and were refined into the generation 
of detailed maps, rigorous use of photography, and well-kept records of all encounters with willing 
interview participants. The approach to grounded theory that is taken here is from a Glaserian 
approach wherein all data collected in Dubrovnik is considered of equal value, and applied to the 
formation of a conceptualisation of heritage in post-conflict that has wider applications beyond the 
remit of this research (and its case study) (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, pp. 22–23; Glaser, 1992). 
Impartiality 
All researchers have difficulty maintaining impartiality as they have pre-existing conceptions and 
theories which will have an impact on the research (Barakat and Ellis, 1996, p. 155). They state that 
to mitigate impartiality the researcher should maintain “an open-minded and reflective approach” 
which allows researcher to “constantly to address and adjust their perspective. To travel into the field 
looking, listening and learning from all possible sides and sources, and constantly assessing the 
viewpoint, is the closest the researcher can come to impartiality” (Barakat and Ellis, 1996, p. 155). 
Using this as a guideline, the researcher sought to maintain their impartiality and integrity by 
maintaining professional links with all participants and avoiding the familiarity associated with 
becoming recognisable to local residents over the course of the research. Furthermore, the researcher 
drew Maria Todorova’s Balkanisation and constantly asked themselves if they were allowing 
elements of “balkanisation” and any pre-existing assumptions (Todorova, 1997, p. 28) into their 
work, and by being aware of this concept stop it from occurring. 
5.9  Summary: The Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework  
The research framework presented here links pragmatic approaches to heritage and conflict 
assessment to design an IHAF that is capable of addressing the needs of a specific context. The 
creation of an integrated perspective on heritage and post-conflict recovery and assessment has come 
in part from a review of the contemporary methodologies used to assess conflict and heritage, but is 
also based on an in-depth investigation into the meaning, use and value of heritage in contemporary 
post-conflict recovery contexts. The following chapters form the answer to the third research 
question: What effect does heritage have on the recovery from conflict in the case study of 
Dubrovnik? This question is answered by using the IHAF in Dubrovnik to gain empirical evidence 
to assess how Dubrovnik recovered from conflict between 1992 and 2012, and to discuss these results 
in the key findings in Chapter Ten.  
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Chapter Six: Dubrovnik Case Study 
The foundations of the Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework (IHAF) have been discussed in 
the previous chapters. Through the remaining chapters of the thesis, the results from the application 
of IHAF to the case of Dubrovnik are explored and discussed. The first step in the IHAF is to define 
the context of the case study in question, and use this context as a basis to determine the suitability 
of the case study in the operationalisation of the IHAF to carry out this research. The case study of 
this thesis is Dubrovnik, specifically the recovery of the Old Town of Dubrovnik following the 
shelling campaign of 1991. This chapter provides a detailed account of the events leading to the 
conflict in Dubrovnik through a thorough analysis of the geo-politics of the region and the identity 
politics at work, and discusses how these two factors are inexorably linked not only to the shelling 
itself, but also to how the local, national, and international community reacted to the attack in the 
aftermath of the shelling. This chapter focuses on the identity divisions that have come to characterise 
the conflicts in the Balkans, and discusses not only where these ideas were created, but also how they 
have become such a defining feature of the region. The chapter then uses this discussion to interrogate 
the events of the bombing of Dubrovnik, argues that the same key aspects that have been established 
and used to characterise the violent history of the Balkans- such as cultural identity politics and 
violence, and the exploitation of these aspects to create cultural norms and expectations in conflict- 
can be seen at work in the attack on Dubrovnik, and in its recovery in the aftermath of the attack. 
In 1991, the Old Town of Dubrovnik became the target for a Serbian-Montenegrin shelling 
campaign. As a listed World Heritage Site and a demilitarized zone, the shelling gained international 
attention, and the Old Town was widely regarded to have been destroyed by the war. Several aspects 
make Dubrovnik an interesting case study for this thesis. Dubrovnik can be considered as an overt 
attack on cultural heritage but this was not unique to the area; the later destruction of the town of 
Vukovar or that of the ancient Bosnian town of Počitelj, both famed for their culture and architecture, 
did not garner the same response from the international community as Dubrovnik. This raises a 
question into why the attack on Dubrovnik should be so widely condemned and illicit such a wide 
international response, when other such attacks in the area did not. The answer, explored in this 
chapter but based on the theories thus far explored, is that Dubrovnik’s status as a World Heritage 
Site made it a target for non-Croatian troops wanting to damage Croatian (and European) identities, 
but its world heritage status also made it a vehicle for Croatia to illicit support and sympathy from 
the world heritage supporting (and western biased) international community. This chapter explores 
the histories of the Balkans in order to understand how a narrative of violence and ownership formed 
around Dubrovnik, and the impact these narratives had on the way culture, heritage, and identities 
were constructed around (and in opposition to) the attack on the Old Town.  
6.1 History of Dubrovnik 
It is likely that there were several motives for attacking Dubrovnik in 1991, but it is clear that culture 
and the values associated to culture were fundamental to the attack. The attack often noted as the 
turning point in the Balkans conflicts when the international community became focused on the 
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destruction of heritage (Pearson, 2010, p. 201); one that served to crystallise anti-Yugoslav (or anti-
Milošević) feeling in the West and ultimately led to the increasing involvement of Europe and the 
USA in resolving the conflict (Francioni, 2004, p. 1212). The horror stories of genocide and ethnic 
cleansing in the narratives of conflict in ex-Yugoslavia are significant in the framing of this war to 
the international community and led to the formation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), itself a turning point in academic and intervention approaches to 
conflict. Later chapters in this thesis fully explore the impact that Dubrovnik had on the ICTY 
proceedings, but it is introduced here as an example of how the attack on the Old Town became a 
readily accepted illustration of Yugoslavian brutality, because this pejorative identity trait had been 
introduced and enforced for centuries prior to the events in Dubrovnik by powerful European 
countries. The narratives of violence have had a profound impact on the way the conflict is viewed 
and remembered not only by the international community but also the local communities who 
experienced the wars, which in turn has shaped, interpreted, and moulded the narratives of history 
and heritage. 
6.1.1 Culture, Nationalism and Conflict in the Balkans 
Tracing the historical roots of the 1991 conflict in Dubrovnik and its association with cultural 
heritage inevitably leads back to the complex history of Yugoslavia. Analysing and interpreting the 
history of Yugoslavia is far beyond the remit of this research, but without investigating the historical 
roots of the 1991 conflict it is impossible to explain how the conflict in Dubrovnik was related to a 
much bigger and long-lasting dispute, and why Dubrovnik is such a landmark case in the long legacy 
of war, nationalism and cultural politics in the Balkans. What follows here is an interpretation of the 
history of the Balkans and its influence over the politics and identities in the region, which resulted 
in the attack on Dubrovnik in 1991. 
6.1.2 Contested Histories: The Origins of Dubrovnik 
The political conflict over the ownership of heritage and identity of the region is a theme at the core 
of this thesis, and although it is a complex issue it can be illustrated in the origin story of Dubrovnik. 
At various points in history Dubrovnik has been claimed by its inhabitants to have originally been 
Roman, Greek and Byzantine: whichever ancient culture Croatia is aligned in its contemporary state 
to determines its political status. For example, contemporary Dubrovnik currently aligns itself to an 
Italian heritage, which is evident through its colloquial use of Italian phrases, an emphasis on Italian 
culinary culture, architectural heritage, and Roman history in museums. This indicates that 
Dubrovnik is more likely to claim a Roman ancestry, aligning itself historically to Europe, to support 
its current status as a European state.  
The foundation of Dubrovnik is either Roman, Byzantine or Greek (Dvornik, 1962, p. 139; Harris, 
2006, pp. 22–23). The seemingly innocuous origins story of Dubrovnik takes on political 
connotations in light of how this history is used and how it signals its cultural loyalty. If the 
contemporary city is Roman in origins, then it can be linked to modern-day Italy and Europe and the 
connections that come with it. If it claims Byzantium heritage it lends itself to a connection with 
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Islam and the union with other Balkan states. The claim to a Greek origin avoids major political 
issues but is at odds with Dubrovnik’s historical and contemporary heritage, which bears less 
similarity to Greek heritage (either in terms of built heritage or cultural traditions) than to Roman or 
Byzantine. The conflict between Balkan and European (East and West) interpretations of 
Dubrovnik’s history emerges from the three myths on the founding of Dubrovnik (Harris, 2006, p. 
22). The first is that Romans fleeing from Slavs founded a trading town called Ragusa (Dvornik, 
1962, p. 139); the second is that the Byzantine Empire created a trading town on the location in the 
seventh century; and the third is that the town was founded on an earlier Greek settlement (Van 
Antwerp Fine, 1991, p. 35). In each case, the settlers’ nationality is associated with the projection of 
an authentic contemporary identity (Dzino, 2010, p. 232), which has a direct bearing on the 
independence of Croatia from Yugoslavia in 1991, and the claims made about whether Dubrovnik is 
Croatian (based on its Western history) or Slavic (based on its Eastern history) (Despalatovic, 2000, 
p. 84).  
This interpretation of the founding of Dubrovnik introduces the argument which governs this chapter, 
is Dubrovnik’s heritage governed by its European or Slavic identity, on what historical grounds were 
these claims of ownership based, and how did this culminate in the siege of Dubrovnik.  
6.1.3 The Republic of Dubrovnik and its reliance on Empires 
The Republic of Dubrovnik functioned as an important centre for trade, with control over Adriatic 
trade routes and situation as a major trading port on the Silk Road (Jelavich, 1983, pp. 97–99). 
Dubrovnik’s cultural history is heavily influenced by its wars lasting for 400 years with the Venetians 
from the sixth century onwards, which fought for control of trade routes in the Adriatic. In 1202 
Dubrovnik was defeated and lost its status as an autonomous region, remaining under Venetian 
control until 1358 (when the Austrian-Hungarian Empire first appeared on the political landscape of 
Dubrovnik) (Faroqhi, 2004, p. 90). 
Dubrovnik prospered until 1667, when an earthquake devastated the town, leading to its decline 
(Lampe and Jackson, 1982, p. 54). During this period Venice began to encroach further into Croatia, 
whilst the Ottoman Empire also began to advance; caught in the middle of this conflict Dubrovnik, 
negotiated and colluded with the Ottoman Empire in an effort to gain protection and avoid 
involvement in open warfare (Sugar, 1996, p. 178). 
Between 1816 and 1914 the Austrian-Hungarian Empire maintained its control over Croatia and 
during this period the cultural characterisation of the Balkans and its people was formed in Western 
Europe to create pejorative cultural stereotypes that would dictate the Balkan–European relationship 
from the nineteenth to twenty-first century (Todorova, 1997, p. 119). This Eurocentric rhetoric 
branded the Balkans as underdeveloped, uncivilised, and in need of imperial rule (Todorova, 1997, 
pp. 119–120). Maria Todorova argues that the discourse creates a negative stereotype in order to 
compare it unfavourably to good European values in order to enforce and justify exerting control 
over these nations, this is referred to Balkanisation, the politically motived classification of an ethnic 
group based on socially constructed values (Todorova, 1997, p. 36). The Balkanisation of states by 
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European powers uses an invented discourse as a fact that delegitimises the political power and self-
determination of Balkan states (Todorova, 1997, p. 110). This discourse may not be as overt in 
politics in the 1990s as it was in the 1800s, but the assumptions made about contemporary wars 
feature subtle elements of the balkanisation thesis (Simić, 2013, p. 118). For example, a speech 
justifying intervention in the Balkans made by former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair to the House 
of Commons in 1999 characterised the Balkan civil war using the word “barbarian”, while framing 
the case for international intervention in almost paternalistic terms to protect the people of Kosovo 
(Blair, 1999). This displays a Balkanised discourse through the characterisation of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia) as uncivilised and in need of imperial protection: 
We must act: to save thousands of innocent men, women and children from humanitarian 
catastrophe, from death, barbarism and ethnic cleansing by a brutal dictatorship; to save the 
stability of the Balkan region, where we know chaos can engulf all of Europe. We have no 
alternative but to act and act we will, unless Milošević even now chooses the path of peace. 
House of Commons Debates 23 March 1999, Vol. 328 Col. 162 
The justification of military action given by Blair reflects Todorova’s insights, showing that the 
narratives that characterise the Balkans are deeply politically ingrained in Western society and that 
no further justification beyond these negative stereotypes of the Balkans are needed, simply because 
the stereotypes are perceived to be true based on historical discourse (Simić, 2013, p. 132). This 
characterisation of Balkan states continues to be a theme in discussions on conflicts in the Balkans, 
and the focus of international attention (Hayden, 2000, pp. 116–117). The conflict in Dubrovnik in 
1991 is as an example of how Slavic aggression is framed – as an uncivilised attack from Serbian 
troops on cultural heritage which required international assistance, controlled by UNESCO, first to 
resolve the dispute, then to restore the sites. The ground-work for the acceptance of this narrative 
had already been laid by the Balkanised rhetoric that has been used throughout Europe to characterise 
the Balkans, and the vocabulary used to make these statements was already familiar to a receptive 
international audience. 
6.1.4 Unification of Yugoslavia and the impact on national identities 
The beginning of a unified Yugoslavia can be traced to the late 1890s, with Serbia as the driving 
force in seeking a strong relationship with neighbouring countries (Mann, 2012, p. 332). However, 
the desire for unification also revealed a key tension between Serbia and Croatia: Serbia wished to 
be at the centre of unification based on mutual Slavic cultures, traditions and memories of a joint 
aggression against the Turks (primarily a Serbian experience); Croatia wanted to form a unification 
based on the kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia, with their own traditions and culture at the 
forefront of the union (Pašić, 2000, p. 262). John Lampe notes that although Croatia and Serbia 
wished to create a unified state based on Slavic tradition and culture, both wanted to control the 
unified state and the interpretation of culture to be used as the foundation to the union (Lampe, 2000, 
p. 39). Lampe contends that unification based on similar cultural heritage was an idea that grew out 
of the Slavic states, and was a rejection of the imagined communities created by the rest of Europe 
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(Lampe, 2000, p. 40). However, as the divide between the two states deepened, both wanted to 
present their own country as the enlightened centre of south Europe, and in doing so created an 
antagonistic history of conflict rather than of fraternity (Lampe, 2000, p. 40). If this were the case, it 
can be argued that in fracturing the narrative of fraternity to become the dominant nation, both 
countries began to Balkanise the other using the same pejorative rhetoric and vocabulary as the rest 
of Europe to create a hierarchical distinction. In doing so both created a historical narrative of cultural 
difference and blame that may have been the foundation (or at least the justification) for the 
separation of Croatia from Yugoslavia in 1991. 
Between 1890 and 1910 Croatia prospered through trade with the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and 
the kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia was resurrected. The dual monarchy wished to include Dalmatia 
in this kingdom and sought Hungarian assistance to ensure protection for Dalmatia from Venetian 
claims (Lampe, 2000, p. 79). Serbia welcomed the union and a state of mutual respect between them 
was revived. However, Hungarian insistence that the Kingdom of Croatia should include not only 
Dalmatia but also Bosnia and Herzegovina led to the cooling of Serbian and Croatian cooperation, 
which in turn led to violence in 1902 and the Balkan wars in 1912 (Grandits and Promitzer, 2000, p. 
132; Lampe, 2000, p. 80). In 1904 Stjepan Radić and the Croatian Peasant Party began to argue for 
power to be removed from foreign powers and given to rural Croatia (where most people lived and 
worked). It was at this time that Radić publicly recognised “Serbs as Slavs, and as ethnically separate 
from Croats” and he began to argue that Bosnia had more in common with Croatia than Serbia, based 
on their mutual traditions of peasant culture (Lampe, 2000, p. 80).  
6.1.5 The First World War and The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
The events of the First World War led to the formation of a unified Yugoslavia. The fall of the 
Austrian-Hungarian Empire after the war opened an avenue for the Balkan states to consolidate 
power in the region (Lampe, 2000, p. 101). In the face of the ailing Austrian-Hungarian and Ottoman 
empires, Serbia pushed for a unified kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes capable of consolidating 
power in the region. Croatia had supported the Hungarians through the First World War, and although 
the peasants were under a great deal of pressure to provide the empire with most (if not all) of their 
produce (Glenny, 2000, p. 301), general opinion stayed loyal to Hungary until the disintegration of 
the Empire in 1918. (Lampe, 2000, p. 109) 
By 1918 the toll of the First World War on Yugoslavia became apparent; thousands of civilians were 
homeless, dying, diseased or refugees escaping genocide and relying on the protection of the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the wake of the fall of Austria and Hungary (Denitch, 1994, p. 24). In the 
aftermath of the First World War a new pattern of retributive violence began to emerge, wherein the 
ethnic minority least able to protect itself received the full force of the majority’s anger in both 
victorious and defeated counties across Europe (Glenny, 2000, p. 326). This pattern of retributive 
violence became a particular staple of wars in the Balkans (notably in Croatia in the Second World 
War) due to the “ethnic patchwork” that had been produced by centuries of shifting geo-political 
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borders; a focus on cultural and ethnic differences and the economic cost of war (and particularly of 
defeat) (Glenny, 2000, p. 327). 
6.1.6 Nationalism and the Second World War in Croatia 
The historic connections between Italy and Germany and Croatia, alongside the growing resentment 
of Serbian authority, came to a head at the outbreak of the Second World War. Fascist Italy and Nazi 
Germany presented Croatia with a chance to to bring about an independent, nationalist Croatia 
(Lampe, 2000, p. 198). In 1941 Croatia became a Nazi puppet state when the Croatian Ustaše 
declared Croatia an independent republic, and commenced the brutal internment and execution of 
thousands of Gypsies, Orthodox Serbs, Jews, and Muslims throughout Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia 
(Denitch, 1994, p. 41). The Ustaše wrought great and widely recognised violence on these groups 
(Lampe, 2000; Glenny, 2000; Despalatovic, 2000; Denitch, 1994) which included some of the most 
brutal acts of genocide of the Second World War. The Nazi-controlled Croatian Ustaše, under the 
leadership of Ante Pavelić, sought to secure Croat supremacy in Yugoslavia by the systematic, 
elimination of all non-Croat nationalities and ethnicities (Pavković, 2000, p. 38). Serbia was marked 
out for particular aggression propagated by Croatian nationalists, based on an imagined history of 
hate and Serbian dominance in Yugoslavia and the perceived subjugation of the Croat people 
(Pavković, 2000, p. 38) which had been created by centuries of Balkanisation perpetrated by Western 
European powers. 
The nationalism of Croatia in the 1940s was explicitly linked to Nazism and fascism, and the legacy 
of Croatian nationalism was tarnished by its association with the Ustaše (Denitch, 1994, pp. 30–31). 
In the years following the Second World War, Croatia became part of Tito’s communist Yugoslavia 
and Croatian nationalism was side-lined in favour of a single Yugoslav nationality, authorised and 
enforced by the state (Silber and Little, 1996). The swing to Nazism and fascism in the 1930s and 
1940s has a direct bearing on the reluctance of Croatia to reassert their national identity after the 
Second World War. The damage caused to the reputation of Croatia by the actions of the Ustaše in 
the war was long lasting and when war broke out again in 1991 the Croatians were instantly framed 
in Yugoslav propaganda as Nazis and Ustaše. The 1991 conflict was characterised on all sides by the 
very same extreme violence, genocide and nationalism that was carried out in the Balkans during the 
Second World War. 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Tito’s partisans emerged as not only the Soviet-supported 
victors of the conflict, but also as its morally superior heroes, compared to the Croatian Ustaše 
(Bennett, 2000, pp. 206–207). In Yugoslavia the old dichotomies of religion, East and West conflicts, 
and uneasy Serb-Croat relations were replaced by a Soviet model of communism under the control 
of a central Serbian government presided over by Croatian born Tito (Lampe, 2000). In 1953 in a 
departure from Stalin’s Soviet Union, a Constitution was drafted to decentralise power. However, to 
ensure the survival of the unification, several provisions were put in place. One dictated that the right 
of succession in Yugoslavia were repealed and that the Yugoslav working-class would choose their 
own leaders (Lampe, 2000, p. 260). This provision aimed for single, socialist consciousness “to 
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replace the various nationalisms that had discredited themselves during the Second World War” 
(Lampe, 2000, p. 261), resulting in a “supra-national identity and the notion of the three named 
people” (Lampe, 2000, p. 261) the Jugoslavenstvo. 
In 1941 Yugoslavia was locked not only into the Second World War, but also into a civil war. The 
three sides were the partisans, the Chetnik and the Ustaše (Pavković, 2000, p. 37). The Chetnik, 
under Dragoljub-Draza Mihailovic, were a resistance army that refused to surrender in the Nazi 
Germany occupation of Yugoslavia and instead continued to take orders from the government-in-
exile (residing in Britain) (Pavković, 2000, p. 38). The Chetnik ideology aimed to return Yugoslavia 
to its pre-war political state under the rule of the Yugoslav monarchy (Pavković, 2000, p. 38). The 
Chetnik were celebrated by the allies (particularly Britain) and propaganda portrayed them as 
resistance fighters and heroes (Pavković, 2000, p. 39). The Chetnik also endorsed a nationalist 
Serbian ideology by seeking to reaffirm Serb superiority in post-war Yugoslavia through a military 
dictatorship and the removal and re-education of non-Serb Slavs. The dual ethos of unity forged by 
returning to a pre-war monarchy and Serbian national authority led to unregulated revenge against 
the Croats and reduced support for the Chetnik from potential recruits from Bosnia and Croatia 
(Pavković, 2000, p. 38). 
The partisans were opposed to the Nazi control of Yugoslavia. Under Josip Broz Tito and the 
Communist Party, the partisans sought to remove the Nazi presence and return Yugoslavia to a 
unified state, but with equal powers invested in all countries (Pavković, 2000, p. 40). The partisans 
were opposed to revenge and promoted a unified fraternity of Yugoslavia against the Nazi occupiers. 
This in turn encouraged Yugoslav supporters from non-Serbian countries to join in, with the hope of 
securing a voice in the new Yugoslavia without fear of reprisals (Pavković, 2000, p. 33). 
6.1.7 Reconciling people, places, and the past in communist Yugoslavia 
By 1945 the Communist partisans emerged as the dominant power in Yugoslavia under the 
leadership of Tito and with the support of Stalin and the Soviet Union. The partisans also benefited 
from increased allied support (particularly of Britain, who switched allegiance from the Chetnik to 
the partisans in 1943), who helped secure international legitimacy for Tito and the communist ruling 
party in Yugoslavia (Pavković, 2000, p. 41). Aleksandar Pavković argues that the lasting effect of 
the Ustaše massacres during the war was an unease at the thought of Croats being in a position of 
power in Yugoslavia and the Chetnik reprisals for Ustaše massacres on Muslims and Croats in Bosnia 
led to fears of returning to a pre-war (Chetnik nationalist) Yugoslavia. The partisans both capitalised 
on and allayed this fear by securing Croat and Muslim governments in Croat and Muslim strongholds 
within the Communist Party, thus providing protection for and against Yugoslav perpetrators of 
violence in Yugoslavia during the Second World War (Pavković, 2000, p. 42). Furthermore, the 
partisans held the Nazis and fascist Italy collaborators solely responsible for any and all atrocities 
committed during the Second World War (Despalatovic, 2000, p. 89). Pavković argues that this 
effectively made the partisans the only party that was not associated with Second World War crimes 
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(as both Chetnik and Ustaše had collaborated with the Nazis) and also enabled them to accuse the 
opposition of being collaborators and therefore criminals (Pavković, 2000, p. 43). 
The decision the partisans made to not reconcile Croatia with its past by confronting widespread 
collaboration with the Nazis had consequences. Because Croatia went from a fascist nationalist 
ideology in the war back to a unified fraternal national identity it could not rid itself of the association, 
and neither will it ever be able to apologise fully for the Ustaše behaviour (unlike other countries 
involved in Nazism in the 1930s and 1940s) because to admit complicity would destabilise the 
legitimacy of the Croatian identity (Despalatovic, 2000, pp. 90–92). The Croatian lack of acceptance 
of their own role in the war, followed by their immediate incorporation into another, now Yugoslav, 
nation has meant that the pre-communist past of Croatia remained unexamined and forcibly repressed 
by Tito’s government. This remained an underlying tension between Slavic republics until the fall of 
communism in the Balkans. As a result, cultural differences and disagreements were reasserted after 
the communist state using cultural repression ceased to control the area. The influence of heritage on 
nationalism is discussed in detail in Chapter Two, suggesting that heritage and nationalism remain 
an intrinsic part of a culture even when they are erased from official histories and discourse.  
When Croatia declared its independence in 1991, the underlying tensions of the unexamined events 
of the Second World War resurfaced, appearing to the Serbs as dangerous nationalism, and to 
Croatians as a demand to be freed from Serbian dominance. The genocidal levels of violence in the 
1990s thus can be seen partly to be a result of continual violence stemming from unresolved Second 
World War perceptions of victimhood, guilt, and retributive justice on all sides of Yugoslavia, which 
was an important factor which contributed to the violence in the 1990s. 
Denitch notes that the lack of reconciliation of previous conflicts in contemporary Balkan countries 
can be seen through the manipulation of the records of casualties and deaths during the war. Denitch 
argues that records of deaths in Yugoslavia during Second World War are not compatible with the 
number of deaths each nation claims (Denitch, 1994, pp. 32–33). Denitch notes that the countries of 
the former Yugoslav Republic exaggerate the extent of their own loss to accentuate their own level 
of suffering at the hands of neighbouring countries (Denitch, 1994, p. 33). This is a further example 
of the political power that heritage and the interpretation of history have over politics and nationalism 
in contemporary Croatia, and is particularly pertinent to the records of levels of damage to cultural 
heritage in Dubrovnik, explored in the following chapters. 
6.2 Dubrovnik Conflict 1991 
In 1991 Croatia announced its independence from the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, 
which subsequently led to the attack on Dubrovnik known as the Siege of Dubrovnik. From October 
1991 until June 1992 Dubrovnik was victim of an unlawful and sustained shelling campaign by the 
Yugoslavian National Army (JNA) that killed forty-three Croatian civilians (ICTY, 2003), wounded 
numerous others and severely damaged the cultural heritage of the city. As the city had been 
demilitarised since 1979 it did not expect an attack as it had no military advantage and was an area 
of outstanding cultural significance (WHC, 2012). 
107 
The argument used by Serbian leaders to justify the attempted annexation of Dubrovnik was 
historical, arguing that the land had been settled by the Slavs centuries ago and therefore should 
remain Slavic, and not part of the European-centred Croatia (BBC News, 2001). Dubrovnik’s borders 
had shifted countless times over centuries of settlement, and Yugoslavia (particularly Serbia and 
Montenegro) took advantage of this to argue that their attack in 1991was legal. Furthermore, the 
Serbian claims to owning Dubrovnik sought to draw attention to the Ustaše defined geo-political 
borders (and flag) of Croatia which included Dalmatia to argue that contemporary Croatian 
nationalism and claim over Dubrovnik was a result of its Nazi past (Bennett, 2000, p. 206) 
The national government of Croatia and the local leaders of Dubrovnik disputed the evidence and 
the historical interpretation and Dubrovnik fought successfully to remain part of Croatia. Despite the 
historical justification put forward by Yugoslavia, the real reason for the attack on Dubrovnik is 
debated (Pearson, 2010, p. 197). The ICTY proceedings in 2004 took the view that under the control 
of Slobodan Milošević, the Yugoslav Army sought to weaken the Croatian army by attacking 
Dubrovnik, thus distracting Croatian troops from conflicts nearer to Zagreb by forcing them to 
protect the town (Francioni, 2004, p. 1215). 
The argument that has received the most traction in the media, the ICTY trial proceedings, and 
academia is that while the city was bombed in part to distract Croatian forces (Pearson, 2010, p. 200; 
ICTY, 2006), its main function was to damage a World Heritage Site. This attack sought to achieve 
a variety of aims; to show the strength of Milošević’s forces to the international community by 
defying international laws (ICTY, 2003) and as a show of strength and disrespect to the Croatians by 
damaging their well-known symbol of pride and cultural identity (Denitch, 1994, p. 136), as well as 
drawing attention to decades-old geo-political upheavals. However, Silber and Little suggest that the 
bombing of Dubrovnik may have been a matter of local rivalry and jealousy of the prosperity of 
Dubrovnik compared to local poverty: “There seemed little or no military rationale to much of the 
bombardment inflected on Dubrovnik. It was the revenge of the poor boys from the mountains on 
one of the richest, most Westward-leaning parts of former Yugoslavia” (Silber and Little, 1996, pp. 
203–204). Both Denitch’s perspective and that of Silber and Little suggest that the reason for the 
attack was politically driven and used history as a justification.  
The ICTY started prosecution proceedings in 2001 against Slobodan Milošević, Major General Pavle 
Strugar (commander of the second operational group, JNA), Vice-Admiral Miodrag Jokić and 
Captain Vladimire Kovačević (Commander of the Ninth Naval Sector), for their involvement in 
shelling the Old Town. Strugar, Jokić and Kovačević were charged with the final version of the 
indictment on 31 May 2003, in case number IT-01–42 Amended. Slobodan Milošević was charged 
separately in case number IT 02–54-T on 21 July 2005, and Dubrovnik featured alongside 
accusations of war crimes committed elsewhere. Milan Zec featured only in the original indictment 
of case number IT-01–42 in 26 July 2002, alongside Strugar, Jokić and Kovačević. Charges against 
Zec were dropped due to insufficient evidence, and his name does not appear on any subsequent 
indictments. The trial prosecutions culminated in a conviction for Strugar and Jokić for “Murder, 
cruel treatment, attacking civilians, illegal attacks on civilian property, and destruction or wilful 
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damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, to charity or education, to art and science, historical 
monuments and works of art or science” (ICTY, 2005).  
Strugar, Jokić, and Kovačević were generals in the JNA and were accused of ordering and 
participating in the attack on Dubrovnik on 6 December 1991. The attack resulted in the deaths of 
two people and “damage and destruction” to the Old Town of Dubrovnik (ICTY, 2003). There are 
fifteen counts relating to Dubrovnik, including “Murder, Cruel Treatment, attacks on Civilians” 
(counts 1–6), “unjustified devastation, unlawful attacks on civilian objects, destruction or wilful 
damage to institutions dedicated to religion, charity, and education, the arts and sciences, historic 
monuments and the works of arts and sciences” (counts 7–12: 7–9 Dubrovnik; 9–12: Dubrovnik 
region), and the “wanton destruction of villages, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions 
dedicated to education and religion, plunder of public or private property” (counts 13–15). Although 
the first counts contain the most grievous of the charges, this research is limited to an interest to 
cultural heritage in Dubrovnik during the shelling, and therefore concentrates on counts 7–9, which 
are concerned with the destruction and wilful damage of Dubrovnik. 
Due to the high profile of Dubrovnik as a WHS when the attack began in October 1991, the Old 
Town was host to UNESCO observers who recorded the damage, as did the local population (both 
heritage experts and also local residents) (UNESCO, 1993b). The record of the shelling is extremely 
detailed. In the ICTY proceedings, the attachments list over 1000 shell hits and their precise location 
for a single day (6 November 1991). The detailed record of events has meant that the analysis of the 
conflict and of the post-war period is also exceptionally detailed. The following chapter uses this 
context to frame its investigation into how the conflict impacted on the heritage of Dubrovnik (and 
vice versa). Chapter Eight also frames the major investigation of the impact of heritage on 
Dubrovnik’s post-war recovery process, which has been carried out in Chapters Seven, Eight, and 
Nine. 
6.3 Summary: The influence of history on the IHAF 
The Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework is founded on the suggestion that history and 
contested cultural meaning shapes the relationship between cultural heritage and (post-)conflict. In 
order to gauge the long-term effect that conflict has on the creation and contestation of cultural 
identities, there is a need to look closely at not only what is reported to have happened, but also who 
has reported it, what their motivations are, and how it has been manipulated into becoming regarded 
as a historical fact. The first stage of the IHAF seeks to interrogate and understand the context to the 
conflict to which it is applied and to use this to understand the cope of analysis in the rest of the 
research undertaken with the IHAF. By gaining an awareness of the history of the Balkans and the 
powerful political influences at work on these narratives, the conflict and recovery of Dubrovnik can 
be contextualised, and the socio-political themes which have influenced (and still influence) 
Dubrovnik are understood in greater depth and applied to further research in the next stages of the 
IHAF.  This chapter has explored how the historical narratives around the Balkans have shaped the 
way in which the attack on Dubrovnik was interpreted by the international community and the ICTY 
109 
proceedings as a war crime and an attack on Croatian cultural identities. Going forward, the 
subsequent chapters will argue that the familiarity of the ICTY with these narratives (and the 
historical assumptions they make on Slavic cultural identities) have blurred the line between 
objective evidence and subjective interpretations over the extent of damage and destruction in the 
Old Town. Chapter Seven investigates this argument by evaluating the extent of damage done to the 
physical fabric of the Old Town through an empirical study of visible damage, and comparing it to 
the records of Destruction created by local people in the aftermath of the war, supported by UNESCO 
and used by the ICTY.  
6.4 The Scope of the Attack on Cultural Heritage and its Aftermath 
The first stage in the application of the IHAF to the Dubrovnik case study involves the creation of 
an overview of the core events of the conflict, and of their impact on heritage in terms of physical, 
economic, and socio-political damage. This chapter explores these impacts by analysing the records 
of damage done to Dubrovnik, and argues that the attack was carefully choreographed to cause 
significant damage to the fabric of the Old Town, which elicited a huge response from a local, 
national, and international community. This chapter provides a baseline for the damage caused to the 
cultural heritage of the Old Town of Dubrovnik, which is used by the subsequent chapters to discuss 
how the town recovered from the conflict, and to interrogate how the records of damage, explored 
by this chapter, have influenced the narrative of conflict recovery.  
The purpose of this investigation is to identify the extent of the damage done to the Old Town. 
UNESCO have recorded the damage done to BCH in a damage report, and listed a selection of 
buildings which were considered culturally significant, and who were damaged in the conflict. This 
list of damaged sites can be considered as the limit of the damage done to the Old Town, and used to 
define the scope of the research in this thesis. 
The damage done to BCH in the conflict has been the catalyst for restoration projects in the city, as 
well as providing evidence to ICTY proceedings and shaping the perception of security and tourism 
in Dubrovnik for local people and tourists alike. Dubrovnik is primarily internationally regarded as 
a heritage site, and it is because of its BCH that this image survives. The damage sustained by the 
BCH in the conflict is a defining feature of international responses to the use of cultural heritage in 
conflict. It is therefore important to attempt an objective assessment of the extent to which the BCH 
was damaged in the conflict and also to comment on the ways in which the damage has been 
recorded. 
The buildings to be studied were identified using the UNESCO (1993b) damage report; these were 
then assessed and photographed by the researcher in Dubrovnik in 2012–2014. Existing restoration 
and ICTY records were also scrutinised. The results of this analysis show that the reports of damage 
to buildings has been limited to an official set of buildings regarded as culturally significant and that 
these form the basis for the international reconstruction efforts in Dubrovnik. The results of the 
survey of damage sustained in the conflict are used as the foundation for Chapter Seven on the 
physical recovery from conflict. 
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6.4.1 Physical Impact: The Effect of the Conflict on Built Heritage 
Mapping the damage done to the BCH in the Old Town is possible due in part to the UNESCO 
observers in the town at the time of the shelling, and also to the local community who documented a 
great deal of the damage themselves. A wealth of documents and photographs has been used to assess 
the damage, but it is UNESCO’s focus on forty-four sites that frames this research (UNESCO, 
1993b). Over 800 buildings were damaged in the Old Town, but by focusing on forty-four significant 
buildings it is possible to limit the scope of this investigation and examine the extent of the war 
damage in detail, whilst keeping in mind the scale of the damage. 
The damaged buildings are mapped in the following figures to demonstrate the density of the hits, 
the location of the shells and the level of damage. These are new maps, created for this research by 
the author, and based on information from UNESCO (1993b) and the Institute for the Restoration of 
Dubrovnik (IFRD) (2011). The notes on damage for 1993 taken from UNESCO are quite short and 
reflect the on-the-ground nature of the report. They were taken at the time of the shelling and appear 
to be accurate field notes. Later sections go into detail about the scale of damage. Most of the 37 
buildings that were examined for this research have been selected from the UNESCO (1993b) 
damage report, and organised using the report’s categories (gutted buildings, damaged buildings, 
religious buildings, streets and fountains); however, the author also examined some sites that were 
recorded only by the IFRD as they hold significance either due to damage, or their (non-Christian) 
religious significance. For each building a photograph was taken during or just after the shelling to 
record the damage in the UNESCO report. Another photo, taken in 2012 or 2013 by the author of 
this thesis, has been used to draw a comparison and build a timeline from damage to recovery. The 
damage information has been used to create a data sheet (also named BCH recovery assessment 
[BCHRA] – see Appendix 2 onward) for each building, with a brief description of the buildings, 
damage done during the war, estimated cost of recovery, a set of comparison photos and notes on 
recovery. 
6.4.2 Grades and Records of Recovery 
The complex relationship between Dubrovnik and its damaged cultural heritage is reflected in the 
grading systems used to collate and categorise the damage. This section briefly outlines the grading 
system used in the 1993 UNESCO report to record significant damage to the BCH. This report is a 
primary source for this study; it was published soon after the conflict, and is compiled from a 
collection of photographs taken by residents during the attacks and written records of the damage 
made by local residents and re-assessed by UNESCO contractors in the aftermath of the conflict. 
The damage report identifies forty-four sites of significant damage, grouped into four broad 
categories: buildings gutted by fire, damaged buildings, religious buildings, and streets and fountains. 
The report also discusses walls as a separate category. For the purposes of this research, they are 
considered part of the overall damage and recovery of the city and are discussed in reference to the 
“fifth façade”, which is elaborated in later chapters. In each UNESCO category, the level of damage 
ranges from level one (slight damage) to level three (totally destroyed) representing the impact on 
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the entire structure based on these aspects. Each of the aspects of a structure have also been given a 
priority listing from A to C, which indicates whether the site needs (A) repairs, (B) partial 
reconstruction or (C) total reconstruction. The more serious the damage to a structure (for example 
gutted by fire) the higher grade of damage it receives from UNESCO (level one, two, or three) with 
an associated priority for recovery (Grade C). This research follows these criteria to structure its 
parameters around the damaged BCH of the Old Town. The priorities of damage and recovery are 
also discussed in reference to this UNESCO system. 
A second important source is the IFRD set of surveys, which show the damage focusing on a similar 
array of sites, but also include some additional sites that have been incorporated into this research. 
IFRD has also recorded the recovery and repairs in these sites with reference to donations and 
restoration work carried out. As such, IFRD is a vital source of information about the actual work 
carried out in the city, whilst the UNESCO damage report is an immediate record of harm caused. 
The information taken from IFRD is discussed at length in the following chapter, with particular 
reference to how it compares to the 1993 UNESO report, but it is this UNESCO report that provides 
the bulk of data used in this chapter. This research has combined all the available data from these 
two resources and focuses on twenty-one individual sites. This number is formed from sites that are 
named in both the UNESCO damage report and the IFRD surveys, as well as additional sites of note 
(discussed later in this chapter). Sites that were excluded from individual evaluation were communal 
sites (such as the walls, roofs, streets, and fountains), which were considered as part of the overall 
recovery of the city. 
6.4.3 Concentration of Shells 
The Old Town was shelled over an eight-month period, with the heaviest shelling taking place on 6 
December, 1991. The shells were accurately reported and recorded by UNESCO observers and local 
people. IFRD and UNESCO were able to record, catalogue, and map the spread of the shell hits 
across the Old Town. The map of shelling (Figure 6.1) is a composite of the data gathered from both 
of these sources to produce an accurate and original map of the shelling in the Old Town, this method 
and data sources has also been used in figures 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6. Figure 6.1 uses the composite data 
to divide the city into quarters and log the number of shell hits per quarter. This presentation of data 
is original to this research and was devised to establish whether there was a pattern to the shelling. 
The shell hits per quarter are cross-referenced to the density of BCH iconic structures and dwellings, 
to discover which areas of the city were the preferred targets during the conflict (see Appendix 2–
12), and whether population density or the concentration of BCH was a contributing factor. 
According to the map, the northern quarters of the Old Town took the highest number of shells, with 
an estimated 188 hits in the north-east and 296 in the north-west. By comparison, the southern 
quarters experienced approximately 36 hits in the south-east and 110 in the south-West. The Western 
quarters of the town were the recipients of more shells than the eastern quarters and the north-West 
quarter was hit almost as many times as all the other quarters combined. 
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Figure 6.1 Map of shells landing on Dubrovnik 1991–1992 
 
 
 
The density of UNESCO-defined BCH in the city is highest in the north-east and north-west, which 
suggests that (either by accident or design) the northern half of the city was both recipient of the 
highest concentration of shells and host to the greatest amount of BCH. The northern quarters of the 
city are also the site of the highest density of homes and shops or businesses. The JNA artillery that 
shelled Dubrovnik was stationed in the hills to the north-east overlooking the town (Figure 6.2), and 
in the sea to the West. The biggest visible BCH landmarks in the Old Town are clearly recognisable 
from these positions due to their size and their recognisable outlines. These landmarks of the 
cityscape include the Dominican Convent bell-tower (NE), the Franciscan Monastery bell-tower 
(NW), the cathedral (SE), the Church of St Blaisius (SE) and the clock tower (SE) and are marked 
on the photograph of Dubrovnik Old Town from Mount Srđ below (Figure 6.3), which was taken 
looking south from the vantage point at the top of Mount Srđ.  
Most of the damaged BCH is in the NW quarter, and the second highest incidence is in the NE 
quarter. The SE quarter is home to some of the most recognisable BCH landmarks such as the 
cathedral, the Church of St Blasius and the Rector’s Palace. It also contains the third highest number 
of damaged BCH sites. The SW quarter contains the least number of BCH sites and received the 
fewest number of shell hits. 
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Figure 6.2 View of Old Town from St John’s Fortress with JNA bombing position on the hill in the 
background  
 
K Bishop (2014) 
Figure 6.3 Dubrovnik Old Town from Mount Srđ: BCH Cityscape 
 
6.4.4 Gutted Houses and Palaces 
 Houses and palaces gutted by fire are recorded as the most seriously affected buildings in Dubrovnik 
and are either partially or completely destroyed. The buildings are listed with their reference numbers 
in Table 6.1, and these reference numbers are referred to throughout this chapter and its maps.  Each 
is mentioned by name in the ICTY proceedings, providing evidence to support charges regarding the 
deliberate destruction of cultural property in Dubrovnik. The destroyed buildings were used as 
evidence in the trial of General Pavle Strugar, Admiral Miodrag Jokić and Captain Vladimir 
Kovačević and were included as the unlawful shelling of civilian objects (ICTY, 2002, p. 31). The 
damage to these houses was severe and each needed substantial rebuilding.  
K Bishop (2013) 
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Table 6.1: Destroyed Building Reference Numbers 
 
The damage to the buildings has, for the most part, been repaired or restored to the extent that severe 
damage is not a defining feature of the buildings: instead, war damage is noticeable through the yet-
to-fade white stonework replacements, replacement window and door frames, smoke damage in the 
recesses and crevices of the buildings (particularly under balconies) and ricochet and shrapnel 
damage and repairs, which are a characteristic feature of contemporary Dubrovnik.  
Figure 6.4 Map of Houses and Palaces gutted by shelling  
 
Category Number Building Grade Estimated cost (US$) 
Gutted 
houses & 
palaces 
1 Palace od Sigurate 1 I 
650 550 
2 Palace od Sigurate 2 I 
433 740 
3 Palace Martinusic– Sv. Josipa 1 I 
443 130 
4 Palace od Puca 11 I 
641 110 
5 Palace Sorkocevic-Miha Pracata 6 I 
448 510 
6 Palace od Puca 16 I 
395 890 
7 Palace Dordic- Maineri- Siroka 5 I 
828 120 
8 Palace Zlatariceva 9 I 
215 080 
9 House Izmedu Polaca 5 I 
130 000  
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Maps in figures 6.4 to 6.6 created by K Bishop 2013. Source: Data from UNESCO Damage report 
(1993) and architectural surveys from the Institute for the Reconstruction of Dubrovnik (1993). 
These buildings were documented as being shelled and destroyed on 6 December 1991, when the 
largest number of shells was fired on the city. Buildings adjacent to large visual targets seem to have 
suffered the brunt of the attack. For example, buildings bordering the Stradun, adjacent to clock 
towers and near known landmarks, suffered a great deal of damage. The two buildings on Od Sigurate 
were two of the worst affected. They may have been shelled based on their location rather than being 
targeted deliberately Looking at the map of the gutted palaces and buildings (Figure 6.4), most of the 
shelling concentrated on two areas; the two houses on the Stradun (Palaces on od Sigurate, see 
Appendix 2 and 3) and a set of buildings along Od Puca street (Appendix 4). 
6.4.5 Damaged houses and Palaces 
These buildings suffered a great deal of damage in the 1991–1992 bombardment, either through 
direct hits or ricochet damage from neighbouring buildings and the Stradun. There are fifteen 
buildings in this category (Figure 6.5) and marks of conflict are still apparent on all the buildings to 
differing degrees with ricochet damage of various kinds and bullet holes peppering the façades. 
Figure 6.5 Map of Damaged Houses and Palaces
 
These buildings were affected in any of four major ways: damage to roofs, damage to their structure 
by the impact of shells on or adjacent to the buildings, fire and smoke damage and a range of 
structural and aesthetic damage resulting from shrapnel. Although the impact on these buildings is 
less severe than those named in section 7.3.3, it is significant as they are sites of historic and cultural 
importance, including some of Dubrovnik’s most celebrated and iconic buildings, such as Sponza 
Palace and the Rector’s Palace (Appendix 5). These buildings are also of significance in terms of 
their recovery. They have been repaired to a high standard, but there is a great deal of war damage 
evident on the façades of the buildings: the ricochet marks and repairs stand out in contrast with those 
designated as gutted buildings (which do not feature many marks) and religious buildings discussed 
below (which show many ricochet marks but there have been hardly any attempts to repair them). 
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This category of damaged buildings provides a baseline for how far repairs have been made, and the 
decisions made to repair or leave damage visible. 
6.4.6 Damage to religious buildings 
Dubrovnik’s Old Town is home to many religious buildings. There are at least eight Catholic 
churches and cathedrals, a synagogue, a Serb orthodox church, and a mosque within the city walls. 
UNESCO lists thirteen religious buildings as damaged during the conflict (Figure 6.6). The domed 
roofs of the churches are reported to have acted as targets during the conflict, and much of the injury 
they sustained was caused by direct shell hits. The roofs of these buildings have been repaired and 
the façades restored in most places, with little major damage visible. Repairs to roofs and carvings 
are not immediately visible except on closer inspection, and they blend in with the original material. 
However, shell and ricochet marks are still very evident on the façades of buildings, and are 
immediately noticeable on several of them, particularly the Franciscan Monastery, the cathedral and 
St Saviour’s Church. 
Dubrovnik is famed for its BCH and also as a religious centre. The presence of so many churches, 
cathedrals, monasteries and convents both active and unused is a reflection of how important religion 
(particularly Catholicism) is to Dubrovnik in spiritual, historical and iconic terms. The decision by 
UNESCO to categorise religious buildings as a separate category from house and palaces damaged 
is interesting because it instantly sets them apart from secular buildings, rather than classifying them 
on the basis of the damage they sustained. From this it can be suggested that a purposeful decision 
was made to separate secular and non-secular buildings in order to draw immediate attention and to 
emphasise the plight of religious buildings in the old town.  
Figure 6.6 Map of Damage to Religious Buildings 
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6.5 Summary: Conflict Profile of Dubrovnik 
The damage sustained to the Old Town during the bombardment was on a grand scale and was well 
documented. The attacking forces had both the technology and the vantage points to destroy the Old 
Town, but instead they shelled it over the course of several months. The data has shown that, of the 
forty-four building listed by UNESCO as damaged, nine are considered to be the worst affected. The 
damage caused to the buildings varies in severity, but all affected houses bear similar characteristics: 
structural stress, ricochet damage and roof damage, so they can no longer be used as normal. 
This research has also revealed the issues faced when trying to assess degrees of damage, and when 
using appropriate vocabulary to describe the damage. The different categorisations of damage used 
by UNESCO and the IFRD attempt to use standardised grades of damage, but they made different 
judgements of the severity of damage based on the same information. This is a useful example of the 
different ways heritage and heritage interpretation can be used based on the same level of 
information, but only taking into account a singular definition of heritage. The IHAF and its holistic 
approach attempts to avoid using a singular definition of heritage as the only indicator of impact and 
influence over recovery, and instead seeks to widen the definition to better understand the pressures 
on cultural heritage and determine the role they may play in recovery.  
The following chapters build on the initial assessment made in this chapter to identify how heritage 
had been used to recover from the damage done to the Old Town during to the conflict. The following 
chapters represent the mainstay of this thesis, in which an empirical investigation uses this chapter’s 
established baseline to assess the impact of heritage on the recovery of Dubrovnik from conflict; it 
achieves this by adhering to the research and results phase of the IHAF to establish the influence of 
heritage over the physical, economic, and socio-political recovery of Dubrovnik.   
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Chapter Seven: Physical Impact of Heritage on Recovery 
The physical damage done to heritage by war is the most visual way in which heritage and conflict 
relate to one another (Merryman, 2005, p. 11; Tomaszewski, 2004, p. 30). The image of destroyed 
heritage is often used by the media to indicate how serious and barbaric a war has become (Sen, 
2006, p. 85; Tuastad, 2010, p. 591), whilst attacks on built heritage are widely regarded in the 
academic literature, the media and in communities as attacks on individual beliefs and identities 
(Assmann, 1995, p. 125). The rebuilding of heritage in post-conflict recovery is less well documented 
but it is often associated with industrious experts from countries with heritage-rich reputations 
helping to carefully rebuild destroyed heritage (Ashworth and van der Aa, 2002, p. 448). Earlier in 
this thesis the ramifications of rebuilding physical heritage were discussed in terms of whether those 
areas are recreating old heritage, or forging a new heritage and identity (see Chapter Four). The extent 
to and the way in which heritage is recovered has a direct bearing on how events have been 
remembered (or alternatively, forgotten and removed from history) (Connerton, 2008, pp. 59–60). 
This section aims to assess and evaluate the extent to which Dubrovnik Old Town has been physically 
restored, and using this as a base to discuss what impact physical repairs have on the inhabitants of 
Dubrovnik. 
The buildings that have been mapped, photographed and analysed are limited to those buildings 
featured in the UNESCO Damage Report (1993b). Both these buildings and the categories of damage 
have been explored in Chapter Six. 
Measuring the impact of the conflict on the built cultural heritage of the Old Town is a major 
component of the IHAF. As argued in previous chapters, the physical cultural heritage of community 
acts as a physical signifier of value and identity (Ascherson, 2007, pp.18-19; Judt, 1992, p. 83; 
Silverman and Fairchild Ruggles, 2007, p. 3). When the physical components of culture are 
purposely damaged during a conflict, this can be interpreted as a direct assault on a particular identity 
(Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 90; Barakat, 2007, p. 16; Sen, 2006, pp. 84–85). The case of 
Dubrovnik takes this argument a step further and it is suggested here that Dubrovnik was not only 
attacked as a cultural symbol, but as a major attack on the town’s ability to use heritage as a tourism 
resource, upon which it heavily relies. In the aftermath of the attack the city was reported by 
UNESCO as having sustained significant damage; these findings were taken from an assessment it 
carried out in collaboration with local Dubrovnik heritage professionals and residents, and presented 
to the ICTY as an objective record of the damage sustained to BCH. The records of damage recorded 
in the aftermath of the conflict are integral to understanding how damaged the Old Town was by the 
conflict as they document where, how, and when specific buildings were damaged in the 
bombardments. Using the methods outlined in the IHAF to follow-up on these records creates a 
comparative record of not only how far the recovery of the Old Town has progressed, but also 
provides the evidence to reassess and evaluate whether the records of damage made in 1992 can be 
considered wholly accurate some twenty years later.  
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Following the IHAF, three areas are outlined as important aspects to investigate in regards to BCH: 
structures, actors, and dynamics (see IHAF diagram in Chapter Five). By investigating these aspects, 
it is possible to determine what was damaged, who took responsibility for its restoration, and what 
has happened to this record of damage and recovery in response to the conflict. The outcome of this 
endeavour is that a comparative record of damage and recovery of Dubrovnik’s BCH will be created, 
and interrogated to establish how physical heritage has been used to interpret and frame the conflict 
in Dubrovnik to its residents and international community. From the theoretical foundations of this 
thesis it has been shown that objectivity in regards to heritage is elusive, and subjective interpretation 
is used when trying to formulate comprehensive narratives around historical events.  
In order to follow the IHAF steps, three main objectives have been established to assess the role of 
heritage in the physical recovery of Dubrovnik. The first objective speaks directly to the determining 
a base line for damage in Dubrovnik by investigating what structures were damaged in Dubrovnik. 
This has been explored in Chapter Seven, and this assessment frames the remainder of this chapter’s 
assessment of recovery by providing a baseline of damage to use for a comparative investigation.  
The second objective speaks directly to the second aspect of the IHAF, and seeks to identify the 
actors involved in the recovery of Dubrovnik by investigating the priorities and biases of these groups 
who were involved in the recovery process. This is achieved by establishing a timeframe and scale 
of heritage-centred reconstruction efforts including (i) the order in which reconstruction took place 
and (ii) its cost (see section 9.1. It is expected that this investigation will reveal that it will not be the 
most damaged BCH that elicits the fastest and costliest recovery endeavour, rather, it is expected that 
the most iconic structures in Dubrovnik will receive the most attention and support. Moreover, it is 
expected that structures which symbolise Dubrovnik’s dominant identity (which was under threat 
during the conflict) will also enjoy a high level of support. For example, Catholic churches with 
iconic status are expected to feature highly on the list as it illustrates Dubrovnik’s strong attachment 
to Catholicism, and its identification with European (specifically Italian) heritage presented through 
its architecture.  
To investigate the dynamics of recovery since the war, a comparative record from damage to recovery 
has been created. This third objective uses the interrogation of the UNESCO reports carried out in 
Chapter Seven to establish a baseline for damage, and creates a comparative recovery report based 
on evidence of damage and recovery on BCH. The recovery report is determined by empirical 
assessments of pre-determined BCH sites using the BCH assessment criteria and methods outlined 
in Chapter Five, and a selection are recorded in the Appendix of this thesis.   
The culmination of these three objectives is a comprehensive comparative study that determines the 
extent of recovery in Dubrovnik, and interrogates how inference, interpretation, and bias have shaped 
the perception of damage to physical buildings in Dubrovnik in and since the conflict. This original 
contribution to the study of heritage in post-conflict contexts argues that BCH cannot be used as a 
factual objective record of damage, as the interpretation of damage is influenced and manipulated in 
accordance with the perspective and motivations of those recording the damage. Furthermore, the 
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perspective of recovery of BCH in Dubrovnik changes in response to its contemporary needs and 
cultural identity rather than actual damage caused by the war. The high level of focus given to sites 
(in terms of time and funding) reflected their cultural status rather than the damage caused to them, 
revealing that the recovery of BCH is strongly connected to the socio-political atmosphere of 
contemporary Dubrovnik, opposed to indiscriminate approach to restoring all BCH to the same level. 
7.1 Actors in Recovery: The order, cost, and motivation behind the recovery of 
Dubrovnik 
The order of recovery has been examined by looking at records of recovery from twenty-one 
damaged BCH sites, the majority of which feature in the UNESCO damage report of forty-four sites. 
The six houses mentioned in the ICTY trial proceedings feature on this list, as well as several of the 
churches and iconic BCH sites. The records of recovery are taken from the IFRD’s website and the 
twenty-one buildings listed there contain information on the date and duration of (physical) recovery 
and its cost. In some cases, there is additional information on donations and donors of specific sites. 
This data has been collated into a BCHRA data sheets for each building, based on information 
retrieved from the UNESCO (1993b) damage report and the IFRD (2004) buildings survey found on 
their website. A selection of the completed BCHRA can be found in the Appendix of this research 
and the complete set is available on request from the author via the University of York. 
The examination of the BCH records shows that the order of recovery does not match the cost of 
recovery. If the recovery of BCH focused on the severity of damage, then it would be expected that 
the buildings with the most damage would be repaired first and that would receive the most funding. 
This is in line with the literature reviewed in Chapter Three which introduced the argument that BCH 
in and after conflict needs rapid intervention and attention as its increasingly fragility will only 
deteriorate more quickly when it has been damaged (Earl, 2003, p. 93). However, the damage 
sustained was only one of the priorities associated with the order of recovery (as seen in Table 7.1 
and 7.2). Similarly, buildings that cost the most to restore were not prioritised and did not receive 
immediate attention. Thus, the order of recovery is influenced by factors other than need. By 
comparing two sets of priorities with the order of recovery we indicate what factors may have dictated 
the order of recovery in Dubrovnik.  
7.1.1 The Chronological Order of Recovery 
The chronological order of recovery records the order in which 21 BCH received restorative 
attention. The order of recovery has been explored by mapping the data year by year since 1992. The 
maps show that the restoration of these twenty-one sites began in 1992 and ended in 2004. Due to 
the limitations of the data available there are no complete records of recovery after 2004, and the 
records of repair after this period are scarce. The thesis assumes that because the records seem to end 
in 2004 most of the repair work on the Old Town had stopped by this date, and the town had been 
restored to the level now seen in contemporary Dubrovnik. The start of a reconstruction effort is 
coloured red on the maps, ongoing projects coloured yellow and completed projects coloured blue. 
The first heritage-centred reconstruction efforts began in 1992, and the first buildings to receive 
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attention were the city walls, the Franciscan Monastery and the convent of St Claire. Final repairs to 
the twenty-one sites listed by IFRD were made in 2004. Table 7.1 and 7.2 shows the order in which 
BCH started to receive attention, according to the data gained from the IFRD, and is plotted on the 
following maps (The Stages of Recovery: Table 7.2 and Figures 7.1 to 7.9) which present a year-by-
year picture of how the BCH was recovered.  
Table 7.1: The Chronology of Recovery 
Order Start Date Place 
1 1988 Sorkočević Palace, Miha Pracata 6 (under restoration pre-
war, but badly damaged in 1992 by the war) 
2 1992 City Walls- See Attached 
3 1992 The Franciscan Monastery 
4 1992 Convent of St. Claire 
5 1994 Jesuit Steps 
6 1995 Palace od Sigurate (Festival Building)  
7 1995 Stradun 
8 1995 Palace od Sigurate (Clasci Palace) 
9 1995 Đorđić-Mayneri Palace, Široka 5. 
10 1995 Gučetić-Martinušić Palace in the Street of St.Joseph 
11 1995  Od puča 11 Palace 
12 1995 Chapel in Đorđić-Mayneri Palace (Chapel) 
13 1995 Amerling Fountain 
14 1996 House in Čubranovićeva 8 
15 1996 The church of St. Ignatius 
16 1996 Palace od Puca 16 
17 1996 Rooftops 
18 1997 The House in Zlatarićeva 9 
19 1997 House Fronts Stradun 
20 1997 The House Od Rupa 7 
21 1997 Church of St Blaise 
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Table 7.2 The Order and Stages of Recovery 
Stages of Recovery: 1992- 2004  
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1 City Walls- See Attached 
             
2 Jesuit Steps 
             
3 
Palace od Sigurate (Festival 
Building) 
             
4 Stradun 
             
5 Palace od Sigurate (Clasci Palace) 
             
6 Đorđić-Mayneri Palace, Široka 5. 
             
7 
Gučetić-Martinušić St.Joseph              
8 Od puča 11 Palace 
             
9 
Chapel in Đorđić-Mayneri Palace              
10 Amerling Fountain 
             
11 House in Čubranovićeva 8 
             
12 The church of St. Ignatius 
             
13 Palace od Puca 16 
             
14 Rooftops 
             
15 The House in Zlatarićeva 9 
             
16 House Fronts Stradun 
             
17 The House Od Rupa 7 
             
18 Church of St Blaise 
             
19 Sorkočević Palace, Miha Pracata 6 
             
20 The Franciscan Monastery 
             
21 
Convent of St. Claire              
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Figure 7.1 Stages of Recovery (1992).  
 
Figure 7.2 Stages of Recovery (1993) 
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Figure 7.3 Stages of Recovery (1994) 
 
 
Figure 7.4 Stages of Recovery (1995) 
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Figure 7.5 Stages of Recovery (1996) 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6 Stages of Recovery (1997) 
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Figure 7.7 Stages of Recovery (1998) 
 
 
Figure 7.8 Stages of Recovery (1999–2003) 
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Figure 7.9 Stages of Recovery (2004)  
 
Maps in figures 7.1-7.9 created by K Bishop 2013. Source: Data from UNESCO Damage report 
(1993) and architectural surveys from the Institute for the Reconstruction of Dubrovnik (1993). 
7.1.2 Cost of Recovery: Most to Least Expensive 
The roofs of the Old Town were by far the most expensive item to repair, costing US$ 5,691,104, 
which is US$ 1,699,124 over the US$ 3,991,980 estimate made by UNESCO. The cost is 
unsurprising as 68% of buildings were damaged, and thus 68% of all roofs needed to be replaced or 
repaired. 80% of funds spent on recovery were houses and palaces gutted by fire (the most serious 
category of damage given by UNESCO), thus; the buildings most affected received most of the 
funding for recovery, as expressed in Table 7.3 based on data taken from the Institute for the 
Reconstruction of Dubrovnik (2011).  
Table 7.3 Cost of Recovery: most to least expensive 
Rank Building Actual US$  
1 Roofs of the inner city 5 691 104.00 
2 Palace od Sigurate 1 634 949.00 
3 Palace Sorkocevic-Miha Pracata  658 123.72 
4 Palace Dordic- Maineri- Siroka 174 947.00 
5 Palace Martinusic Sv. Josipa 133 942.00 
6 Od Rupa 7 133 074.03 
7 Church of St Blasé 121 190.03 
8 House fronts on Stradun 115 970.81 
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9 Franciscan Convent 114 389.17 
10 Palace od Puca 11 101 999.97 
11 Stradun 82 611.88 
12 Palace od Puca 16 79 919.00 
13 Palace od Sigurate 2 79 000.00 
14 Amerling Fountain  60 027.24 
15 Palace Zlatariceva 9 11 432.06 
16 Dordic-Mayneri Palace 8 607.70 
17 Jesuit steps  5 903.00 
18 St Claire’s Convent No data available  
19 Clock tower No data available  
20 Large Onofrio Fountain  No data available  
21 Walls No data available  
 
The order of repair shows that religious buildings and the buildings that were gutted during the 
conflict received attention in the early stages of recovery, and work on the Franciscan Monastery 
started in the same year as the conflict ended (see table 7.2). Repair on the city walls also started 
immediately, and the roofs received attention in 1996. Both were completed in 2004 (Rooftops 
Figure 7.10 and Appendix 7) 
Figure 7.10 Old Town Roofs 
 
K Bishop (2012) 
The focus on collective BCH (roofs and walls), both the data records and their priority in order of 
recovery, shows that there was a sustained effort to repair the cityscape as well as individual houses 
and palaces. Although immediate repair of the roofs would have allowed the buildings to be returned 
to their normal function, both UNESCO and IFRD include them in a separate category rather than as 
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a constituent part of each individual building. In this way each of the buildings on the IFRD list 
underwent at least two phases of recovery; building repairs and a separate roof repair. If 68% of the 
roofs of Old Town were damaged, and if roof repairs started in 1996, 68% of buildings did not have 
sound roofs from 1991 to 1996 (although the emergency measures began in 1993). The roofs are 
seen as a specific and isolated feature of Dubrovnik, the “fifth façade” (UNESCO WHC, 1994), 
rather than as belonging to individual buildings. Thus, cityscape repairs of Dubrovnik were 
prioritised over individual buildings. This is further demonstrated by the inclusion of the house fronts 
of the Stradun as a single entry into both UNESCO and IFRD lists. So buildings on the Stradun, such 
as Sigurate 1 and 2 (BCHRA Appendix 2 and 3) were the recipients of three different, overlapping 
or concurrent recovery processes: their own repairs, roof repairs and house front repairs. 
7.1.3  Donors: Most to Least Number of Donors 
Buildings that attracted more donors tended to attract more funds, and also tended to be repaired 
sooner in the restoration process. This created a hierarchy of buildings with the more attractive 
famous buildings receiving more funding, and those that are less attractive received less. This may 
be counterproductive to recovery as some less attractive buildings may require more funding then 
they receive. The number of Donors for each sites is expressed in Table 7.4, and the data is taken 
from the IFRD (2011). 
Table 7.4 Priorities: most to least number of donors 
Rank Building Number of Donors 
1 The Franciscan Monastery 8 
2 Roofs 6 
3 Church of St Blaise 6 
4 Palace od Sigurate 1 (Festival Building)  4 
5 Amerling Fountain 4 
6 Convent of St Claire 4 
7 Stradun 2 
8 Chapel in Đorđić-Mayneri Palace (Chapel of the Choir of Jesus) 2 
9 Jesuit Steps 1 
9 Palace od Sigurate 2 (Clasci Palace) 1 
9 Đorđić-Mayneri Palace, Široka 5. 1 
9 Gučetić-Martinušić Palace in the Street of St.Joseph 1 
9  Od Puča 11 Palace 1 
9 House in Čubranovićeva 8 1 
9 The church of St Ignatius 1 
9 Palace od Puca 16 1 
9 The House in Zlatarićeva 9 1 
9 House fronts Stradun 1 
9 The house Od Rupa 7 1 
9 Palace Sorkocevic-Miha Pracata  1 
9 Stradun 1 
9 Walls 1 
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From the analysis of these two datasets on the priorities of recovery show that a dramatic difference 
was found between the estimated and the actual amounts spent in nearly all cases. In most cases the 
actual amount spent on recovery was well below the estimates, but in a minority of cases it was far 
more. In some cases, the Ministry for Public Works contributed unspecified funds to the recovery of 
buildings, but these funds cannot be traced as the then Ministry of Public Works, Reconstruction and 
Construction is defunct and has been subsumed under the Ministry of Construction and Planning, 
and the records are unobtainable. However, IFRD also notes that “According to the data available, 
we estimate that some 15% of the total amount spent for the restoration of the architectural heritage 
of Dubrovnik came from donations in the post-war period” (IFRD, 2014). This suggests that the 
remaining 85% of the funding came from the government and independent or individual donations. 
If this is extrapolated to each site, then the amount of funding listed in each case should amount to at 
least 15% of the total estimate. In all but two instances this proves to be the case, but the actual 
amount spent on each building remains unclear. 
The varying differences between estimates and costs in the figures taken from the IFRD indicate that 
either the UNESCO estimates were too high, the recovery of Dubrovnik is incomplete, or additional 
funding for these (and other) sites was donated but not used on their allocated sites. This research 
claims that by a process of elimination, the expert and local knowledge and contributions render the 
UNESCO report reliable, and that the physical survey of the buildings undertaken by this research 
shows that most buildings have been repaired to different extents and are in a better condition that 
they were just after the conflict. Therefore, it is likely and plausible that the extent of funding and 
the amount of donations is greater than the donations listed on these twenty-one sites which 
undermines the accuracy of the reports on the cost of recovery made by the IFRD.  
The final amounts spent on complete recovery by 2014 are estimated by UNESCO to be US$ 80 
million (UNESCO WHC, 2014), of which UNESCO in 1993 estimated US$ 9 million would be the 
cost of recovery for the forty-four BCH sites listed in the damage report (UNESCO, 1993b). 
According to IFRD the actual amount spent for the twenty-one sites on the list was approximately 
US$ 10 million, including the complete repair of the roofs. Various charitable groups have donated 
to the recovery effort in Dubrovnik, and several groups were also formed for the sole purpose of 
raising money to help rebuild the Old Town. 
UNESCO, the Rebuild Dubrovnik fund (Chicago Sun-Times, 1992) and the Grand Circle Foundation 
(2011) were three of the biggest contributors to the recovery of the Old Town. According to the 
Council of Europe parliamentary papers from 1994, UNESCO contributed US$ 200,000 and the 
World Heritage Committee donated an additional US$50,000 (Council of Europe, 1994). UNESCO 
was also responsible for drafting and executing a recovery strategy. The Grand Circle Foundation 
donated US$55,850 between 1991 and 1995 to the Rebuild Dubrovnik fund (Grand Circle 
Foundation, 2011, p. 26). The Rebuild Dubrovnik fund was established shortly after the war with the 
sole objective of raising funds to assist the recovery of Dubrovnik’s built heritage. 
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The Rebuild Dubrovnik fund was established by the American Society of Travel Agents (ASTA), 
under the presidency of Earlene Causey (Groff, 1992). It was passed from ASTA to the IFRD in 
1997, to complete the final project: the restoration of the library in the Franciscan Monastery 
(Godwin, 1997). The ASTA and the Rebuild Dubrovnik fund were created by the tourism industry 
both in Dubrovnik and in America and their subjective motivations in the restoration of Dubrovnik’s 
BCH may have put the needs of tourism above the needs of reconciling local tensions. The Grand 
Circle Foundation and the Rebuild Dubrovnik fund were included in the donations listed in IFRD’s 
survey of war damage, as are further funds from UNESCO and the World Heritage Committee, in 
addition to private and individual donations. An estimated total of US$ 8,207,190 is the full amount 
raised by international bodies, non-profit organisations and charitable donors, and any additional 
expenses will have been paid by the Croatian government and other governmental sources. In light 
of UNESCO’s estimation of US$10 million as the absolute value of donations needed to rebuild 
Dubrovnik, the recovery costs listed by the IFRD (comprising many donors) almost match (with a 
difference of approximately US$ 1.8 million.). 
7.2 Recovery Priorities 
Whilst the total amount spent overall on the recovery of the Old Town is difficult to determine, the 
amount spent on twenty-one buildings and sites is clear. The schedule of recovery reveals that 
although priority was given to the buildings most affected by the conflict (those gutted or destroyed 
by fire) and were repaired quickly, equal importance was given to less affected buildings. The repair 
of these buildings were given priority, as can be seen by on the focus on them in the early stages of 
recovery and also by the amount spent on them. The less affected buildings that received attention 
quickly may indicate that priority was given to buildings in the Old Town based on the demands of 
investors, rather than on the needs of the buildings. 
According to IFRD data, the first sites to receive attention and repair in the aftermath of the conflict 
in 1992 were the city walls, the Franciscan Monastery and the convent of St Claire (see Appendix 
10). The city walls were repaired over the next eight years and restoration from war damage was 
completed in 2004. War repairs to the convent of St Claire and the Franciscan Monastery were 
completed in 1992. The walls were a priority for restoration due to the danger their instability posed 
to the rest of the town, and their restoration was organised by the Friends of Dubrovnik society, who 
are now responsible for their day-to-day maintenance and the paid visitors walking the walls in 
contemporary Dubrovnik. The Franciscan Monastery was a level one priority for repair, and received 
funding from eight different bodies (see Appendix 8). The cost of these repairs was at least US$ 
114,389, which is US$ 336,975 less than the UNESCO estimate. However, as unspecified funds from 
the Ministry of Public Works were also allocated, and as the IFRD donations account for only 15% 
of the total cost; donations to this project constituted 25% of the total estimate. This reflects the 
priority given to this project by international donors. The convent of St Claire’s has four separate 
donors as well as funds from the state budget. The total amount given is undisclosed, but the number 
of identified donors suggests that the building enjoyed high priority. In the twenty-one building and 
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sites analysed the number of identifiable donors is low; for each case usually few donors are named, 
and in many cases only the Ministry of Public Works is identified.  
The scale of recovery shows that the buildings and site to receive attention first were not necessarily 
the worst effected, instead they are the sites that received the most amount of interest from donors, 
even if they did not receive the largest donations. Although there was a coordinated effort to restore 
the town, organised by UNESCO and the IFRD, restoration opportunities were offered to donors on 
a site by site basis. Donors could choose which sites it would sponsor, and limit the use of their 
donations. As such, it is reasonable to suggest that the pressure to begin and complete restorative 
activities would have multiplied for each additional donor. The structures and processes governing 
the recovery effort, particularly the role of IFRD, has been discussed in Chapter Seven. Of the top 
three sites on the order of recovery (Table 7.4) that were repaired most quickly also have the highest 
number of donors; the city walls, the Franciscan Monastery (eight donors), the convent of St. Claire’s 
(four donors) (see Appendix 8). Whilst some sites are ranked highly without being associated with 
many donors (the Jesuit steps ranked fourth with a single donor) (Appendix 12), the overall trend 
was that the buildings and sites with the most donors received attention more quickly than those with 
fewer donors. This suggests that funding is a major factor in driving recovery, and that the donors 
had the power to direct how Dubrovnik was restored.  
In terms of funding, the buildings damaged the most during the war received the highest amount of 
money, and the actual amount spent was greater than the amount estimated. Walls, roofs and 
buildings gutted by fire received the most amount of money from a variety of donors. The most 
frequently mentioned donors were the Rebuild Dubrovnik fund (which amalgamates funds from 
other sources) and the Ministry of Public Works. Other sites that received large donations were those 
with the highest number of donors. These include the Franciscan Monastery and the Church of St 
Blasius, which had medium levels of damage and received large donations from a variety and 
relatively high number of sources (Appendix 9). 
The recovery in Dubrovnik encompasses the repair and reconstruction of 563 buildings (UNESCO, 
1993a, p. 25) and complete recovery costs are estimated to be between US$50 and US$80 million. 
The focus on these twenty-one buildings shows how some of the most badly damaged and culturally 
significant buildings were affected during the war and the post-war recovery. These twenty-one BCH 
sites feature in the UNESCO damage report encouraging specific donorship by directing attention to 
individual sites and the cost of restoring them. In its survey of damage and recovery of twenty-one 
BCH sites IFRD lists specific donors against some of these sites, implying that the targeting 
donorship was successful. In these cases, the financial cost of recovery can be traced from damage 
to repair, and a baseline sum for the cost of recovery can be assessed. In cases of named donors, the 
donation may amount to 100% of the cost of recovery or 15% of recovery, with the Croatian 
government contributing the most to recovery (UNESCO, 1993a, pp. 46–48; IFRD, 2011). UNESCO 
has donated materials, training, experts and education programmes to assist recovery, as well as a 
further US$ 38,000 from the World Heritage Fund to directed recovery programmes outside of the 
remit of physical repairs (UNESCO WHC, 1994).  
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7.2.1 UNESCO and the ICTY Definitions of Damage  
As discussed in Chapter Seven and the introduction to this chapter, there is a discrepancy between 
the language used to describe and classify damage in the UNESCO damage report and its use in the 
ICTY proceedings. The different uses and understanding of heritage by different international bodies 
has culminated in various classification of damage using different scales to categorise the damage to 
the Old Town. The changing categories of damage in the UNESCO, ICTY and IFRD assessments 
reveals that damage is a malleable term, and demonstrates how heritage can influence recovery 
processes. It is argued here that the damage records created by UNESCO and used by the ICTY were 
based on local perceptions of damage reported to the IFRD, which may have been affected by an 
emotional reaction to the perception of damage to the town. The result of this is that an objective 
level of damage to BCH in Dubrovnik remains unclear and the definitions change in response to 
contemporary social, political, and economic dynamics which alters the perception on the extent to 
which BCH has been restored in the Old Town. This reflects a finding by Herscher and Riedlmayer 
in the assessment of Kosovan heritage that damage to cultural heritage sites can be used for political 
purposes that are not fully reflective of tangible evidence on cultural heritage sites (Herscher and 
Riedlmayer, 2000, p. 108).   
Within each of the four categories of damage, the UNESCO report makes a sub-categorisation of 
damage from I to III. The buildings in the category of “gutted” buildings were graded in terms of the 
severity of the damage they sustained on a scale of I to III by UNESCO, and later categorised on a 
scale of 1 to 5 by the ICTY. However, the UNESCO damage report and the ICTY do not use the 
same scale of damage for the secondary categories of “damaged house and palaces”. For UNESCO, 
houses and palaces in the second category suffered equitable amounts of a different type of damage 
as the “gutted category”; for the ICTY these buildings were not considered to have suffered equitable 
damage.  
The ICY damage report works on a scale of Destroyed to Damaged, whereas the UNSECO report 
works on a scale relating to the structural integrity of the building which does not include destroyed. 
The highest category of damage changes between these two assessments, the highest level of damage 
for the ICTY is Level 1: totally destroyed, whereas the highest level of damage for UNESCO is 
Houses gutted by fire: grade I. This indicates that there is a slightly different scale in use between 
the two assessors where ICTY includes destruction and UNESCO does not. UNESCO refers to three 
types of damage:  
I. Sustained major damage jeopardizing its existence and/or preventing its normal use 
II. Sustained damage seriously affecting the outer aspect or not having deteriorated its 
structural features and not preventing its use 
III. Sustained incidental damage deteriorating its outer aspect and/or its normal use (UNESCO, 
1993b, p. 5).  
For the sake of clarity in analysing the two systems of damage classification, UNESCO designated 
damage is written as ‘grade’, whilst the ICTY categories are recorded as ‘level’. This follows the 
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language and recording system used by these two bodies, and emphasised here to avoid confusion in 
the following discussion.  
The IFRD survey of Dubrovnik’s damaged and restored buildings focuses only on twenty-one 
buildings (IFRD, 2011), whilst the UNESCO report focuses on forty-four sites (UNESCO, 1993), 
and the ICTY prosecution used a record of the shelling from UNESCO which listed 450 damaged 
properties (ICTY, 2003).  
The difference between UNESCO grades I and grade II is vast. All the buildings in the UNESCO 
‘gutted’ category are given grade I priority, and are reported in the ICTY proceedings as destroyed; 
hence it is unsurprising that buildings in the most severe category of damage also receive the most 
severe grade of damage in both the UNESCO and ICTY grading systems. However, it is surprising 
that six buildings in the less severe “damaged” category also receive grade I in the UNESCO report, 
which indicates these buildings were in a similar state of disrepair as those in the most severe 
category of damage.  
These UNESCO grade I damaged buildings in the less severe UNESCO category are: Sponza Palace, 
Rector’s Palace, Stay Palace, Gučetić Palace, Miha Pracata 11 and Miha Pracata 3. Of these six, only 
two feature in ICTY damage report: Sponza Palace and the Rector’s Palace. The ICTY notes 
categorise them at damage level 3: “Buildings with damaged structural parts” (ICTY, 2003), a less 
severe category given by UNESCO. Both the UNESCO and ICTY grades include serious structural 
damage, but the UNESCO grade I implies the damage to the building is jeopardising its existence 
and/or preventing its normal use, whilst level 3 in ICTY designation implies that the damage is 
structural but not critical. If the damage was considered more critical it would have received a level 
2: “heavy damage to structural parts” or level one “building completely destroyed”. This difference 
between UNESCO grades of damage and ICTY records of damage highlights the ability for damage 
to cultural property to be interpreted in different ways depending on the abilities and grading structure 
of the assessor. 
The varying scales and measurements of damage used by the ICTY and UNESCO results in an 
inconsistent assessment given to the town by two authoritative sources. UNESCO is regarded as the 
primary source of knowledge on damage assessments, and it is notable that the definitions used by 
the ICTY do not rely solely on the UNESCO damage report but instead make use of their own 
assessments which align more closely to unofficial local records of damage which were made by 
local residents for the IFRD during and immediately after the conflict.  
In summary, this thesis suggests that although the UNESCO Damage Report was used as evidence 
for the attack on the Old Town by the ICTY proceedings as the primary source, the classifications of 
damage used by the ICTY align to the locally produced records of damage recorded by the IFRD. 
The ICTY proceedings designate the most serious damage to a single day- the 6th of December, and 
have structured their arguments for the severity of attack around this event. During the course of this 
event 6 buildings designated as severely damaged by UNESCO (both in terms of specific grade and 
in overall category) and were designated as destroyed by IFRD and reported similarly by ICTY. The 
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difference between UNESCO and the ITCY is surprising as UNESCO is the international authority 
on cultural heritage assessment and has the legal mandate to give evidence in these proceedings, and 
would therefore be expected to act as the primary source of evidence at criminal proceedings and its 
results and definitions to provide the authoritative level of damage. 
The existence of this discrepancy between the UNESCO and ITCY evaluations serves to highlight 
the contingent and contested nature of post-conflict damage assessment. The IHAF, by incorporating 
strengths of top down and bottom up approaches to this task, seeks to incorporate an 
acknowledgement of this contestation and contingency by including an awareness of the fluidity of 
heritage and the politicisation of its uses as the core foundation of the assessment tool, while also 
providing an operationalisable framework 
7.3 Grades of Recovery: The Extent of Recovery in Dubrovnik 
The way in which Dubrovnik was damaged by the shelling campaign has been discussed in detail in 
Chapter Seven, which interrogated which buildings were damaged, how they were damaged, and 
what UNESCO grades of damage they received. This section uses the IHAF to analyse how BCH 
has recovered since this attack. Using the criteria created by the IHAF methodology of this thesis, 
each building mentioned in the UNESCO and IFRD reports has been assessed and graded by this 
researcher. What follows here is a discussion into what grades these buildings received and how they 
compare to the damage they received in 1993. The result of this assessment is the accurate 
measurement of the extent of recovery of the BCH of Dubrovnik. 
7.3.1 Assessment Grades: Averages and Outliers 
A selection of detailed assessments of the buildings listed in the UNESCO damage report can be 
found in the Appendix of this thesis, along with the justification of the grade of recovery they have 
been given. These assessments were carried out using pro-forma created by this research and its 
IHAF methodology. The criteria for these assessments were created by the author in an attempt to 
gain an objective perspective on the extent of damage to cultural heritage. These criteria can be found 
in the Appendix, as well as some populated examples that are discussed here in great detail. The 
heritage sites were labelled as BCHRA (Built Cultural Heritage Recovery Assessment) with an 
assigned number, and graded between one to five (complete recovery to no repairs made) by this 
research. The assessments made in this research contribute both an original perspective on the 
damage and recovery in Dubrovnik based on existing photographic records, and also new empirical 
data gained from the researcher’s survey of all twenty-one sites. All sites are mapped in figure 7.11: 
2013 Grades of recovery in Dubrovnik. 
7.3.2  The Results of Physical Assessment of Recovery 
The grades of recovery for each building assessed in this research are expressed in Figure 7.11 which 
maps the extent of recovery across Dubrovnik Old Town. Most buildings received a grade three, 
which indicates that most buildings in Dubrovnik are restored to a good degree of recovery.  
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Figure 7.11 Grades of Recovery Dubrovnik 2013 
 
 
The buildings have had some damage to their façades but also show visible signs of repair. This 
shows that money has been spent on these buildings and, although the funding and sources cannot 
be traced exactly, they are assumed to fall under the remit of repairs undertaken by the institutions 
listed in the UNESCO Plan of Action. Physical repairs can be distinguished on the fabric of the 
buildings and show both levels of expert repair (window, doors and balcony repair) as well as non-
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expert repair (different types of concrete repairs on ricochet marks). The average level of recovery 
for most of the buildings also shows that most buildings in Dubrovnik have been restored to a similar 
degree, which supports the notion that Dubrovnik has been repaired as a single site; there are no 
buildings in the city that have not been repaired at all (recovery grade five) but there are also no sites 
repaired to the extent that there are no noticeable war marks at all (recovery grade one). 
The notable exceptions to the average level of repair for buildings and sites in the Old Town are 
those that are of a higher (recovery grade two) or lower (recovery grade four) extent of repair than 
the average. Using the scatter graph in Figure 7.12 it can be seen that in the first nine cases of BCH 
(the gutted palaces and houses) the average is grade three, and the two exceptions have a higher rate 
of recovery, at recovery grade two. These building are Od Sigurate 1 (BCHRA 1) and Od Puca 16 
(BCHRA 2). 
Figure 7.12 Grades of recovery for thirty-nine buildings in Old Town 2013 (1, complete recovery; 5, 
damaged) 
 
 
The Palace of Od Sigurate 1 (Appendix 2) has undergone repair work and is indistinguishable from 
its neighbouring and opposing buildings that were less badly damaged during the war. There is 
ricochet damage on the lower half of the front façade, most likely from fragments hitting the building 
from nearby shell hits on the Stradun. There is no visible remaining smoke damage despite the fire 
damage done to the building. The funding of the repairs can be traced back to named sources 
including the International trust for Croatian Monuments and GBR Rotary Club-Klagenfurt 
(Austria), as well as funds from the Croatia Government and UNESCO. The actual cost of repairs 
on this building are US$634,949, which is US$15,601 less than the UNESCO estimate, a difference 
of approximately 2%. The building is used as a cafe on the ground floor and a residence on the upper 
floors. The building is rated at recovery grade two: a high level of recovery based on the criteria 
outlined above. Although the level of repair varies slightly, the palace of Od Sigurate 2 is graded as 
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recovery grade three (recovered) due to its lack of clear and accessible financial records and its place 
in the order of recovery. The strength of this assessment framework is that it requires a clear record 
of how (financially) the building was recovered, as well as the extent of physical recovery. 
The Palace of Od Puca 16 (Appendix 6) has also received a recovery grade two, due to its extremely 
high level of physical repair, its clear record from damage to recovery and an accessible record of 
financial repair. The building has been repaired and the damage done during the war is not 
immediately evident. The doors and windows have been replaced and are distinguishable by being 
cleaner in appearance than neighbouring houses, as is the entire façade of the building (see examples 
of Od Puca in Appendix 6). There is some evidence of ricochet damage and of repairs done to remedy 
the damage, but the marks are small in number and size. The cost of recovery was US$658,123, 
which exceeded its estimate of US$448,510 by 46%. The funds were provided by the Ministry of 
Public Works and no other specific sources are credited. The building is in use as a post office, but 
also as a permanent war memorial. The lower sides of the buildings have displays of the war damage 
done to the building, and information about the role of the building and its resident artist during the 
war (see Appendix 6). It is one of only five buildings in Dubrovnik to make public and open reference 
to the siege of the Old Town. The building’s grade of recovery is two: a high level of recovery. 
7.3.3 The Recovery of Severely Damaged BCH 
The nine buildings given the most serious category of damage in the 1993 UNESCO Damage Report 
have been restored to a high standard, particularly when considering the severity of the damage done. 
The buildings have surviving aesthetic war damage, particularly from ricochet damage, and there are 
signs of obvious repair work. The repairs will fade over time, and it will become increasingly difficult 
to distinguish the new and old fabric in the Old Town. The fabric of the buildings shows that the 
recovery from conflict in the nine significantly damaged buildings is almost complete (see Table 6.1 
for a list of these houses). The repair work is similar to other non-war related repairs occurring almost 
continuously in the Old Town. The reminders of conflict are the ricochet marks, which are unlikely 
to disappear altogether: instead, they are likely to become assimilated into the general history of the 
building by not being easily or immediately connected with the conflict in 1992. 
These nine buildings have the most complete set of data of all categories, and there is a good level 
of information on the damage some to buildings, the financial cost of recovery and the speed and 
scheduling of recovery. However, despite the good level of information, not all the data was 
accessible, meaning that the recovery cannot be considered complete. The lack of data, particularly 
on the funding for specific buildings and the cost of recovery, means that the transparency of recovery 
is affected and it is impossible to fully examine whether the cost of recovery met or exceeded the 
US$ 10 million estimate, and whether individual buildings met or exceeded their own estimates. The 
financial data available suggests that overall the recovery process did meet the US$ 10 million 
estimate based on only twenty-one out of forty-four sites. The remaining twenty-three buildings have 
been restored to some extent. There is a large discrepancy between the known amount spent on 
twenty-one buildings and the unknown amount spent on the remaining forty-four sites (and beyond).. 
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The status of these buildings as the most badly damaged is not reflected in the scheduling of repair; 
although six of the nine buildings are present on the IFRD’s damage and recovery survey, they are 
not the first six to be repaired. 
The war damage on these buildings remains evident, and they suffer from the lack of financial data. 
Each of the buildings has a UNESCO estimate of costs, but most do not have the actual cost of 
recovery. The average level of recovery for these buildings is grade three: recovered. All but two 
buildings have a grade three recovery, the two exceptions are the roofs graded 2: a high level of 
recovery (BCHRA 27) and the Gučetić Palace on Buniceva Polijana (BCHRA 13), which received a 
grade four (low level of recovery). 
The financial data is more traceable in these buildings than in the other categories of damage. While 
specific costs are not accessible, the sponsors and donors of the repairs are. Furthermore, the recovery 
of the religious buildings seems to have been financed not only by the Croatia government and 
UNESCO (and their own donors) but also by direct individual and group partnerships with specific 
institutions. The information is not available via IFRD or UNESCO but on site in the buildings in 
memorial and sponsorship plaques (for example, the partnership between the New York Jewish 
society and the synagogue, memorialised inside the synagogue (see BCHRA 33). The lack of clear 
information on the restoration work done to the religious buildings combined with the remaining 
visible damage has resulted in this category attracting various different grades. The average for these 
buildings is a (low) recovery grade three: recovered. The buildings vary from recovery grade two 
(high level) to recovery grade four (low level), possibly based on the popularity and centrality of the 
building. The more famous churches are graded at recovery grade two (Franciscan, St Blasius, the 
cathedral) based on their high level of repairs, whilst the less popular and more hidden churches have 
a recovery grade of four (St Roche, St Mary’s and St Saviour’s) based on their comparatively low 
level of repair.  
7.3.4 The Recovery of Damaged BCH Buildings 
The UNESCO category of building damage includes buildings 10–24 (see Figure 6.5 for a list of 
these houses) which were graded by UNESCO as grade II damage. The recovery of these buildings 
have been graded by this research with an average of grade three. These buildings cannot receive a 
higher grade of recovery as there is a notable lack of traceable financial data on their cost and rate of 
recovery. Furthermore, although there are photographic records of the damage done to these 
buildings they are fewer in number than other categories of damage and not so widely publicised. A 
lack of data recorded by UNESCO and IFRD for these buildings has resulted in the assessment of 
their recovery being limited; the lack of photographic evidence from UNSECO also reveals that they 
did not prioritise these buildings in comparison to the attention shown to those that were damaged 
more severely, or religious buildings. It is argued by this thesis that this lack of focus shows an 
inherent bias in the UNESCO records towards recording extreme damage to BCH to be used in later 
prosecutions, and in recording religious buildings due to their status not due to their damage. It is 
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argued from this that UNESCO may have had a motive beyond recording damage when the 
UNESCO Damage Report was compiled in 1993.  
As discussed in section 6.4.6, two religious buildings are notably absent from the damage report: The 
Church of St Ignatius and the Mosque. The Mosque may have been omitted due to its housing in a 
non-religious building or due to a lack of willingness from the local community to include it as a 
religious building in an effort to present itself as a singularly Christian community (which is a 
persuasive argument when considering the ethnic and religious divisions during the conflict and the 
emphasis contemporary Dubrovnik places on Christianity). The omission of the Church of Ignatius 
is more difficult to interpret; it was aesthetically damaged, and remains so as it has had little 
restorative work done. It stands as a large building on top of a hill in the centre of the town, and was 
one of the only iconic buildings to directly face JNA stronghold in the hills to the North East. An 
answer to this mystery could not be determined by this research, despite searching the historical 
records of the town and questioning the IFRD. However, it can be speculated that the active Jesuit 
religious order may have asked to be excluded from the recovery effort as spending money on the 
restoration of the church may have been at odds with their religious views. This interpretation is 
suggested here as a possible reason the church has not been restored, but would require further 
research to substantiate fully. The omission of the church is notable not only because it cannot be 
found in in the damage reports but also because its exclusion from these reports is not discussed 
anywhere.   
The effect of having less detailed records of damage and the difficulties in accessing data on recovery 
has meant that, although the buildings have been restored to a good standard (albeit with some 
remaining war damage) they cannot be regarded as repaired beyond a recovery grade three. As 
outlined in Chapter Six, this thesis argues that for a BCH site to be considered completely restored it 
needs to do be able to provide a full record of how it was restored. By providing a financial record 
of recovery, a site is able to outline what funds were needed (via the damage report), and specify if 
these targets were met thus ensuring that the level of damage was accurately recorded and the repairs 
made were able to restore the site. If the financial records are incomplete it cannot be determined if 
a site is restored, or if the estimates were accurate. If the recovery estimates were inaccurate this may 
indicate the level of damage was recorded as more or less severe than it may have actually been. If 
these records are not available then the recovery process cannot be considered to be transparent which 
in turn leaves the process open to potential accusations of impropriety – either by a lack of 
accountability for funds not spent, or for neglecting to reassess the levels of damage to BCH in 
response to the extent of the actual repairs needed.  
The exceptions to this grading is BCHRA number 13: Gučetić Palace-Buniceva Polijana (Appendix 
6), which are designated at recovery level four and the roofs graded at recovery level two, both of 
which are pictured below. The palace is used as a commercial unit, with accommodation above. The 
front façade of the house is noticeably damaged with shell, ricochet and possible bullet holes. The 
pattern of the marks suggests street level ricochet damage and direct hits or gunfire damage to the 
first and second floors. 
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Figure 7.13 Ricochet marks: Rector’s Palace  Figure 7.14 Ricochet Marks: Gučetić 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gučetić Palace has the most noticeable remaining war damage in this damage category, and is 
equalled by the neighbouring cathedral in the vast quantity of ricochet damage suffered. The contrast 
between the damage on the façade of Gučetić Palace with that on the Rector’s Palace (Figures 7.13 
and 7.14) opposite is vast, suggesting that Gučetić Palace was not sheltered by the direction of the 
attack. Ricochet and other shell damage has been repaired with cement, although not all marks have 
been repaired. The cost of recovery was not accessible and it is unclear if the cost of repairs equalled 
the UNESCO estimate of US$ 30,542. The damage on the building is very obvious. The roof and 
structure are repaired and intact and the building bears signs of restoration. The building is graded at 
recovery grade four: low level recovery. 
The level of repair of the building is unusual because of its prominent position in conjunction with 
the highly visible war damage. Most buildings in adjacent Stradun and tourist-heavy areas have 
received a great deal of attention, particularly to façade repairs (see BCHRA in Appendix 1–12 for 
examples) but despite this building’s prominent position it is very obviously a recipient of war 
damage that can be seen by casual observation. 
The other outlying grades of two and four are all religious buildings. Of the twelve religious buildings 
(BCHRA 25–37) listed on the UNESCO damage report, five are recovery grade two, five designated 
at recovery grade three, and four designated at recovery grade four. 
7.3.5 The Recovery of Religious Buildings 
The five religious buildings with the highest level of recovery are the Dominican Convent, the 
Church of St Blasius), St Claire’s Convent, the Synagogue Zudioska and the Orthodox Church 
(Figure 7.15-716. These buildings are characterised by a high level of physical repair, traceable 
donors and financial records and their continued use (either as religious buildings, or in the case of 
St. Claire’s, as a restaurant). Each building also has detailed records of the repair work done on small 
but important features of the building.  
K Bishop (2013)                        
K Bishop (2013) 
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The buildings with a grade three recovery level are the Franciscan Convent, the cathedral, St Mary’s 
Convent and Church and the Dordic-Mayneri Palace chapel. These buildings are the most well-
known and popular religious tourist attractions in the Old Town. As with most of the religious 
buildings, their façades are characterised by unrepaired ricochet damage, which means that they 
cannot be considered to have a higher grade of recovery. This is in contrast to the grade two buildings 
that do not have as many ricochet marks but have similarly complete financial records, and to the 
grade four religious buildings which have higher or similar quantities of visible façade damage but 
do not have accessible information on the rate and cost of recovery.  
The grade four buildings are St Sigurata Church, the Church of St Joseph, St Saviour’s Church and 
Church St Roche. This collection of buildings is unusual as it consists of St Saviour’s church in a 
very prominent position next to the Pile Gate entrance, and (St Joseph’s church on a tourist heavy 
street, and two that are not on visitors’ routes. All four of these churches are characterised by their 
small size and their inaccessibility. St Sigurata (Figure 7.15) and St Joseph are active churches but 
not frequently open, whilst St Saviour’s church is no longer in use as a religious building and the St 
Roche (Figure 7.18) appears to be unused and uninhabited. This may have a bearing on the level of 
repair they received and the level of conservation they currently receive. 
As established earlier, the restoration of Dubrovnik relied heavily on recreating the city as a single 
heritage site. This can be seen in the emphasis by many interested parties on restoring the roofs as an 
early (1992) priority. The tiles were donated by UNESCO and arrived in the city in early 1992, before 
the shelling of the Old Town had completely ceased. A great deal can be found on the reconstruction 
price and cost of the roofs at the IFRD and associated literature, the UNESCO publication Dubrovnik 
1992–1992 (UNESCO, 1993) and in the State of Conservation Reports (UNESCO, 1991–2014) from 
the World Heritage Centre at UNESCO. Similarly, the immediate focus on repairing the walls of the 
city and their continued careful conservation is indicative of both the early protection of the city from 
further war damage from falling stone debris from the walls and the need to restore the city as a 
whole as soon as possible. The roofs and walls are among the most iconic features of the Old Town 
and the Dubrovnik region, and their restoration could be considered an imperative to restoring the 
city as a cultural icon. 
Figure 7.15 Church St Blasius: Recovery Figure 7.16 St Claire’s Roof and Courtyard  
K Bishop (2013)      K Bishop (2013) 
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 Figure 7.17 Church St Sigurata                          Figure 7.18 Church St Roche 
K Bishop (2012)                                                    K Bishop (2012) 
 
7.4 Summary: The Physical Recovery of Dubrovnik 
The physical repairs in Dubrovnik have recreated the Old Town as a cultural monument in itself. 
Repairs to the roofs and the wall made the city appear whole as soon as possible, and by 2004 from 
afar the city looked as it would have done pre-war. While this study aimed to establish the effect that 
the post-conflict BCH has on the physical environment of the Old Town by examining the extent to 
which the BCH has recovered (Figure 7.11), the details of the shelling remain unclear.  
In the investigation carried out by this research into the records of damage, the author began to 
uncover the facts upon which the narrative of the conflict rests. The IHAF was able to uncover these 
inconsistencies by systematically going through these records, and analysing them not only against 
other records from this time, but also against a contemporary comparative empirical analysis of 
surviving damage in modern day Dubrovnik. The IHAF directed the research along this course of 
action due to the conceptual foundation at its core. The concept the IHAF relies on is an in-depth 
understanding that heritage cannot be considered static, nor can history be considered objective; both 
the UNESCO records and ICTY proceedings relied on the reverse being the case.  
The classification of these buildings into a separate category may either represent the beginning of 
the narrative process, using the categories as easily accessible reference points, or it may be seen as 
supporting an emerging narrative of violence and damage and brutality during the break-up of 
Yugoslavia (Despalatovic, 2000, p. 84). This perspective could also explain the focus on religious 
buildings as symbols of cultural affinity wherein Croatia aligns itself with Western Catholicism, and 
violently protected this identity against Eastern Orthodox Serbs during the conflict, and sought to 
continue to promote this identity in less violent ways in the aftermath of the conflict. In this 
perspective the focus on churches in Dubrovnik is a way to reinforce cultural difference and to ensure 
the conflict is not forgotten (Connerton, 2008, p.60-64). However, other facts used in the grand 
narrative of the shelling of Dubrovnik are accurate: the worst of the shelling did occur on 6 
December, the BCH was very badly damaged and people (civilians and armed defenders) were killed 
as a direct result of the unprovoked attack. 
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The information on the donors and contributions to the restoration of BCH are similar to the details 
concerning damage. The UNESCO estimation of the damage of US9,657,578 (ICTY, 2003, p. 47) 
was used as a benchmark for the financial costs of repair, however the details of the actual cost of 
recovery are more difficult to ascertain. The IFRD lists the actual costs of recovery for twenty-one 
buildings as (approximately) US$8 million (IFRD, 2011), but does not indicate how the restoration 
of the other buildings has been financed. We can assume that more repairs have been carried out 
(because all the buildings show signs of repairs) which would have cost more than US$10 million, 
but the details of the actual overall cost and the specific costs per building are not accessible. 
Although the contributors are named on the IFRD website it is difficult to connect donors to 
buildings, making it difficult to ascertain whether the order in which the buildings were recovered 
reflected the desires of the donors to repair certain buildings, or whether the prioritisation was 
controlled by the Croatian government, UNESCO or the IFRD. 
The categorisation of the damaged buildings has been followed by this research in order to reflect 
the UNESCO damage report with an assessment of recovery surrounding the same buildings. The 
categories strangely record private and public buildings in terms of the severity of damage, but 
religious buildings are a completely separate type of building, and are not defined by the severity of 
damage. Furthermore, “objects” (fountains, squares etc.) form a miscellaneous group categorised by 
object rather than damage (UNESCO, 1993b). The walls fall into another category and are under the 
jurisdiction of another organisation (The Friends of Dubrovnik Antiquities) and they are not restored 
by UNESCO and IFRD. The damage to severely damaged buildings and religious building is set out 
in the greatest detail while minimal details are provided on damaged buildings or the miscellaneous 
group. In this way, the UNESCO damage report has forced attention onto nine gutted buildings and 
religious buildings, while not providing public information on the extent of the damage for the whole 
of Dubrovnik (Van den Wyngaert, 2006, p. 67). 
The damage assessment criteria work well in terms of establishing recovery on different platforms, 
looking at physical repairs, the cost of building repairs and the use of building today in order to grade 
the level of recovery (Figure 7.12) and gauge the impact BCH has had on recovery. The BCH in the 
Old Town has been repaired and the cityscape restored to its pre-war state, and the remaining 
aesthetic damage has been ignored and become part of the fabric of Dubrovnik. The speed of 
recovery, coupled with the lack of detailed information, could be an indication that Dubrovnik 
needed to restore its heritage quickly and efficiently to ensure the survival of its tourism economy. 
The whole restoration process indicates that the recovery of the Old Town to a pre-war state as a 
single site is more important than the full restoration of its individual components. 
The city relies on its cultural assets to give it meaning and relevance and this was one of the reasons 
why the Old Town was targeted. The post-conflict recovery of the BHC was an exercise in recreating 
the material fabric as well as the cultural significance of the city as a symbol both for Croatian 
independence, and also for the success of international assistance in the recovery of culture. 
However, the restoration process is incomplete, while the surviving war damage and repairs draw 
attention to the past conflict, making it unclear whether Dubrovnik is celebrating or denying its past. 
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On the one hand the mythology of the Siege of Dubrovnik has been popularised by celebrating the 
survival and regrowth of the city, as well as honouring those who died in the conflict; whilst on the 
other, there has been a sustained effort to minimise the physical damage on the cultural property, 
which makes it more difficult for casual observers to connect the city to the violence and shelling 
that happened within living memory. 
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Chapter Eight: Economic Impact of Heritage on Post-conflict Dubrovnik 
The economic impact of heritage on the recovery of Dubrovnik has been assessed in this chapter by 
using tourism as a key indicator to measure how heritage impacts on the economic security of the 
region. Tourism- or more specifically cultural tourism- is a major factor in the economic activities 
of Dubrovnik. Contemporary Dubrovnik has a thriving tourism industry, and pre-war Dubrovnik had 
a similar industry. When the war started, tourism was badly affected, and took a long time to recover. 
It has been argued by this thesis that tourism in Dubrovnik is considered synonymous with heritage, 
that tourism exists primarily because of Dubrovnik’s status as a significant cultural attraction. When 
the shells damage the city and its reputation as a safe tourist destination, it had a major impact on the 
ability of post-conflict Dubrovnik to recover and function as it did before. This is an explicit way in 
which heritage (via tourism) impacted on the economic recovery of the Old Town. This chapter seeks 
to establish what the value of heritage is to the town of Dubrovnik, and what impact the reduction of 
heritage tourism had on the economic profile of Dubrovnik during and after the war.  
The structures which govern tourism in Dubrovnik have been determined by a set of indicators, which 
were introduced in Chapter Five and outlined below. These indicators build up a picture of how 
tourism influences day-to-day Dubrovnik by an analysis of the tourism statistics. The structure of the 
tourism industry will reveal how tourists use Dubrovnik’s heritage and how heritage is presented to 
tourists.  
The actor that governs control the records of tourism in Dubrovnik is the Croatian Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS), and this will be the primary source for the investigation in this chapter. As with the previous 
chapter, the ways in which data is recorded, stored, and used have a direct bearing on their reliability. 
In the previous chapter the classifications of damage to BCH were shown to be a major factor in 
objectively determining the extent of damage and recovery in Dubrovnik. Here, the CBS tourism 
statistics are considered reliable, but they are incapable of accurately reflecting the complexities of 
war on the tourism industry. Fluctuations in visitor numbers due to resurgence of conflict or influx 
of refugees are reflected in visitor numbers, but can provide false positives when estimating the 
influence of tourism spending and value to the tourism industry. For example, a refugee will not act 
in the same way as a tourist, and the advent of cheaper travel may provide tourism spikes which 
disrupt averages and estimates. The scarcity of data from the war years (1990 to 1995) also presents 
a challenge, as it requires estimates to be used in place of actual recorded numbers. The culmination 
of this is that the data from the CBS cannot be considered to be completely factual, and instead 
careful interpretations of the data will have to be made in order to gauge the value of tourism in post-
conflict Dubrovnik. 
The next IHAF step seeks to evaluate how the dynamics of the tourism industry have changed in 
response to the conflict. This has been accomplished in this chapter by taking a longitudinal view of 
tourism statistics from 1990 to 2010 based on the indicators that define the heritage tourism industry. 
This investigation culminates by estimating the value of the tourist to contemporary Dubrovnik, and 
looking at how this value has fluctuated over the course of twenty years. From this analysis it 
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becomes clear that the conflict had a major negative impact on the heritage tourism industry, but that 
tourism has had a major positive impact on the economic recovery of the of the Old Town. The 
previous chapter showed that the BCH of the Old Town garnered international attention and was 
considered a major priority when recovering the area. One such driver for the recovery of the Old 
Town and its focus on heritage is likely for tourism purposes: this chapter provides the evidence for 
this assertion based on the reliance Dubrovnik has on the economics of tourism.  
This chapter uses tourism indicators to calculate the value of heritage to Dubrovnik by collating and 
analysing tourism statistics from the CBS, the Ministry of Tourism (Croatia) and the United Nations 
World Tourism Organisation.  
8.1 Tourism During and Immediately after Conflict in Dubrovnik 1990–2000 
Calculating how the war affected Dubrovnik financially between 1990 and 2000 is both important 
and complex, because records for tourism in this time are incomplete due to the difficulties of 
recording tourism statistics during and immediately after the conflict. This research has a full set of 
statistics for the period between 2001 and 2012 but the information 1990 to 2000 period was not 
available. This study was thus obliged to rely on incomplete statistics for this period, which focused 
on national tourism, and to extrapolate estimates of Dubrovnik’s share of tourism based their average 
share of visitors from later years. This section restricts its analysis to Dubrovnik, and utilises the 
definition of tourism argued previously in Chapter Five: that any and all tourist in the Old Town can 
be considered as cultural tourism and therefore their actions (or their absence) considered to have a 
direct bearing on the economic profile of Dubrovnik. It is understood that all tourism in the region 
will have been adversely affected by the conflict, but the definition of tourists in Dubrovnik renders 
them as unique in this investigation. However, a similar argument could be made for other culturally 
significant areas.  
Between 2001 and 2011 there were altogether 110,267,074 visitors to Croatia (CBS, 2001–2011), 
with an average annual number of 10,024,279 visitors. There were 4,776,458 visitors to Dubrovnik 
between 2001 and 2011, an average of 434,223 visitors annually (CBS, 2001–2011). Using these 
figures, the average share of visitors to Dubrovnik was approximately 4.3% of the total between 2001 
and 2011, and this percentage has been used to scale a best-case statistical scenario of tourism in 
Dubrovnik between 1990-2000 where no data was accessible. CBS show that there were 
approximately 49,595,000 visitors to Croatia between 1990 and 2000, with an average annual 
number of 4,508,636 visitors; scaling this to Dubrovnik, this equates to an average of 193,871 visitors 
annually. This estimated figure provides a statistical marker to begin to examine how Dubrovnik’s 
tourism was affected by the war, rather than just offering a national perspective. 
The graph in Figure 8.1 shows that visitors to Croatia between 1990 and 2000 fell significantly 
between 1991 and 1992, due to the conflict. We can assume that this drop in numbers was mirrored 
in Dubrovnik. The lack of tourism data during the war and in its immediate aftermath is a limitation 
of this calculation, but the wealth and depth of information from 1999 onwards helps to arrive at 
reasoned and reliable estimates.  
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Figure 8.1 Percentage Share of Travel and Tourism to Croatian GDP 1990–1999 
 
To check that 4.3% is an accurate estimation of Dubrovnik visitor numbers, a comparison has been 
made between the estimated 4.3% share of Croatia’s tourists and the actual number of Dubrovnik 
tourists from 2001 to 2011. Using the 1990 national figures as a fixed starting point, a 4.3% share of 
visitors has been calculated year on year until 2011. Between 2001 and 2011 the estimated figures 
differed from the actual figures by an average of 3,179, which is a 0.3% margin of error between the 
two datasets. This research suggests this margin of error is acceptable considering the length of time 
(twenty-one years) it spans, and the data this research has analysed for this estimation. Although 
conflict will have an obviously detrimental effect to GDP, it is useful to examine the drop in GDP as 
it provides a bench mark for the general trend of Croatia’s and Dubrovnik’s economic profile, and 
provides a limit and reference point for the overall state of Croatia’s economy. 
Between 1990 and 2000 the number of Travel and Tourism (TT) visitors to Croatia decreased 
dramatically, from a high of 8,497,000 visitors in 1990 to a low of 2,297,000 in 1992: a loss of over 
six million visitors. In turn, Dubrovnik’s tourism fell from approximately 764,730 to 206,730 
visitors, a loss of approximately 558,000 visitors in a single year. This can be considered a 
conservative estimate as it is likely to be higher due to the occupation of Southern Dalmatia during 
the conflict which separated it from Croatia.  
Visitor figures can be seen to begin a trend of recovery from 1993 onwards, but with notable spikes 
and dips. Cross-referencing the dips to political events, as the hostilities along the Dalmatian coast 
(and wider Croatia) did not cease until 1995, a smooth upward trend does not begin until after this 
time, and a resurgence of violence in 1995 would have discouraged tourism to the Balkans. The drop 
in visitor numbers in 1999 could be explained by the end of the conflict in Kosovo in 1999 and the 
large media presence reporting on the mass atrocities committed throughout the wars in Yugoslavia 
in the 1990s. 
The image of a destination as tourist friendly can alter its popularity (Hughes and Allen, 2008. p. 39). 
When a conflict is connected to a wider context of violence and war (Dubrovnik to Yugoslavia), an 
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association is made between the brutality and atrocity committed in a single place to the whole of 
the conflict zone (McManamon, 2000, p. 18); such as Srebrenica to Yugoslavia; and Yugoslavia to 
Dubrovnik. The effect is to tar the whole conflict area with the same level of violence whether 
merited or not (Judt, 1992, pp. 83–85). This tarnishes the image of a tourist destination and it ceases 
to appear to a security-seeking cultural tourist (Cavlek, 2002, p. 478). 
Figure 8.2 Estimated Visitor Figures to Dubrovnik between 1990 and 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tourism in Croatia and Dubrovnik followed a general trend between 1990 and 1999 (Figure 8.2). 
Visitor figures, GDP, consumer price index, employment in tourism and the contribution of TT to 
GDP, as well as tourism hospitality industries all dramatically fell in 1991 and did not begin to 
recover smoothly until 1995. All these statistics fluctuated in 1995, with a dip in 1995 and a sharp 
rise in 1996, and all were affected in 1999 by a (less dramatic) fall and rise. The conclusion of this 
analysis is twofold; first, that tourism is a prominent factor in the economy of Croatia, and the fall in 
visitor numbers is directly reflected in the figures documenting income, employment and GDP. And 
secondly, tourism has been affected by the conflict, as shown in the dramatic dip in tourism figures 
between 1990 and 1993. 
8.2 Measuring Impact: Indicators 
According to the CBS data analysed in this chapter, tourism in Dubrovnik is a significant factor in 
the economic viability of the town. The town’s heritage assets are a commodified product (Cohen, 
1988), and their value is confirmed by the number of individuals employed directly in cultural 
tourism. Moreover, the constant stream of tourists who have heritage experiences in the Old Town 
(whether by chance or on purpose) confirms a continual demand for cultural outlets and heritage 
attractions in the Old Town (McKercher and Chan, 2005, p. 22). A self-perpetuating cycle of heritage 
supply and demand has engulfed the Old Town; and while heritage is valued highly among the 
residents the market relies on overseas visitors and cannot be sustained without support were these 
visitors to disappear again, as they did in 1991. 
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8.3 Indicator One: Tourist Arrivals 
Compared with national visitors to Dubrovnik the number of international visitors is extremely high 
(CBS, 2008, 2012) and the latter generate most of the income from tourists and visitors. As a general 
trend, the number of international visitors to Croatia crashed during the war in 1991, and did not 
begin to recover until 1999. From 1999 onwards, visitor numbers to Croatia increase smoothly, and 
this trend appears to continue beyond 2013/4. International visitor numbers to Croatia recovered in 
2008 to 9,415,105, which was 7.5% more than the previous most successful in pre-war Croatia in 
1987 of 8,756,000 recorded visitors (CBS, 2011). The graph in figure 8.3 show that both domestic 
and international visitors follow the same trend and both drop significantly between 1990 and 1992. 
The fall in visitor numbers to Dubrovnik in the early 1990s indicates that the war prevented tourism 
and discouraged tourists, who continued to avoid Croatia until 1996, when numbers began to rise. 
After the war it is possible to see tourist confidence in safety and confidence in the tourism market 
grow steadily, year on year as the war recedes into the past confirming Cavlek’s argument that 
tourism needs a safe environment to flourish (Cavlek, 2002, p. 450). 
Figure 8.3 Visitor Arrivals to Croatia (1985–2011) 
 
Between 1990 and 2000 the conflict had a profound effect on the number of international visitors to 
Croatia, which fell from 7,049,000 to 1,488,000: a reduction of 78.9% in a single year. The figures 
show that over the next ten years the numbers of international visitors were at their lowest in 1991 
and again in 1995. However, despite expectations, the crash in figures did not bottom and level out 
in 1991 to 1995 (the active war period). Instead, international visitor numbers rose sharply between 
1993 and 1994 (1,663,000 to 2,528,000, respectively) before dropping to the lowest number in 1995 
(1,485,000). Visitor numbers grew slowly between 1995 and 1998, dropping sharply again in 1999 
by 15.4%. 
The sharp decrease between 1998 and 1999 is likely to be attributed to a decrease in international 
visitors who are refugees, which would decrease as the area becomes more stale. In post-conflict 
Croatia in 1998 it could be assumed that fewer refugees needed accommodation.  
During 1991 and 1992 the JNA occupied the surrounding region in Dubrovnik, and an estimated 
15,000 people fled these areas (particularly from Cavtat and Konavle), and sought shelter in 
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Dubrovnik (Fenrick, 1992, p. 24-26; Kaufman, 1992). These refugees were sheltered in the empty 
hotels, and other accommodation facilities in the Dubrovnik New Town (west of the Old Town) 
(Fenrick, 1992, p. 16; Kaufman, 1992). It is estimated that 7,000 people (including local Dubrovnik 
residents) were evacuated by the Croatian Navy from the harbour throughout the siege in 1991 
(Fenrick, 1992, p. 16). The data of refugees in Croatia remains scarce, and relies on a UN report, 
media reports and anecdotal data; therefore, it is noted that although there were approximately 15,000 
refugees in Dubrovnik during the siege, the exact number, where they stayed and their length of stay 
remains unclear.  
Although the refugees would have occupied the hotels, their impact on the tourism data gathered 
from the CBS is minimal as migrants and displaced persons are excluded from their statistics. The 
CBS define a tourist as:  
every person who, outside his/her place of permanent residence, spends at least one night 
in a hotel or some other tourist accommodation establishment for reasons of rest, 
recreation, health, study, sport, religion, family, business, public tasks or meeting. Tourists 
exclude migrants, borderline workers, diplomats, military force members on their regular 
duties, displaced persons and nomads. 
Croatian Bureau of Statistics 
Tourist Arrivals and Overnight stays in Rented Accommodation: Notes on Methodology 
2015 
This definition is extrapolated to the use of tourism facilities, and it is therefore reasonable to assume 
that the CBS statistics on nights spent occupying accommodation facilities are limited to tourists 
only. Although the refugees would have had an impact on the available capacity of the hotels, it is 
unlikely that this shortfall in capacity was a major factor on tourism as international tourism 
plummeted during the war, and available capacity would have been extremely high. Furthermore, 
this definition of a tourist given by the CBS also excludes relief workers (border workers and 
diplomats) and military personnel from the definition of tourist, which suggests that UN and 
UNESCO observers would also not have counted as tourists.   
8.4 Indicator Two: Nights Spent 
The number of visitors indicates visitor volume, whereas the number of nights spent in Dubrovnik 
show how long they are visiting (CBS 2008, 2012). The number of nights spent in Dubrovnik has a 
direct and measurable impact on how much tourists spend on accommodation. In tandem with visitor 
figures it is clear that accommodation facilities were negatively affected by the war, and there was a 
huge reduction in overnight visits from tourists. 
The difference between the number of visitors and the overnight stays suggest that more international 
than national visitors stay overnight, but national visitors also staying overnight. The length of visit 
is significant because an overnight stay implies that the visitors to Dubrovnik may remain in the Old 
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Town and visit more attractions, which in turn drives employment and wealth generation, which 
influences focus and protection to material and intangible cultural heritage as a source of income.  
Figure 8.4 Overnight Stays in Dubrovnik (2001–2011) 
8.5 Indicator Three: Duration of Stay  
The duration of stay helps to give an understanding of how tourists behave whilst in Dubrovnik, and 
also forms the basis for how much tourists spend on each trip. The average duration of stay is 
calculated by dividing the overnight stays by the number of tourist arrivals.  
Figure 8.5 Overnight Stays and the Average Duration of Stay in Croatia (1985–2011) 
 
The trend in Figure 8.5 shows from 1985 onwards the duration of stay for a single visitor is falling, 
whilst the number of nights spent by the total number of visitors is increasing. This shows that there 
are more people visiting Croatia year on year (as a general trend would suggest), but each visitor is 
staying for a shorter amount of time. The total number of nights spent by visitors was greatly affected 
by the war in 1991, and the fall in stays mirrors the fall in visitor numbers.  
Unlike total overnight stays by visitors and visitor numbers, the duration of stay has not regained the 
pre-war highs and the trend indicates that future visits to Croatia and Dubrovnik are unlikely to rise 
above five (Croatian average) or four nights (Dubrovnik average, Figure 8.6). This may be due to of 
a lack of recovery in tourism, or a reflection of the way tourism has changed in response to cheaper 
travel and an increase in shorter trips. The change in the way people visit Dubrovnik as a reason for 
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the changing tourism trends is supported by interviews with local residents, most of whom talk about 
the changing types of tourists, and make a distinction between pre and post war tourists. Although 
they see this change as a direct consequence of the war, it could be interpreted as a general world-
wide trend in changing tourism attitudes due to the availability of cheap travel.  
Figure 8.6 Overall Nights and the Average Duration of Stay in Dubrovnik (2001 to 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.6 Indicator Four: Accommodation Facilities by Type 
The type of accommodation offered in Dubrovnik reveals how space is divided in the Old Town. 
The declining demand for hotels and the growing preference for private apartments suggests that 
private spaces (houses and apartments) are being utilised by owners and residents for the use of 
tourists. The availability of beds for overnight stays indicates the capacity for Croatia and Dubrovnik 
to host national and international overnight tourists, and also indicates how profitable it is as a 
sustainable economic activity. From this data the frequency of use of the available accommodation 
has been calculated to estimate how efficiently the capacity is being used, this indicator is labelled 
as “Capacity Use” and follows after this indicator. 
As a general trend it is possible to see that the popularity of hotels in Croatia is declining, although 
their number continues to expand (CBS, 2008, 2012). This is shown in the growing number of beds 
offered in each type of facility and the average (declining) use of each bed per year. Apartment types 
of accommodation have been growing steadily since 1990 and are becoming most popular. 
Overnight accommodation in Croatia is divided by the CBS into four main groups: hotels, campsites, 
households and others. “Hotels” include hotels, villas and all-suite hotels, tourist resorts, tourist 
apartments, boarding houses, guest houses and motels. “Campsites” include campsites, quick-stop 
camping and small camps. “Other accommodation” includes overnight accommodation, vacation 
facilities, youth hotels and hostels, inns, spas and nautical ports, as well as uncategorised facilities 
and any other rented overnight accommodation. These three groups are categorised as collective 
accommodation. “Households” includes private apartments, rooms, summer houses, rural 
households and private campsites and are categorised as private accommodation. 
Between 1990 and 2000 tourists predominantly used collective accommodation, however, from 2001 
to 2011 the number of beds offered (and occupied) dropped by 2% and private accommodation 
experienced a steady increase of 53%, culminating in nearly equal numbers of beds available in 
collective (469,321) and private accommodation (465,243) (CBS, 2008, 2012). 
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The war caused dips in both accommodation types, with significant reductions in available beds in 
1991 and 1992. Private accommodation was disproportionally affected and did not recover its pre-
war highs until 2001 to 2002. Collective accommodation has not regained its pre-war 
accommodation capacity, but unlike private accommodation it did experience a spike in 
accommodation in 1994.  
The use of The Old Town residences as tourism accommodation presents a challenge to the 
protection of the intangible and material heritage of Dubrovnik; short stay tourist lettings of Old 
Town residences offer an economic incentive to residents not to remain in the old town, and by doing 
so the town become more densely populated with tourists and becomes less attractive to future 
tourists. This is a similar problem experienced by other cultural destinations popular with tourists, 
such as Venice.   
8.7 Indicator Five: Capacity Use 
This indicator assesses the capacity of the tourism sector in Dubrovnik by looking at how many 
available beds there are in tourist accommodation compared to their use. The graph in figure 8.7 
shows how much of the available capacity of accommodation is used and whether the market for 
accommodation is saturated or insufficient which has a direct impact on how economically valuable 
built heritage is to the tourism sector. The use of beds also shows that there is a high and low tourist 
season, and that income is not consistent throughout the year as accommodation is frequently empty 
(CBS, 2008, 2012).  
Figure 8.7 Available Beds in Collective and Private Accommodation 1985–2011
   
Figure 8.8 Occupied Bed Nights and Frequency of Occupation 1990–2011
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The number of nights each bed is occupied per year is relatively low; at around 9–15% capacity over 
20 years in the whole of Dubrovnik, and each bed/facility has a turnover of around four to twelve 
different guests per year (Figure 8.8). Considering the number of accommodation facilities, the high 
number of arrivals and long duration of stay in Croatia the reliance on the tourism market is clear, 
but visitor turnover and occupation rates suggest that the accommodation facilities are empty or 
underused for a considerable period of the year (CBS, 2008, 2012). However, the growing number 
of tourists and increasing number of facilities each year suggest that the demand for accommodation 
remains profitable as the number of facilities grows steadily year on year.  
8.8 Indicator Six: Direct contribution of Tourism to GDP 
This indicator assesses how vital the tourism industry is to the economy of Dubrovnik and Croatia 
and track changes in the value of tourism from 1990 to 2012. It deals with direct tourism services 
such as accommodation, culture, recreation and services directly linked to tourism; it excludes 
employment and government contributions. The information and statistics are taken from Trading 
Economics and verified against GDP data from the World Bank and the World Travel and Tourism 
Committee. The data is considered accurate but because it uses the average GDP contribution over a 
twenty-year period, the final direct contribution of Dubrovnik tourism to GDP is considered to be 
approximate. 
The direct contribution of Dubrovnik’s tourism sector has been calculated by dividing the 
contribution of travel and tourism to Croatian GDP by Dubrovnik’s share of tourists. Using data from 
Trading Economics (2013) the direct contribution of travel and tourism to Croatian GDP between 
1990 and 2011 was approximately US$ 64.7 billion, which is approximately 8.6% of Croatian GDP 
(Figure 8.9). Dubrovnik accounted for approximately 4.2% of all tourists in Croatia, and therefore 
could reasonably be expected to produce 4.2% of income and resources based on this share of 
tourists. Between 1990 and 2011 4.2% of tourism’s contribution to Croatian GDP was approximately 
US$ 2.5 billion. However, this assumes that tourists across Croatia spend similar amounts in all 
regions and Dubrovnik would have the same average prices as other areas. However, the cost of 
living in Dubrovnik is higher than most other places in Croatia due to its reputation as a cultural 
centre, its popularity with tourists and its geographical position. Therefore, the estimate given above 
is a baseline estimate of Dubrovnik’s travel and tourism contribution to Croatia’s GDP. 
According to the International Monetary Fund the consumer price index (CPI) for Croatia from 1990 
to 2011 shows a sharp increase in 1992 (due to the declaration of Croatian independence, the 
transition away from communism, and the impact of the conflict on the availability of resources), 
and a continuous increase has occurred since then in the cost of consumer items (Numbeo, 2013). 
The graph in Figure 8.10 shows that the sharp rise in the price of consumables occurred between 
1992 and 1994, during the closing stages of the war in Croatia. This could be attributed to the return 
of stability and commerce to war-affected regions of Croatia such as Dubrovnik.  
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Figure 8.9 Contribution of Travel and Tourism to GDP in Croatia    1992– 2011 
     
Figure 8.10 Consumer Price Index in Croatia
 
8.9  Indicator Seven: Direct Employment in Tourism Services 
This indicator assesses how many people are employed directly by tourism in Dubrovnik, and looks 
at how it has changed between 1990 and 2012. This research has identified four levels of employment 
in tourism which include cultural tourism. The first level is food, retail and accommodation 
(employing 72% of the tourism sector). It includes those employed by tourism services indirectly, 
looking at the needs of tourists rather than tourist attractions. The second level is cultural services 
(4%), and includes those employed by museums, archives, libraries and other cultural institutions, 
showing how many people are employed in heritage-centred industries. The third level is recreation 
activities (8%), which covers people employed in non-cultural attractions such as sport, gambling 
and other recreational activities. The fourth is other employment (16%), and includes other tourism 
and heritage services such as specialist construction, travel agents and reservation services and those 
employed to support a specialist heritage infrastructure. 
CBS data shows that employment in tourism industries amounted to approximately 14 to 18% of all 
employment in Croatia between 2000 and 2011 (Figure 8.11), and cultural services tourism amounted 
to approximately 0.7% of overall employment in Croatia, which equates between 6000 and 8000 
individuals from 2000 to 2011 (CBS, 2008, 2012). Food, retail, and accommodation account for the 
largest proportion of employees, making up 12% of all employment in Croatia and employing 
between 100,000 and 140,000 people per year between 2000 and 2011 (CBS, 2008, 2012). 
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Figure 8.11 Employment by Sector in Croatia 2000-2011 
    
As the pie chart in Figure 8.12 indicates, tourism is the second largest employer at approximately 
16%, following manufacturing (21% of the total) (CBS, 2008, 2012). As argued previously, if 
tourism and heritage can be considered synonymous (or at least very closely intertwined) it is clear 
that Croatia’s economy relies heavily on the heritage and tourism industry for employment and 
income from people using tourism amenities and services. Between 2000 and 2011 employment in 
tourism has followed a steady upward trend with more people being employed in tourism industries 
and employment evenly dispersed across the four levels of tourism. Employment in tourism is 
calculated based on national statistics of Croatia, and uses averages over a general eleven-year trend. 
Figure 8.12 People Employed in Tourism Industries from 2000 to 2011 in Croatia 
 
8.10 Summary: The economic recovery of Dubrovnik 
From 1990 to 2011 tourism in Croatia and Dubrovnik has followed a general trend: a dramatic 
decrease of international visitors during the war from 1990 to 1992 leading to a dramatic drastic dip 
in accommodation facilities, employment in tourism, and tourism’s contribution to GDP. The 
recovery of tourism occurred between 1999 and 2008 when tourism figures, nights spent in 
accommodation, employment in tourism, and contribution to GDP recovered to their pre-war (1990) 
levels. From 2008 to 2011 tourism figures increased, but suffered a dip in 2009, most likely due to 
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the financial global crisis, but the figures recovered and are now at their highest level, beyond their 
pre-war levels. 
On average, visitors are staying fewer nights in Croatia and Dubrovnik than before the war, and the 
number of day-trippers is considerably higher than pre-war levels. Accommodation is rarely utilised 
to capacity in Dubrovnik. Between 2001 and 2011 accommodation was used to capacity for 
approximately 58 nights of a year. Although this suggests that accommodation is plentiful but 
underused in Dubrovnik, it is also in keeping with Dubrovnik’s seasonal tourism in most visitors 
arrive between March and September. The cost of living in Dubrovnik is likely to continue to 
increase, and although it is not the most expensive in terms of the CPI, Dubrovnik is on average 
approximately 1% higher than the Croatian average. Other tourist-centred regions in the Dubrovnik 
region are also higher than the national average, with Dubrovnik-Neretva ranking the fifth most 
expensive county behind Karlovac, Vukovar-Syrmia, the City of Zagreb, and Split-Dalmatia. 
Tourism is a significant employer in Dubrovnik, employing on average 14–17% of all employed 
people in Croatia. Direct employment in heritage-centred occupations accounts for only 4% of all 
those employed in tourism, but other employment in tourism in Dubrovnik can be seen to support 
heritage through associated hospitality and entertainment industries.  
In 2012, the town was above the average in terms of cost of living, the number of visitors it receives 
each year, and the number of people employed in tourism services. It attracts a large number of 
tourists each year, with the highest on record recorded in 2013 with 12.4 million tourists, of which 
8.9 million were international (CBS, 2013). The visits to Dubrovnik are higher in the summer, with 
the highest number of visitors coming in August. The seasonal nature of the visits to Dubrovnik 
shows that there is a greater demand for tourism and accommodation in the summer, which is why 
the occupation of all facilities in Dubrovnik averages approximately 16% per year. Another 
contributory factor for the low occupation rate could be the flooding of the accommodation market 
with a vast array and quantity of types of accommodation. Both its seasonal tourism and ample 
accommodation could explain why accommodation in Dubrovnik is rarely full to capacity. 
Dubrovnik’s industries and services are predominantly tourism based, either relying on 
accommodation and food services, recreational activities, cultural services or other (administrative) 
tourism roles. Travel and tourism in Dubrovnik contributed an estimated income of US$ 2.7 billion 
from 1990 to 2011, and an estimated US$323.73 million for one year in 2012 (CBS, 2013). The 
primary driver of travel and tourism in Dubrovnik is cultural heritage- either through direct 
employment in specialist heritage sectors, or through wealth generation through tourism supporting 
hospitality industries- thus when discussing the economic value of tourism, we can estimate the 
associated economic value of heritage to both tourism and Dubrovnik as a whole.  
The reliance on tourism in contemporary Dubrovnik (which centres on cultural tourism and cultural 
significance of the old town) as a sustainable source of income is highly likely to affect the degree 
to which the history of the area is sanitized and influence the prioritisation of peace narratives over 
war narratives. This will ensure consistently high visitor numbers to the old town, and in doing so 
increase the ontological distance between Dubrovnik as a war-affected region and Dubrovnik as a 
159 
cultural tourism hotspot. This will subsequently affect the way conflict is remembered through 
cultural heritage and also how Dubrovnik is positioned and broadcast within war narratives to 
visitors. The economic influence of tourism and heritage is a key factor which alters the way 
Dubrovnik recovered from conflict, and this economic profile has shown how integral these 
influences are both to the economy of Croatia as well as the individuals employed within this sector; 
this analysis enables the researcher to have a better understanding of contemporary Dubrovnik which 
equips them with the knowledge to better receive and interpret the information being given by 
interview subjects during the final IHAF stage which interrogates the socio-political impacts of the 
conflict.  
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Chapter Nine: The Socio-political Impact of Heritage on Post-conflict 
Dubrovnik 
The treatment of Dubrovnik as a single site has led to the view that the extent of damage to the entire 
Old Town was severe and the town devastated, whereas records of damage to individual building 
show there was a greater variety of damage and restoration than had been envisioned by reports. This 
chapter views heritage from a socio-political perspective to see how the relationship between people 
and places may have been altered by the conflict, and how people in Dubrovnik define and use 
heritage. As such, this chapter represents an application of the expanded analytic horizons opened up 
through IHAF as compared to predominant modes of post-conflict heritage management. The chapter 
explores ideas of how heritage can be defined, the role of heritage in creating post-conflict cultural 
identities, the creation of war narratives and the mythologies, and how heritage has affected 
reconciliation in Dubrovnik both in terms of reconciliation with the past, but also with their 
contemporary Serbian and Montenegrin neighbours. This chapter operationalises themes introduced 
through Chapters Two, Three and Four, which explored the theoretical aspects of heritage creation 
and the way that heritage has been conceptualised in conflict and post-conflict zones. This chapter 
also uses the discussions of the previous chapters on the physical and economic impact of heritage 
to establish a link between the physical recovery and the more intangible socio-political recovery, 
and examines the consequences of envisioning Dubrovnik as a single cultural heritage site with a 
fixed narrative of recovery. 
This chapter culminates by bringing all three IHAF areas of research together to answer the third 
research question of this thesis: What effect does heritage have on the recovery from conflict in the 
case study of Dubrovnik? To answer this question, this chapter integrated the findings of the physical, 
economic, and socio-political perspectives to develop six key findings in order to illustrate the 
influence and impact heritage has had on the recovery of Dubrovnik. These key findings are the final 
step and end product of the IHAF approach; although they are specific to the nuances of Dubrovnik, 
aspects of these findings can be extrapolated towards a better understanding of some of the key ways 
in which heritage impacts conflicts more widely.    
In order to gauge how heritage is perceived in Old Town, a series of semi-structured interviews were 
conducted between 2012 and 2014 with participants from a variety of backgrounds, undertaken over 
three years. The cumulative method of data collection was used, in part, because of the breadth of 
economic, physical and social data to be collected, but also due to access to interview participants. 
Data used to explore the social impact of heritage in Dubrovnik is based on ten one-hour to two-hour 
interviews with local residents (coded for purposes of anonymity as post-conflict cultural heritage 
informants (PCCH) and numbered 1–10).  
The semi-structured questions sought to give individual participants the opportunity to relate their 
narratives of conflict and recovery, and explain how they perceived heritage in contemporary 
Dubrovnik, but the standardised questions also allowed the researcher to compare answers and look 
for common themes in the answers which could be used to discern a collective experience of war and 
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recovery of the residents of Dubrovnik. The interviews aimed to gauge the perception of the local 
Dubrovnik participants on the recovery of Dubrovnik and its link to heritage. This chapter links the 
three major themes of this research together, and using this integrated perspective, together with this 
research’s theoretical foundation, discover what impact heritage has had on the recovery of 
Dubrovnik since 1992. Although not repeated here, the methods detailing how the interviews were 
carried out, participants recruited and their anonymity protected as well as how barriers and 
linguistics issues were solved, can be found in the methodology chapter of this thesis (Chapter Five). 
During the interviews several themes emerged and these are analysed and discussed at length in this 
chapter. The emergent themes are taken from the interviews and categorised as the perception of 
conflict and recovery, the relationship between people and place in post-war Dubrovnik, 
remembering, forgetting and reconciliation, the mythology of conflict in Dubrovnik, and tourism in 
contemporary Dubrovnik. 
9.1 The Perception of Conflict and Recovery in Dubrovnik 
The recovery of Dubrovnik has been discussed in economic and physical terms in earlier sections, 
but the perceptions of the process and result have so far been limited to official accounts, which offer 
a limited perspective of the conflict and recovery. The conflict was experienced both collectively and 
individually and this section seeks to explore the overlap between these narratives and ascertain how 
much influence each has on the other. The theme of the perception of recovery emerged from 
interviews in a series of recurring concerns and talking points. These sub-themes are: the discourse 
of damage, recreating pre-war Old Town, and the extent of recovery in the Old Town. 
9.1.1 The Discourse of Damage 
There is some debate about the extent of damage to the BCH in which the line between “damaged” 
and “destroyed” has become blurred. These differences in perception are expressed by the residents 
of Dubrovnik. Most interviewees referred to the buildings as destroyed, rather than damaged. Some 
go further to describe the damage as destroyed completely or obliterated, for example: 
Nine houses were completely destroyed, two [of those] houses was our family [sic]. 
PCCH1 
The reference to nine destroyed buildings echoes the broad narrative of the damage reports discussed 
in this chapter. The perception that the buildings were destroyed is particularly apparent in residents 
who were indirectly associated with the rebuilding process. Shop owners, restaurateurs and students 
frequently referred to the buildings as “destroyed” (the word “destroyed” surfaced fifteen times in 
the interviews in relation to war-damaged cultural heritage). However, those who were directly 
involved in the rebuilding process, either through the Ministry of Culture or via IFRD, referred to 
the buildings as damaged, using more technical and precise language and making the distinction 
between damage and destruction clear: 
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Nothing was suppressed [or] crushed down completely, because it’s stone, those are the stone 
houses, but most of them were without roofs, they were burnt inside and it required a lot of 
repair. 
PCCH6 
These contrasting perspectives show that those directly involved in the recovery process have a good 
understanding of the damage, whilst those were not involved have a less clear understanding of it. It 
may be the case that those indirectly involved in the repair work did not possess the expertise to 
differentiate between technical definitions of destroyed and damaged and so based their 
understanding on the reports and narratives that used the term destroyed rather than damaged. 
The ways in which the damage has been remembered and reported can be read as a type of collective 
memory wherein individual experiences are interpreted and incorporated into a singular authoritative 
narrative (Misztal, 2003, p. 20). In this case, individual experiences of damaged buildings have been 
subsumed into a collective understanding that Dubrovnik was destroyed, and it is this narrative that 
was transmitted to the international community. This can be seen in the violence of the language 
used by the participants when discussing the extent of the harm, which included the terms 
“destroyed” (PCCH1, 2, 3, 5), and “obliterated” (PCCH1, 3, 7). 
The collective experience is reported of 6 December, agreed by most participants agreed to be the 
worst day when the city was bombed from the hills and sea: 
It was the St Nicholas day in 1991, 6 December, it was bombed throughout the whole day, and 
lots of houses and palaces were burnt, completely. 
PCCH6 
Aggression was really hard, with 20,000 soldiers from the aggressors from three sides were 
coming to Dubrovnik in October 1991, from three sides … and Dubrovnik stayed like an 
island, surrounded by the aggressors’ army … with army ships, came in front of Dubrovnik 
and they declared some kind of “do not move any kind of boat or ship or anything like that”. 
No one could move off from Dubrovnik, or came into Dubrovnik. 
PCCH5 
… terrible bombardment first in October then in November and then this one in December 
when they bombed heavily, the 6 December, St Nicholas day. 
PCCH6 
PCCH8’s recollections were more violent and graphic than those of the other participants. Due to a 
family tragedy during the war, the participants were initially uneasy about speaking in personal terms 
and they preferred to talk about the effect of the conflict as a collective experience. Despite this initial 
reluctance, when they began to talk about their individual experiences they eventually made many 
references to the violence and the emotional impact of the attacks, rather than focusing (as many of 
the others did) on the physical effect of the war on their cultural property: 
163 
I walked through the town in the early afternoon and there was some houses burned, with 
firemen outside … so quiet and people were just crying. I had a camera but I couldn’t take any 
photo, it was for us really unbelievable. Unbelievable. 
PCCH8 
The influence of emotional trauma in remembering is examined in more detail in section 9.3.3 
“Reconciliation”. It is mentioned here as an example of how individual experience is framed within 
authorised narratives: 
I see those days very clearly and I am proud that I can say I was a part of all these happenings 
but it’s all coloured with a kind of tragedy, a private tragedy and that’s the reason I’m maybe 
a little bit emotional about all of this. 
PCCH7 
The tendency to link the grand narrative of the conflict to personal experience was a recurring feature 
of most of the interviews. For example, PCCH1 spoke of their experience during the war, first by 
talking about the official narrative of the conflict, and then immediately relating it back to their own 
experience and how they could be situated within this narrative: 
Very early in the morning, about 6 o’clock they started, and one of the first houses, and another 
one what was also our property on Stradun … they started with that … nine houses were 
completely destroyed. 
PCCH1 
The interviews also revealed that another factor that could influence the way the war had been 
remembered and transmitted may be the interactions with people and their different experiences of 
the conflict. For example, PCCH5 spoke briefly about a personal connection to the Dubrovnik 
defenders and gave a detailed account of the involvement of the defenders in the conflict. Unlike the 
other participants, PCCH5 differentiated between civilians and defenders: 
[In] four days, more than 20 civilians and almost 30 Dubrovnik defenders were killed, and 
Dubrovnik became very known about the bombing at the 6 December. 
PCCH5 
The Dubrovnik defenders were not discussed by most the other interviewees, and when they were 
mentioned they were spoken about as part of a collective experience (following the official narrative 
of their involvement). 
9.1.2 Recreating Pre-war Dubrovnik 
The interviews also illustrated a key heritage debate, centred on whether to let the marks of the 
conflict show on the BCH or to completely recreate the town as a mirror image of the pre-war town. 
The participants all noted that they would like to see the town complete and without war damage, 
but they also were aware that complete recovery was not possible. PCCH3 said that the marks on the 
164 
stones were a symbol of how far the city had recovered and argued that there was little need to repair 
any surviving damage as the city would naturally weather away the damage over time: 
It is a weakness of the past, that when some catastrophic thing [the 1979 earthquake] happened 
… it is always explainable. But what about weathering with this barbarian damages, with this 
vandalism? It is called vandalism these mechanical damages. It is best to leave it, to stay as 
long as it needs to … then it is healed properly. That’s what I think. 
PCCH3 
PCCH1 has a different perspective and argues that the marks of war damage should not persist in the 
Old Town because the town will be passed on from past generations to future generations. This 
echoes many of the theoretical heritage debates outlined in Chapters Three and Four, and is explored 
in greater detail in section 9.3: 
Because we didn’t want to change anything, we would like to have everything the same as it 
was before the war. Because this is our feeling, yes, and we put the same the same interior, the 
kitchen. Our bedroom, and our dining room etcetera. In the same place as it was. 
PCCH1 
9.2 The Relationship between People and Place in Post-war Dubrovnik 
Heritage is Dubrovnik is an all-encompassing feature of everyday life, but the relationship between 
people and place is examined here to show how a sense of belonging in Dubrovnik has been created 
and what effect notions of exclusivity shape post-war cultural identities. The livelihoods of most of 
the people in Dubrovnik are tied to heritage, either through the museums, the built heritage or by 
catering to the thousands of tourists who visit the city every day. But the relationship is more than 
purely financial. It hinges on the acceptance of the importance of heritage, the overwhelming sense 
of pride that the local people have in the city and a deep sense of belonging. 
The interview participants without exception showed they understood the importance of heritage to 
Dubrovnik. They not only identified heritage as fundamental to their everyday livelihoods, they noted 
that Dubrovnik is defined as heritage. When asked directly about the importance of heritage PCCH1 
replied “heritage is everything”, whilst another participant (PCCH10) gestured to the building walls 
and said “We are stone, and stone is Dubrovnik”. The built heritage is invoked not as an economic 
driver but as a symbol of identity. PCCH10 went on to describe how the locally sourced stones from 
Ston were part of Dubrovnik’s identity, PCCH1 proudly stated that “If you cut us we are stone 
inside”. The quote was said more in jest than the aggressive nature of the words would suggest, but 
the imagery invoked is one that links people intrinsically to the built heritage of Dubrovnik via not 
only a sense of belonging and history but also of physically being linked to the city. The participants 
linked themselves to heritage in several ways, but the most frequently recurring link was that of 
continuous family connections to Dubrovnik, situating their own experiences alongside their 
ancestors living in the city or being born in the city: 
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Here in Dalmatian part, in Croatia especially here in Dalmatia, heritage is everything, you 
know. Here, it’s that kind of culture; people who are born here and live here have a very strong 
feeling about their culture. 
PCCH1 
People who are born here, and family have lots of families here who are from the Old Town 
and there are four or five hundred years here, old families. For example, I’m like 13th or 14th 
generation here. 
PCCH2 
It was very important because this is our culture, and we would like to protect this for many 
generations for future. It’s very important, this [Dubrovnik] is unique, and the whole town is 
like one museum and it very important to have something like that … to keep this and to have 
for our children. 
PCCH9 
The connection to people in the past, as opposed to historic events, is a way to bond to heritage using 
a personal historical claim to the city that depoliticises the process of defining Dubrovnik heritage. 
By invoking family relationships to form a bond to the past, the participants are at once claiming a 
direct and uninterrupted inheritance of the city, whilst bolstering the notion that Dubrovnik can 
belong only to those born in the city with their own historical claim to it. In this way, Dubrovnik has 
become the exclusive domain of local people with ancestral roots in the city, whilst excluding those 
who cannot claim a hereditary place in Dubrovnik. The transmission of heritage was invoked as one 
of the most important aspects of heritage, but the participants did not expand on exactly what aspects 
of heritage they had inherited, or what they would safeguard for future generations. Heritage in 
Dubrovnik is often described simply as undifferentiated heritage: the assumption seems to be the 
town and its heritage are completely indistinguishable: the function of being Dubrovnik equals the 
function of being heritage. Laurajane Smith argues that heritage is a discourse that is produced and 
performed, and an authorised narrative is produced that utilises the built heritage environment to 
justify its identity as heritage (Smith, 2006); this process appears to be clearly illustrated in this case 
study. Emma Waterton builds on this argument to note that the discourse of heritage protects its 
status by directing attention towards signifiers of heritage and encouraging people to continue to 
mark it out as such (Waterton, 2009, p. 40). 
The dual incentive of the economic benefits and the social importance of heritage means that those 
who work and live in the city have an interest in continuing the heritage rhetoric in the city and 
encouraging future generations to do likewise. The participants frequently used heritage to signify 
economic stability, and this illustrates a key theme in the discourses of heritage in the city: 
It [cultural assets produced in Dubrovnik] is very good: olives, olive oil, and stone, wine: they 
are the heritage of Dubrovnik. From the beginning we had this, and this is what the traditional 
souvenirs we should be selling. 
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PCCH2 
Tourists don’t come to have a sunny day or swim in the sea which is beautiful and clear, they 
mostly come to see the walls, this precious heritage, the city stones and city walls; to have a 
walk throughout Old Town. That’s the reason why they come, because Dubrovnik is unique 
we don’t have such preserved Old Town somewhere else. Heritage definitely has big influence 
on that. 
PCCH5 
The importance of heritage in Dubrovnik is tied to feelings of belonging in the city. This goes beyond 
defining and transmitting a heritage discourse in Dubrovnik to considering the celebration of heritage 
as normal and the rejection of the celebratory rhetoric as abnormal. This is partly defined in a 
comparison with family bonds: PCCH2 likened taking care of the city to caring for relatives: “It is 
normal … to live at your parents and take care of your parents”, adding, “if you have your own house 
… people begin start wondering why”. The implications for this interpretation in the context of post-
war Dubrovnik are significant; the acceptance of heritage in Dubrovnik means an acceptance of the 
collective heritage narrative and the heritage image created in Dubrovnik: if you deviate from this 
norm in Dubrovnik you are in the minority. 
But this does not suggest that there is no supra-personal, socio-political imperative at work. The identity 
of the “Dubrovniks” as identifiably “local” was highlighted by a comment on the impact of incomer 
groups: 
The traditions are not possible [to change] quickly. So changes could come with the new 
people, we don’t know what we are supposed to be after becoming the European Union. 
Perhaps when other races … you see in England you have a lot of Africans, Indians and 
Chinese people … we don’t have it still. But everything is possible to change, and I don’t 
know how it will look. But our protection of the patrimony and the old lives of history, and 
culture – not only material – is strong. Very traditional. 
PCCH4 
The comparison between insiders and outsiders allows those with a hereditary attachment to feel more 
included, and cement their identities against newcomers who will never attain the same level of 
generational inclusion. Most of the included group are ethnic Croatian Catholics with a family tie to 
Dubrovnik. Minority groups that have existed in the same space for a long period but are not Croatian 
or Catholic (the Jewish, Muslim and Orthodox communities) are partially included in the Dubrovnik 
discourses. Excluded groups are not ethnically Croatian, they are usually migrant workers or foreign 
visitors, and they are likely to be renters and not home owners.  
After the homeland war, the last war, a lot of people came here. Of course, we have lots of 
people from Bosnia and Herzegovina, from Slovenia, It’s different. Their culture is different. 
They think different but they mostly live outside of the Old Town. Inside the Old Town is 
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mostly reserved either for the old people that are from here, or rich foreigners who can afford 
the house. 
PCCH9 
The comparison between those who belong and those who do not reinforces the sense of belonging in 
a very exclusive group, but the division between the two groups (Croatian and Not-Croatian) where 
lingering post-war tensions become distinct, and illustrates the key argument on the bombing of 
Dubrovnik: to which group does Dubrovnik belong? Milošević claimed Dubrovnik was Slavic and 
therefore the property of Yugoslavia, whilst Croatia claimed it as Croatian. In 1991 Dubrovnik was 
Croatian, but only as recently as 1941 had the Croatian borders been defined as such. The annexation 
of Dalmatia into Croatia in the 1940s gave Croatia its contemporary borders; when Milošević made the 
argument for Yugoslav control of Dubrovnik he based his claim on pre-Second World War boundaries 
which delegitimised Croatia’s contemporary borders (see Chapter Six for details). In the outbreak of 
war Dalmatia and Dubrovnik defined themselves as Croatian, but the cultural history of Dubrovnik is 
ambiguous, allowing Milošević to bomb the Old Town using the history of Dubrovnik (unsuccessfully) 
both as justification and as a shield against international criticism. The interview participants mirrored 
the cultural rhetoric used by Croatia and Yugoslavia to claim Dubrovnik, but with a different result; 
they identified not only as Croatian, but more centrally as Dubrovnik – with a clear differentiation: 
Not only Croatian but we consider ourselves Dubrovnik. 
PCCH2 
It’s a long history, and older history than Croatia, three times as much you know? There’s 
more history of Dubrovnik than of most of the towns in Europe. Dubrovnik is as old as Rome 
or Venice. You know, London is new compared to Dubrovnik. 
PCCH9 
[Compared to] Split or Trogir, they have nice heritage too, but Dubrovnik is something special. 
Like architecture, like everything; and the culture is the main point, it is why the people come. 
Even if they don’t want to go to the museums, they know they are existing here and everything 
is full of history and heritage. 
PCCH3 
The comparison between Dubrovnik as a centre for culture with other cultural centres in Croatia is 
invoked to elevate the status of Dubrovnik and set it apart from the rest of Croatia. Dubrovnik’s status 
as a cultural symbol (supported by its status as a UNESCO WHS) was considered a key reason for 
Milošević’s attack on the city, and it was used by the ICTY in the trial. The extracts above echo the 
rhetoric used by Milošević, but with a different aim; to define themselves firstly as a culturally 
independent city of Dubrovnik and secondly to define themselves as Croatian (with an associated 
European bias). The argument made here is that the rhetoric on the national cultural identity of 
Dubrovnik uses a historically based narrative that can be manipulated and changed according to the 
goals of the speaker; while the goals of the residents of Dubrovnik and the acts perpetrated by Milošević 
168 
are obviously very different, the rhetoric used is similar. The participants also echo international 
criticism of the bombing in 1991 and link the bombing explicitly to culture: 
The Old Town was most damaged, because it … it was a symbol. They were shelling a symbol. 
PCCH5 
Both the historical rhetoric used to define sociocultural identities and international (popular) criticism 
of the bombings make use of Dubrovnik’s elevated cultural status, whilst evading the acknowledgment 
that Dubrovnik was directly involved in the conflict. If the identity of Dubrovnik is separated from that 
of Croatia then the former is a victim caught between two warring countries, rather than being complicit 
in Croatian acts. This is supported by the perception of how Dubrovnik behaved in the conflict: 
[Dubrovnik was] like concentration camp surrounded from four sides, even from the air with 
planes from Mostar. Dubrovnik lost electricity lost liquid water, lost medical supplies or 
anything like that, and that lasted for almost ten months … [at the] end of 1991 the war luck 
changed because the Dubrovnik defenders succeed to push back the other army and they didn’t 
achieve what they wanted to accomplish, that is they wanted to occupy [the] Fort Imperial on 
top of the Srđ. 
PCCH5 
A contemporary community (nation or city) in the aftermath of war will attempt to distance itself for 
involvement in the conflict because no side will have an untarnished war record (Ashworth and 
Tunbridge, 1996). The authors go on to argue that by framing a post-war nation as a victim or hero in 
a war, whilst simultaneously avoiding ownership or responsibility of the war, a community can recreate 
a historical narrative that both includes and distances them from the war (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 
1996). Dubrovnik is just such an example of this rhetoric. In creating an exclusive cultural identity 
Dubrovnik has created a narrative of belonging that in turn helps to support the mythology of the war 
in post-war Dubrovnik. 
The post-war relationship between people and place in Dubrovnik seems to have strengthened 
reliance on the rhetoric of heritage in the city. The heritage discourses are considered the most 
important sign of belonging in the city, but it is often simplified as a generic term for all “heritage” 
activities and buildings in Dubrovnik. The result of is that the participants are very attached to 
heritage and see it as a core aspect of their own identities but they do not discuss what heritage is. 
They define it as the built heritage and traditions of the city, but events since the Second World War 
are not included in the heritage discourse except to highlight how Dubrovnik suffered in the 1991 
attack. The impact of the war on the relationship between people and place led to the cementing of 
Dubrovnik identities (insiders and outsiders) and the invocation of cultural heritage rhetoric which 
was used in and after the war to preserve ownership of the city, but ownership claims that are based 
on family rather than national ties. The cementing of post-war identities and the ways in which 
memories of the war have been intrinsically linked to the heritage discourse is explored in the 
following section. 
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9.3 Remembering Conflict in Dubrovnik: Memory, Reconciliation and 
Commemoration 
Economically and physically the Old Town has recovered since the conflict in 1991. However, the 
several markers of the conflict in the city include the ricochet marks on the buildings, one memorial 
in Sponza Palace and a war museum on the hill outside the Old Town. The marks of conflict are not 
immediately apparent, but they are there. The Dubrovnik residents who were interviewed mirror the 
city in this way; the conflict was not immediately a talking point, especially not in regards to 
contemporary Dubrovnik; rather, it was mentioned in passing in relation to other aspects of life in 
Dubrovnik (such as tourism, the meaning of heritage and the future of the city). When asked directly 
about conflict the participants were prepared to talk about the effect of conflict on built heritage, and 
a discourse of conflict and recovery emerged based on a collective experience of conflict during the 
Siege of Dubrovnik. Discourses of conflict and recovery revealed how Dubrovnik has collectively 
remembered the conflict, and the effect its memories has had on processes of commemoration and 
reconciliation. During this section the process of memory making in Dubrovnik is scrutinised, 
looking how the participants have collectively and individually remembered the conflict, and whether 
the erasure of war marks on BCH is echoed in the participants’ choice to remember or forget the war. 
This section will also explore how the residents of Dubrovnik regard their international neighbours 
and discuss whether these relationships can be considered reconciled or fractious. 
9.3.1 Remembering 
The way in which the conflict is remembered in Dubrovnik is split between the public 
commemoration of the attack as a shared experience and personal narratives of individual suffering 
and loss. The participants spoke about their memories of war as a collective experience, emphasising 
that the attack on the town meant that all the residents had suffered during the conflict. The aggression 
against Dubrovnik was framed as a unique experience for the residents of the town and had not been 
replicated anywhere else in Croatia: 
There is no one, no family in Dubrovnik which wasn’t touched in some kind of a war 
aggression, and people always asked people from Dubrovnik, “How you feel during the 
aggression, what were you doing” or something like that. Every single citizen in Dubrovnik 
were at the first line of front. I talk a lot with the defenders who came to liberate this part of 
Croatia or they were in some other part of our country, and they always say “Yes, but my 
family stayed in Rijeka, they were safe and I went to war”, and here everyone was in war. 
PCCH5 
The collective experience of isolation and the uniqueness of the experience separates Dubrovnik 
narratives of war from a national Croatian narrative of war. The collective experience of war becomes 
dominant over individual memories of war and individual experiences are often subsumed under the 
collective narrative (Misztal, 2003, p.23). Misztal goes on to argue that a hierarchy of collective 
memories exists in which national narratives dominate local community narratives, forcing the latter 
to exist primarily through their connection with the dominant collective discourse (Misztal, 2003, 
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p.24). In Dubrovnik, however, individual experiences became part of the Dubrovnik collective 
experience, but the Dubrovnik narrative remains separate from national narratives of conflict. This 
is shown by the lack of dialogue on the way the Dubrovnik conflict fits into the national narrative 
(as would be expected from war narratives). Misztal notes that tying individual and local narratives 
to national ones is a way to increase the importance of a localised experience by associating it to the 
wider political context (Misztal, 2003, pp.24–25). Nevertheless, during interviews the participants 
did not assimilate their narratives into a grand narrative, and they mentioned other conflict zones 
only to differentiate them from their own and highlight the uniqueness of their own experience. For 
example, PCCH2 speaks at length about the ways in which the Old Town was bombed, but limits 
the narrative of conflict to Dubrovnik until they draw a distinction between experiences of Dubrovnik 
and Croatia: 
So here, people were still fighting, still hear here the gunshots, fighting, street fighting here 
until almost 1998, rest of Croatia it was 1994, 95. They freed the northern part of Croatia much 
faster than here. 
PCCH2 
There was a pattern in the interviews as participants frequently referenced the Dubrovnik collective 
narrative (mentioning dates and times of the bombings) in conjunction with an associated individual 
experience. In the quotations below the associations have been limited to the loss of BCH, but many 
of the participants mentioned family tragedies: 
…very early in the morning, about 6 o’clock they started [bombing] … And one of the first 
houses, this is one, and another one what was also our property on Stradun, the main street … 
they started with that. The first two houses to be destroyed in the Old Town. 
PCCH1 
My family was here in Dubrovnik and I went to Zagreb 15 days before the aggression started 
and my mother said to me “Go, go, go to university, do your thing, you have to learn war won’t 
happen here”. And then 15 days after that the bombing started here. 
PCCH5 
The established collective memory in Dubrovnik functions to fix the chronology of events, and this 
is supported by the international retelling of events in the ICTY trial proceedings and in the media, 
as explored in Chapter Eight. The individual experiences fit into the collective narrative with little 
difficulty; the exclusive nature of the siege experience and the fixed chronology of the events allows 
the participants’ individual experiences to gain prominence and recognition within a collective 
narrative. However, there is little deviation from this narrative, and the individual experiences 
described in the interviews are similar to each other. This may be due to the similarity of experience 
of those within Dubrovnik or it may be caused by the repetition of a practiced narrative and the 
assimilation of alternate experiences into a collective experience. 
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The way the restoration of BCH was done was identified as a source of tension in the interviews. 
The debate between keeping evidence of damage to remember versus repairing all damage to its pre-
war state was raised a number of times. PCCH1 was particularly adamant that the town should be 
completely restored to be passed onto “many generations in the future”. The process of controlling 
the narrative of the present to pass it onto the future suggests that the past they would like future 
generations to inherit would not include this particular period of history. However, PCCH1 went on 
to explain that each house had an archive stretching back hundreds of years, so it was not necessary 
for the damage to be seen on the BCH, because the events had been recorded. This argument was 
echoed by PCCH4, who noted: 
Now, when you are coming twenty years after the war, you can’t even, if you know nothing, 
can’t even see it [war damage]. But we are still seeing in our minds, we are still seeing. 
PCCH4 
PCCH1 and PCCH4 illustrate the side of the argument that would like to erase the physical presence 
of the damage, as it is not necessary to have physical reminders as the memories are still vivid. 
PCCH3 suggests that the war damage and monuments should not exist because “if you make the sign 
visible and recognisable, then you make a monument to the barbarians”. In PCCH3’s perspective, 
the damage forms a monument not to commemorate the conflict but to remember the act of 
aggression. PCCH3’s view falls a mid-way between the two opposing sides, with complete 
restoration on one side (PCCH1 and PCCH4) and the recommendation to retain the evidence of 
damage and to create commemorative museums. 
Memories are created through a process of collectively selecting the most appropriate events in 
history and framing (altering) memories to fit into these events (Connerton, 2008, pp. 61–63). The 
selection process and the collective memory that results from it must be reinforced in the wider 
society in order for the memory to be internalised and accepted. In the case of Dubrovnik and we can 
argue that a collective narrative of surviving the conflict and full recovery has been created, but the 
presence of the war damage acts to derail this history. The war damage therefore either needs to be 
framed within collective memory (commemorated) to become part of visible heritage of the city, or 
it needs to be hidden both physically on the BCH and from the collective remembrance of the war 
experience. That is not to say that the war would be obliterated from the record of Dubrovnik, but 
the experience to be retold would be one of destruction and complete recovery instead of continued 
war damage. 
There is a disconnection between the way people privately experience their memories, and the public 
commemoration of the conflict. The participants showed they remain traumatised by the conflict but 
the public record of the conflict is biased towards a narrative of complete recovery, despite visible 
reminders of the conflict surviving on the BCH of the Old Town. The public stories of complete 
recovery can be found in the history of the conflict in the contemporary history museum and 
associated publications. This is in direct comparison with the private memories of the participants 
for whom they have not completely recovered or been reconciled with, as demonstrated by the 
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emotive and personal nature of their interviews, as noted in the quotation cited earlier in this chapter 
from PCCH8: 
From early in the morning until maybe 2.30 in the afternoon, and it was really after that when 
this stops. I walked through the town in the early afternoon and there was some houses burned 
with firemen outside. It was terrible, and people were slowly just walking. So quiet and people 
were just crying. I had a camera but I couldn’t take any photo, it was for us really unbelievable. 
Unbelievable. 
PCCH8 
Despite individual memories deviating from the collective, the recollections (such as those of 
PCCH8’s) are complicit in the creation and transmission of the collective remembrance of the war, 
as their own recollections are framed against the context of the conflict. This is consistent with the 
point made earlier in light of Barbara Misztal’s argument that personal narratives are subsumed into 
a collective memory, but the collective memory remains prioritised. 
Dubrovnik has imbued meaning into all aspects of the Old Town, culminating in a definition of 
heritage that “Dubrovnik is heritage”, which is to be preserved and passed onto future generations. 
The creation and transmission of this slogan has been carefully managed, and the inclusion or 
exclusion of war narratives into Dubrovnik’s history is a point of tension in the Old Town. 
The war is seen as an important aspect of Dubrovnik’s recent history, and there is a desire to ensure 
the war remains in the collective memory of the residents and visitors. For example, PCCH5 noted 
that the museum plays an important function in educating visitors about what occurred during the 
war and the history of the region: 
I talk to people who came to me in the museum about that [the war] and they are talking like 
that’s our remembrance. Also came to my museum small children and even students, but they 
are born after the war and you have to talk to them about communism, socialism, about 
capitalism today, about when did the republic of Croatia arise, and what’s happening twenty 
years ago and why the republic of Croatia was established. 
PCCH5 
9.3.2 Forgetting 
There is an equally strong pull to limit the impact the war has had on the physical and socio-political 
heritage of Dubrovnik. The participants expressed their desire to commemorate the past without 
admitting that the marks (visible and invisible) remain, although the same participants later report 
that they still have difficult memories of the conflict. The way in which Dubrovnik has solved this 
problem is by placing the war experience outside the walls to the Fortress on Mount Srđ, and a 
permanent memorial to the Dubrovnik defenders in Sponza Palace. The relationship between heritage 
and difficult histories is carefully managed in heritage sites, and that in order for the construction of 
a heritage site to flourish a difficult history is limited to standalone monuments and structures to 
create a division between the glorious and the difficult history (Panjabi and Winter, 2009, p.20). The 
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placement of the museums reflects their interaction with tourism; the museum on Mount Srđ is 
located beyond the city walls (as seen in the background on the hills in the background of Figure 
9.1), creating distance between the military installation and the civilian city below. The memorial in 
Sponza palace is in the heart of the city (as seen in figure 9.2), and provides names and faces to the 
local Dubrovniks who died in the conflict. Although both are focused on the same event, the 
narratives they espouse are from different perspectives: The Fortress shows Dubrovnik as an 
overwhelmed military power, whereas the memorial presents a visual narratives of victims-as-heroes 
to those killed whilst fighting during the conflict.  
The War Museum on Srđ offers an in-depth look at the Dubrovnik experience and perspective of the 
conflict, complete with times, dates, local artefacts and experiences, and military history. The 
memorial in Sponza Palace is a collection of portraits of the defenders with information about their 
lives, and a small exhibition on the war (Figure 9.2). The Museum on Srđ offers a war history, 
whereas the commemoration room presents the human face and the personal tragedies of Dubrovnik 
to commemorate the people rather than the event. The memory room in Sponza Palace is a highly 
politicised monument of the conflict, with a sharp focus on the victimisation of Dubrovnik. This 
memorial neither forgives nor reconciles local people to the conflict: it is a stark reminder of the 
human cost of the conflict. While it is not within the remit of this research to fully analyse the curation 
of the exhibition in Sponza Palace, the narration of the war through the perspective of victimhood 
and the marginalisation of the context and details of the conflict has been achieved through a process 
of forgetting and selecting memories. 
Figure 9.1 Mount Srđ: Fort Imperial War Museum       Figure 9.2 Sponza Palace  
In Seven Ways of Forgetting Paul Connerton suggests that there are various ways in which people 
forget the past, and do so for various reasons. The process of commemoration seen in Dubrovnik 
though the Sponza Palace exhibit shows that several different types of forgetting have occurred. 
Prescriptive forgetting is a state-led endeavour that seeks to remove memories from society that are 
deemed harmful to contemporary society (Connerton, 2008, pp.61–62). In Dubrovnik this is visible 
in the lack of information on the period of history from 1930 onwards, and particularly in this 
exhibition that erases the context of the conflict, but retains the loss and tragedy of the war in the 
memories of the victims. The erasure or repackaging of memories from public discourse can be seen 
K Bishop (2013)            K Bishop (2012) 
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as an attempt to forge a new identity. This type of forgetting is characterised by a management 
process where memories are stored and prioritised according to their bearing to contemporary needs 
(Connerton, 2008, p.64). Connerton remarks that in this type of forgetting a societal agreement is 
forged where new memories are created through a process of sharing that gently silences memories 
that are not in-keeping with a new identity (Connerton, 2008, p.63). 
In Dubrovnik a new post-war identity has been bolstered by creating a collective memory of the war 
while silencing the details (at least within the city walls) and preserving the legacy of the war in the 
commemoration of the victims. In doing so, Dubrovnik has become a place of historic importance 
that has contemporary relevance as a WHS without the negative associations of active participation 
in the conflict. Forgetting in Dubrovnik has become part of the Dubrovnik myth, and in order for the 
memory of the conflict to survive it has been simplified and aspects of it forgotten. The conflict is 
remembered and commemorated in Dubrovnik but it is a memory of victimhood that requires 
memories to be tailored to fit into the authorised narrative. 
The effect of tailoring narratives on reconciliation is that it is unclear whether the participants have 
forgiven the attacks on the town. The interviews suggest that the war memories are vivid and have 
been hidden rather than forgotten. In the future, the hidden and silent memories may be forgotten 
and the collective memory will be the only dominant memory left, but this has not yet happened. 
However, it is interesting to note that when the two youngest interview participants (25–35-years 
old) relayed narratives of the conflict, they did so using the collective narrative of war and focused 
on damage to BCH. Their narratives tended to focus more on the collective experience of war as they 
were not present (or were too young) and do not have individual memories of the conflict: 
They [the museum and memory room] are necessary because we want to keep a memory of 
the people who lost their lives defending the city. There are lots of guys that actually, without 
weapons they stood up and went to fight the enemy and to protect the city … the Fort Imperial. 
It is a symbol of defence because the little groups of defenders were actually in that fort and 
they were shooting with the guns and the enemy actually thought it was a whole army inside, 
so they defended Dubrovnik because we could easily be occupied. 
PCCH6 
The narrative presented by PCCH6 is referred to again later in this chapter in conjunction with the 
creation of the myth of Dubrovnik. The absence of personal memories is at once both surprising and 
unsurprising. The two participants made it clear that they had a strong family connection to the town, 
and referred to their property in relation to the conflict, but they did not refer to the experiences of 
the older generations. Perhaps the narrative that will survive in the Old Town will be the collective 
memory of events and the older generation’s experiences will be subsumed into this authorised 
discourse. Generational memory suggests that memories (personal memories and experiences of 
events) survive through three generations, that a child will be interested in their grandparent’s stories 
as they know the actors, and will retell (with some alterations) these experiences as history or as 
myths (Huyssen, 1995, p.2). The two youngest interview participants do not retell family war 
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experiences, although they highlight their family connection to Dubrovnik, instead they retell the 
collective narrative of events. This is somewhat surprising as personal family stories of ownership 
are very important to the participants, therefore it would be reasonable to expect a younger generation 
to be as involved in the family connections to the war. That this has not happened could suggest that 
personal (generational) aspects of the conflict have been silenced or forgotten. The following 
quotation from PCCH2 about the conflict illustrates the focus on the collective narrative of events, 
and the lack of personal connection to the conflict. PCCH2 made no reference in the interview to 
family ties to the conflict, except when mentioning damage to their family home: 
On the 6 December, they tried to take over the Old Town and start a new warning, with 
bombing and larger forces, special forces going on the hill and starting to enter the city. There 
were like two times they tried that, it started with a small submarine in the old port. 
PCCH2 
Whilst the two youngest participants concentrated on the collective narrative of the conflict, the others 
focused on a collective narrative populated with their own experiences. This results in the details of the 
conflict (such as local participation and traumatic experience) being erased in favour of presenting the 
conflict as a single and resolved issue of Dubrovnik’s past. The residents balanced the public 
commemoration and private suffering by eagerly anticipating the loss of war memories and balancing 
forgetting with reconciliation: 
It was difficult really, and luckily, thank God, memories fade. 
PCCH3 
It’s my opinion, people doesn’t feel today, anger or something like that, but they can’t forget. 
Yet. 
PCCH5 
9.3.3 Reconciliation 
The way the war is framed in collective memory has a direct bearing on the process of reconciliation. 
This can be seen in this quotation from PCCH8, who did not see the mountain men but believed they 
existed and connected the attack to the barbarism of the JNA soldiers. This process of seeking 
meaning and looking for reasons behind the war is often repeated amongst the participants, and is a 
strong feature of reconciliation processes between post-war ex-combatant nations, as outlined by 
Bloomfield, Barnes and Huyse (2003): 
You think with your mind and with your head that the people bombing, that they can be aware 
of the beauty and value of the heritage, but it’s not the case. It was like a conflict of civilisation 
because you have those fighters from Montenegro and Serbia; after a few months we saw some 
video tapes from some journalists that we were friends with, so those people sending bombs 
to us they were toothless, with beards, like mountain people, we didn’t know those people 
existed so close to us, so it was like a conflict of culture as well. 
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PCCH8 
PCCH8’s vivid memories of the “mountain people” provide an insight into how the aggressors were 
considered in the conflict (this is echoed by PCCH5 who also refers to “the men in the hills”). The 
presentation of the aggressors can be seen as a propaganda effort (not necessarily made by the 
Dubrovniks themselves, but present in the media at the time) which differentiate the cultured 
Dubrovnik Old Town from the uncultured aggressors. This division is reminiscent of the dichotomy 
between the cultured Western Croatia and the uncultured eastern Slavic dichotomy discussed in 
Chapter Six, with particular reference to Todorova’s idea of balkanisation (Todorova, 1997). This 
rekindling of pre-Tito-era rhetoric to split the Balkans between east and West rather than unifying it 
through their cultural Slavic similarities reflects the shift in socio-politics in the 1990s from an ethnic 
similarity to ethnic difference and conflict.  
PCCH8’s characterisation does not seem out of place amongst these other depictions, but the context 
of their categorisation reveals that they did not see the aggressors themselves, but relied on the media 
and other outlets to create this image. They mention that before they saw these toothless, bearded 
mountain men they had assumed that even though the attackers were bombing the city they were 
aware of the beauty of Dubrovnik. It was only after the negative images were shown that they began 
to think of the aggressors as culturally different from themselves. This differentiation is striking for 
several reasons. Firstly, it shows the power of propaganda and its effect on the characterisation of 
the aggressors; secondly, it shows how processes of personal remembrance are affected by public 
discourses of memory. Thirdly, it shows how the mythologies about the conflict (particularly those 
on the severity of the conflict) continue to permeate contemporary Dubrovnik society- of both 
victims and aggressors; both have been mythologised and the narratives streamlined in the post-war 
years. 
Bloomfield, Barns and Huyse (2003a, pp. 19–21) say there are three chronological stages of 
reconciliation: replacing fear with non-violent coexistence when fear no longer rules; building 
confidence and trust; and lastly building empathy. This can be seen in the ways in which the 
relationship between Dubrovnik, Montenegro, and Serbia were mentioned. In most of the interviews, 
they were referenced as “Neighbours” (PCCH1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9) but they also mentioned that they 
remained fearful about the participation of their neighbours in the conflict: 
I, myself, was once to see my aunt who lives in Korta last year, was very difficult for me to 
go. Very difficult. I went to see her, but I’m not very keen on going because my memories are 
maybe stronger than somebody else’s. I never can get this answer why. And when you walk 
around and have … you can’t stop thinking that maybe some one of them was around. Maybe 
it wasn’t his will, he had to go, but still it’s rather uneasy. You know, always. I am sure that 
all behaved very nicely, I don’t know about some sporadic accidents maybe, that’s war. 
PCCH3 
PCCH3 is afraid that individuals in neighbouring countries may have been complicit in the conflict, 
or in the bombing of Dubrovnik. Although they try to mitigate their fear by assuring the interviewer 
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that “they all behaved very nicely”, they cannot forget the involvement of their international 
neighbours in the war despite their family connection. The experience of PCCH3 is replicated in 
other interviews, for example: 
Today we all want to forget a lot of things, and many people now from Dubrovnik … My 
sister she don’t want to go to Montenegro and Trebinje. The small towns in the countryside 
who, we were attacked by them. She still don’t want to go there but some people are going, to 
make shopping, to go to restaurants and so on, it’s cheaper than here. 
PCCH4 
Despite the experience and lingering fears displayed by PCCH3, they argue strongly towards 
reconciliation, and display empathy towards Montenegrins and the perception that they were forced 
to participate in the conflict (although no such empathy was displayed towards the JNA soldiers). 
Over the course of the interview they argue that they wish to see more variation in the visitors to 
Dubrovnik, and show sympathy towards the experience of Montenegrins in the war by referencing 
their forced involvement in the war and the similar experiences of war: 
We were in good contacts with our neighbours, they were our relatives, they were our friends, 
and many of them were really around the town, like locals. They were locals, and then they 
ran away to bomb. Though I must tell you, there were very, very decent people who have 
families and are living here, and they never moved. They were Serbs and Montenegrins, they 
never moved and they suffered just like us. They suffered in all detail – in food, in water, in 
scare, in bombardment. In all. 
PCCH3 
They were residents who were Serbs that led the families, so part of the families they led them 
to join these attackers. These terrorists, together with Yugoslav army of course, because it’s 
not only Yugoslav army, it’s the people who were recruited from the places. They were obliged 
to recruit. 
PCCH4 
The comments from PCCH3, 4 and 5 show that lingering tensions remain in contemporary Dubrovnik, 
which manifest as fear of the unknown actions of others. In light of this is it hard to gauge the level of 
reconciliation as the participants shown that mistrust and suspicion is still relevant in contemporary 
Dubrovnik, as is reflected in the ways the conflict has been remembered. The commemoration process 
in the Old Town shows that the conflict has been managed and tailored to fit the collective narrative 
(and memory) of the war, but that local people are still suffering to reconcile their own memories of 
the war into the collective narrative. The participants revealed that the two memory types (public and 
private) sit easily together until they are interrogated: the collective memory turns the conflict into a 
historic event to be commemorated, whilst the private memory revolves around personal experiences 
and unreconciled fears: 
178 
I think that no court on the earth can compete with this feeling that every morning you need to 
look in the mirror and see so many terrible things that they did, without any reason…. I see 
those days very clearly and I am proud that I can say I was a part of all these happenings but 
it’s all coloured with a kind of tragedy, a private tragedy. 
PCCH8 
9.4 Cultural Tourism and the Impact on the Socio-politics of the Old Town 
Throughout this research tourism is acknowledged as a dominant facet of Dubrovnik’s cultural 
heritage; it is the main avenue to export culture and commerce from Dubrovnik around the world 
and it is an opportunity to manage what cultural attributes, messages and products are on sale to 
visitors. All the participants agreed that tourism is a huge economic force in the Old Town, and this 
is supported by the economic evaluation of tourism in Dubrovnik in Chapter Eight. The participants’ 
acknowledgement that heritage is a key component of the economy of Dubrovnik does not lead them 
to endorse tourism completely; instead they were divided on whether their reliance on tourism had a 
positive or negative impact on post-war Dubrovnik. The impact of mass and accessible tourism since 
the war has exposed the Old Town to increasing numbers of visitors. Its visitor numbers are now 
consistently high year on year after the dramatic fall in 1991. The participants divide tourism broadly 
into two categories: “good tourism” and “bad tourism” which are applied the types of tourist and the 
types of vendor.  
All tourists to Dubrovnik can be defined as cultural tourists, as they interact with heritage 
(McKercher and du Cros, 2002, p. 5). As the whole of Dubrovnik is defined as a heritage site, any 
tourist entering in the city is engaging in the tourist industry directly (visiting the walls, going to 
museums, engaging in history) or indirectly (going to restaurants, bars, hotels, buying souvenirs). 
The participants’ acknowledgement of heritage as an all-encompassing feature of life in 
contemporary Dubrovnik has been explored earlier in this chapter; and tourism is discussed in similar 
terms: 
The museums are the most important thing. You lose the museums and you lose Dubrovnik. 
Like we said, Dubrovnik is like one big museum, that our town is one. The town is old, every 
house, everything that you see, tells a story. 
PCCH2 
PCCH2 spoke about museums often, and it became apparent that they (amongst others) were eager 
to present the interviewer with the perspective that they viewed heritage as a culturally significant 
factor in their everyday life. The objectivity of PCCH2 may be biased by their own connection to the 
use of heritage in the tourist industry in Dubrovnik, and the invocation of museums as a signifier of 
cultural identity for the Old Town may have been used in part to present themselves as primarily 
culturally rather than economically connected to heritage, although they contradicted this view 
during the interview. The objectivity of the interview participants is a recurring issue seen in many 
empirical studies, and is discussed in Chapter Five. However, the subjectivity of the participants was 
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limited in this research by accepting that it was likely that the interviews will contain bias, but due 
to the in-depth and wide-ranging nature of the interviews, as well as the cumulative collection of data 
and the trust built between interviewer and interviewee it is hoped that bias will be more easily seen 
and its impact noted. 
PCCH3 showed an awareness of the attraction of cultural heritage to the tourist industry, and 
emphatically explained that without heritage the tourist industry would suffer: 
[Heritage is] very important. Very important. Extremely important. Without it, it would be 
very difficult to attract visits. Oh yes, cultural heritage is the main magnet. 
PCCH3 
This view was repeated in all the interviews, and contradicts the claims made by tourism development 
agencies who seek to capitalise on the tourism market in the area; whose view is that the Old Town 
is a bonus rather than a magnet.  
As well as introducing the importance and connection of heritage and tourism, these two quotes also 
introduce a key concern in the use of heritage in the Old Town: as an expression of culture and as a 
product to be consumed. These two ways of viewing heritage are not exclusive and the participants 
show that, although is a concern, they accept that heritage is considered in both ways: 
The museum part is good. Everyone loves museums. Everyone respects them. Also galleries, 
that’s the tradition. Everything else the people consider too many. Too many shops, too many 
restaurants, too many souvenirs. 
PCCH2 
If not [for heritage] then the people wouldn’t come. When they are not here there is six months 
when they is nobody here in the town and it is very sad and hard to live. 
PCCH4 
PCCH6 refers to the importance of heritage in connection to tourism explicitly by linking income to 
the city via cultural institutions and visitor numbers: 
Dubrovnik has a very large budget for culture. It’s about 13 or 14% of total budget in the city. 
When you compare it to other cities and to the Ministry of Culture its huge amount of money. 
We have ten institutions that are actually funded by the city. Those are museums, cinemas, 
Dubrovnik summer festival, folklore and we have library, I don’t know, what else. We have 
ten of them and they are mostly financed by the city. Some of them has their own profits and 
their own incomes and one of them is the museums, definitely, they can of course thank that 
to the Rector’s Palace because more than 300,000 people visit museums per year. All other 
museums in Croatia don’t have together that kind of, that high number of visitors. 
PCCH6 
The commodification of heritage is apparent in the interviews of both supporters and opponents of 
the mass tourism market. This acceptance and also criticism of the tourist industry is countered by 
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defining tourists as good or bad on the basis of their economic value and status, and the actions of 
vendors in terms of good or bad behaviour. 
9.4.1 Types of Tourist 
A distinction between “good” and “bad” tourists was either explicitly or implicitly made by the 
participants in terms of the economic status of the visitors. PCCH2 says quite bluntly that the tourists 
are “low to middle-class tourists. We don’t have high class”, they go on to say: 
There are five-star hotels but they do not have five-star guests in the hotels. Maybe once twice 
a year someone richer like Abramovich [a famous billionaire investor] and they have a lot of 
money. The hotels here are not so expensive, even those with five-stars so you can afford. 
What most people do here is they have a holiday for seven days and they take a loan and pay 
it off for an entire year. People from all types of country say exactly the same thing. Most of 
the cruise ships have like 200 euros, I think a seven-day trip on cruiser and you can pay it off 
for 12 months. That kind of guest can’t pay 200 euros on a painting or something, so that’s 
why you can see a lot of souvenir places, and not so many boutiques [local independent 
traders], like two or three in the whole town. 
PCCH2 
PCCH2 explicitly links the influx of less affluent tourists to the increase in souvenir shops and the 
decrease of boutiques. By linking less affluent tourists to the increase in souvenir they imply that the 
market in Dubrovnik is controlled by the tourists and not vice versa. They note that Dubrovnik has 
the capability to host richer tourists, but that they do not come to the Old Town. The demise of the 
high-class market is also blamed on the cruise visitors who, PCCH2 argues, visit for shorter amounts 
of time and tend to spend less money as they are on a strict budget. For PCCH2 the distinction 
between two tourist types is clear; the richer the tourist the more likely they are to buy local cultural 
(higher priced) products and the more valued they are, and the less likely they are to spend at souvenir 
shops. PCCH2 goes on to state that in the whole town 
There are like five or six galleries [local commercial art dealers] in the town, so you don’t get 
a lot of those. Before the war we had more. 
PCCH2 
PCCH2 links the reduction of galleries to the war, implying the different type of post-war tourist 
forced the change, rather than the war itself. The war here functions as a fixed event or generalised 
historical period that caused tourism to change, and but it does not function explicitly as a reason 
why tourism itself changed. PCCH2’s view of the class of tourists is echoed by other interviews, for 
example: 
Maybe in one day we have like 10,000 tourists people are here. Maybe too much … but we 
must be honest, before the war in former Yugoslavia we have tourism here. We have a high 
quality of tourist, very good hotels with five stars, how to say, and first-class hotels…. I think 
it would be very good for Dubrovnik to be the same like before. 
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PCCH1 
They want everything. It is good for some aspects because a lot of people are selling – pizzas 
and something – for 10 euro or I don’t know. But they want also to have the luxury hotels with 
five, six stars and everything comfort, and everyone who is paying this expensively high 
classes of hotel, they don’t want to come in the town because of such a huge lot of people. If 
they want exclusivity it could be exclusivity, but it is not. It was. 
PCCH4 
You can, by walking through the town, you can always hear “Before the war we have this, we 
lived like that like this” and lots of people … lost jobs. They were in some other companies, 
some of them were ruined. People say they used to live better before the war then after the 
war. 
PCCH6 
PCCH3 and PCCH5 repeat the argument that the less affluent tourists have led to decline in the 
standards of the town, but they also argue that a less exclusive tourist industry allows for more 
visitors, which is beneficial culturally and economically: 
If you do not have contacts, then you become xenophobic, and I don’t like that kind of feeling. 
I don’t like xenophobic, no not at all. And now, even when we talk together it’s something 
new, and whomever you know and meet, new person, it’s a wealth…. About this kind of mass 
tourism or elite tourism, I don’t know what to tell you. Let ordinary people come and see 
Dubrovnik too, not only the rich ones with yachts. Because some of their wealth is 
problematic. And modest people, ordinary people, really work hard for their living, so when 
they can afford an eight-day holiday and want to go to Croatia, they are welcome. More than 
welcome. If you ask me. 
PCCH3 
There are a lot of discussions in our community about the cruising and the cruising ships, is 
that good or is that bad. Like everywhere, I think, and about everything, you can a lot of pluses 
and a lot of minuses. It is good for tourist guide, taxi drivers and fast food, something like that, 
not very much for museums or institutions like that, because the people from the cruiser come 
in Dubrovnik at 8 o’clock in the morning and they went and leave in Dubrovnik at 1 pm, just 
few hours, and they spent time walking on the main street, going to take a cup of coffee or 
something like that, buy some kind of souvenir. 
PCCH5 
It is difficult to say with certainty if the claims that pre-war tourism was very different from post-
war tourism reflect an actual change in tourism numbers, but the number of tourists in Croatia shown 
in pre-war tourism records indicates there was as high a level of visitors to Croatia between 1985 and 
1990 as there was between 2006 and 209. In 1985 there were just over 10 million visitor arrivals 
(10,125,000). This dropped to around 2 million (2,297,000), in 1991 and reached 10 million 
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(10,385,000) in 2006 (CBS, 2007). It is possible that the visitor numbers have been misremembered 
by the locals and that the lack of tourists during the war followed by high tourist numbers in 
contemporary Dubrovnik have led to feelings of nostalgia over the perceived better tourism of pre-
war Dubrovnik. It is possible that this nostalgia for pre-war tourism is in fact nostalgia for tourism 
between 1995 and 2006 when tourism was redeveloping in the area, when the number of tourists 
were lower and their influence over Dubrovnik more valuable because there were fewer tourists to 
participate in the tourist-based economy. This theory is supported by the nostalgia shown for the pre-
war period and the assertion that there used to be better tourists then, and is also supported by the 
pre-war and post-war visitor figures. However, there is not enough evidence to support this 
interpretation but it would form an interesting point to investigate in the future. For PCCH3 and 
PCCH5 bad tourists are signified by their numbers, not by their behaviour. PCCH3 notes that the 
higher number of tourists are good for the city as this enables more people to visit the heritage of the 
Old Town. PCCH3 expresses the position of the cultural value of heritage tourism, whilst PCCH2 
refers to the commercial aspect of tourism. 
The BCH is the main reason for tourists to visit the Old Town, but it was noted in the interviews that 
there was concern on the effect the amount of tourists may have on the BCH. PCCH3 notes that the 
creating of the BCH was the result of tourism, and argues that tourism has an important place in the 
heritage and history that founded Dubrovnik: 
When the tourist come everything is different, and a lot of people bring a lot of new good 
things. It’s always like that. If Dubrovnik wasn’t so aware of contacts with different 
civilisations, then we probably would have such a nice city. Because all these styles have been 
bought from somewhere, from Italy because it’s near, let’s say Romanesque, Gothic, 
Renaissance, Baroque styles: they were all coming some years after, but never mind. And all 
these beauties were bought because of the contacts. 
PCCH3 
They go on to suggest there “may be too much” tourism in the Old Town. For PCCH3 the possibility 
of overcrowding is an acceptable consequence of sharing cultural heritage with tourists, however, 
PCCH3 also notes that overcrowding may be a threat to the survival of the BCH: 
Maybe I am a little conservative according to the monuments. I don’t want them to be 
overused, that’s all. Otherwise, I like them to be living, and have people around and people to 
respect them the way they should be respected not to break and not to cause harm. I hope for 
the best. 
PCCH3 
It is interesting to note that PCCH3 in this quote sees themselves as too conservative in their desire 
to protect heritage, suggesting that others are less worried about the threat of overcrowding. The 
other interviewees note that they also consider overcrowding to be a negative aspect of mass tourism. 
Unlike PCCH3, many of the other participants say they are concerned by the oversaturation of 
tourism and the effect it will have on their businesses rather than on heritage itself. For example, 
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PCCH4 (together with PCCH2) links detrimental mass tourism to the lower class of tourism and 
speculates that mass tourism will prevent elite tourists from visiting: 
The people who stay in the hotels won’t come here to my store to buy because it is so crowded 
that they don’t want to push with the people. 
PCCH4 
This is echoes fears in other heritage sites over mass tourism. PCCH9’s mention of Venice is 
particularly interesting because of the similarities that have been highlighted between the two WHS. 
A comparison between the two sites sees ‘hit and run ‘tourism as performing a similar function, with 
all the detrimental social and economic effects short-term mass tourism can have on popular heritage 
centres (Ruoss and Alfarè, 2013, p. 525). Mass tourism endangers the future prospects of a heritage 
tourism destination as the host city undergoes a Disneyfication process in order to quickly package 
and pass on cultural experiences to short-term (day-tripper) tourists and encourage them to spend 
money (Ruoss and Alfarè, 2013, p. 526). Moreover, ‘hit and run’ tourism leads to a range of negative 
effects, including increased reliance on tourism flows, rising prices of goods in the site and increasing 
pressure to develop the heritage site (Ruoss and Alfarè, 2013, pp. 526–527). The participants in this 
study say that these issues are pertinent to the way tourism has grown in the city in a number of ways. 
They express concern that they have become over-reliant on tourism and say that cruise ship tourists 
have become a point of discussion amongst the residents: 
My opinion, it’s not very good about the cruiser ships coming in the same moment on the same 
day. In the high season you have six or seven ships in the same time and it is impossible to 
walk, to communicate, to do anything. Like Disneyland. 
PCCH4 
So from the end of the war to the end of the 90s, everything was really, really hard, no jobs, 
no salaries, no visitors, no tourists, no anything. And in the new millennium, cruisers came! 
PCCH5 
They are aware that the price of goods in Dubrovnik has risen beyond the means of local residents 
and that heritage in the Old Town may be for the tourists rather than locals: 
It’s too expensive. Dubrovnik is generally too expensive, even for us who are living here, but 
for domestic tourists we have some, it is expensive. It is not for [us] it is only for the strangers. 
PCCH4 
Inside the Old Town is mostly reserved either for the old people that are from here, or rich 
foreigners who can afford the house! 
PCCH2 
Dubrovnik is also under pressure to develop, as residents discuss whether to install air conditioning 
units, satellite dishes and internet connections in the Old Town, as well as the (recently stalled) 
proposal to build a golf course and resort on Mount Srđ. Further threats are the Disneyfication of 
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heritage and the sense of alienation that results from local people being pushed out of heritage sites 
in favour of developing tourism (Ruoss and Alfarè, 2013, p. 526). 
The two most threatening features of tourism (and tourists) in Dubrovnik are the commodification 
of culture and the rewriting of history to make it acceptable, and rid it of uncomfortable memories 
of the conflict, and secondly the alienation of local people from their own heritage through push and 
pull factors to relocate from the Old Town. The former threat was expressed by PCCH5 when 
discussing the decision to put the war museum on top of mount Srđ: 
Our city politicians decided that in the historical centre of Dubrovnik there is a lot of people 
and opportunities that tourists can see, visitors something like that, and after we established 
capitalism a lot of private properties came back to private owners and they rent for some 
months or to someone who can pay a lot, and the museum can’t pay a rent for 10,000 euros. 
and they decided to put the museum in the fortress [placing the museum outside of the city 
walls so as not to take up space that can be more profitably used]. But it is good because it is 
historical site and I can’t say anything against that decision, but [I] was trying to convince 
them that we had to establish some kind of small exhibition, or small information point in the 
historical city to tell the tourists or someone who wants to learn something about the homeland 
war in Dubrovnik – the main facts or something – on that spot and people who work there can 
say “If you want to know more you can go up the stairs, up to the hill by cable car or on foot, 
whatever you want”. I am trying to convince them but it is really hard with the politicians. 
PCCH5 
PCCH5 suggests that a major factor in the creation of the museum in the fortress outside the city 
walls was economic, based on a comparison between the amount of revenue bought in by the war 
museum against other tourist-centred enterprises. The development of tourism as sole an economic 
driver (as opposed to the development of heritage and tourism) is cited by Ruoss and Alfarè as a 
negative and unsustainable way to develop tourism. The development of tourism within heritage sites 
disregards the fact that heritage is the main attraction for tourists, and by tourism itself instead of 
heritage resources tourism is effectively stifling its possibilities for future growth. This can be seen 
to some extent in Dubrovnik by the movement of local people away from the Old Town, which is 
becoming a place of employment rather than a lived-in space. 
The second major threat posed by tourism is the alienation of the local population, particularly the 
older generations. All the participants remarked on the aging population in the Old Town and 
suggested that the older generations were suffering from the onslaught of mass tourism. The 
interview participants believed that the older generation was be less comfortable with tourists in the 
Old Town than younger generations: 
The young families would like to be here and to work so they don’t have anything against 
[tourism], but the older ones, they do, because they were here before any of this happened and 
they want peace and quiet. And they don’t have anything against the museums or 
accommodation. But the restaurants and the cruise ships, they don’t like that. 
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PCCH2 
The assumption that PCCH2 is making here is that young families are unable to buy or rent houses 
in the area as the prices are too high, and are pushed higher by demand to use them for holiday rentals 
and tourists. This assumption is supported by PCCH6, who notes that there is a drive to bring younger 
families back to Old Town, suggesting that there is currently a lack of younger people in the town: 
The situation [is] that mostly old people are still living in the Old Town and there are some 
ideas to bring back the young people by building some houses, apartments, little buildings, 
which will be acceptable for young couples to pay rent or to buy. 
PCCH6 
Presumably the houses to be built mentioned by PCCH6 will be built outside the Old Town because 
of the restrictions placed on development within the walls. The solution to the movement away from 
the Old Town presented by PCCH6 seems to revolve around building more houses, rather than 
stopping the redevelopment of homes into holiday lets. This reluctance to halt the development of 
tourism in the Old Town is reflected in the view of PCCH1 of how local people see tourism as 
positive or negative based on their own experience and relationship to tourism: 
If they work in restaurants then they are for restaurants, but otherwise they are too much 
because there is heat, there is smell, there is steam, you know. It’s nice, grilled fish, it’s nice, 
for one day, but for a month, it’s not so nice anymore! Tourists, restaurants and shop people 
are used to it. The old people don’t like it because they are used to normal communication and 
walking around, and they can’t go on the main street. 
PCCH1 
There are two serious consequences of this argument. The first is that the older generations have the 
potential to be removed from decision-making in the Old Town. As the older generations in 
Dubrovnik are in a minority, their views on tourism in the city will have less influence, which in turn 
will lessen their influence over heritage decision-making. This suggests that the people (who are 
involved in the tourism industry) have the power of the majority in the acceptance of tourism in the 
area, and the potential to influence decisions that may affect the function of heritage in the city. This 
majority may make decisions based on their own economic interests rather than in the interests of 
protecting heritage or preserving ways of life. This could be another push factor for older generations 
to leave the Old Town. The second is that if local politicians are pro-tourism (as they appear to be), 
this may be both to gain economic benefit for the town but also to increase their political support. In 
this situation, older generations (and minority groups not involved in tourism) who are opposed to 
the commercialisation of the town may not have the influence to halt or limit the development of 
tourism in their local area. This could be seen as excluding the latter from local heritage, and 
decision-making on collective narratives of events and collective or dissonant memories. 
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Many of the participants say that the difficulties of living in the Old Town, such as the expense and 
the problems associated with so many tourists in the Old Town, compared with the relative ease of 
living outside the Old Town walls is a major push factor to leave the Old Town: 
It’s not very easy because people just don’t want to live inside the walls because everything 
inside is more expensive. If they want to go to the supermarket they can’t use car to get near 
the apartment; and if they want to rebuild something inside the apartment the, those guys who 
come to fix it, are twice as expensive as if they do it outside the Old Town. This is all the 
reason why people are actually going out of the town, and now we have this situation that 
mostly old people are still living in the Old Town. 
PCCH6 
PCCH6 voices the push and pull factors for younger people to leave the city, and also shows that it 
is considered a problem by noting it is a trend that Dubrovnik (the government and the people) wish 
to halt. The older generation who remain in the Old Town do so because they own their properties 
and are encouraged to stay by government schemes to make their lives easier. However, this scheme 
has limited success because it prevents the older generations from leaving the Old Town, and it is 
only a temporary fix as the generations that inherit property are more likely to sell or develop it than 
live in it: 
Maybe there will be a few more foreigners and other places in Europe than the locals [in 
Dubrovnik]. More than the locals. Now it’s maybe 50/50, but as the older people die and the 
younger sell the houses as the rate goes up. 
PCCH2 
The younger generations were perceived to be more likely than older generation to sell their houses 
to rent to tourists. The concern expressed by the participants on the plight of the older generations 
could be interpreted as an anxiety that the loss of older generations would weaken the connection 
between contemporary Dubrovnik, and the nostalgic heritage upon which contemporary Dubrovnik 
relies. The older generation, as authentic residents, give the Old Town legitimacy as a living heritage 
site rather than a tourist attraction. This view is supported in the way the older people are referred to 
in the interviews. PCCH4 comments suggests that the residents are protected, supporting the notion 
that the (older) residents are valuable to the Old Town: 
The residents in the old city, they are ever year less and less and now they are like, protected, 
like in a zoo. 
PCCH4 
PCCH2 also comments on the older generation’s value to Dubrovnik by noting the impact they have 
on the intangible culture of the Old Town in the transmission of language: 
We have a Dubrovnik language, Croatian language mixed with Italian. Even I don’t know 
everything. So maybe when I, when two older people are talking in real Dubrovnik, I can’t get 
to understand a lot of it. 
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PCCH2 
Language in Dubrovnik has been shaped by its geo-political history, and contains both Slavic and 
Italian words and phrases. This is unique to Dalmatia, and particularly to Dubrovnik. It is specific to 
and survives with the older generations. PCCH2 also notes that the influx of international visitors 
brings new words to the culture, particularly English slang, which is not part of the cultural heritage 
of the city. However, it can be argued that the blame for the infiltration of English in the Dubrovnik 
language comes in part from the education system and the internationalisation of culture, resulting 
in familiarity with American or English and expressed in everyday life and using different media. 
The aging population’s competence in the Dubrovnik language has not been completely passed on 
to the younger generations (PCCH2), and, combined with an erosion of a single language (Croatian) 
society, there does not seem to be a functional need to learn the old Dubrovnik but is important in 
heritage preservation. PCCH1 also notes the use of Dubrovnik language is becoming less frequent: 
“we lose, we lose our language, our words” (PCCH1). For PCCH1 and PCCH2 the loss of language 
is a consequence of exposure to other languages through tourism, rather than being linked to the 
failure to transmit languages between generations. 
The way in which people in the Old Town have purchased houses for tourist use and holiday lets was 
also a point of contention as it deals with both hereditary property and claims to property owned by 
the Yugoslav state before the war. The movement from Communist Yugoslavia to independent 
(capitalist) Croatia meant that it was possible for individuals to purchase property. In the aftermath 
of the conflict when a small Serbian population left Dubrovnik and the surrounding area it is said 
that some of the empty houses were bought by Croatians for low prices as restitution for war damage. 
The participants note that properties that were bought after the war are now being used for tourism 
in contemporary Dubrovnik: 
Before war there were more than 5000 people living inside the Old Town, and now we have 
some information about 900 people living inside the Old Town. Because a few years ago there 
was a big increase in the price of the real estate inside of the Old Town and a lot of people 
used the opportunity to sell their real estates and they, for one house that was inside the Old 
Town they could buy two more, two big houses, outside the Old Town. So everyone used the 
opportunity, or the others just transferred to tourism and rented to the foreigners who come 
because the prices are very high inside the Old Town. 
PCCH6 
Although an investigation into property rights after the war has a bearing on the use of property in 
contemporary Dubrovnik, this is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
In this reading of tourism the war functions as a fixed point in history, as a stop gap between pre-war 
and post-war tourism. It is the point at which the tourists changed from good to bad, but it is not seen 
as the cause of the change. This could also reflect a shift from communism to capitalism, when the 
restraints on state-owned properties vanished and post-war privatisation allowed people to buy and 
commercialise their properties for personal profit. With the constraints of Tito-era tourism lifted, the 
188 
development of the personal tourism industry flourished due to relaxed governmental interference 
and a drive to capitalise on the surviving tourist industry in the most affluent area in a post-conflict, 
economically deprived country. 
The contemporary reliance on tourism can be seen as a legacy of the industry that was built up and 
thrived in communist Dubrovnik, but the (over) development of that industry in post-communist 
Dubrovnik can be seen as a reaction to the lessening of communist (and Serbian-centred) control in 
the area. 
The criticism of mass tourism or tourist numbers (and the bad tourist) was distinguished from 
negative criticisms of tourists in general. Tourists were seen as an asset to the town both economically 
and culturally. A good tourist was able to give high economic value to local cultural heritage by 
buying expensive locally produced cultural assets, but also by engaging in a cultural exchange with 
the local residents. The good tourist is presented to ensure Dubrovnik is perceived as open to foreign 
visitors and is not xenophobic. The anxiety of appearing xenophobic was mentioned explicitly by 
one participant and implicitly by several others to mitigate any negativity towards tourism. This 
occurred either to justify relying on a tourism industry of which they are also critical, or to lessen the 
impact of the ethnic homogeneity of the Old Town (98% Catholic Croat) and fight against the historic 
perception of ethnic intolerance associated with Croatia (originating from the Ustaše during the 
Second World War and revived in 1990s anti-Croatian propaganda). It is highly likely that mitigating 
negative criticism of tourists is the main reason why the positive aspects of tourists are highlighted, 
but countering negative post-war stereotypes may also have been a contextual factor in defending 
tourism. 
9.4.2 Types of Tourism 
The participants tended to lay blame on positive and negative aspects of tourism, placing the 
responsibility for beneficial or detrimental tourism on the tourists, rather than the vendors. That is 
not to say that aspects of the tourist industry were not criticised; indeed, the same category of tourism 
was characterised as both good and bad. Good tourism involved producing expensive local cultural 
items and bad tourism sold of internationally produced souvenirs. 
A connection is made between good tourism originating from historic Dubrovnik and its local people 
participating in the tourist industry, and bad tourism as an outsider movement into the tourist industry 
in the Old Town and the exploitation of its resources: 
The locals, we live better than before. Everybody. There are a lot of reasons, but it could be 
the cruiser ships because lot of people work with them, and a lot of museums are working well, 
the city walls are always full. Different, so, cable car is going up and down and was restored 
a few years ago and its always, even in the night after 12 o’clock it is going up and down…. I 
think, everybody, with such a mass of tourists, everybody [locals] could rent a room or go to 
catch a fish, or he could in the same moment sell the fish, because there is always somebody 
who would want it. So, you know, for such a crowd, such a mass is passing. How the tourist 
is thinking? I think they are satisfied, and it’s very popular to come here. 
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PCCH4 
In this quotation PCCH4 notes that mass tourism is good for the city because it produces 
employment, commerce and visitor satisfaction. However, they also limit their positive effects to 
locals. The definition of “locals” as “everybody” suggests that locals can benefit from tourism by 
utilising their own means within the city – their ability to rent a room in their own property (making 
use of the cultural heritage of the Old Town) or their ability to catch and sell fish (making use of 
natural heritage of the area and the market forces created by tourism). The interplay between 
“everybody” and “locals” excludes non-locals from the definition of “everybody” and, in doing so, 
excludes them from benefits of good tourism. The question then arises: if only locals are considered 
everybody, how do migrant workers fit into Dubrovnik? This topic of inclusion and exclusion is 
discussed in reference to the division between good and bad tourism is reflected in the distinction 
between local and not local. Local manufacturing and local goods are a sign of good tourism and 
attract good tourists, whereas non-locally produced goods are a sign of bad tourism and attract bad 
tourists: 
Our customers [in boutique shops] they are coming back. We are not existing by the cruiser 
population because they don’t come, and if they do they don’t have time, but the people who 
are coming back, who are in hotels, who are relaxed, who have a confidence that you can’t 
find any fakes and new things here. 
PCCH4 
PCCH4 claims that the customers of the local boutique shops are hotel tourists rather than the cruiser 
tourists (good and bad tourists) and that they survive on the custom of good tourists, characterised 
by their length of stay and spending behaviour, not the bad tourists from cruise ships who do not 
shop there. PCCH4 hints that there are two tourist markets (one or good and one for bad tourists) that 
are only compatible with their corresponding type of tourist. 
Thus, the wealthier (good) tourists spend money on locally produced cultural assets in boutiques and 
galleries (good tourism), stay locally and eat in local restaurants; whilst mass tourism and day-
trippers (bad tourists) only buy souvenirs produced globally from tourist shops (bad tourism). The 
reliance and trust that the participants show in their locally produced tourism positions the Old Town 
of Dubrovnik as a cultural resource that they can support and use, whilst outside interference or 
control is less well received.  
9.5  IHAF Key Findings: Dubrovnik  
The overarching goal of this case study was to assess the value of heritage in the recovery of 
Dubrovnik from the beginning of the bombardment until 2014, looking at the impact of heritage 
since the war. The research into each sector has been discussed at length over the last three chapters, 
and the impact of recovery measured in each instance using three approaches to data collection. The 
integrated perspective on cultural heritage in Dubrovnik generated by this research has resulted in 
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six key findings on the contribution of heritage to the post-conflict recovery process which are 
presented here. 
It has been shown that the historical context of Dubrovnik was a key factor in the cause of the conflict 
and the actions taken in the aftermath of war. The awareness of cultural ties and tensions remain 
constantly in the foreground of this study, which notes that the socio-political history that has shaped 
the geo-politics of the region has influenced and continues to influence the relationship between 
people, place and history in Dubrovnik. The tumultuous history of the Balkans and its complex ethnic 
and cultural relationships have culminated not only in strengthening national cultural identities but 
also in the defence and differentiation of these cultural identities from each another. The search for 
historical causes of the violence in Yugoslav wars is an immensely difficult endeavour, and well 
beyond the limits of this thesis. The historians who have done so have been faced with by a number 
of varying perspectives, interpretations and biases, and the knowledge that, while the high-level 
political causes of the war in the 1990s can be traced historically, the explanations for this are still 
contested. However, what is clear is the central role played by nationalism and cultural heritage, 
which was integral in creating the nationalist narrative, and manipulated to affect the dynamics of 
the war and its aftermath. Furthermore, the influential role of culture on the region has been clearly 
identified, wherein cultural identities and the heritage that supports them have had profound effect 
on the exacerbation or reduction of tensions in the area. Cultural heritage in Dubrovnik is not a space 
where ethnic and cultural tensions can merely be observed: it is where they are caused and mitigated. 
Post-war recovery has been defined in this research as the negotiation between the past and the 
present, in which cultural heritage functions as a tool to discern how the past has been politicised by 
the present and used as a resource to achieve contemporary aims. This stance has been investigated 
using the research questions set out in the introduction, and in answer to the third question the 
following key findings have been identified. The key findings both conclude the investigation into 
Dubrovnik and also help to demonstrate the effectiveness of the IHAF methodology. 
This study discovered that the impact of heritage on the recovery from conflict can be categorised as 
areas where it supports stability and reconciliation in Dubrovnik, and areas where it enshrines 
tensions and discourages stability. By examining these areas using an integrated perspective taken 
from the three data streams, the impact of heritage in post-war recovery in Dubrovnik is shown and 
the political ramifications of heritage understood more clearly. 
9.5.1 Key Finding One: Interpretations of damage influence perceptions of severity 
The various interpretations of damage authorised by UNESCO, the ICTY, and the IFRD have 
influenced perceptions of the severity of the attack both locally and internationally. 
Chapter Six discussed at length the use of built heritage in the ICTY prosecutions and suggested that 
the difference between the grading systems may have influenced the damage assessments made in 
the aftermath of the conflict, and the sematic use of either “damage” and “destroyed” to describe 
serious damage is a good example of the fluidity and subjectivity of heritage interpretation and use.  
In this chapter the repeated appearance of the nine destroyed houses in the interviews has been 
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discussed, and it has been argued that the destruction of BCH had become the accepted perception 
of damage in the city, as reflected in the narratives of the conflict. The interviewees drew attention 
to similar experiences of war that were shared by all civilian residents in the town, and from this, my 
research suggests that the acceptance of definitions of destruction has occurred because of the 
societal need to find evidence for the trauma experienced by the civilians trapped in the Old Town. 
The economic consequences of the destroyed properties were discussed in Chapter Nine, which 
argued that the drive (headed by UNESCO) to gain funding and support from the international 
community made use of different definitions of damage to direct and encourage funding. The 
UNESCO report is the first report published internationally to differentiate the nine most seriously 
affected buildings from other damaged BCH, and it presented them as such to encourage support and 
put a monetary value on the damage. 
Cultural heritage is used here to demonstrate the severity of the attack on Dubrovnik, and to showcase 
the attack to an international community. This is done in three ways: the ICTY use of heritage as 
evidence, the projection of local experience onto built heritage interpretations and the economic 
agenda for the reconstruction of BCH. The ICTY proceedings, which designated the attack as an 
unprovoked war crime, increased Dubrovnik’s status and public profile as a target in the break-up of 
Yugoslavia. The experiences of local residents onto the built heritage supports this framing of the 
attack and places in the AHD the physical evidence of their versions of events (Smith, 2006, p. 93). 
In this reciprocal process the damage to BCH influences the severity of the experiences of the 
residents and the local residents shape their perception of the damage.  
Thus, the damage done to BCH in the conflict has played a vital role in framing the conflict in the 
post-war period both locally and internationally. The implication is that BCH cannot be relied on to 
be an unbiased source of evidence, however much it is perceived to be an objective physical fact. 
Although the report has a superficial appearance of objectivity its interpretations have led to lasting 
recriminations and less-than-transparent drives for funding. Furthermore, these interpretations 
created a lasting perception of the destruction among local residents, based both on their own views 
(which are in turn based on official reports) but also that of the international community and 
subsequently reflected back onto Dubrovnik. 
9.5.2 Key Finding Two: Narratives of conflict 
The conflict has been shaped into a fixed, authorised historical narrative by the residents of 
contemporary Dubrovnik. 
The impact of the conflict has been minimised in the discourse of history in the Old Town and is not 
frequently mentioned. The narratives of the conflict have coalesced into a single experience of 
remembrance. The authorised discourse allows Dubrovnik to celebrate its pre-war past and sell this 
image to tourists. The economic advantages of an unproblematic past are clear in a town like 
Dubrovnik, where tourists want to visit a cultural site, not a site of war. Dubrovnik capitalised on the 
conflict to rebuild its damaged BCH, but it has speedily moved away from its economic reliance on 
the conflict in order to recreate a tourist industry and relegated this AHD to a distant past. The effect 
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of this is there is no discussion or variation in the war narratives, and the conflict has been 
repackaging in mythic terms. This is discussed in Chapter Nine, which shows that in this 
mythological construction the role of Dubrovnik as the victim and the attackers as barbarians has 
become fixed. Ashworth and Tunbridge argue that the past is used as a resource to legitimise the 
present and to create an acceptable version of events by with fixed and unproblematic victors and 
losers as the actors. The distinction between victims and barbarians, however, polarises the cultures 
involved. Thus, if Dubrovnik is seen as a cultural icon of international significance (reinforced by its 
world heritage status and its self-identified importance) then those who attack it are seen as 
uncultured barbarians. 
This formulation allows the dichotomy between the two cultures to be extended to define Croatia (in 
the shape of the victimised Dubrovnik) as cultured, and Serbia and Montenegro (as the aggressor 
armies) as uncultured. These fixed binaries permit the interpretation of the conflict as a clash between 
cultures. The differentiation of Dubrovnik from Slavic culture implicitly renders it impossible for 
Serbia or Montenegro to own Dubrovnik. The simplified version of history can also be seen in the 
presentation of BCH, wherein the lack of available information on modern history does little to 
address the contemporary use of the buildings. The BCH is defined by its historic value and original 
use as palaces and churches, not by its current use as tourist shops and restaurants. The palaces and 
buildings are superficially valued for their status as heritage, defined by their age and beauty and 
existing in a nostalgic past without the complications of the recent conflict. This construction 
depoliticises these sites and removes them from participation in the conflict (as a cause or aim of the 
attack) to position them as victim and to be used as immutable evidence of process of war crime. The 
use of BCH in the Old Town reflects the duality of approaches to heritage in the town; the need for 
the war to be treated as an attack on a way of life, and the need to reduce the impact of the attack in 
order to maintain the perception that Dubrovnik is a WHS and a peaceful tourist destination. 
The implication is that the official and only narrative of Dubrovnik’s history does not allow alternate 
narratives to diversify the heritage of the Old Town. Dubrovnik is frozen in an inauthentic, imagined 
version of the Old Town’s history that is easily marketed for tourism, but that may not have 
adequately explored individual experiences of the war or the trauma of the conflict. The attempt to 
freeze-dry an idealised version of the Old Town has had a lasting impact on the performance of 
heritage and the performance of reconciliation. The residents’ performance of restored heritage in 
Dubrovnik and the restored BCH has resulted the perception of successful reconciliation but has 
failed to confront lingering tensions between ex-warring nations. These performances have created 
a façade of belonging and security for the benefit of visitors, but unreconciled experiences from the 
conflict have resulted in hidden tensions. 
9.5.3 Key Finding Three: Presentations of recovery 
Restored BCH is used to showcase Dubrovnik as a city wholly restored for economic gain 
through tourism. This performance fails to confront or reconcile any persistent tensions 
between geo-political neighbours. 
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Chapter Nine explored the performance of heritage in Dubrovnik by discussing the use of older 
generations as living heritage to be conserved in the Old Town to promote its authenticity. Both the 
older generations and the BCH signify the connection to an unproblematic past and erase 
contemporary attempts to modernise perceptions of the Old Town. Older generations function both 
as tourist attraction and as the focus of nostalgia for the past for local residents. Although the residents 
suggest that the older generations preferred life before the war, linking the post-war period to the 
influx of mass tourism, this research has shown that the claim that pre-war was not a period without 
mass tourism is not accurate. Most of the participants were involved in the tourist industry and were 
thus unable to criticise it openly, but they were able to connect to the notion of non-commercialised 
heritage through the older generations who object to the tourist industry. Despite their role in the 
preservation and promotion of heritage, older generations do not have an influence over the way 
heritage is managed in the town and their narratives constitute an example of missing narratives 
absent from the AHD of the conflict in Dubrovnik (Smith, 2006). 
The performance and manipulation of the older generations is similar to that of BCH in the Old 
Town. Chapter Eight discussed the recovery and presentation of BCH after the conflict, arguing that 
the presentation of heritage in Dubrovnik relies heavily on defining the Old Town as a whole and 
complete heritage site, rather than a collection of smaller sites (built or otherwise). This allows any 
and everything in Dubrovnik to be placed under the umbrella term of “heritage” and so strengthens 
and support the “wholeness” of the Old Town as a WHS. Nevertheless, Dubrovnik cannot be seen 
as the sum of its parts, it needs to be seen as a single site with a single history; individual sites, 
experiences and memories that disrupt this ideal are disregarded. This was apparent throughout the 
interviews, as discussed in Chapter Seven in section 7.2 and in Chapter Nine in regard to prioritising 
the recovery of the façades of BCH to be restored over the interiors. 
The effect of this, and the crux of this key finding in the research, is that the visible recovery of 
Dubrovnik’s Old Town does not match its invisible socio-political recovery. The restored town is 
required to perform to visitors that it is wholly recovered in order to attract and sustain high visitor 
levels; in turn, the presence of visitors support the legitimacy of performance, and in doing so make 
it a reality. This reflects the process of upscaling and downgrading the damage of the BCH; the 
damage was recorded as more severe when the town needed to be seen as attacked in order to seek 
justice for an illegal act of war, but when the town needed tourism to return, the damage to BCH was 
downplayed and erased form popular culture. The interviewees suggest that remaining tensions exist 
and are not accounted for in the authorised narrative. This tension manifests as unease (for some) 
with visiting neighbouring Montenegro as there remains a fear that those in the nearby Montenegrin 
towns were involved in the attack on the Old Town.  
9.5.4 Key Finding Four: Division and priorities 
The division of built heritage into categories allowed the recovery process to prioritise religious 
aspects of the society without interrogation or justification. 
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In Chapter Seven it was shown that certain aspects of BCH were prioritised over others, with little 
justification. The UNESCO damage report was separated into three categories: “gutted” (later 
defined as destroyed), “damaged palaces” and “damaged religious buildings”. The distinction 
between the damaged buildings and the damaged religious buildings reveals religious buildings are 
considered a separate category with a different set of priorities. The list of religious buildings consists 
mostly of Catholic churches and cathedrals, reflecting the contemporary and historical Catholic 
majority in Dubrovnik. It also includes the Orthodox Church (a religion associated with the Serbian 
minority) and the synagogue. The mosque is not included as a damaged religious building but as a 
damaged building. There is no justification for this in the report. While it is probable that, despite its 
active function in the community, it was not included in the list because it is not a purpose-built 
structure, the synagogue is also housed in a converted building. Why include the synagogue but not 
the mosque? Furthermore, nearly all the churches in Dubrovnik were listed as damaged, although 
some were disused or already in a state of decay pre-war, indicates that they are included on the list 
as religious monuments rather than as places to practice religion. 
This research suggests that the inclusion of so many Christian churches as damaged religious 
buildings was a politically motivated move to garner economic support for the rebuilding process 
based on the fraternity of religions across international borders, and to strengthen the image of 
Dubrovnik (and Croatia) as a Western Christian nation. The ramifications of this distance Dubrovnik 
from its cultural and historical connection to ex-Yugoslavian Orthodox countries and instead aligns 
it to Roman history and European Christianity. Excluding the mosque from the list allows the Old 
Town of Dubrovnik to present itself as a unified Christian culture. The homogenous Catholic 
majority is presented as the main religion, and the historical links to Islam are not acknowledged in 
the list of damaged buildings. This is also a way of distancing Dubrovnik from involvement in 
Christian and Muslim conflicts and atrocities in the Bosnian war during the 1990s and limiting its 
war experience to Serbian and Montenegrin aggression. The inclusion of other religions in the list 
would disrupt this hegemony and problematize the history of Dubrovnik, thus exposing an 
unacceptable challenge to the socio-political construction of the city as victim. 
9.5.5 Key Finding Five: Tourism and heritage are interdependent 
The commercialisation of heritage for tourism both threatens and protects livelihoods in the 
Old Town 
Chapter Eight looked at the impact of cultural tourism on post-war Dubrovnik and noted that the 
commodification of heritage has been divided by perceptions of tourists and tourism markets as good 
and bad. The study focused mainly on the perceptions of the residents who were involved in the 
tourist trade. These interviewees said that whilst tourism was necessary to their livelihood there was 
an underlying perception that tourists visiting the Old Town in post-war contemporary Dubrovnik 
were visiting in the wrong way. Post-war tourists spent less time and money in the city and this had 
resulted in the cheapening of the tourist market. In this view, the demands of the tourist had shaped 
what the tourist industry supplied; that is that cheap, non-elite mass tourism had led to a tourist 
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market relying on selling more affordable, non-local products. The participants showed they 
distinguished not only between desirable and non-desirable tourists but also between the two separate 
tourist markets that cater to them. All the interviewees who identified as having links to the tourist 
industry claimed they were linked to high-brow, local cultural tourism and that they disapproved of 
low-brow, mass-produced tourism.  
The mass-tourism market (consisting of day-trippers and less wealthy tourists) has been attracted to 
a sanitised Dubrovnik, where an unproblematic restored heritage has been created to support a 
tourism industry which employs most of the residents (as signposted by the interviewees). 
The research has shown that Dubrovnik is extremely reliant on tourism to the Old Town as a place 
of employment and continued development. However, the impact that post-war tourism is having on 
the heritage of the Old Town leads to the insight that, although the BCH is protected against overuse, 
the connections between people and place are damaged as they rely on heritage more for its 
commercial aspect than for its cultural ties. This is of particular concern when looking at the creation 
of authorised narratives and power dynamics (see key findings one and two), which seek to simplify 
the history of the conflict and make it less accessible by the public, then use this produced history as 
an authentic representation of culture to be sold to tourists. 
While the development of tourism relies on heritage, these simplified narratives threaten heritage by 
weakening its bond to local people and becoming inauthentic. The development of the on-going golf 
resort and cruise tourism seek to capitalise on an established cultural tourism market, but in doing so 
damages tourist experiences of heritage in the Old Town (by inauthentic souvenir shops and crowds 
of tourists) and threaten the sustainability of the cultural tourism market. The more the Old Town 
relies on tourism, the less authentic it becomes. Dubrovnik’s viability as a tourist attraction is based 
on its reputation as a heritage site and its UNESCO world heritage status; if the value of heritage 
decreases through overuse and overdevelopment, it will be less able to attract tourists and the stability 
of the tourist market and the livelihoods of those who rely on it will be threatened. 
9.5.6 Key Finding Six: Public and private perceptions of recovery 
The use of heritage in post-war Dubrovnik resulted in the separation of public and private 
conceptions of recovery in the Old Town 
The recovery of Dubrovnik from war has emerged in this thesis as a dual process of public and private 
action. The BCH in the Old Town has been restored to a high standard, but from the outside in, and 
this is a good metaphor to use for the framing of the recovery in general in Dubrovnik. The 
appearance of physical recovery, economic development and performances of socio-political 
reconciliation has taken precedence over ensuring transparency in BCH restoration, curating the 
careful management of cultural tourism development and more substantial reconciliation between 
the people to their past. Heritage has been used in each instance as a means to support actions rather 
than interrogate the consequences of those actions. Heritage was used in its most visual form as BCH 
to firstly frame the severity of the conflict and then to distance the Old Town inhabitants from the 
conflict by presenting it as totally restored. The recovery of the BCH involved repairing the façades 
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on each property to recreate Dubrovnik as a single heritage site. This is supported by the evidence of 
the speed and prioritisation of the restoration process as discussed in Chapters Eight and Nine, and 
by the responses made by the interviewees discussed in this chapter. The restoration of BCH placed 
heritage at the heart of the recovery of the Old Town, but, the consequences were the exaggeration 
of damage in the ICTY proceedings and in international perceptions of destroyed Dubrovnik, and 
the prioritisation of restoring BCH to a pre-war norm rather than on restoring BCH to a new post-
war reality. The discussions in the interviews on the remaining war damage reflect this process where 
the choice to remove all traces of the war for the prosperity of the town conflicts with a desire to 
retain the war damage in the Old Town to memorialise the experience of war. The interviewees were 
uncertain which course of action was best; some participants suggested that the marks were not 
needed to help them to remember as they had their memories – this suggests that personal 
reconciliation has not occurred as there are still traumatic memories in the townspeople. Others 
wished to see the damage removed as the war damage had no purpose other than to commemorate a 
barbarous attack on culture, and therefore should not be remembered. The experience of the conflict 
is set out for public consumption, but lingers as a private memory. One participant who argued for 
the removal of all war damage later revealed that they had framed photographs of the war damage 
sustained inside their house but did not show these publicly. 
The effect of the war on the BCH has been minimalised (and maximised) and the war museums 
removed from public access (by physically removing them from the town, or socially by making it 
hard for outsiders to fully understand). The result of this is that the heritage of the conflict has been 
managed and mitigated. The conflict does not need to be interrogated as, in the public arena, it has 
been packaged, mythologised and consigned to the past; in doing so any dissonance or unreconciled 
narratives have no platform from which to explore the conflict from diverse points of view.  
That is not to suggest that these remaining tensions have no outlet. The memorial in Sponza Palace 
presents the faces of the local people who died in the war by not distinguishing between civilians and 
combatants, but they are presented with little information or interpretation; their function is not only 
to remember the dead but also to remind the casual observer that Dubrovnik suffered. This is a good 
example of forgetting but not forgiving the acts perpetrated in war. The memory room exemplifies 
some of the arguments made (and discussed in this research in Chapters Two, Three, and Four) by 
memory theorists, specifically Barbara Misztal and Paul Connerton, in regard to how collective 
memories are formed, and how and why societies choose to forget. 
The research notes that Dubrovnik has a personal and private mode of recovery, and that public 
recovery occurred at a faster pace than private recovery. The application of this finding is necessary 
to the understanding that BCH is not a sole marker for damage or recovery as this does not imply 
that a society has recovered. Instead, this finding shows that heritage can be used both to uncover 
and conceal tensions in a post-conflict environment. Thus, in Dubrovnik the manipulation of heritage 
has crystallised into an authorised and acceptable experience which the town has used to recover 
physically and economically.  
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Heritage can be a means to enable or halt the processes of reconciliation, and the private and public 
negotiation of the conflict in this case shows that heritage may slow down socio-political (private) 
reconciliation in favour of encouraging economic (public) development through physical perceptions 
of BCH recovery. Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse (2003) say that reconciliation is a process wherein 
the negotiation of experiences of conflict are placed within a contemporary setting (as discussed in 
Chapter Four in the process of reconciliation). This research has argued that this process has occurred 
in Dubrovnik on the basis of a collective experience of conflict (as discussed in section 9.3 but it is 
not yet complete. 
Reconciliation has taken place in Dubrovnik, but it has been a public performance undertaken for the 
sake of economic and cultural stability through tourism and reciting acceptable cultural narratives of 
history (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996, p. 12). Failure to reconcile has become privately internalised 
as the interviews have demonstrated. Drawing on arguments from Tunbridge and Ashworth (1996), 
Lowenthal (1998) and Shils (1981) regarding the creation of heritage, this research finds that the 
heritage was not used as a way to interrogate the past but to re-invent an idealised past (Shils, 1981, 
pp. 31–32) This has been achieved through a lack of negotiation between the past and the present, 
and the removal of the conflict from both the visible and the narrative heritage of Dubrovnik. This 
has curtailed a public discussion on the past and allowed the continuation of simmering hostilities. 
This suggests that although the pre-war and post-war tensions may be currently dormant they are not 
necessarily erased, which has implications for the sustainability of peace and protection for 
Dubrovnik in the event of future political upheavals. 
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Chapter Ten: Conclusion 
This research was undertaken to increase our understanding of the role of cultural heritage in post-
conflict recovery, with particular emphasis on how the impact of heritage on recovery can be 
assessed. The result of this was the creation of the Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework 
(IHAF), which was trailed successfully in the field to analyse the impact of heritage on the recovery 
of Dubrovnik following conflict. The IHAF is dependent on a strong theoretical foundation, which 
was gained through a wide ranging and thorough literature review, presented in the first three 
substantive chapters of this thesis. The conceptual base of this thesis argues that heritage must be 
perceived as a process of connecting people and places to their pasts in order to fully understand and 
realise the potential impact heritage has over post-conflict societies.  
To undertake this research, three research questions were identified, and have been addressed 
throughout this thesis. This chapter concludes the research by exploring the findings of each of these 
questions, which were fully outlined in the introduction.  
1. How can the impact of heritage on post-war recovery be conceptualised? 
2. How can the impact of heritage on post-conflict recovery be assessed? 
3. What effect does heritage have on the recovery from conflict in the case study of Dubrovnik? 
10.1 Research Question One: How can the impact of heritage on post-war recovery 
be conceptualised? 
This question sought to conceptualise the impact of heritage on post-conflict recovery and has been 
answered by an in-depth analysis of the literature relating to heritage and post-conflict recovery. The 
arguments made by this research concluded that heritage has a long-lasting and significant impact on 
the way societies recover from conflict, which has previously not been fully explored. Instead of 
focusing on a single aspect of heritage (its physicality, its economic attributes, or its perception in 
society), this research has argued that heritage needs to be investigated using a more holistic concept 
in order to fully understand the relationship of heritage to conflict and recovery.  
To answer this research question, four objectives were established to guide the structure of the 
analyses. These four objectives formed the literature review chapters of this thesis (chapters two to 
four), and the conclusions that were drawn from them shaped the integrated perspective on heritage, 
which underpins this research. 
The first objective was to create and support a working definition of cultural heritage that could be 
the foundation of this thesis, and used as a reference point throughout all subsequent chapters. The 
thesis argued forcibly that a fixed definition of heritage that focused on cultural property would not 
be sufficient to understanding the impact of heritage on conflict and recovery. Despite the ability of 
cultural property to show how heritage has been affected through damage to heritage sites, it cannot 
help us explore why heritage can become such an emotive target, nor can it fully explain how the 
relationship to people and their heritages changes in response to conflict. Instead, heritage is 
perceived by this research as a process of creating meaningful connections between people, place, 
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and their pasts, which is achieved through constant interpretation and re-interpretation of the past by 
those in power. This connective process relies on an interpretation of events that are turned into 
accepted narratives, and these are expressed through physical heritage sites (Smith, 2006; Hewison, 
1987; Harrison, 2010). This active process of constructing narratives is contextually bound by its 
contemporary socio-political atmosphere, and contemporary heritage can be used as an avenue to 
assess contemporary political tensions (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996; Smith, 2006). 
 From these perspectives, this thesis argued that heritage can be defined as a process that is shaped 
and morphed according to the needs of the present, and manipulated to favour those in power. The 
result of this process is the reinforcement of some identities through heritage, and the de-
legitimisation of others. The narrative and symbolism of heritage chooses what can be expressed or 
remembered in society, and as a consequence, what is forgotten or purposefully removed (Connerton, 
2006). Using the definition of heritage constructed upon this basis enables the impact of heritage on 
conflict recovery to be seen on a larger scale, in which heritage is capable of influencing how 
contemporary society views the past, how they view themselves, and how they view different 
cultures. The impact of this on societies recovering from conflict has huge potential to either help 
move a society on from conflict towards reconciliation and recovery, or to become a trigger for 
violent conflict. 
The second objective, explored in Chapter Two, sought to take the definition of heritage as a process 
and apply this perspective to understanding how heritage protection is formalised internationally. 
The effects of an authorised narrative of heritage and its impact on post-conflict identities cannot be 
explored if heritage is limited to only to cultural property, but this is the definition that is widely used 
in heritage-protection legislation. This thesis argues that the protection offered by these international 
conventions is hindered because their definition is limited to cultural property, and they do not reflect 
the intricacies or the legacy of heritage.  
International conventions, particularly the 1954 Hague Convention and the 1972 World Heritage 
Convention, hold massive influence over the way heritage is defined and protected in conflict. These 
are interrogated in this thesis in several ways; as reflections of the contextually bound definitions of 
heritage, what this legacy is, and why the documents face difficulties in the contemporary world 
(Kastenberg, 1997; Toman, 2009). The thesis argued that The Hague Convention was founded as a 
result of many previous legislative attempts to formalise the treatment of heritage in conflict, but also 
argues there was a catalytic reaction to the treatment of heritage in Europe during the Second World 
War, which spurred on the creation of convention. This thesis argued that the urgency with which 
The Hague Convention was formed came from not only the widespread nature of the damage to 
heritage during the war, but also its location in Europe (Tomlinson, 2002). This thesis suggests that 
the Eurocentric nature of heritage protection has hindered its use in other international conflicts. The 
need of The Hague Convention and World Heritage Convention to universally formalise heritage in 
order for it to be protected has created a set of international criteria that determine what can be 
considered as universally significant, and in doing so have constructed world heritage designed to 
transcend local social constructions of heritage (Meskell, 2010). The thesis argues that this results in 
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the targeting of world heritage sites as places not only of heritage significance, but also of foreign 
intervention. This argument is put forward as a major reason why heritage is targeted in war, and 
why current legislative attempts are struggling to protect heritage in conflict.  
The third objective, explored in Chapter Four, took this argument further by establishing that heritage 
is considered as an active participant in causing conflict, and not a passive bystander or recipient of 
damage. This objective was therefore explored in regards to how heritage influences and is 
influenced by conflict. Kaldor (2006) suggests that ‘new’ wars can be understood as an attempt to 
further an ideological belief, in contrast to the pre-1990s conflicts, which had geo-political 
expansionist motivations (Kaldor, 2006). This thesis argued that in a ‘new’ conflict, heritage as a 
process of meaning-making influences how ideology is shaped and symbolised, which has a direct 
impact on causing and continuing conflict. The presentation of heritage as the manifestation of 
identity allows it to be used to unify or divide a society depending on who is in control of the cultural 
narrative (Kaldor, 2013; Sen, 2006); this can result in the re-hashing of history to emphasise a deep-
seated ethnic or cultural tension that may not have existed (Meskell, 2005; Sen, 2006; Todorova, 
1997). This argument echoes the arguments made in Chapter Three which also argue that the 
interpretation of heritage has a profound influence on identity. This argument is also particularly 
relevant to the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s, which were explained (and initially accepted by 
the international community and in Yugoslavia) as the explosion of ethnic hatred that had been 
simmering as blood feuds for centuries (Kaplan, 2001) and the subsequent rejection of this argument 
(Todorova, 1997). The artifice of this explanation was not exposed, but the result of this heritage 
discourse was brutal violent conflict. The targeting of built property in the Balkans is the physical 
manifestation of a conflict stained by the manipulation of heritage wherein sites, which had remained 
untouched and respected for centuries, became the epitome of ethnic difference, and targeted as such.  
The fourth objective moves beyond the impact of heritage in war, and looks at how the process of 
heritage alters in the post-conflict era, and discussed in Chapter Two and Four. This thesis argued 
that heritage is capable of surviving conflict, but also of being created from conflict. MacDonald 
(2009) suggests that narratives of dissonance are created from conflict and are attached to places 
previously without this connection (Meskell, 2005); this results in previously unknown places 
becoming synonymous with atrocity and violence (MacDonald, 2009). These places become the 
explicit sites of the heritage of war, whereas places considered as heritage before conflict are 
perceived by their populations as sites whose heritage envelope new conflicts. Ashworth and 
Tunbridge (1996) argue heritage sites that survive conflict have the conflict added to their historic 
tapestry as a way to minimise its effect on the grand narrative of history, as well as the effects on the 
cultural identities of its owners (Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996). The interpretation and inclusion 
(or exclusion) of conflict into existing heritage narratives is an explicit use of the Authorised 
Historical Discourse (Smith, 2006). The celebration or commemoration of dissonant experiences of 
conflicts at new sites fulfils two functions; it cements the ideological legitimacy of the survivors of 
conflict by acknowledging these events occurred, and moves the conflict away from the immediacy 
of the contemporary society by creating them as separate discourses of a wider historical event 
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(Meskell, 2010; Sen, 2006). For example, pre-conflict heritage sites, such as Dubrovnik and Mostar, 
focus on the timelessness of their cultural heritage, despite the cultural property being brutally 
demolished or damaged in conflict. The effect the conflict has on their pre-existing designation (from 
UNESCO and themselves) of heritage is minimised in favour of re-creating their pre-war pasts. In 
contrast, Srebrenica and Auschwitz-Birkenau are founded as new sites of dissonant heritage after 
conflict, giving previously unknown places an irreversible connection to murder, torture, and mass 
atrocity, as well as providing clear evidence that these events happened and cannot be erased 
(Macdonald, 2009).   
The first research question has been answered by these four objectives to conclude that heritage is a 
process of connecting people to places and their pasts, which has a direct impact on how conflict 
experiences are interpreted and reconciled in post-conflict societies. From this examination, several 
interdependent aspects of conflict, recovery, and heritage have become apparent; the physical 
damage to heritage, the economic value of heritage, and the socio-political influences of heritage 
over recovery.  
The aspects were formed into an integrated perspective which are explored in terms of the physicality 
of heritage in conflict, with particular emphasis on the limits of defining heritage as cultural property 
and the consequences this has for its damage and protection (Henckaerts, 1999; Kastenberg, 1997; 
O’Keefe, 2006; Starzmann, 2008); the relationship between conflict and economics, focusing on the 
role of heritage as an economic incentive for conflict and recovery (Kaldor 2013; Collier, 2000); and 
the connection between people and place, addressed through a socio-political interrogation of what 
heritage means in a post-conflict environment to its people, and how it influences that relationship 
(Ashworth and Tunbridge, 1996; Hall, 1999; Kaldor, 2013; Kaldor, 2006; Macdonald, 2009 Meskell, 
2010; Sen, 2006; Smith, 2006). The integrated perspective gained through this conceptual review 
culminated with the argument that heritage is capable of determining how effectively a society will 
move on from conflict by controlling how the conflict is interpreted, reconciled, and remembered. 
Furthermore, in order to gain an integrated and holistic understanding of the impact of heritage on 
post-war recovery, it must be assessed using these three aspects (physical, economic, and socio-
political).  
The argument generated by this thesis connects the concerns of heritage studies to those of post-war 
studies. This represents a valuable contribution to literature by attempting to widen the interpretation 
of heritage in conflict beyond cultural property, and in doing so gaining a greater insight into how 
heritage influences key aspects of recovery in post-conflict environments. 
10.2 Research Question Two: How can the impact of heritage on post-conflict 
recovery be assessed? 
In answer to this question, the thesis created the Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework (IHAF) 
as a methodological framework capable of assessing the impact of heritage upon recovery. This 
framework focused on the physical, economic, and socio-political aspects of recovery, which were 
considered the key aspects of heritage based on the findings from the first research question. In order 
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to construct this framework and address the second question, four objectives were created to guide 
the research; these objectives were explored fully in Chapter Five, and their conclusions discussed 
here.   
A key issue encountered by this research was reconciling the needs of heritage with those of conflict 
recovery. The conceptual answer to this issue was to interrogate how those needs crossed over and 
integrated, resulting in the answer to the first research question, which argued that heritage is capable 
of controlling the post-conflict narrative and of reconciling or exacerbating ideological differences. 
To evidence this relationship, key aspects of society that are damaged by conflict were identified; 
these were the impact of conflict on place, economy, and people. These areas lent themselves to the 
investigation of records of damage to built heritage, recovery of the tourism industry, and the socio-
political consequences of conflict on its population.  
The second objective sought to establish what assessment frameworks existed and how they could 
be used as a basis for heritage assessment. This was achieved through an examination of the most 
widely used tool in development studies and interventions, the DFID SCA framework (Barakat and 
Waldman, 2013; Goodhand, Vaux and Walker, 2002). The framework prioritised the need for 
contextually bound assessments, and focused on breaking down the area of assessment into 
constituent parts. From this foundation, the thesis identified three key aspects of heritage from the 
literature reviewed in Chapters Two to Four, and used these as the foundation for this assessment. 
Built heritage, the economy of heritage, and the socio-political aspects of heritage were all shown to 
have tremendous influence over post-conflict recovery, but only built heritage had been prioritised 
in post-conflict interventions, as evidenced by the many cultural property restoration projects such 
as Mostar Bridge. It was concluded that in order to analyse heritage (as defined in the previous 
research question) a mixture of qualitative and quantitative assessments would be required.  
The third objective sought to establish what methods would be capable of shaping the IHAF into a 
robust framework based on integrating the needs of both heritage and recovery. The IHAF has four 
main components; the contextual evaluation of conflict, the assessment of built heritage, the 
assessment of the economics of heritage, and the socio-political impact of heritage, as determined by 
the first research question and previous objectives. In order to cover these diverse research areas a 
mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods was used (Brannen, 2008; Tashakkor and Teddlie, 
2010). These methods resulted in the generation of photographic records of damage complete with 
geo-location information, statistical analysis of tourism statistics to establish financial value to 
heritage, and semi-structured interviews to gain an insight into the relationship between people and 
heritage in a post-conflict setting. The IHAF was held accountable to the feasibility guidance in 
fieldwork methodologies and helped to define the limits of the IHAF.  
10.2.1 Evaluation of the Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework 
The guiding principle of the IHAF was that it had to be a robust and repeatable methodological 
system that could be applied to the assessment of heritage after any conflict. This set a challenging 
goal for the framework as it aspired not only to create a new method of assessing heritage in conflict, 
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but also of using a previously unquantifiable definition of heritage as its foundation. The intricacies 
of heritage versus cultural property have been fully explored in this thesis, and will not be repeated 
here. It is mentioned however to emphasise that the definition of cultural heritage identified by this 
research has not been used in conflict recovery assessments before, making the IHAF and its trial in 
Dubrovnik unique, contributing valuable data to the debate on the role of heritage during and after 
war. However, the IHAF has areas that need careful consideration to mitigate possible weaknesses. 
These include access to data, data flooding, and contextually bound definitions. 
10.2.2 Limitations of the IHAF 
The IHAF relies on data collection, and is most effective when it can access complete records and 
high volumes of data, however this is not always possible after a conflict. In a perfect scenario the 
IHAF would allow a researcher to structure their research using complete records of physical 
damage, complete tourism statistics, and have access to a wide variety and large number of interview 
participants. The fact that these are not always available in their entirety is a fact of post-conflict 
societies and must be countered for. The IHAF counters this in several ways; first, the reliance on a 
single incomplete data set is mitigated by relying on the generation of three complementary data 
types to gain an integrated perspective on the impact of heritage on recovery. Scarcity of data in one 
area of study will be countered by data from the other constituent areas, but will remain a fundamental 
part of the research as it will give an indication of how that aspect recovered, or be conspicuous by 
its absence.  
Secondly, the IHAF is not a retrospective assessment and it is capable of carrying out long term 
assessments. If the data is not available at the start of the research, the IHAF can collect data in real 
time. For example, if interview participants are unwilling to cooperate with interviews initially due 
to unfamiliarity with the researcher, they may agree to be interviewed at a later date if the study is 
run on a long term basis. Equally, photographic records of restoration work can be carried out during 
said work, and tourism statistics can be measured going forward, creating a baseline and measuring 
changes in real-time rather than analysing past statistics. The IHAF relies on the quality of data it 
receives, but it is capable of mitigating this by aiming to collect a varied range of data rather than 
becoming a reliant on a single data stream.   
The amount of data can also cause a separate issue if there is a high volume of data collected. This 
issue became apparent in the trial run of the IHAF in Dubrovnik, where a great deal of data was 
collected, which resulted in the time consuming analyses of three large data sets. Although this is a 
positive issue as it has resulted in the thesis gaining a thorough insight into the impact of heritage on 
Dubrovnik, in future applications of the IHAF this problem could be anticipated by increasing the 
number of researchers in the team, enabling faster processing without compromising the volume of 
data collected.  
12.2.3 Benefits of the IHAF 
The flexibility of the IHAF to adapt to its context is undoubtedly a positive benefit of this 
methodology, but it also means that the generalisation of results cannot occur as each context is 
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different The definition of heritage and the IHAF structure can be used as they are in future research, 
but the results gained from Dubrovnik cannot be applied to other contexts. However, this enables the 
IHAF and its definitions to be used in many locations, and the results directly compared. This will 
give a wider appreciation for the impact of heritage in different contexts and conflicts, but it will 
resist universal assumptions into the generalised behaviour of heritage. Within this thesis this is 
considered to be a positive result as it provides more evidence to the diversity of heritage in different 
contexts and conflicts, but this may be considered a draw back by those seeking international policy 
applications from the assessment of heritage using fixed definitions of cultural property. 
The IHAF aimed to create a robust methodology, and this has been achieved through an in-depth 
interrogation of research methods and exploring other existing assessment tools. The mixed methods 
approach reflects the definition of heritage argued by this research; heritage is a dynamic process 
that engages many different areas of study, and mixed methodology is a varied approach capable of 
producing different data types. The analysis of the DFID SCA resulted in modelling the IHAF on an 
already well established SCA framework, and used this as the foundation to structure the IHAF. The 
analysis of the SCA resulted in the IHAF benefitting from a similar rigorous structure without 
compromising the definition of heritage, whilst the mixed methods approach allowed for a varied 
approach to data collection. A key strength of this framework is the visualisation of the methodology, 
which was created not only to clarify the process of the IHAF, but also to emphasise how it could be 
repeated. Each section of the IHAF is linked to a specific aim and methodology in order for the IHAF 
to be widely used in other contexts and future research.  
The flexibility built into the structure of the IHAF allows it to be changed according to the context 
in question. To this end, the first step in the IHAF is to analyse the context of the conflict, and in 
doing so uncover specific contextual issues. In the case of Dubrovnik, this required an analysis of 
the Balkan conflicts, how the Old Town of Dubrovnik was involved, and how culture played a large 
part in the conflict. The contextual analysis not only outlines what you wish to assess, but highlights 
the limits of the investigation (both temporal and geographical). The structure of the IHAF follows 
a logical structure, requiring data from three specific areas of investigation and details how these data 
sets can be collected, but remains flexible depending on the needs of the researcher and the data 
available.   
10.3 Research Question Three: What effect does heritage have on the recovery from 
conflict in the case study of Dubrovnik? 
This research question moved beyond the conceptualisation of heritage assessment in post conflict 
recovery, and carried out a trial run of the IHAF fieldwork in Dubrovnik. This assessment has taken 
place from Chapter Six, and culminates in the key findings in Chapter Nine. Each objective outlined 
in the introduction has been answered in order in Chapters Seven to Chapter Ten. In answer to this 
third research question an overview of the impact of heritage on Dubrovnik is given. The assessment 
concluded that cultural heritage in Dubrovnik was not a space where ethnic and cultural tensions can 
merely be observed: it is where they are caused and mitigated.  
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The conclusions drawn here are based on the six key findings from the case study, which are 
discussed fully in Chapter Nine. The first key finding argued that the changing interpretations of 
damage in the official UNESCO records influenced perceptions of the severity of the attack both 
locally and internationally, which had a direct impact on the ICTY prosecution proceedings. The 
second finding argued that a fixed narrative of the conflict is present in Dubrovnik that is publically 
(if not privately) endorsed by its residents, who rely on the economic stability of heritage. The third 
key finding argues that although the built heritage has been restored on a wide-scale to promote the 
perception that the town is completely recovered from conflict, individual narratives suggest that the 
conflict has not been reconciled on a socio-political level. The fourth key finding argues that religious 
buildings were restored as a separate category to non-religious buildings in an effort to prioritise their 
recovery. Key finding five argued that the reliance on tourism in the town threatened to damage the 
perception of heritage on which it relies, but that it was equally difficult not to rely on the saturated 
of tourism market. The final key finding argued that there is a distinct difference between the public 
perception of recovery endorsed by residents, and their private conceptions of heritage in 
contemporary Dubrovnik. It is argued that this has resulted in a disjuncture between real and pseudo 
reconciliation. 
These key findings combine to show that the historical context of Dubrovnik was a key factor in the 
cause of the conflict and the actions taken in the aftermath of war. The awareness of cultural ties and 
tensions remain constantly in the foreground of this study, which notes that the socio-political history 
that has shaped the geo-politics of the region has influenced and continues to influence the 
relationship between people, place, and history in Dubrovnik. The tumultuous history of the Balkans 
and its complex ethnic and cultural relationships have culminated not only in strengthening national 
cultural identities, but also in the defence and differentiation of these cultural identities from each 
another. The search for historical causes of the violence in Yugoslav wars is an immensely difficult 
endeavour, and well beyond the limits of this thesis. The historians who have done so have been 
faced with by a number of varying perspectives, interpretations and biases, and the knowledge that, 
while the high-level political causes of the war in the 1990s can be traced historically, the explosion 
of violence, ethnic hatred and genocide cannot be rationally explained nor can a consensus be 
reached. What is resoundingly clear is that culture had a huge influence over the area, and cultural 
identities and the heritage that supports them have had profound importance in the exacerbation or 
reduction of tensions in the area.  
10.3.1 Limitations of Dubrovnik Case Study 
Although this research sought to identify and minimise the impact of limiting factors at the earliest 
opportunity, some limitations remain. These were either barriers to carrying out the research such as 
funding and time restraints, or barriers to gathering data, such as lack of access to records or 
interviews. For further information on the feasibility of this fieldwork, please refer to Chapter Five: 
5.5 Testing the feasibility of the IHAF methodology. 
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The research was conducted under time restraints, which were at odds with the time necessary to 
recruit interview participants. The research was completed over a course of three fieldtrips to 
Dubrovnik. The sensitive nature of the qualitative aspects of this research (and, indeed, all research 
in post-war environments) meant that it was paramount that the interview participants were 
comfortable sharing their experiences of conflict with the researcher. As such, the participants of this 
research were approached directly and openly by the researcher and made aware of the extent of their 
participation. The participants were unwilling to initially participate in interviews as the researcher 
was not known to them; the return fieldtrips to Dubrovnik over three years built trust between the 
researcher and participants. Once trust had been established, the participants would recommend the 
researcher to other potential participants, which resulted in more interviews taking place.  
Some of the Dubrovnik residents did not want to participate formally in the research, and instead 
preferred to be interviewed off the record, which added an ethnographic element to this study. 
Although the time constraints of this research put pressure on this process, the interviews would not 
have taken place without building up the required trust. The fieldwork was completed over three 
consecutive years, with each fieldtrip lasting for up to four weeks. Although it would be efficient to 
complete the fieldwork in a single extended trip, financial constraints made this impossible, and it 
would not have resulted in the high quality data sets gained from multiple fieldtrips. The slow build-
up of data allowed the researcher to gain more time with interview participants, to survey a high 
volume of cultural property, and to gain access to high-level interview participants in local 
government. 
The interview participants made it explicitly clear to the researcher that they would only participate 
in face-to-face interviews. The participants characterised Dubrovnik as oral culture, and because of 
this it was difficult to gain participation in the research through email or via telephone. The researcher 
offered a translator to all research participants and potential participants, but none took up this offer. 
The participants in this research were happy to be interviewed for extended periods of time, and often 
one interview would lead to the recommendation of the researcher to another participant. Some 
residents were happy to speak to the researcher about conflict and heritage but would not agree to 
formal interviews, citing a wish not to record traumatic narratives. The interview schedule was 
hampered by the tendency of high-level participants (government and museum official) to cancel or 
rearrange interviews at short notice, which proved difficult to negotiate considering the limited time-
frames of fieldwork. Although all cancelled interviews took place, scheduling interviews prior to 
arrival in Dubrovnik proved inefficient. Most interviews with high-level participants were secured 
whilst the researcher was in Dubrovnik, at their convenience. 
There were also barriers to gaining access to economic data on the recovery of the BCH and on the 
visitor numbers. The data on the donations and funding of BCH was available publicly from IFRD 
on a number of damaged BCH properties, but they were unwilling to share more detailed data despite 
multiple requests. The same data proved difficult to locate from other sources (UNESCO and local 
government archives) and was met with a similar reception of unwillingness or unresponsiveness. 
However, the data taken from the IFRD was enough to show how over half of the buildings had 
207 
received funding since the conflict, and to allow the researcher to identify and discuss priorities, 
funding, and the overall reconstruction of the town. 
10.4 Applications of the IHAF 
The previous chapter outlined six key findings from the application of the IHAF to Dubrovnik, 
however, these findings can also be generalised to different contexts in order to assist in the creation 
of a comparative knowledge base on heritage and conflict recovery.  
The assessment of heritage recovery in Dubrovnik using the IHAF identified a number of findings 
which generated some patterns of recovery which can be generalised to other contexts based on 
historical assessments, and can be further explored though further testing of the IHAF in diverse 
conflict contexts.  
10.4.1 Physical Patterns: Prioritising authorised narratives through material heritage  
The assessment of material heritage in Dubrovnik both through desk-based investigation into the 
extent of damage and funding for recovery, and the contemporary survey of the same buildings in 
2012 drew to the conclusion that the order of recovery was not determined by the severity of damage, 
rather the priorities for recovery were set by available funding granted by donors. Consequently, the 
buildings that received the highest level of donor interest were repaired as a priority, and these tended 
to be religious buildings with a wide international community.  
This finding reveals a potential prioritisation bias which favours donorship over heritage need. 
Although this is in itself unsurprising, as heritage cannot be repaired without funding and there is a 
scarcity of national or international funding for heritage projects, the impact of this prioritisation bias 
and the emergence of religious groups as key donors to heritage reconstruction is a pattern worthy 
of tighter scrutiny. This is particularly valid when considering the authorised discourse associated to 
heritage, and the influence it has over the legitimisation of individual identities and a sense of 
belonging in a community. In the aftermath of conflict when heritage narratives are challenged by 
the events of conflict, the way a society prioritises the reconstruction of heritage is likely to be a 
factor in the ability to move beyond or back to violent conflict. When some aspects of heritage are 
prioritised beyond others through funding and donorship it is likely to be interpreted as a bias towards 
certain groups and a rejection of minority or othered heritage. In Dubrovnik, the prioritisation of 
religious heritage sites from Christian, Jewish, and Muslim international donors has resulted in the 
reconstruction of religious buildings across the town, and a strong religious connection to the old 
town from its residents. The reconstructed heritage may not be the reason for the strong cultural links, 
but the repaired religious heritage sites serve to reinforce and promote the importance of 
(predominantly Christian) religion to Dubrovnik residents and visitors. The comparison of donor 
priorities across an array of conflict contexts will serve to determine which aspects of heritage are 
likely to be recovered more quickly than others, and interrogate how the priorities of donors’ 
influence and impact on the construction of heritage messages and identities in post-conflict 
communities. This application of the IHAF will be particularly relevant to post-conflict environments 
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with ethnic or religious tensions, particularly those contexts who have experienced genocide with a 
large international diaspora or with religious connections.  
10.4.2 Economic Patterns: Public and private reactions to heritage destruction and recovery 
guided by financial flows at tourist intensive and non-intensive heritage sites 
The use of the IHAF in Dubrovnik found that the local community held a public and private view of 
the damage done to the city and the extent to which it has been recovered. These findings also 
suggested that an important factor in these perceptions were their reliance on the tourism trade in the 
town, which in turn relied on the city being presented as a peaceful cultural centre, not a conflict-
affected cultural centre. The perspective given through interviews was further supported by the 
economic profile of Dubrovnik, which revealed a high dependency on external tourism in order for 
the town to function effectively through hospitality industries of restaurants and hotels, as well as 
day visits from cruise passengers. The interviewees presented an unease between exploiting heritage 
for tourism where conflict had to be removed from public view, and a private view of heritage where 
resentment existed towards tourists who used the old town and a tension was expressed with the need 
to whitewash the conflict from the public narratives of the city.  
The economic profile of the city underlined how fundamental tourism is to the survival of the town 
and region, and identified how the conflict has been used (or hidden) to create a tourist friendly 
history. Previous chapters explored how responsibility and blame are driving factors in the need to 
relegate conflict to past generations to distance oneself from involvement; this research has shown 
that economic drivers are of equal importance when considering how a conflict is distanced from or 
included into a local heritage narrative, and how this narrative is performed and transmitted to a 
national and international tourism market.  
The inclusion of recent conflict in heritage sites is likely to differ between tourism intensive and non-
intensive site. Where tourism and heritage tourism is a key economic driver it is hypothesised that 
contested heritage narratives and conflict heritage is less likely to be included or acknowledged in 
heritage sites; whereas in areas with low tourist turnover, conflict heritage is likely to remain more 
overt, and it is less likely to be a source of income generation. This is particularly relevant to heritage 
in conflict zones where heritage is less accessible due to travel and safety restrictions to an 
international tourist industry. The IHAF is fully capable of carrying out heritages centred economic 
assessments, and mapping these against socio-political reactions to heritage gained from interviews 
and determining how prevalent tourism is in the area to assess whether the economics of heritage 
alters how a context recovers from conflict. This will also begin to inform the threat picture and how 
situation heritage-led intervention methods. It is likely that the results of these assessments across an 
economically diverse range of conflict affected regions and cultures will demonstrate varied response 
to the economics of heritage, and will encompass looking the value heritage has as a feature of the 
tourism industry and also as a moveable commodity in legitimate and illegitimate markets. This will 
enable the IHAF to expand into other areas of recover including security and law enforcement and 
the impact heritage has on criminal financial flows and the organisation or criminal groups. A key 
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case study for the development of this aspect of the IHAF is illegal archaeological digs in Afghanistan 
and the looting of the Baghdad National Museum in 2001. 
10.4.3 Socio-political Patterns: Cemented authorised narratives of recovery and the erasure 
of diverse narratives at contested heritage sites. 
Conceptually, heritage narratives have been shown to be employed to claim ownership of contested 
sites based on a degree of historical authority and inheritance. In conflict, this relationship intensifies 
to the degree where identities become more aligned to an authoritative narrative of history and where 
contested narratives present a threat to the legitimacy of claims of ownership and belonging. In 
Dubrovnik, this resulted in the post-war hegemonic reimagining of the old town as a place of 
uncontested Croatian heritage prior to the war and rebuilt to reflect this homogenous interpretation 
of heritage after the war through cemented narratives of conflict and recovery (as supported by the 
Dubrovnik Key Finding One in Chapter Nine). Beyond this contextually bound example, it is 
possible to see a similar pattern emerging within different contexts wherein diverse heritage identities 
prior to conflicts are reimagined into singular heritage narratives after conflicts, either through the 
cementing of authoritative narratives which remove contested pasts from history, or through violent 
suppression and erasure of cultures through genocide and heritage destruction.  
Religious fundamentalism lends itself to heritage erasure through conflict, wherein violent 
fundamentalism requires suppression to justify and position itself as the only authoritative culture in 
a particular geo-political space. In order to cement its authority, it needs not only to prevent contested 
narratives being expressed in a heritage site, but to prevent these narratives existing or to present 
them as culturally distant and oppositional. In the case of Dubrovnik, the religious hegemony of the 
old town allowed culturally diverse narratives to be buried in post-conflict narratives without extreme 
violence of overt heritage destruction. Instead, authoritative accounts of conflict and recovery were 
reinforced by prioritised heritage recovery funding for religious buildings and the creation of sites 
and museums celebrating a pre-conflict identity which separated Croatian (Dubrovnik) identities 
from their Slavic neighbours (as supported by Dubrovnik Key Finding six in Chapter Nine). At sites 
of conflict in Bosnia- notably Vukovar-, the same hegemonic result was achieved through cultural 
erasure using the methodologies of genocide, cultural genocide, and violent repression. Extrapolating 
patterns of cultural erasure and the formation of authorised heritage narratives is a key way in which 
the findings from Dubrovnik can be used to apply the IHAF to different contexts covering a diverse 
range of conflicts. This will be of particular use in assessing post-conflict heritage sites across the 
Balkans covering the long term use of heritage in both tourism intensive and non-intensive areas, 
which both Dubrovnik and Mostar are examples of, as well as dark tourism sites including Holocaust 
sites in Germany and Poland, and Genocide sites in Rwanda.  
This pattern will also yield a comparative assessment of conflict and heritage narratives from 
conflicts driven by religious fundamentalism, such as the previously discussed case study of Palmyra 
and the emerging details of how Daesh used religious and culturally based arguments to justify and 
encourage the Yazidi genocide and enslavement in Syria. By utilising the integrated perspective of 
the IHAF (and conceptualising heritage as a process of creating meaning and connecting people to 
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place), heritage erasure, exploitation, and destruction is recognised a key aspect of conflict, and 
enables the assessment of post-conflict heritage recovery to focus on the political and economic 
drivers of heritage narratives as well as damage done to material structures.   
10.4.4 Threat mapping and effective interventions 
From the key findings and associated thematic applications of the IHAF made in the previous chapter 
the value of pattern comparative studies across different conflict contexts is clear as it will aid the 
development of the IHAF itself, its theoretical underpinning, and enhance the knowledge base on the 
impact of heritage on conflict. But beyond these applications the IHAF is capable of using these 
findings to start to map similar heritage features of conflicts and start to make judgements on where 
threats can be anticipated and where effective interventions can be made. Although this aspiration is 
beyond the remit of a single research project, and will rely on rigorous testing and development of 
the IHAF as well as the generation of comparative assessments, it is strongly anticipated that the 
standardised structure of the assessments generated from the IHAF approach will enable a cross-
context analysis to take place, and facilitate the identification of trends, patterns, commonalities, and 
atypical uses of heritage in and after conflict.   
10.5 Areas of Further Research 
The limits of this thesis have been noted in both the evaluation of the IHAF, and its trial in the field 
in Dubrovnik. As noted, it would be beneficial to make some considerations to the IHAF based on 
its successful use in Dubrovnik, but there are also other avenues of investigation that this research 
could explore. These include incorporating the responsibilities of the military into the conceptual 
framework of the IHAF, and the use of the IHAF in different contexts.  
12.5.1 Comparative Studies 
The IHAF has proved to be successful, and the Dubrovnik project produced quantifiable and 
replicable results that allowed the researcher to detail the impact that heritage has on post-war 
recovery processes. The key findings have been discussed, and perhaps the most critical lesson is 
that heritage is actively constructed and used to direct recovery, it is not a passive receiver of damage, 
and its role is both beneficial and divisive at the same time. As the IHAF has been successfully 
trialled in Dubrovnik, it would be beneficial to replicate this study in other locations and conflicts. 
As this thesis has argued, the use of heritage in conflict is a frequent characteristic of war, and it is 
an unfortunate fact that there is an abundance of modern and historic conflicts that have utilised 
heritage. There are many possible case studies which could benefit from the IHAF, and these include 
(but are not limited to): assessing the impact of mural artworks in Northern Ireland, the impact of 
heritage on over twenty years of recovery in Počitelj, Bosnia; the recovery of Vukovar in Croatia; 
the historic analysis of Dresden in Germany and Coventry in the UK; the use and influence of 
heritage in civil disputes in Egypt; and the future possibility of assessing the impact of heritage on 
conflict and recovery in Libya and Syria (particularly in Aleppo and Palmyra).    
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12.5.2 Military Responsibilities in Conflict 
The conceptual chapters of this thesis sought to link heritage and conflict literature through the 
integration of key concerns of both fields. Further areas of study to investigate would be to explore 
the military responsibilities to protect heritage, and to interrogate why these are (or are not) 
successful. This would involve looking more closely at the 1999 Second Protocol of the Hague 
Convention and understanding what contemporary pressures are put on militaries within active 
conflict. Possible case studies for this examination would be the looting of the Iraq National Museum 
in Baghdad following the US invasion of Iraq, and the occupation of cultural heritage sites in Iraq 
by US military forces, and the antiquities black market in Afghanistan and its trafficking routes to 
Europe (Breitkopf, 2007; Emberling and Hanson, 2008; Gibson, 2008; MacGinty, 2004; Rothfield, 
2009; P. Stone, 2013). 
10.6 Review of IHAF 
The implications of this research and the successful testing of the IHAF go beyond the results gained 
in Dubrovnik. This investigation into cultural heritage in a post-conflict context has added 
substantially to the understanding of these concepts, and in particular explored how heritage can be 
conceptualised, how heritage can and is used for political gain, and the impact heritage has on the 
performance of reconciliation in the fragile aftermath of conflict. These three facets are discussed in 
this section in regard to extrapolating the findings of this case study to future and further research in 
this area.  
10.6.1 Cultural Heritage, Not Cultural Property 
From the outset of this research the use of terminology around heritage has been fraught with 
difficulties. The problems with implementing initiatives using a complex and fluid definition of 
heritage led to the breaking up of the term into constituent parts: cultural property is one such 
compartmentalised term and is preferred and relied on by the legislators (as discussed in Chapter 
Two), as well as subsequent academic focus of post-war recovery studies and practitioners of post-
war recovery in the field (as discussed in Chapters Four). The compartmentalisation of the term 
allowed the intangible connections of culture to be replaced with the universal term of “cultural 
property” or BCH. Although the benefit of using this definition is clear as it allows us to understand 
heritage as a physical and thus a solid object, it lessens the importance of the connection between 
people, place, and the past, as well as allowing the assumption to permeate that physical heritage is 
objective and cannot be manipulated. This research has shown that BCH is open to political 
manipulation on a global scale, and the manipulation is made all the more insidious and successful 
as it is performed in a context that assumes that its manipulation is unlikely (if not impossible). 
10.6.2 Politicisation of Heritage 
By aligning this research with contemporary heritage theories which suggest heritage is constantly 
created through a process of negotiation between people and place (see Chapter Three), this research 
has shown that heritage in and after conflict is a highly politicised tool that can be used to delegitimise 
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or legitimise the conflict as history. In the lexicon of conflict, heritage can be a tool or a weapon in 
recovery depending on how it is acknowledged and used.  
In Dubrovnik, this issue arose as the exclusion of dissonant narratives and experiences of war that 
delegitimise the Dubrovnik myth of the siege which characterised the Old Town as the victim. This 
biased history is an oft noticed facet of conflict, but emerged here not only in relation to creating an 
acceptable past, but also in creating a commodified past. This presents a collaboration between re-
creating an acceptable past via recovery processes, and a tourism industry based on that past to sell 
heritage to an international audience, both for profit and to have this past legitimised. The conflict 
functioned in Dubrovnik as an opportunity to re-create the past and to ensure the survival of heritage 
as an economic and cultural driver for sustained livelihoods.  
10.6.3 Performances of Reconciliation through Heritage 
A major application of this research is the performances of reconciliation mediated by heritage. In 
Dubrovnik, the residents and the tourist industry have created the performance of reconciliation that 
belies the supressed underlying tensions between the actors (both Yugoslav and Dubrovnik) during 
the conflict and their place in society and history. The pressures to restore heritage as a major 
economic driver in the Old Town led to the need to restore it with speed. Similarly, the reliance on 
BCH to attract visitors and engender an atmosphere of peace necessitated the swift (and not 
altogether transparent) recovery of the physical structures. Conversely, although the local population 
needed to live and work in the Old Town, using heritage as a major factor in their livelihoods, there 
remain some lingering tensions and anxieties over the conflict. 
This research noted that the use of heritage as a tool for reconciliation was not interrogated during 
the reconstruction of Dubrovnik, subsequently the need for reconciliation was not recognised once 
the physical presence of BCH had been restored. The result of this is that the physically and 
economically recovered town effectively imprisons an unresolved socio-political tension, as to 
reconcile this third factor could threaten the physical and economic stability of the area. As discussed 
in this thesis, the cracks in this façade are apparent when talking to local individuals and in the 
museums that seek not only to remember the conflict, but to remember that they were the victims of 
violence. This is not reconciliation; it is the cementing of a victimised post-war identity that 
highlights cultural difference instead of cultural similarity with its international neighbours – 
something that has occurred many times in the history of the region. The application here is that if 
heritage is not considered in each of the areas outlined, the performances of recovery will become 
considered as absolute and the anxieties of the local population dismissed, which may culminate in 
unstable international relationships, decreased security, and the re-emergence of violent conflict. 
10.7 Using Cultural Heritage as a Tool in Post-war Recovery   
The Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework (IHAF) was designed and successfully tested by 
this research, with the goal of becoming a robust and reliable framework capable of assessing heritage 
in different conflicts. The application of the IHAF in other conflict settings could occur, and the 
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results could generate in-depth case studies, structured in the same way as with Dubrovnik, for a 
multitude of given conflicts. Multiple case studies could begin to create a record of how heritage 
impacts on post-conflict communities, and the way heritage is perceived before, during, and after 
conflict could be profoundly changed. This research project demonstrated that the impact of heritage 
on recovery is far more influential than can be understood by analysing how many cultural properties 
were damaged. Understanding heritage as a process of creating meaning in post-conflict narratives 
draws attention to its role as the negotiator of peace or violence, and to place a low priority on heritage 
recovery risks misunderstanding conflict and mishandling possible intervention strategies.  
This thesis has gone beyond investigating the problem with defining heritage in post-conflict, and 
created an integrated perspective on heritage and conflict studies in order to bridge this conceptual 
gap. This has added to the literature surrounding this topic, and has contributed a different perspective 
to the debate on the role and responsibilities of heritage in post-conflict recovery. The research 
investigated how heritage might be used as a tool for post-conflict recovery, and in doing so designed 
a transferable method of assessing heritage through the IHAF. This integrated framework has been 
designed and tested by this research, resulting in unique data from Dubrovnik that challenges the 
long held assumptions of the town and its heritage. The success of the IHAF design and subsequent 
implementation has the potential to assist with a better understanding the role of heritage in conflict, 
which could have a major impact on how heritage is perceived and used to the benefit of post-conflict 
societies.  
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Abbreviations 
 
AHD authorised heritage discourse 
BCH built cultural heritage 
BCHRA Built cultural heritage recovery assessment 
CBS Croatian Bureau of Statistics 
DFID Department for International Development 
ICH Intangible cultural heritage 
IHAF Integrated Heritage Assessment Framework 
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
IFRD Institute For the Reconstruction of Dubrovnik 
JNA Y[J]ugoslavian National Army 
OUV Outstanding Universal Value 
PCCH Post-conflict cultural heritage 
UN United Nations 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation 
WB World Bank 
WHC World Heritage Convention 
WHS World Heritage Site 
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